The Air Campaign began on January 17, 1991, and the Ground Campaign did not begin until February 24. During this 39-day period Coalition aircraft waged a campaign of intensity not matched since World War II. Nearly 100,000 combat and support sorties were flown and 288 Tomahawk Land-Attack Missiles (TLAMs) and 35 Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs) were launched before G-Day, February 24. Some 60% of all sorties flown were combat missions. Of course, not all these attacks were directed against the Iraqi ground forces and their lines of communication. At first, as Figure 14 shows, the bulk of the sorties were directed at Iraqi strategic targets and at gaining air supremacy. Later, however, sorties devoted to battlefield preparation dominated the campaign, as Iraqi aircraft disappeared from the skies, and available strategic targets became scarce. The goal of this battlefield preparation was to reduce the effectiveness of the Iraqi ground forces in Kuwait by about 50%. To this end, Coalition aircraft attacked Iraqi logistic installations, resupply routes and lines of communications, and, of course, the units themselves. U. S forces discovered that even buried armored vehicles could

Figure 14. Air Campaign - Sorties by Phase

Figure 15. Iraqi Equipment Degradation in Kuwaiti Theater before G-Day, according to CENTCOM Intelligence Estimates at the Time

be located by their thermal imaging equipment, and "tank plinking" -- attacks on individual Iraqi armored vehicles using GBU-12 500-pound Laser Guided Bombs -- became a lucrative form of attack. Figure 15 shows CENTCOM estimates of the destruction of Iraqi military equipment in the Kuwait Theater (KTO) before G-day. Thus, according to CENTCOM estimates, Coalition air attacks had damaged 39% of the Iraqi tanks, 32% of their armored personnel carriers, and 47% of their artillery in the theater before the ground campaign began. Postwar surveys indicated that CENTCOM's initial counts of equipment destroyed were too high -- for example, only about 10% of the Iraqi tanks captured had been destroyed by fixed-wing aircraft. However, estimates of the target base were also too high, and the errors offset one another. Thus CENTCOM's percentages of equipment destroyed by the beginning of the ground war were in line with later observations, although the numbers of pieces destroyed were too high. In addition, there were great variations in unit armor attrition during the air war -- from 10% for an armored division in the middle of the theater (12th Armored Division) to nearly 100% for divisions close to the front lines (52nd Armored, 25th, 30th, and 48th Infantry Divisions. The Republican Guard heavy divisions had suffered about a 24% armor attrition.

To directly assist in breaching the Iraqi defenses, B-52 bombers bombed the Iraqi minefields with 750-pound M-117 and 500-pound Mk-82 bombs, beginning on February 15. "Daisy Cutter" fuses were used to reduce cratering in the minefields. MC-130 Combat Talon I aircraft dropped 15,000-pound BLU-82 bombs to try to detonate the mines by overpressure. Fuel-air explosives were (FAE) also used. In the marine sector, AV-8Bs dropped napalm on the Iraqi fire trenches in an attempt to ignite the fuel and burn it off before the ground attack. These techniques did not meet with much success. In the sector of the 2nd marine division, for example, the Division Engineer reported, "The B-52 strike missed the minefields in the breach. All the obstacles, to include the wire, were intact when we started the breach."

Although the attempts to breach the minefields using air power were not very effective, the indirect effects of the Air Campaign on the breaching operations were significant. Minefields are much more effective obstacles when they are defended and covered by fire; and the Coalition Air Campaign severely reduced the equipment strength and, more importantly, the will to fight of the forces which were supposed to defend the minefields, place artillery fires on the Coalition breaching forces, and counterattack to eliminate any penetrations of the defense belts. CENTCOM estimated that the Air Campaign had reduced the combat effectiveness of front line Iraqi divisions by about 50%. (The combat effectiveness of units in the rear, including the Republican Guards, was however, reduced by only about 25%.) In addition to the damage to tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery described above, command and communications were disrupted -- in some cases corps, division, and brigade commanders lost touch with their units. Some of the equipment and supplies the Iraqis had stockpiled in Kuwait were destroyed, and the road nets for resupply were degraded. These interdiction operations also sapped the morale of Iraqi front line troops. Many prisoners of war reported that the air war seemed to go on forever, and food and water became scarce. Hence desertion rates increased. Thus the Coalition Air Campaign made the task of breaching the Iraqi defense belts considerably easier, even though the minefields and other obstacles remained in place.

