U.S. Army Transformation War College Report praises Air-Mech-Strike (AMS) and Breaking the Phalanx (BTP)

"The more things change, the more they stay the same"

--Old American Proverb


How the establishment views us reforming radicals...Chapter 6 page 159.....



James W. Shufelt, Jr.

Challenged by the last decades dynamic strategic environment and a wide range of potential future threats, the U.S. Army has embarked on a journey to transform itself into a force of greater relevance. The creation of the first redesigned units and the selection of an Interim Armored Vehicle for procurement have established the momentum to begin, as well as sustain, the process of change.1 This transformation will ultimately alter the Armys basic combat organization and increase its strategic responsiveness, while still maintaining its critical characteristics of decisive and dominant force. The purpose of this chapter is not to recommend fundamental changes to a transformation process that has already started, nor to attack the logic behind the decision to change. Indeed, the need for change is an imperative and the basic route is appropriate. Rather, this chapter will look at the lessons learned that drove the decision to change, review the transformation process, examine alternative transformation designs to identify potential concepts useful for improving the current transformation process, and recommend appropriate adjustments to that process. Envisioned as a 30-year process, this evolution will be especially difficult because the Army must still execute its current commitments, while undergoing transformation. An additional challenge is the fact that the Objective Forces operational concepts, tactical organization designs, and core combat vehicle, the Future Combat System, do not currently exist. These key pieces will have to be the products of hands-on experimentation, the application of current and future lessons-learned analyses, and the incorporation of


research and development efforts conducted during the initial years of the transformation process.2 There are a number of models for the transformation of the U.S. Army, ranging from incremental modernization of its current combat systems and fighting organizations to radical revision of the Armys basic systems, units, and methods of fighting. By selecting a path that provides focused near-term fixes to documented deficiencies in order to free up resources to support a more radical transformation of the future force, the Army has rejected its previous path of gradual modernization, as well as more sweeping and immediate changes proposed by others. While the Army has consciously refused alternate reorganization models, such as those presented by Colonel Douglas Macgregor in Breaking the Phalanx and retired Brigadier General David Grange's team in Air-Mech Strike, these controversial proposals include a number of concepts that could improve the Army's strategic responsiveness. Incorporation of an Army-wide rotating unit readiness structure, increased use of reserve components for existing long-term operational requirements, adjustments in unit stationing, and tactical mobility enhancements for light forces could all help improve the Armys near-term strategic responsiveness. The positive impact of other ongoing Army actions, such as improvements in manning critical units, the development of a consolidated operational rotation plan, and the creation of additional rapid-response capabilities, would further enhance the value of these initiatives.


The need to transform the Army from its current structure lies in its experiences since the end of the Cold War. In the challenges of the past decade, the Army succeeded despite the limitations of its available tools, light and heavy forces with Cold War structures. The conundrum that it confronts today is simple in its clarity and profound


in its operational implications. The Transformation Campaign Plan explains:

. . . todays Army force structure and supporting systems were designed for a different era and enemy. The Army's superb heavy forces are unequalled in their ability to gain and hold terrain in the most intense, direct fire combat imaginable and once deployed are the most decisive element in major theater wars. The current heavy forces lack strategic responsiveness and deployability. They also have a large logistical footprint and have significant support requirements. On the other hand, the Armys current light forces can strike quickly but lack survivability, lethality and tactical mobility once inserted. The result is a near-term capabilities gap that the Army must address as a matter of the utmost urgency.3

Operational Lessons Learned.

Operation JUST CAUSE, the U.S military's successful operation in 1989 to overthrow Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega's regime, demonstrated the strengths and weaknesses of the Army's Cold War force structure. JUST CAUSE's success would seem to suggest a model for decisive, simultaneous distributed operations. Such a judgement, however, obscures the fact that the operation was the product of a deliberate planning process and months of preparation, including in-country rehearsals and pre-positioning of selected heavy equipment. Moreover, U.S. forces fought against a generally inept foe, who possessed neither will nor ideological commitment. A key fact was that most of the Army's force structure was too heavy to operate on Panama's primitive roads. As a result, the mechanized elements in this operation possessed some of the lightest and oldest equipment in the Army's inventory: M113A1 Armored Personnel Carriers and M551A1 Sheridan Airborne Armored Reconnaissance Vehicles.4

Similarly, the success of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM obscured the high risks incurred in the initial force deployments and the limited utility of


American light forces during the Allied offensive against the Iraqi Army in February 1991. The rapid deployment of the 82nd Airborne Division may have had considerable deterrence value, but the division possessed limited ability to stop an Iraqi attack of Saudi Arabia. Once force deployments were complete, offensive operations by the Allies conventional heavy forces proved decisive. However, the U.S. Army's light forces in the theater had less utility due to their limited tactical mobility during fast-paced offensive operations. They thus received a secondary mission on the western flank of the main operation. While military operations in Somalia from 1992 to 1994 were significantly different from DESERT STORM, both in mission objectives and deployment, these operations demonstrated that there is a role for heavy forces in peace operations. Moreover, it underlined that rapid deployment of such forces is critical, if peace operations lead to conventional combat. Similarly, military operations in Haiti demonstrated that, while existing American conventional heavy force equipment may be too cumbersome for potential third world venues, the coercive effect of their presence can make them useful in some situations.5

Peacekeeping operations in Bosnia further illuminated deployability weaknesses in the Armys structure. Current heavy equipment and constrained deployment infrastructures, exacerbated by the challenges of conventional forces executing peacekeeping operations, presented major difficulties to U.S. forces in the Balkans. While the initial movement to Bosnia received considerable publicity, problems with the use of Army heavy equipment for a variety of missions received less attention. Eventually, the Army had to issue additional wheeled tactical vehicles to the deployed heavy and light units in order for them to perform their missions better. The provision of lighter-weight vehicles allowed heavy units to minimize the road-damaging movement of M1 Abrams tanks and M2/M3


Bradley Fighting Vehicles and helped improve the tactical mobility of resource-poor light units. The most recent deployment, the provision of U.S. forces to Kosovo in 2000, confronted similar difficulties. The deployment, training, and employment problems of Task Force Hawk, the Army's AH-64 Apache and Multiple Launched Rocket System task force, have received much attention. The initial operations of Task Force Falcon, the U.S. component of the Kosovo Force, provide an even better example of the Army's limited strategic responsiveness. Major infrastructure limitations, coupled with political decisions not to preposition significant U.S. forces and equipment in Macedonia in anticipation of possible operations in Kosovo, resulted in a hastily assembled task force as the initial American component of the Kosovo Force. Comprised of selected Task Force Hawk components, a marine corps Infantry Battalion Landing Team, an Airborne infantry battalion from the United States, and command and control elements from the U.S. Army, Europe's First Infantry Division, Task Force Falcon achieved its missions, but at some initial tactical risk due to its hasty assembly.6

Future Operational Requirements.

