Armed Forces Journal International, March 1987, pages 46-47

by C.E. Myers, Jr.

An unducted-fan "Mud Fighter"

The Army's proposed budgets for Fiscal Years 1988-1989 include $799-million for research and development money for a new light helicopter experimental (LHX) and $573-million for a new Forward Area Air Defense System (FAADS), which wags call "Son of DIVAD." That $1.4-billion is just a down payment on two still relatively undefined systems that the Army estimates will eventually cost $50- to $60-billion. In addition, the Army last fall solicited proposals for a separate, new helicopter-or fixed-wing aircraft-optimized for anti-helicopter air-to-air combat, the Advanced Counter-Air Fighter Aircraft (ACAF) system. (That's a role skeptics say LHX's scout/attack version can't fill because of the relatively low speed the Army has specified for it.) Instead of spending $50- to $80-billion on these three systems, the Army and Congress should look at a new option: the "Mud Fighter," a single system that could perform most missions of all three at one-fourth the cost of LHX, FAADS, and ACAF.

The turbulence, agony, and expenditures associated with the Army's effort to provide airborne fire support for and air defense of its maneuver forces suggests one or all of the following possibilities:

. The problem is mysterious;

. The problem is new and unique;

. In-hand technology is lacking;

. There is no operational experience base; and/or

. Options to solve the problems are bureaucratically constrained.

Tactical air power is supposedly an effective source of timely firepower augmentation for maneuver forces-at least it has been on some occasions. Once upon a time, the same pilots and aircraft simultaneously provided fire support and counter-air. An example was the Army Air Corps' barrier to German Army attacks against General Patton's right flank as he raced through France.

In today's DoD language, the pilots of those P-47s and P-51s were performing close air support (CAS), battlefield air interdiction (BAI), and counter-air in direct support of an important ground action. Then, as now, CAS and BAI were coordinated with the ground commander's scheme of maneuver. The difference between CAS and BAI was and is the doctrinal and commonsense requirement for a forward air controller (FAC) to clear pilots to release ordnance or fire their guns in close proximity to friendly troops or vehicles. The FAC was and is usually a pilot serving a tour as an air liaison officer with ground forces. This effective arrangement is the product of the insight and tactical understanding of two pragmatic generals, namely Omar Bradley and Elwood "Pete" Quesada.

Today, all three missions could be performed by organic Army aviation units. Further, there is evidence that they could be performed more effectively in 1995 than in the past and for one-third the cost of the Army's proposed LHX and FAADS.

Since the Key West Agreement of 1948, there have been more studies of how to provide ground forces effective air support and forward area air defense than there have been studies of how to distribute wealth equitably through income tax reform-and with equally dismal results. Some insight into the mission need may be gained by asking an Army or marine corps infantry company commander what he wants and his order of preference for fire support.

It is no longer a sign of obsolescence to display a propeller, especially if it is called an unducted fan.

He will say: (1) he wants it when he asks for it, and he doesn't want it when he hasn't asked for it; (2) he wants it where he wants it; (3) he wants it to kill or suppress the enemy; and (4) he does not want it to injure his troops. His order of preference for fire support, according to a panel of about 15 combat veterans, is:

(1) Organic (from his own resources), (2) Artillery, (3) Naval gunfire, and (4) Aviation: organic (armed helicopters) OJ: remote (tactical air's "fast movers").

How does he feel about air defense for his infantry forces? First, his experience of being attacked by airplanes has been limited to being bombed and strafed by "friendly" air forces (not as uncommon as one might expect). Generally, the damage done by bombing and strafing against his troops was not heavy, particularly if they were dug in. Attacks against his vehicles were much more serious. He would prefer not to be attacked by any aircraft, although he recognizes that other ground forces seem to endure air attacks and fight successfully in spite of them. He suggests that, compared to enemy artillery and armor, air attacks aren't so bad. He says he needs all the firepower he can get and would not, if given a choice, trade ground combat power and supplies for specialized air defense systems which include men who eat, drink

water, and bleed, but contribute little in a fight. He'd prefer not to be harassed by either air force, but recognizes that he may have to endure attacks with or without the presence of dedicated air defense hardware.