K. THE BATTLE OF KHAFJI

The first major ground action of the Gulf War was actually initiated by the Iraqis. On the night of January 29, 1991, they launched what was apparently a series of spoiling attacks or probes of the Coalition defenses with elements of the 5th Mechanized Division and the 3rd Armored Division. In spite of overhead photography, electronic intercept, and active patrolling, this attack came as a surprise to the Coalition. The first intimation of the attack came about dusk, when the Iraqis began jamming the communications of the marine units using antiquated AN/PRC-77 type non-frequency-hopping radios screening the border. Soon afterwards an Iraqi armored brigade crossed the border at the Saudi police post of al-Zabr, which the marines called OP-4. See Figure 16. This attack was repulsed by the USAF air strikes, AC-130 Spectre gunships and marine Task Force Shepherd (the 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion-LAI), supported by coalition tactical air after a night of hard fighting. Although the wheeled Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs, essentially armored cars) with which the unit was equipped were considered too light to fight against tanks, the LAVs with TOW missiles proved effective by virtue of their stand-off range capability in the coverless desert. The Iraqis lost 10 tanks, and four of their soldiers were taken prisoner. The marine casualties were LAVs incinerated mostly from their own friendly fire. A little later the Iraqis also made crossings in battalion strength opposite marine screening positions at al-Wafra and between al-Raghwa and al-Rafi'iya. The marines engaged these attacks with artillery fire, anti-tank missiles, and air strikes. At al-Wafra they destroyed some 24 Iraqi tanks and 13 other vehicles. The Iraqis quickly turned and withdrew back across the border.

While the attention of the Coalition headquarters was focused on the fighting at al-Zabr and al-Wafra, a tank battalion and a mechanized infantry battalion of the 15th Mechanized Brigade of the Iraqi 5th Mechanized Division crossed the frontier north of the town of al-Khafji. (This town had a prewar population of about 30,000, but it had been evacuated at the start of the Air Campaign, since it was within Iraqi artillery range.) The Iraqi attack was met by a screening force of the 2nd Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) Brigade, which was equipped with Cadillac-Gage V-150 armored cars. The Saudis, outnumbered and outgunned, withdrew south of the town, and the Iraqis occupied al-Khafji. Later that night, however, after the Saudis were reinforced with two tank companies (one Saudi and one Qatari), they attacked an Iraqi column moving south and captured 5 tanks and six armored personnel carriers.

Throughout January 30, Coalition air power was active around Khafji. North of the border Coalition aircraft dropped tons of bombs and GATOR mines to slow down Iraqi armor reinforcements. There were several B-52 strikes on suspected convoys. Carrier-based aircraft dropped cluster and guided bombs. Air Force jets followed with Maverick missiles and more

Figure 16. The Battle of Khafji

cluster bombs. When night fell three AC-130 Spectre gunships attacked the Iraqi forces. As a result of these air attacks, the Iraqis gave up attempts to reinforce their forces in Khafji.

The ground attack to recapture Khafji began about 0800 hours on January 31. It was a Saudi and Qatari operation, although the ground troops were supported by artillery and Coalition air power. A Saudi M60 tank battalion, reinforced with two TOW platoons blocked the road to the north. A Saudi Marine Battalion blocked the road to the south. Two battalions of the 2nd SANG Brigade, reinforced with a Qatari AMX-30 tank company and mechanized company attacked to clear the town. The fighting was brief but heavy. The Saudis advanced street by street and, in some cases, house by house. By about 1330 hours they had reached the north end of the town, although some pockets of Iraqi resistance remained. Those Iraqis who tried to escape up a rough coastal trail were harried by Coalition air attacks. A dozen tanks were destroyed and some vehicles were simply abandoned. Some Iraqis in the town, in fact, did not surrender until the next day. The Saudis reported that they had destroyed 11 tanks and 51 armored personnel carriers (APCs) in Khafji and captured another 19 APCs. A total of 463 Iraqis surrendered. The Saudis lost 18 dead and 32 wounded -- the Saudis killed in action were about half of those for the entire war.

Though not a major battle, the Battle of Khafji was important for several reasons. It exposed the limitations of the Iraqi ground forces and confirmed their vulnerability to Coalition tactics. It bolstered the morale and self-confidence of the Arab Coalition forces and removed any doubts of their combat capabilities. On a tactical level, the Iraqi 15th Mechanized Brigade was essentially destroyed at Khafji and the remainder of the 5th Mechanized Division heavily damaged by air attacks while it was moving toward the border. These were the forces intended to counterattack any Coalition attack up the coastal highway toward Kuwait City.