As tumultuous as the last decade has been, the future is likely to see the Army's continued involvement in similar operational missions. Faced with a multi-polar and complex environment, the United States will confront challenges from a number of regional competitors. Adaptive and evolving adversaries will recognize weaknesses and constraints in U.S. capabilities and adjust their methods to develop and leverage short-term advantages against the American vulnerabilities. The Army's roadmap for its change process, the Transformation Campaign Plan, sums up the threat in this fashion: The adaptive and unpredictable nature of the envisioned future adversary mandates that the Army have a rapid,


decisive capability to respond across the full spectrum of operations. The Armys current capabilities with regard to the envisioned operational environment clearly indicates that there is a near-term strategic capabilities gap which impacts on the ability to provide the NCA [National Command Authority] and CINCs [Commanders in Chief] the full range of landpower options necessary to operate in this dynamic security environment.7

Chief of Staff of the Army General Eric Shinseki and Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera further defined the need for change in terms of the broad spectrum of potential missions and the need for dominance throughout the spectrum of war:

The spectrum of likely operations describes a need for land force in joint, combined, and multinational formations for a variety of missions extending from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to peacekeeping and peacemaking to major theater wars, including conflicts involving the potential use of weapons of mass destruction. The Army will be responsive and dominant at every point on that spectrum. We will provide to the Nation an array of deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable and sustainable formations, which are affordable and capable of reversing the conditions of human suffering rapidly and resolving conflicts decisively. The Armys deployment is the surest sign of America's commitment to accomplishing any mission that occurs on land.8

The Armys experiences over the past decade and challenges of the future underline the need to transform the Army to correct past deficiencies and meet its current and anticipated future requirements more effectively.


According to General Shinseki, transformation is the process of changing the Army into a force capable of dominating at every point on the spectrum of operations. The Army's Transformation Strategy will result in an Objective Force that is more responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable than the


present force.9 Other key requirements for this force are the ability to deploy a combat-capable brigade globally in 96 hours, have a division on the ground in 120 hours, and deploy five divisions in theater within 30 days.10 The transformation process supports changing the Army into the Objective Force, while simultaneously keeping its current forces trained and ready to meet national requirements at all times.11 The Army's Transformation Strategy, captured in the Transformation Campaign Plan, tracks the evolution of the three forces that will comprise the Army during transformation: the Legacy Force, the Interim Force, and the Objective Force.

The Three Components of the Transforming Force.

The Legacy Force consists of the current heavy and light forces. The Army must continue to support and enhance these forces to maintain its combat capabilities as the transformation process evolves. Continued sustainment and modernization of the Legacy Force, along with recapitalization of selected Legacy Force equipment, such as the Abrams tank, is critical, as the Legacy Force . . . will continue to guarantee our nonnegotiable contract with the American people, to fight and win the nations wars, for a decade or more. The trained and ready Legacy Force maintains the credible deterrent that will cause our adversaries to hesitate before challenging American interests. It keeps open the current window of opportunity to transform The Army. Its readiness is indispensable to that enterprise.12 The Interim Force will provide an improved capability to meet current and future requirements for worldwide operational deployments. The Interim Force will consist of six to eight converted heavy and light brigades, depending on funding, restructured into Interim Brigade Combat Teams equipped with off-the-shelf Interim Armored Vehicles that are significantly lighter and therefore more strategically deployable than current armored vehicles. The first Interim Brigade Combat Team, stationed at Fort


Lewis, Washington, will provide the Army with an immediate, enhanced capability for strategic deployment. Exercises and tests will validate the organizational and operational model for the Interim Force.13 The original Army plan was to commence Interim Armored Vehicle procurement in 2001 and conduct operational demonstration of the first Interim Brigade Combat team in 2002. However, acquisition and production challenges have delayed the first operational demonstration until the 2003-2004 timeframe.14

The Interim Brigade Combat Team will be an infantry-heavy organization possessing improved tactical mobility and a robust dismounted assault capability. Three motorized infantry battalions, equipped with Interim Armored Vehicles, will form the brigades primary maneuver elements. Each infantry battalion will include three combined-arms infantry company teams. The brigade will also include a reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition squadron, as well as an organic antitank company, artillery battalion, engineer company, signal company, military intelligence company, and brigade support battalion. The Interim Brigade Combat Team possesses a design that will allow its rapid expansion, based on mission requirements, through the addition of similar forces, or by augmentation by forces not common to the brigade, such as military police or air defense.15

State of Army Transformation.

A dedicated research and development effort over the next decade will aim at satisfying of the required capabilities of this enhanced force: improved responsiveness, agility, versatility, deployability, lethality, survivability, and sustainability. Legacy Force units will convert directly to the Objective Force design, constructed around the capabilities of its primary combat system, the Future Combat System, followed by conversion of the Interim Force which possesses the Interim Armored


Vehicle. The current plan sees this conversion as a 15 to 20 year process, ending in approximately 2030. Strategic Responsiveness. Improved strategic responsiveness is the critical requirement for the Interim Force and the Objective Force, as this characteristic will address the key shortcoming of the Legacy Force. The June 2000 Draft of Army Field Manual (FM) 3-50, Decisive Force, explains that: Strategic responsiveness is the ability to establish or reinforce credible force, when and where required by the joint forces commander (JFC), to maintain peace, deter conflict, or win war. Army forces meet the goal of strategic responsiveness they are trained and ready to respond globally with decisive forces capable of executing prompt and sustained operations that span the full spectrum of military operations. The United States Army is the worlds premier land force. Retaining this superiority, however, requires the Army to be strategically responsive. The Army has to move with a greater velocity and sustained lethality to continue its role as the guarantor of victory. The Army must have the capability to maneuver operationally from strategic distances as part of a joint force to provide the joint force commander (JFC) the capability for early and continuous application of interdiction and maneuver. 16

Key components in this definition are credible force, the appropriate force needed to accomplish the mission, and the inclusion of a range of potential missions that includes maintain peace, deter conflict, or win war. The definition thus underlines the full-spectrum aspect of the mission. In other words, strategic responsiveness does not mean just the ability to deploy a small, light force for a peacekeeping operation. It must include deployment of a large, heavy force necessary to win a major theater war. This definition highlights the current challenge facing the Army with respect to strategic responsivenessthe need to deploy large forces more quickly with greater lethalityand further reinforces the need to transform the Army.


The Attributes of a Strategically Responsive Force.