How do tactical fighter pilots feel about air defense of forward-deployed ground forces? There is a consensus which states that the most, important characteristic of an air defense system is the degree to which it is proliferated. For instance, the 11,000 small-caliber guns of a Soviet motorized rifle division are seen as a much more worrisome threat than the 16 sparsely distributed quad 23mm radar-directed, self-propelled air defense systems. This view should have some influence on the Army regarding air defense for maneuver forces.

Pilots of attack aircraft, polled as to which air defense element is the most threatening, replied: enemy fighter/interceptors. Their reasons for concern included the potential omnipresence of that threat and enemy fighter persistence once contact is made.

When dealing with ground-based air defenses, attack pilots can dictate their exposure duration; this is not the case with enemy fighters, which are unlikely to disengage until they are low on fuel or interrupted by opposing fighters.

The Air Force's existing A-10 force, which will evaporate before the year 2000, constitutes the best close air support capability in the world (in spite of the fact that the airplane is three times larger than it should be and exhibits sluggish combat maneuvering performance). The legacy of the A-10 program is:

* A cadre of pilots who appreciate the ground commander's environment and problems and are good at their trade;

* A highly reliable anti-armor gun; and

* A hundred million rounds of depleted uranium 30mm ammunition which, in live-fire tests flown by A-10 pilots, has killed hundreds of combat-configured tanks.

The challenge for DoD leadership is to channel this legacy into a form which can be fully exploited for support of Army ground maneuver forces. Many tactical air advocates cling to the hope that USAF will eventually recognize the importance of the CAS mission and create a dedicated airplane to replace the A-10. But, contrary to rhetoric, USAF financial and force plans portray a declining interest in direct support of ground combat forces. Air Force historical and doctrinal interests have, since 1945, been heavily oriented to nuclear strike and conventional bombing, a "win the war from the air" doctrine which has emphasized all-weather nuclear strike, airfield attack, and deep interdiction.

Meanwhile, the Army is performing close air support with a large force of attack helicopters. Unfortunately, because of constraints which evolved from the 1948 Key West Agreement, or DoD "pie cutting," the Army has been constrained from using optimal aircraft and has referred to the activity as "aerial fire support." Officers who experimented with armed helicopters at Ft. Rucker, AL, in 1958 were doing the best they could in response to the need for "organic," mobile fire support. If they had been offered a thousand A-1 Skyraiders, they would have enthusiastically extracted the most from them and may have created a base force of appropriate CAS aircraft.

Now the Army is struggling to cope with an emerging air-to-air threat in the terrain flight environment (between the mud and 300 feet). The need for a low-altitude, battlefield air-to-air capability evolves from visions of encounters with enemy helicopters and fighter aircraft. The Army perspective rightfully includes the need to cope with enemy combat helicopters and other aircraft which may interfere with air and ground maneuver operations. Given likely budgets, it may be impractical to equip all divisions with sufficient firepower and air defense assets to cope with peak battle requirements.

An attractive alternative would be a system which can be time-shared as needs shift across an Army corps sector.

One analysis of battle requirements, coupled with a preliminary design exercise, yields an organic Terrain Environment Counter-Air and Anti-Armor System (TECAAS) which provides an affordable and cost-effective, single-pilot aircraft to exploit the potential of air-mobile and ground maneuver forces. Studies suggest the following mission-essential criteria, with priority given to the anti-armor task:

. Pilot expertise and dedication to the mission;

. Communication and understanding between pilots and troops;

. Basing that maximizes connectivity and minimizes C2 burden;

. Tactics that minimize susceptibility to IR/radar air defenses;

. Aircraft size that minimizes detection and PH (probability of hit) from barrage fire;

. Aircraft propulsion configuration that minimizes IR signature;

. Extraordinary agility (high thrust-to-weight ratio, low wing-loading, high roll rate);

. Good slow-speed maneuver and flying qualities (100 kts);

. Aircraft that can sustain combat maneuver without loss of energy;

. Aircraft with quick re-attack capability;

. Maximum speed (400 kts) to provide rapid transit to battle area;

. Excellent cockpit visibility (forward, side, aft, down);

. Minimum vulnerability to small arms (7.62mm through 14.5 mm);

. Cockpit armor (forward/below and side);

. Pilot escape for nap-of-earth flight;