Minefields did not play a significant role in the Battle of Khafji. However, the fact that the Iraqis could move battalion-sized forces south through the minefields indicated that the Iraqis had probably left a number of cleared lanes for that purpose. The Marines were to devote considerable effort to locating such lanes. The minefields did have one indirect effect during the battle. One Iraqi battalion got lost and had difficulty finding its way back through the minefield. While searching for the passage it provided a lucrative target for Coalition air power and artillery.

L. BREACHING THE IRAQI DEFENSE LINES

1. Concept of Operations

As Section F indicated, the Coalition concept for the Ground Campaign involved a deep envelopment around the lightly defended west flank of the Iraqi forces. The main effort was assigned to the U. S. VII Corps, which was to attack west of the Wadi al-Batin, envelop the Iraqi forces in Kuwait, and then turn to the east to destroy the Republican Guard units north of Kuwait. Farther to the west the XVIII Airborne Corps would drive quickly to the north to seize the highway south of the Euphrates, block the main escape route of the Iraqi forces in Kuwait, and prevent the movement of reinforcements into the theater. To the east, where the Iraqis were expecting the attack, marines and the coalition forces of Joint Forces Command East and Joint Forces Command North were to attack north into Kuwait. These were to be only supporting attacks, intended to mislead the Iraqis as to the location of the main effort and fix their forces in place. To further these objectives, the timing of the attacks was different for the different corps -- the U. S. VII Corps and Joint Forces Command North (JFC-N) were not scheduled to attack until G+1, although their attack was moved forward when the plan was executed.

2. Joint Forces Command East (JFC-E)

Joint Forces Command East (JFC-E) was assigned a 20-km wide sector on the Coalition right flank along the Gulf Coast. The bulk of their forces were Saudi -- two mechanized brigades (8th and 10th) and the 2nd Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) brigade. However, the Command also included units from Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, UAE, Senegal, Morocco, Qatar, and Bangladesh. For political as well as military reasons, the small units were grouped with the Saudi brigades into task forces with historic Arabic names -- it was politically much more acceptable for units from Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain to be attached to Task Force Othman rather than to the 8th Saudi Mechanized Brigade, even though the Saudi brigade provided the command and staff for the task force. The task organization is shown in Section D.1.

The mission of JFC-E was to attack directly north to Kuwait City, beginning on G-Day. Gen. Sultan planned to attack with his two heavy task forces (Othman and Omar -- 8th and 10th Mechanized Brigades) side by side west of the coastal highway. Task Force Abu Bakr (2nd SANG Brigade) would conduct a reconnaissance in force up the coastal highway. Task Force Tariq (two Saudi Marine Battalions) would operate on the right flank, between the highway and the Gulf, clearing any enemy points of resistance. The Qatar Mechanized Infantry Battalion would screen the left flank and maintain contact with the marines. See Figure 17. In addition

Figure 17. Joint Forces Command East (JFC-E) Attack

to their own artillery, JFC-E received fire support from the guns of the USS Wisconsin and the USS Missouri, now longer available to U.S. forces though they could be if recommissioned

Although the Saudis had managed to purchase some countermine equipment from Turkey and Egypt, they planned to accomplish most of the breaching by hand. The Saudi engineers were well trained for this task. For weeks they had trained in the desert under realistic conditions, including the use of live mines and booby traps. Barriers were erected similar to the Iraqi ones, and each Saudi unit made two practice daytime crossings and one at night.

On February 20, four days before G-Day, the Saudis sent forward a strong combat patrol of tanks, artillery, special forces, and engineers. Eight miles inside Kuwait they encountered the First Defense Belt, with mines and tank ditches. The Iraqi units guarding the minefields had withdrawn, and the mines were all on the surface. It is not clear whether they had been laid on the surface or whether they had originally been buried and the wind had blown away the covering sand. Although there was some Iraqi artillery fire, it appeared to be unobserved. An engineer platoon began lifting mines by hand and cleared a 30-yard gap through the minefield, which was about 150 yards deep at that point. The Saudi engineers recorded the position on video and returned to their own lines with some 70 mines. The next day another patrol managed to open up three lanes and brought back 600 mines. The Saudis also captured the abandoned Kuwaiti border post of Nuwaisib and brought up Kuwaiti troops of the Al-Fatah Brigade and a band to raise the Kuwaiti flag. In addition to the psychological impact of liberating the first bit of Kuwaiti soil, this reconnaissance yielded two valuable bits of information: the Iraqi mines were on the surface in this area, and the minefields were no longer guarded.