The Command and General Staff Colleges Student Text 3-0 Operations (October 2000) discusses seven attributes that strategically responsive forces must possess: responsiveness, deployability, agility, versatility, lethality, survivability, and sustainability.17 These attributes are presently driving programmatic and operational requirements for the redesign of the Army and the accompanying force redesign and doctrinal development processes.

The essence of responsiveness is the ability to deploy the right Army forces, to the right place, at the right time. The combination of forward deployed units, forward positioned capabilities, peacetime military engagement, and force projection can provide the needed capabilities for responsiveness today and in the future. Training, planning, and preparation for deployment, to include individual preparation, equipment readiness, and frequent practice of alert and deployment plans and procedures, must also influence responsiveness.18

Deployability is a holistic attribute that combines the characteristics of a unit and its equipment with the physical characteristics of deployment support facilities, plans, and transportation modes.19 For now and the foreseeable future, Army ground units possess no inherent capability for strategic deployment transportation of Army personnel and equipment depends on airlift, or sealift provided by other services or commercial sources. The capabilities of deployment support facilities and intermediate staging bases, if required, further define force deployability. While the Army can request acquisition of additional strategic airlift and sealift assets and can recommend improvements to strategic deployment support facilities, action in this realm lies within the purview of the other services and often loses out in annual budget struggles. As a result, the simplest way the Army can improve its strategic deployability is to redesign and re-equip its units to enhance


their inherent deployability, preposition heavy equipment in the vicinity of likely areas of conflict, and base selected units within or in close proximity to potential areas of conflict.

Agility is a tenet of Army operations as well as an attribute of a responsive force. A responsive, agile, force is sustainable and possesses sufficiently tactical mobility to accomplish the mission. However, limitations on strategic lift currently compel commanders to balance competing mission requirements and develop compromise solutions. Agile commanders and units are capable of transitioning between types of operations without loss of momentum. Agility is the product of tough, realistic training in dynamic environments.20

Versatility is also a tenet of Army operations. This attribute accounts for the requirement for Army forces to conduct full spectrum operations with forces appropriately tailored for accomplishment of the specific mission. Versatility also requires that Army force packages are capable of reorganizing and adapting based on changing missions. Versatility requires that commanders carefully tailor and sequence forces during deployment, while ensuring the presence of necessary command and control, combat, combat support, and combat service support assets to accomplish assigned missions.21

Army forces combine the elements of combat power to maximize lethality against the enemy. Commanders must insure deployed Army forces have sufficient combat power to overwhelm potential adversaries. Commanders must also balance the ability to mass the effects of lethal combat systems against the requirement to deploy, support, and sustain the units that employ these systems.22 Survivability combines technology and methods of providing maximum protection to Army forces. Survivability can be a function of lethality; lethal forces destroy the enemy before he can strike and can retaliate, if necessary. Deploying


commanders must integrate sufficient force protection assets to ensure mission accomplishment.23 The generation and sustainment of combat power is fundamental to strategic responsiveness. Commanders must reconcile the competing requirements to accomplish assigned missions immediately, while also deploying adequate sustainment for extended operations. Commanders must tailor force packages to provide adequate combat service support, while utilizing every option to reduce the footprint of these forces.24


There are two major force designs that this chapter will consider that could provide alternatives to the Armys current plan for transformation: Colonel Douglas Macgregor's Phalanx and Brigadier General David Grange's Air-Mech-Strike Force. These two force designs were selected because the former initiated intense public debate over the Armys future force structure, while the latter appeared after the Army had determined its path for transformation.

Macgregor's Phalanx.

Written by a professional Soldier during his year as a Military Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Colonel Macgregor's Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century has inspired intense debates on the redesign of the Army.25 His analysis of the role of landpower in joint operations and resulting recommendations for Army reorganization were immediately controversial, both in scope and the response they inspired. Macgregor argued that the Army needed to evolve due to changes in the strategic environment, as well as the necessity of leveraging the technology of the information revolution better and integrating itself more closely with joint operations. He recommended reorganizing the Army into mobile combat groups. These groups,


designed for rapid and decisive action, would then be task-organized, based on the situation, under the command and control of corps headquarters designated as a Joint Task Force Headquarters.

Basing his recommendations on historical analysis of the decisive role of landpower in combat and the difficulty of achieving revolutionary changes in peacetime organizations, Macgregor identified the Armys most pressing requirement as the . . . need to emphasize qualitative improvements to compensate for reduced numbers of Army ground forces and the need for adaptable warfighting structures that can fill a wide range of mission requirements. 26 Combining this argument with a historical trend toward smaller, more mobile, integrated all arms combat formations, Macgregor recommended the formation of four types of 4,000-5,000-man combat groups: heavy combat groups, airborne-air assault groups, heavy reconnaissance-strike groups, and light reconnaissance strike groups.27 All combat groups would be self-contained, all-arms, self-supporting organizations, commanded by brigadier generals.28 Macgregor further recommended the formation of additional functional groups to provide operational level support: general support groups, engineer support groups, rocket artillery groups, theater high altitude air defense groups, air defense groups, aviation strike groups, aviation support groups, and command, control, communication, computers, and intelligence (C4I) groups.29 Under his concept, the entire Army, to include reserve components, would reorganize into a group-based structure.

The most controversial aspect of Macgregor's recommendation was the elimination of the division command and control echelon, in favor of corps-level joint task force headquarters, that would directly command assigned groups.30 He argued that such an approach would allow force tailoring without the removal of assigned forces or headquarters from divisions, as occurs today, which often leaves a division incapable of executing other operational


missions.31 He further argued that this organization would prove more capable of rapidly executing operations based on Joint Intelligence, due to its elimination of a redundant echelon of command, the division headquarters.32 Macgregor also argued that his reorganization would inherently better prepare the Army for commitment, as it would also facilitate a tiered system of rotating readiness. According to his argument, the combat groups would rotate through three 6-months long operational readiness cycles in peacetime, enabling one-third of the combat groups in the Continental United States (CONUS) to be available for worldwide deployment at any time.33

Macgregor also recommended changes to other aspects of the force. He proposed minor adjustments in current overseas stationing plans, specifically reducing forces in Europe and Korea, while increasing forces permanently stationed in the Middle East. He argued that such minor changes would actually increase the overall size and number of contingency forces available for commitment to wartime theaters.34 He further advocated the co-evolution of doctrine with organizational change and incorporation of new technology, as well as more rigorous and dynamic training programs.35