. Good crash survivability for pilot;

. Battle damage repairable structure;

. System fully supportable from forward located grass fields;

. Aircraft footprint compatible with grass field operations;

. Take-off and landing distance less than 1,000 ft;

. Weapons employment that do not inhibit employment of best tactics;

. Weapons effective at eyeball target identification range;

. Acceptable weapons impact pattern (no gross errors);

. Anti-armor weapons with war-relevant inventory;

. Weapons with proven anti-tank kill capability ;

. Weapon cost low enough to permit liberal use in training;

. Squadron-size units moveable in 5-ton trucks;

. System cost low enough to buy large inventories (including combat replacements)

An initial conceptual design exercise for an aircraft weapon mix which could satisfy the mission-essential criteria for TECAAS compared the following options: helicopter, tilt-rotor, fixed-wing turbojet, and fixed-wing turboprop. Vectored thrust (ala AV-8) was eliminated in early screening due to cost, fuel consumption, and vulnerability.

The fixed-wing configurations showed advantages in ability to shift attacks from one location to another because of high cruise speed (350 + kts), forward-base maintainability, reliability, aero-agility, lifecycle cost, IR signature, vulnerability to small-caliber guns, offensive air combat maneuver and kill, initial and proficiency training burden, pilot escape, peacetime flying safety, and rapid worldwide deployment. The virtues of helicopters and tiltrotors were: take-off and landing distance, slow-speed flight capability for night attack, and the pop-up and look tactic for scouting.

Among fixed-wing options, the turboprop (particularly with modem propeller technology) dominated by a wide margin because of advantages in low fuel consumption, which translates into increased mission time and/or reduced logistics burden, acceleration, deceleration, rate of climb, take-off and landing distance, and air combat capability against helicopters compared to turbofanjet and turbojet aircraft.

Industrial designers came to the same conclusions during the 1966 A-X pre-design exercise. These results were, however, dismissed by Air Force decree. A lot has happened in the propulsion area during the past 20 years. It is no longer a sign of obsolescence to display a propeller, especially if it is called an unducted fan, which Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, and Airbus Industries hail as the engine of the 1990s.

TECAAS would evolve as a very small (under 8,000-lb gross take-off weight), modem, unducted-fan, fixed-wing, single-seat aircraft constructed around a reduced size version of the GAU-8 30mm anti-armor cannon. It would benefit from the inventory of ammunition purchased for the A-10. Modern turboprop and materials technologies could combine with an existing weapon to yield Mud Fighters which, in the hands of dedicated pilots who live and fight in the terrain environment, could defeat anything on the future battlefield, including the most advanced tanks. Mud Fighter performance and lethality, in the hands of experts, would be more than a match for any imagined helicopter or jet fighter flown by pilots foolish enough to challenge such aviators in the battlefield terrain flight environment. Costing less than $4-million each, the Army could field a war-relevant force of thousands-with a back-up force of equal depth to be held in a war reserve, three-day-storage status. For less than the projected cost of LHX, FAADS, and ACAF, the Army could have it all: Mud Fighters, appropriate light helicopters, and proliferated air defense weapons.

The potential to simultaneously reduce out-year budget requirements while substantially improving the conventional warfighting capability of ground forces warrants a DoD-sponsored industrial design exercise followed by competitive prototyping and concept evaluation. The amount recently allocated just for LHX, an unproven and not fully defined concept, would be more than enough to fund a TECAAS exercise, including construction and testing of competitive prototypes. Why is it so easy? Because it does not challenge technology. It is a case of utilizing in-hand technology to create a very simple flying machine which exploits a well-proven weapon in a form that is easily employed by high school graduates.

There is a precedent: the last time we put a lot of points on the board, in 1944, we coupled off-the-shelf technology with off-the-shelf people flying P-47s and P-51s to support Army maneuver forces.

Chuck Myers is a former U.S. Army Air Corps and U.S. Navy pilot and test pilot and former Director of Air Warfare in the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. He flew combat in the Fifth Air Force in World War II and with Air Group Seven in Korea and then tested and evaluated most of the nation's fighter/attack airplanes and helicopters in the late '50s. He is the President of Aerocounsel, Inc., a consulting firm he describes as a "mini-think-tank".