Consequently, when JFC-E launched its attack at 0400 on G-Day, February 24, the troops made good progress. Engineers from the 2nd Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) Brigade breached the border berm, and the Coalition forces advanced into Kuwait without opposition. When they reached the First Defense Belt, the Saudi engineers began lifting mines by hand. By mid morning they had cleared a total of six lanes through the minefield. Since the mines were on the surface, clearing the lanes did not present a major problem. Except for a few artillery rounds, there was no serious opposition -- in fact the Saudis did not see an Iraqi soldier until they had advanced 13 miles into Kuwait. Likewise, the Iraqi tank ditches were also overcome without difficulty. The Saudis had brought up Armored Vehicle Launched Bridges (AVLB) to use in crossing the tank ditches. Since there was no fire on the breaching sites, however, the Saudis used unarmored dozers to fill in the ditches.

The SANG troops moving up the coastal highway encountered more serious delays. Although there were few mines, the Iraqis had done a thorough job of cutting the highway. The three northbound lanes were systematically destroyed. The three southbound lanes were cut by ditches at 100-meter intervals for the first three kilometers from the frontier. For the next three kilometers, cuts were made halfway across the three lanes every 100 meters. Further north the highway was blocked by wrecked vehicles and bomb and shell craters. In spite of these difficulties, Saudi engineers were able to open two lanes for traffic for about 25 kilometers into Kuwait by nightfall. This was quite important, since the Saudis planned to use the highway as their main supply route.

After breaching the First Defense Belt and securing the initial objectives, Gen. Sultan faced a difficult decision. Should he halt and prepare for the expected counterattack or continue and attack the Second Defense Belt? Since JFC-E had advanced more rapidly than the Marines on their left flank, an Iraqi counterattack could come from the west as well as the north and east. To make things more difficult, the day was overcast, and smoke from the burning oil wells limited visibility to about 100 meters. The prospect of making a blind attack against a numerically superior enemy was not attractive. Late in the morning, however, the wind shifted and started to blow from the southeast. Within a few minutes visibility improved dramatically. Coalition aircraft again had a clear field of vision and began attacking Iraqi positions. Task Forces Othman and Omar resumed their advance.

The anticipated Iraqi counterattack did not materialize. The Iraqi 18th Infantry Division was not able to organize a counterattack with its own resources. The designated counterattack force for this area, the 15th Mechanized Brigade, had essentially been destroyed at Khafji, and the rest of the 5th Mechanized Division had been heavily damaged. The virtually continuous Coalition air attacks had apparently prevented the Iraqis from rebuilding these counterattack forces. Moreover, the Iraqi III Corps apparently considered the marines attack more serious. Even when Task Forces Othman and Omar reached the Second Defense Belt, the defense was not nearly so strong as expected. The advancing forces faced artillery fire, but, with only a few exceptions, Iraqi infantry surrendered as the Saudi and other Coalition forces approached their positions. So many surrendered, in fact, that a battalion of the SANG was assigned the mission of escorting them to the rear. In this sector the minefields of the Second Defense Belt were also on the surface. Again Saudi engineers breached lanes by hand with no major difficulties. By nightfall the forces of JFC-E had advanced through the Second Defense Belt. Here they stopped for the night. Unlike the U. S. and British forces, the Arab contingents had limited night vision equipment and hence preferred not to fight at night.

3. 1st marine expeditionary force (MEF)

a. Sector, Mission, and Concept

As Figure 18 shows, the 1st marine expeditionary force (MEF) was assigned a sector from the left boundary of Joint Forces Command East to the point where the Kuwait border turns to the west. The mission of the 1st MEF was to breach the Iraqi defense lines and seize the al-Mutl'a Pass and the roads leading into Kuwait City, some 35 to 50 miles inside Kuwait. The 1st MEF faced the strongest concentration of enemy defenses in the theater.