Macgregor concluded that the entire national defense establishment demands transformation. He especially argued for eliminating redundant service capabilities and unjustified new weapons systems.36 He stressed the importance of revolutionary change for the U.S. Army. In order to deter future aggression, where the strategic stakes justify the risks, the United States must be willing and able to respond vigorously with ground forces.37 However, he noted, attempts to graft large-scale technological change onto old thinking and old structures can only be a temporary expedient; new capabilities demand their own organizations and operational culture.38 Macgregor's book inspired immediate and vigorous response from many critics. The most common argument


challenged his elimination of the divisional echelon of command. Critics argued that its elimination would create potential span of control problems. One critic stressed the low probability of getting support for this recommendation from senior leaders who are well aware of the divisions proven flexibility and staying power.39 As anticipated, many critics focused on the unpopularity of specific changes for their service or branch, but most concurred with his argument for the need to think innovatively both on the battlefield and in redesigning the Army.40

Despite these criticisms, there are many attractive features to Macgregor's proposals. His small, self-contained combat groups possess inherent responsiveness and deployability, especially in comparison to current heavy divisions. The all-arms nature of his groups would enhance their agility and versatility, and the modularity of their design would provide even greater versatility to the Joint Task Force Commander, who could construct his ground forces based on a menu of available groups. The combat groups would provide varying lethality and allow force selection commensurate with potential threat. Survivability and sustainability of these organizations would be inherent in their self-contained, self-supporting design.

Grange's Air-Mech-Strike Force.

Air-Mech-Strike Force, co-authored in 2000 by retired Brigadier General David Grange, retired Brigadier General Huba Wass De Czege, Lieutenant Colonel Richard D. Liebert (Army Reserve), Major Charles A. Jarnot (Active Army), and Mike Sparks (Army National Guard), offers another innovative force design.41 Its line of argument recommended conversion of Army divisions into organizations more strategically deployable and tactically mobile than current forces. Organizational redesign and incorporation of light mechanized equipment and commercial all-terrain vehicles would increase strategic


and tactical mobility. According to the authors, the Air-Mech-Strike concept, provides a flexible, land combat force with the capability of air, mechanized, and dismounted maneuver to achieve decisive action through positional advantage regardless of open or restricted terrain.42

The key component of this concept would be the fielding of medium-weight tracked infantry carriers (modified M113 Armored Personnel Carriers nicknamed Gavin fighting vehicles), the M8 Armored Gun System, lightweight tracked reconnaissance vehicles (modified 4-ton German Wiesel vehicles nicknamed Ridgway fighting vehicles), and commercial all terrain vehicles. The key feature of the Gavin fighting vehicle would be the ability of CH-47F Medium Lift Helicopters to transport it. The Ridgway fighting vehicles and all terrain vehicles would be transportable on commercial cargo aircraft, U.S. Air Force (USAF) strategic and tactical transport aircraft, as well as the Army's CH-47 and UH-60 helicopters.43

Under the Air-Mech-Strike concept, all heavy brigades would consist of a Ridgway fighting vehicle and all terrain vehicle-equipped reconnaissance troop, a Gavin fighting vehicle mechanized infantry battalion, an M2 Bradley fighting vehicle mechanized infantry battalion, and an M1 Abrams tank battalion. This combination of organizations would allow three-dimensional maneuver within a brigade combat team, while retaining a significant direct fire combat capability. Light brigades would improve their tactical mobility by converting one infantry battalion per brigade to a Gavin fighting vehicle mechanized infantry battalion organization and equipping the remaining two infantry battalions with Ridgway fighting vehicles and all terrain vehicles.

The vigorous exploitation of the restructured forces third dimension of maneuver, the rapid air movement of light mechanized forces, forms the key element of the Air-Mech-Strike operational concept. This new capability to


strike enemy forces at unexpected times and locations and conduct simultaneous attacks throughout the depth of the battlefield, the authors claim, would facilitate the rapid and decisive defeat of the enemy.44

By converting all active Army forces in accordance with this concept, every type of Army division could execute the Air-Mech-Strike operational concept. In this design, the most significant enhancements would occur in the Armys light, Airborne and Air Assault divisions due to significant increases in their tactical mobility, survivability, and lethality.

While the conversion of the Army to the Air-Mech-Strike design would theoretically improve strategic responsiveness, at least in terms of its strategic deployability, the operational impact of conversion is currently unknown. An Army converted to the design presented in Air-Mech-Strike appears to be more agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable than its predecessor. However, the operational concept of three-dimensional warfare presented by the authors of Air-Mech-Strike remains unproven, and the logic of immediately changing the organization of the entire Army based on an unproven operational concept is questionable.45

Improving the tactical mobility of light infantry units through the acquisition of light mechanized vehicles and all terrain vehicles does deserve study and hands-on experimentation. Moreover, analysis and experimentation with the Air-Mech-Strike operational concepts may provide significant insights into concepts applicable to the Objective Force and could help define required capabilities for the Future Combat System.


The Army, under General Shinsekis leadership, is already taking steps to improve its strategic responsiveness. The formation of the first redesigned Brigade Combat Teams at Fort Lewis, Washington,


development of the organizational design and operational concept for the Interim Brigade Combat Team, and the selection of an Interim Armored Vehicle for procurement are important measures to improve strategic responsiveness. Recognizing the complexity of the process of change, the Army has developed and implemented a Transformation Campaign Plan, a methodology for managing a 30 year change process. Two actions the Chief of Staff of the Armys unit manning initiatives and the development of a consolidated unit operational rotation planunderline the initiation of this process. They are already improving strategic readiness.

The Chief of Staff of the Army's Unit Manning Initiative.

The Chief of Staff of the Armys unit manning initiative, announced in November 1999, improves the manning of the Armys primary war-fighting organizations: its active duty divisions and armored cavalry regiments. Unlike traditional tiered manning schemes where only a selected set of high priority units were fully manned, General Shinseki directed the manning of active duty divisions and armored cavalry regiments at 100 percent of their authorized grades and skill levels. Achieving this objective will occur in several phases. During Fiscal Year 2000, the Army goal was to fill the ten active component divisions and the armored cavalry regiments to 100 percent of their aggregate personnel authorizations. The next step, targeted for second quarter of Fiscal Year 2001, is to fill the active divisions and armored cavalry regiments to 100 percent of authorizations by skill within three grade bands: E1-E4 (junior enlisted Soldiers), E5-E6 (junior noncommissioned officers), and E7-E9 (senior noncommissioned officers). This simple directive has significantly improved the responsiveness of all divisions and armored cavalry regiments by ensuring they have adequate personnel to accomplish peacetime and wartime tasks. Nevertheless, this initiative is painful to both the institutional army and


corps-level and higher units, who have suffered reduced manning as a result of the initiative. Continued implementation of the manning initiative will focus on improved manning of other critical units, such as corps-level field artillery and logistics support units.46 Implementation of a Consolidated Operational Rotation Plan.