Because of the shortage of breaching equipment, LTG Boomer's initial concept called for the 1st marine division to make the breach and the 2nd Division to follow through the same cleared lanes, execute a passage of lines, and become the point of the main effort. Neither division commander was happy with this concept. Additional breaching equipment arrived at the beginning of February, and LTG Boomer accepted MG Keys recommendation that the 2nd marine division have a separate breaching sector. Thus the final concept was for the two marine divisions to attack abreast with the 1st Division on the right.

b. 1st marine division

The 1st marine division developed a rather complex plan for the breaching operation. Two infantry forces, Task Forces Taro and Grizzly, would infiltrate through the First Mine Belt under cover of darkness. Then they would each turn 90 to provide security against counterattacks from the right (TF Taro) and left (TF Grizzly). The main attack would be a deliberate breach conducted by Task Forces Papa Bear and Ripper, each of which had a tank battalion, in addition to engineer reinforcements with minefield breaching equipment. After breaching the First Defense Belt, they would regroup and conduct a deliberate breach of the

Figure 18. 1st marine expeditionary force (MEF) Sector and Concept

Second Defense Belt. Depending on the difficulties encountered in the first belt, breaching the second belt might be delayed until the next day. Then they would continue the attack to seize the al-Jaber Airfield and Kuwait International Airport.

To carry out this plan, it was clearly vital to know the details of the Iraqi minefields. Consequently, the marines began conducting detailed reconnaissance on February 18, a week before G-Day. The reconnaissance teams discovered that the First Defense Belt was largely undefended and found a path through the minefields for TF Taro. Finding a path for TF Grizzly, however, proved to be much more difficult -- in fact, by the morning of G-1 one had still not been found. At 1500 hours that afternoon, while TF Grizzly was planning and preparing to conduct a hasty breach, a small group of Iraqis walked through the minefield to surrender. Their route was observed and carefully noted by a reconnaissance team, which retraced the Iraqis' steps through the minefield, captured three more prisoners, and seized a bunker overlooking the lane. At 1740 hours 22 Iraqi soldiers drove up to the minefield in three trucks, dismounted, and walked through the minefield to surrender. This revealed the location of another lane through the minefield. At 1800 hours marine combat engineers began checking these lanes by hand. A team of combat engineers led by SSG Charles Restifo crawled through the minefield probing for mines and marking the cleared lane with chemical lights. At 2300 hours TF Grizzly moved through the two lanes and set out for its blocking positions. TF Taro was similarly successful. At about 2000 hours the task force began infiltrating the First Obstacle Belt, using lanes located by the earlier reconnaissance and marked by the engineers. Thus by midnight on February 23, the 1st marine division had overcome the first major hurdle of the ground offensive. TF Grizzly and TF Taro were through the first minefields and on their way to their assigned blocking positions. They had encountered only light resistance and suffered few casualties.

Task Force Ripper began its breaching operation at 0618 hours on February 24. A tank with a Track Width Mine Plow towed a MICLIC trailer to the point chosen for Lane 1. The MICLIC was launched and detonated. Then the tank moved forward, lowered its mine plow and followed the mark left by the MICLIC through the lane. When it reached the end of the mark, the tank backed to the entrance of the lane. Then a MK-154 advanced to the far end of the cleared lane and fired a second MICLIC to extend the lane. The rocket fired, but this MICLIC failed to detonate. After an unsuccessful attempt to detonate it by hand, the MK-154 fired a second line charge directly on top of the first. The detonation of this line charge detonated the first. The process was then repeated, and the M-154 fired its third charge. This also worked perfectly, and the engineers reached the far side of the minefield. In spite of the difficulties with MICLIC, Lane 1 had taken less than 15 minutes to clear. After the plow tank cleared remaining mines, the marines used their locally fabricated roller system "Roller Dude" to proof the lane. The same technique was used for Lane 2. One MICLIC failed to detonate and had to be detonated by a hand-placed block of C-4. Nevertheless, the lane was cleared in 14 minutes. After the lanes had been proofed with the roller, the engineers marked the lanes. By 0700 hours the engineers were reloading their line charge launchers and waiting for the order to move to the Second Defense Belt.

At the breach location of the 1st battalion, 7th marines, the minefield was not so deep. At this point two successful line charges would be sufficient to breach the minefield. There were technical difficulties, however. In Lane 4 the trailer-launched MICLIC failed to detonate and could not be successfully primed by hand. A triple-shot MK-154 was brought forward. Two line charges from this system were enough to reach the other side of the minefield, although both had to be detonated manually. In Lane 3 the MICLIC launched and detonated properly. However, a mine remaining in the lane put out of action an M60 tank trying to proof the lane, and this blocked the lane. Since they had no equipment to extract the disabled tank, the marines moved 25 meters to the left and began again. After firing and detonating by hand two line charges from a MK-154, the engineers reached the far side of the minefield.