The development of a consolidated operational rotation plan has also had a positive impact on the Armys strategic responsiveness, as it provides greater predictability and shares the burden of standing operational requirements throughout service components. The plan includes existing operational rotations through June 2005. It identifies specific divisions and corps responsible for providing units and headquarters for unit rotation to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Kosovo Force, the observer force in the Sinai, and Operation INTRINSIC ACTION in Southwest Asia. The stabilization force rotation, in particular, is unique in its direct incorporation of National Guard units and headquarters. The implementation of this plan facilitates improved strategic responsiveness by providing advance notice of deployments to units, thus improving unit stability and supporting focused training. This plan also establishes a precedent for expanded use of National Guard units to perform other standing operational requirements, thus freeing up active duty units for other missions.47 USAREUR's Immediate Ready Force.

A new initiative that has directly improved the strategic responsiveness of the force has been the creation of additional rapid-response capabilities such as U.S. Army Europe's (USAREUR) Immediate Ready Force. This force is a battalion-sized force consisting of a heavy company team equipped with Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles, a medium-weight mechanized infantry company equipped with M113A3 armored personnel carriers, and


scout, engineer, military police and communication platoons, designed for deployment in 24 to 48 hours from notification. The responsibility for providing the Immediate Ready Force rotates every 6 months among USAREURs four heavy maneuver brigades. The force is tailorable, based on the mission, and thus provides the USAREUR Commander with a range of force options in a quick-reaction scenario. The most likely employment of the Immediate Ready Force is in conjunction with commitment of the Southern European Task Force (SETAF), the U.S. Airborne infantry brigade combat team, based in Italy. The inclusion of a non-standard M113A3-equipped mechanized infantry company leverages the in-theater availability of Air Force C-130 airlift and creates a unique, medium-weight mechanized capability in Europe. Deployment of the Immediate Ready Forces heavy team would require allocation of USAF C-17s or C5As, strategic airlift aircraft based in the United States, due the weight of the Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles.48


Although the Army has already made the basic decision on the path it will follow for transformation, alternative and more radical transformation designs such as Macgregor's Phalanx and the Air-Mech Strike Concept include features that could improve the Army's current and future readiness. Features that deserve study for inclusion in the present plan for transformation could include an Army-wide rotating unit readiness system, increased use of reserve units for long-term operational requirements, adjustments in unit stationing, and tactical mobility enhancements for light forces.

An Army-Wide Rotating Unit Readiness System.

As discussed earlier, the execution of a centralized Army operational deployment plan would have positive impact on


the Armys strategic responsiveness, as it would reduce active unit commitments, provide increased training predictability, and directly improve stability and training. The continued use of centralized scheduling for operational deployments, in coordination with the centrally managed rotating unit readiness system urged by Macgregor, could have an even greater impact by improving the Armys overall strategic responsiveness.

An Army-wide rotational unit readiness plan using existing active duty organizations could parallel rotational readiness systems currently utilized by every other branch of military service.49 Macgregor bases his rotational plan on his combat groups. A similar rotating readiness plan for the Army today would depend on divisions, since current brigades are neither self-contained, nor self-supporting organizations. Analysis of the forces in today's Army indicates that the active army possesses a total of 35 light Infantry or heavy brigade-size units, ten division headquarters, and four corps headquarters. Six of these brigades are not available because of other commitments, such as general strategic commitments (the 75th Ranger Regiment), ceremonial duty (the 3rd Infantry Regimentthe Old Guard), operational missions in Korea (one heavy brigade and one light brigade), and the ongoing Interim Brigade Combat Team conversions at Fort Lewis (one heavy brigade and one light brigade). Similarly, one division headquarters (the 2d Infantry Division) is unavailable due to its operational missions in Korea and one corps headquarters (I Corps) is unavailable due to reduced manning authorizations. This leaves a total of 29 brigades (15 heavy brigades, 12 light brigades, 1 armored cavalry regiment, and 1 light armored cavalry regiment), nine division headquarters (five heavy divisions and four light divisions), and three corps headquarters available for incorporation in the rotating force readiness system. Macgregor proposed an 18-months readiness cycle, starting with a 6-months training cycle, followed by a 6-months ready cycle, followed by a 6-months reconstitution


cycle. During the training cycle, units would conduct collective training, to include a Combat Training Center rotation, while higher headquarters would conduct a simulation exercise, all in direct preparation for transition to the highest readiness cycle, the ready cycle. During this second cycle, units would maintain their individual and collective training proficiency and serve as the Armys primary designated crisis response forces. After 6 months of duty in the ready cycle, units would then move to the reconstitution cycle, where they conduct individual replacement, education, leave, changes of command, and other necessary actions prior to starting the training cycle once again.

This model of rotating readiness is applicable to the pool of available units in several different fashions. Based on the available number of units, the Army could have a corps headquarters, three division headquarters, and a combination of nine light infantry and heavy brigades in each cycle. The simplest rotational system would be to use existing unit assignments and corps structures as much as possible (see Table 1). For example, if III Corps were the training cycle corps headquarters, it could command the 4th Infantry, 1st Cavalry, and 25th Infantry Division headquarters and combat brigades from all three divisions, augmented with brigades from the 101st Air Assault and 82nd Airborne Divisions. Similarly, if the U.S. Army, Europes V Corps were the ready cycle corps headquarters, the ready corps could consist of the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), 1st Armored Division, and 10th Mountain Division headquarters and combat brigades currently assigned to the divisions, along with the 187th Airborne Brigade, which would provide forced entry capability. Forces in the reconstitution cycle would be the XVIIIth Airborne Corps Headquarters, 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized), 82nd Airborne, and 101st Air Assault Division Headquarters, heavy brigades from the 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions (Mechanized), the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, and light brigades from the 82nd


Airborne and 101st Air Assault Divisions. The greatest difficulties with such a pattern of readiness would be that it would maximize the demand for local training resources within a narrow band in time and rigidly perpetuate current relationships without using the potential capabilities of a broad pool of available units.


Organization/Cycle Training Cycle Ready Cycle Reconstitution Cycle

Corps Headquarters III Corps V Corps XVIII Abn Corps
Division Headquarters 4th ID(M) 1st ID(M) 3d ID(M)
Division Headquarters 1st Cav 1st AD 82d Abn Div
Division Headquarters 25th ID(L) 10th Mtn Div 101st AA Div
Heavy Brigade 1/4th ID 1/1st ID 1/3d ID
Heavy Brigade 2/4th ID 2/1st ID 2/3d ID
Heavy Brigade 1/1st Cav 3/1st ID 3/3d ID
Heavy Brigade 2/1st Cav 1/1st AD 3/4th ID
Heavy Brigade 3/1st Cav 2/1st AD 3d ACR
Light Brigade 1/25th ID 1/10th MD 1/82d Abn
Light Brigade 2/25th ID 2/10th MD 2/82d Abn
Light Brigade 3/101AA 3/10th MD 1/101 AA
Light Brigade 3/82d Abn 187th Abn 2/101AA

Note: This leaves 2 Brigades unassigned plus 2 converting to IBCT

Table 1. Readiness Cycles with Traditional Unit Alignments.

An alternative example of unit readiness rotations might spread brigades in a division across the various readiness cycles, thus minimizing competition for training resources and supporting training priority rotation schemes already followed internally in most divisions, at least in those divisions stationed in the United States (see Table 2). While this rotational readiness scheme would be theoretically more efficient in utilization of available training resources than one based on traditional unit relationships, the complexity of command and control and


Organization/Cycle Training Cycle Ready Cycle Reconstitution Cycle

Corps Headquarters III Corps V Corps XVIII Abn Corps

Division Headquarters 4th ID(M) 1st ID(M) 3rd ID(M)
Division Headquarters 101st AA Div 10th Mtn Div 82nd Abn Div
Division Headquarters 25th ID 1st Cav 1st AD
Heavy Brigade 1/4th ID 2/4th ID 3/4th ID
Heavy Brigade 2/1st ID 1/1st ID 3/1st ID
Heavy Brigade 3/3d ID 2/3rd ID 1/3d ID
Heavy Brigade 1/1st Cav 2/1st Cav 3/1st Cav
Heavy Brigade 3d ACR 1/1st AD 2/1st AD
Light Brigade 1/25th ID 2/25th ID 1/82d Abn
Light Brigade 2/82d Abn 3/82d Abn 2/101st AA
Light Brigade 1/101st AA 3/101st AA 187th Abn
Light Brigade 2/10th Mtn 1/10th Mtn 3/10th MD

Note: This leaves 2 Brigades unassigned plus 2 converting to IBCT

Table 2. Readiness Cycles with Nontraditional Unit Alignments.

support relationships would limit its utility. Such a readiness scheme could only work if the Army were to restructure brigades to be more independent, self-contained organizations, and if division and corps headquarters were more generic in capability. This alternative would provide enhanced efficiency, as well as the benefits of the improved unit and headquarters self-sufficiency and modularity advantages worth considering in the transformation of the forceespecially with respect to improving the strategic responsiveness of the legacy forces over the next 30 years.

Improving Light Force Tactical Mobility.

Macgregor's and Grange's proposals also address the question of improving the tactical mobility of light forces. In Macgregor's model, light forces are multi-purpose forces, capable of Airborne or Air-Assault forced entry. Once committed, Macgregor sees Army helicopters as the primary provider of light unit mobility on the battlefield. The Air-Mech-Strike concept improves light unit tactical mobility by fielding additional light mechanized and wheeled vehicles to all light infantry units. While light units selected for conversion to the Interim Brigade Combat Team design will also have increased tactical mobility with the Interim Armored Vehicle, current plans fail to provide legacy force light-infantry units not converted with enhancements to their tactical mobility. This deficiency demands further study and experimentation; the Air-Mech-Strike concept proposes several methods to improve light infantry tactical mobility.

Increased Utilization of Reserve Component Units.

Both Macgregor and Grange note that the conversion of reserve units is a more complex issue than that of active duty units for political and operational reasons. The increased use of reserve component units to perform long-term deployment requirements could further reduce the burden on over-taxed active units and would offer direct


as well as indirect benefits to the reserves. By performing long-notice operational missions, reserve component units could demonstrate their contribution to the maintenance of national defense. Performing such deployments, which feature adequate time for member notification and individual and unit preparation, would demonstrate the strengths of the reserve component with minimal degradation to mission performance. The Texas National Guards 49th Armored Divisions recent mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina has already demonstrated this ability. Increased use of reserve component units to perform other long-term operational requirements, such as the Kosovo and multinational observer missions, would further reduce active duty unit operational deployment requirements and allow active duty units to focus on training and preparation for no-notice deployments, a major improvement in the army's strategic responsiveness. Nevertheless, such increased use of reserve forces carries with it the heightened difficulty of attracting and maintaining Soldiers in reserve units.

Adjusting Unit Stationing.

Minor stationing adjustments could also contribute to improved strategic responsiveness. While further reductions in Army components in Europe and Korea may be difficult because of treaty obligations, such actions would increase the size of contingency forces in the United States. Furthermore, the permanent stationing of a heavy brigade in the Middle East, as Macgregor recommends, has great strategic utility. A permanent force would provide increased deterrence with its increase in combat power compared to current rotating forces. Moreover, the removal of the Intrinsic Action unit operational deployment requirement would eliminate turbulence created by current rotation cycles. Conversion of at least one Europe-based heavy brigade to the Interim Armored Vehicle-equipped Interim Brigade Combat Team design is also worthy of consideration. A forward-stationed Interim Brigade


Combat Team would then be immediately available for use in the European Commands area of responsibility, further reducing strategic lift requirements.

IBCT Conversion Decisions.

The Army should also consider creating a floating prepositioned set of Interim Brigade Combat Team equipment. While it is difficult to predict where a crisis will occur and the Army cannot afford multiple sets of Interim Brigade Combat Team equipment scattered across the world, the creation of even a single floating Interim Brigade Combat Team equipment set would improve strategic responsiveness. Deployment of a floating set to likely areas of conflict would signal U.S. intentions, as well as facilitate rapid deployment of an Interim Brigade Combat Team. The greatest value of a floating Interim Brigade Combat Team, however, would lie in a situation where the Army has to deploy multiple brigades. In a future Balkan crisis, for example, the combination of a self-deploying Europe-based Interim Brigade Combat Team, a floating Interim Brigade Combat Team set linked with personnel airlifted to Europe, coupled with deployment of a third Interim Brigade Combat Team by USAF strategic airlift, would enable the rapid arrival and commitment of a division-size force, perhaps even within General Shinsekis 120-hour deployment goal for a division.

Consideration of the issues involved in the stationing of Interim Brigade Combat Teams, prepositioned equipment, and the role of Reserve Components has direct impact on fielding/conversion decisions. Table 3 presents a conversion and stationing recommendation, based on issues and recommendations previously discussed. The first two Interim Brigade Combat Team conversions reflect the ongoing conversion of two brigades at Fort Lewis.50 This chapter does not recommend any changes to these conversions due to the adverse impact that changes to the current conversion schedule would have on overall


momentum of transformation. The selection of an East Coast-based brigade for the third brigade for conversion would result in a pool of three CONUS-based Interim Brigade Combat Teams. This would facilitate a rotational readiness plan incorporating the three Interim Brigade Combat Teams and utilize strategic deployment platforms on both U.S. coasts. Creation of the fourth Interim Brigade Combat Team from a European-based brigade would create an improved capability for strategic responsiveness within that theater and would support the constant availability of an Interim battalion-size ready force in Europe. Finally, the use of the fifth set of equipment to create an floating set of prepositioned equipment would provide a capability to preposition equipment in the proximity of a likely theater of employment and provide the nations leaders with an additional tool for deterrence, while supporting rapid strategic deployment of forces by a variety of means.


IBCT #1: Heavy Brigade, Fort Lewis, WA
IBCT #2: Light Brigade, Fort Lewis, WA
IBCT #3: Light Brigade, Fort Drum, NY
IBCT #4: Heavy Brigade, Europe
IBCT #5: Prepositioned equipment set, floating
IBCT #6: Light Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Polk (if funded)
IBCT #7: Light Brigade, Fort Drum, NY (if funded)
IBCT #8: Air Assault Brigade, Fort Campbell, KY
or prepositioned equipment set, floating (if funded)

Table 3. Proposed IBCT Conversions and Locations.

If congressional funding supports conversion of additional Interim Brigade Combat Teams, conversion of the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment to a structure similar to that of the Interim Brigade Combat Team would provide additional flexibility due to its ability to execute economy-of-force missions and the inherent self supportability of its component Armored Cavalry Squadrons. Conversion of an additional brigade at Fort Drum would create the first division composed of Interim Brigade Combat Teams and provide an ideal opportunity for experimentation with such an organization, as well as further expanding the readiness pool of available CONUS-based Interim Brigade Combat Teams. Selecting an air assault brigade from the 101st Air Assault Division at Fort Campbell for the next conversion would support experimentation within a different type of division (air assault) and further expand the Interim Brigade Combat Team readiness pool. As an alternative, creation of an additional floating set of equipment would allow the positioning of floating sets of equipment in two potential areas of conflict, or the staging of two floating Interim Brigade Combat Team sets in a single potential area of conflict, further improving strategic responsiveness. This recommendation does not include the conversion of any reserve component brigades to the Interim Brigade Combat Team structure, as such a move would not appreciably improve Army responsiveness. Until the deployment readiness of a converted reserve component brigade changes to match that of any active component Interim Brigade Combat Team in the pool of available brigades, diversion of Interim Brigade Combat Team equipment to the reserves does little to improve overall responsiveness. Reserve component units would find better use during Armys transformation by performing long lead-time operational requirements such as stabilization force and Kosovo Force rotations and providing temporary augmentation, when Joint Strategic Capabilities


Plan-apportioned forces are unavailable due to ongoing conversion to the Interim Brigade Combat Team design.


The Armys transformation process has the potential to correct short-term deficiencies and will fundamentally change the Army in the long term. This process, guided by the Transformation Campaign Plan, must be dynamic, reflecting funding realities, experimental results, ongoing lessons learned, and emerging joint warfighting concepts. In addition, the process must address all components of the Army to ensure that improvements in overall strategic responsiveness occur throughout the service, not just in the Interim Force or the Active Component. Although not addressed in this chapter, evolving training and doctrinal issues caused by Army transformation are not trivial. The Army will have to wrestle with the employment of various combinations of forces and changing conflict scenarios, and these issues must also play a role in transformation. As this chapter suggests, there are a number of options the Army should consider in improving its strategic responsiveness. While the exact plan selected for transformation is not as radical as some alternatives, such as Macgregor's Phalanx and Grange's Air-Mech-Strike concepts, the Army Transformation Campaign Plan does allow the Army to move forward in a process that will simultaneously address short-term responsiveness deficiencies and lead to better determination of how the Army will fight in the future. The selected path also appears to have sufficient flexibility to allow incorporation of selected components from alternate transformation proposals. For example, a rotational readiness scheme that incorporates centralized management of operational requirements and increased utilization of the reserve components offers the potential to improve the entire forces strategic readiness. Decisions about Interim Brigade Combat Team conversion and the creation of a floating


Interim Brigade Combat Team equipment set could also have a positive impact on force readiness. Regardless of which decisions the Armys leadership renders, execution of Army Transformation is a necessity. Accomplishment of any step of the processeven the creation of only a single Interim Brigade Combat Teamwill significantly improve the Armys current strategic responsiveness.

Improving the Armys future strategic responsiveness is a greater challenge, due to the difficulties involved in accurately predicting future threats and the clear requirement for ever more tightly linked and integrated joint operations. Because future joint warfighting concepts are still emerging at the same time the Armys legacy systems drift into obsolescence, the Army confronts a conundrumforce modernization decisions must occur in the near termperhaps even before joint warfighting concepts develop sufficiently to provide guidance for force modernization decisions. The greatest value the Armys Objective Force concept could provide is its potential role in forcing the rapid resolution and detailed definition of future joint warfighting concepts and requirements. The danger of proceeding with Objective Force development without a better view of the future joint fight is that the Army could potentially develop the wrong Objective Force, perfectly fitting Army requirements, while not meshing well with future joint warfighting concepts.


1. James Dubik, ICBT at Fort Lewis, Military Review, September-October 2000, pp. 17-23; Steven Lee Myers, Armys Armored Vehicles are Already Behind Schedule, New York Times, November 18, 2000, p. A-10.

2. In January 2001, the Armys Training and Doctrine Command issued a briefing slide package and a paper that presented the Foundations of Transformation and the current version of The Objective Force Concept. These two documents discuss future joint operational requirements, present objective force key operational concepts derived from future joint requirements, and present an initial


set of required capabilities for the Objective Force. The required capabilities list is, however, still general and provides limited detail on the future forces specific organizations, equipment, and operating characteristics. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, The Foundations of Army Transformation and the Objective Force Concept, January 17, 2001, Final Draft, and The Objective Force: Foundations of Transformation and the Objective Force Concept, Briefing Slides, January 24, 2001, version.

3. U.S. Army, Transformation Campaign Plan (Pre-decisional Final Coordination Draft), October 27, 2000.

4. By 1997, both mechanized units utilized in this operation no longer existed. The M551A1 battalion at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the 3rd Battalion, 73rd Armor (Airborne), was deactivated due to cancellation of procurement of the Armored Gun System (AGS), the designated replacement vehicle for the obsolete M551A1, and the 5th Infantry Division at Fort Polk, Louisiana, was relocated to Ft Hood, Texas, and converted to an M1 tank and M2/M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle organization.

5. Elements of the 3d Battalion, 73d Armor (Airborne), were deployed to Haiti in 1995 for 30 days to provide additional direct firepower to the Army forces there and to enhance security of selected facilities.

6. Dennis Steele, The Army Magazine Hooah Guide to Army Transformation: A 30-Minute Course on the Armys 30-Year Overhaul, Army Magazine, February 2001, p. 33.

7. Transformation Campaign Plan.

8. Louis Caldera and Eric K. Shinseki, Army Vision: Soldiers on Point for the Nation . . . Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War, Military Review, September-October 2000, p. 3.

9. Eric K. Shinseki, The Army Transformation: A Historic Opportunity, Army Magazine, October 2000, p. 28.

10. Ibid.

11. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Statement of the Fiscal Year 2001 Budget and Posture of the United States Army by General Eric K. Shinseki, Chief of Staff, United States Army, 106th Cong., 2nd Sess., February 10, 2000, p. 12.

12. Ibid.


13. Ibid.

14. Myers, Armys Armored Vehicles are Already Behind Schedule, p. A-10.

15. Dubik, ICBT at Fort Lewis, p. 21. The organization and capabilities of the IBCT are reviewed in greater detail in U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, The Interim Brigade Combat Team Organizational and Operational Concept, Version 4.0, April 18, 2000, pp. 8-19.

16. Department of the Army, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations, Field Manual 3-50 (100-7), First Draft, July 2000, p. 4-1.

17. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Operations, ST 3-0, Fort Leavenworth, KS, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, October 1, 2000, p. 3-2. This document is the current draft version of the replacement for Army FM 100-5, Operations.

18. Ibid., p. 3-3.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., p. 3-4.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., p. 3-5.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Douglas A. Macgregor, Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century, Westport, CT, 1997, p. xv.

26. Ibid., p. 52.

27. Ibid., p. 53. The heavy combat group is designed to conduct decisive offensive and defensive maneuver operations and consists of a reconnaissance squadron, three balanced combined arms battalions, an indirect fire battalion, a command/control/communications/ computers/intelligence (C4I) battalion and a group support battalion. The airborne-air assault group is designed to be air-delivered in order to conduct forced entry operations, close and deep economy of force operations in support of decisive operations, contingency operations, and operations other than war as needed. In order to conduct its forced


entry and deep economy of force operations, the airborne-air assault group consists of three airborne-air assault infantry battalions, an air attack squadron, three helicopter assault battalions, an indirect fire battalion, a C4I battalion, and a group support battalion. The heavy recon-strike group is designed to conduct close and deep economy of force maneuver operations in support of the joint task force (JTF) mission and security missions (guard, screen, cover) to protect the JTF. The heavy recon-strike group is assigned three heavy reconnaissance squadrons, an air attack squadron, an indirect fire battalion, a group support squadron, and a C4I squadron. The light recon-strike group is designed to be air-deliverable and conducts close and deep economy of force maneuver operations, forced entry operations, contingency operations, and OOTW as needed. The light recon-strike group is equipped with three light reconnaissance squadrons, an air attack squadron, a combat engineer mobility battalion, a group support squadron, and a C4I squadron.

28. Ibid., pp. 75-82.

29. Ibid., pp. 82-83.

30. Ibid., p. 84.

31. Ibid., p. 85.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid., p. 152.

34. Ibid., p. 155.

35. Ibid., pp. 143, 165.

36. Ibid., pp. 212-213. Macgregor argues that the Armys Crusader artillery system, the Navys F/A-18 E/F aircraft, the Air Forces F-22 aircraft, the Marine Corps V-22 Osprey aircraft, and its Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle should all be either reduced or cancelled.

37. Ibid., p. 226.

38 Ibid., p. 227.

39. Richard D. Hooker, Jr., Breaking the Phalanx, Naval War College Review, Summer 1998, p.143.

40. In two subsequent, but related, journal articles, Macgregor specifically addressed the relationship between transforming joint


warfighting and transforming the Army. In Transformation and the Illusion of Change, National Security Studies Quarterly, Autumn 2000, p. 112, he explains that . . . transformation means effectively combining and integrating service capabilities with new joint operational structures. The flaw in the Armys transformation plans, he continued, is that it is not occurring within a joint transformation process. Macgregor continues his argument in Joint Operational Architecture: The Key to Transformation, Strategic Review, Fall 2000, p. 35. He notes that development of a new joint operational architecture would allow better definition of the Armys Objective Force and could accelerate its development.

41. David L Grange, Huba Wass de Czege, Richard D. Liebert, Charles A. Jarnot, and Mike Sparks, Air-Mech-Strike: 3-Dimensional Phalanx, Paducah, 2000, p. 1.

42. Ibid., pp.19-20.

43. Ibid., p. 31.

44. Ibid., pp. 27-28.

45. One critic, Lieutenant Colonel Steve Eden, writing in Armor, noted that, as intriguing as Granges notions are, the Air-Mech Strike proposal is significantly limited by the poor quality of the presentation of its concepts, limited discussion of logistics and tactics, and the lack of a coherent justification for the need for this radical reorganization. Lieutenant Colonel Steve Eden, Air-Mech Strike Force Proposal: Big Questions Persist, Armor, March-April 2001, p. 48.

46. U.S. Army, Army Begins Manning Initiatives, U.S. Army Press Release #99-107, November 8, 1999.

47. Association of the United States Army, Army Sets 5-Year Balkan Rotation, AUSA News, January 2001, p. 1.

48. Sean Naylor, Ready and Waiting, Army Times, November 6, 2000, p. 18.

49. Examples are the Air Forces Air Expeditionary Wing concept, Navy carrier battle group and submarine deployment scheduling, and Marine Corps Marine Expeditionary Brigade and Marine Expeditionary Unit deployment rotations.

50. A March 5, 2001, Army Times article, citing anonymous senior Army officials, stated that the next two interim brigades (conversions number three and four) would probably be stationed in Hawaii and


Alaska. The article also stated that the fifth converting brigade would be a National Guard heavy brigade. According to the article, the primary logic for the selection of the third and fourth interim brigades was the availability of support infrastructures, proximity of Air Force bases, and the adequacy of existing training facilities in Alaska and Hawaii. Supporting reasons for these selections included an emerging shift in national strategic emphasis from Europe to the Far East and the desire to retain existing heavy forces for use if a major war occurs prior to fielding of the Objective Force. The article concluded that the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment was a candidate for the sixth interim brigade. However, as of April 8, 2001, the contents of this article had not been publicly confirmed by Army sources. Sean Naylor, Pacific Push, Army Times, March 5, 2001, p. 8. 1