Task Force Papa Bear began its breach of the First Defense Belt at 0900 hours. They used the same methods as TF Ripper, with the 3rd battalion, 9th marines, in the lead. By 0930 they had established two lanes through the minefield and secured the other side. The engineer task force completed two additional lanes and moved to the northern side of the minefield, where it rearmed the MICLICs and MK-154s for breaching the second belt. The 1st Tank Battalion led the remainder of the Task Force through the minefield and prepared for the next breaching operation. The tankers attacked Iraqi positions defending the Second Obstacle Belt and directed Cobra and Harrier attacks on enemy tanks and bunkers. These destroyed several tanks and observation posts and a number of enemy bunkers.

By midmorning it was clear that no Iraqi counterattack was coming from the east. In fact, the majority of the Iraqi troops between the two defense lines had either already withdrawn or were surrendering. Therefore, MG Myatt ordered TF Taro to clear two additional lanes in order to reduce traffic congestion at the breach site. With the assistance of two tanks with Track Width Mine Plows temporarily transferred from TF Papa Bear, TF Taro engineers cleared, proofed, and marked the two lanes and reported them open at 1300 hours.

The 1st marine division attack on the Second Defense Belt began at noon on February 24. The Iraqis defended this belt, and Task Force Ripper received artillery, mortar, and machine gun fire as it approached the minefield. Consequently, the assault was preceded by a 22-minute mixed artillery barrage. It included smoke rounds to hide the breaching operations, high explosive rounds to suppress enemy fire, and variable time fuse (VT) missions against enemy bunkers. TF Ripper also put heavy direct fire on the enemy positions. Under cover of this fire, the engineer obstacle clearing teams moved in and began work. They used the same procedures as in the First Defense Belt, except that in this case the breaching had to be done under fire. They also encountered some of the same difficulties. In Lane 1, when the tank tried to fire the MICLIC, nothing happened -- the firing cable had been broken when the turret rotated. A MK-154 drove up into position behind the tank and fired one of its line charges into the minefield. The charge failed to detonate and had to be manually primed. However, the remaining two charges worked perfectly, and the lane was cleared and proofed without difficulty. In Lane 2, everything worked like clockwork. The line charges all worked, the Track Width Mine Plow cleared remaining mines, and the roller proofed the lane without encountering any mines. At 1208 hours the engineer officer in charge fired the green and white star cluster signifying that the first lane had been cleared. In Lane 3 the situation was quite different. Just as at the first belt, the MICLIC failed to launch. A MK-154 launched one of its three line charges, which had to be manually primed. Since the minefield was relatively thin at this point, this left only about 10 meters of minefield to clear, but both the remaining MK-154 line charges failed to launch. The company commander used the tank with the Track Width Mine Plows to clear it. No mines were set off in the process, and the lane was proofed and marked by 1225. Lane 4 was cleared by two line charges, although both had to be manually primed. By 1225 hours, therefore, TF Ripper had succeeded in opening four lanes in the Second Defense Belt.

As soon as the lanes were opened, the two infantry battalions and the 3rd Tank Battalion passed through and began their assault on the Iraqi positions. The three battalions pushed outward to expand the breachhead area. See Figure 19. The situation quickly became confused. Some Iraqis continued to fight with determination, and the Task Force had to fight bunker by bunker. The defense was strengthened by a number of tanks -- T-62s as well as T-55s. Many more Iraqis, however, decided to surrender. In one case, for example, several hundred Iraqis, with a colonel, surrendered to the 1st Battalion, 7th marines. The unexpectedly large number of Iraqi prisoners slowed the marine advance as much as the Iraqi resistance. In addition, the prisoners being evacuated helped to clog the already crowded lanes through the minefield. The division breach control party, which was supposed to control traffic, had not yet arrived at the Second Defense Belt.

After passing through the minefield, TF Ripper cleared the area known as "The Emir's Farm" on its right flank. This was a large tract of tamarind groves southwest of the burning al-Burqan oilfields. Some 56 towed 152mm guns had been located there, but they had been

Figure 19. Task Force Ripper's Breachhead

destroyed by air and artillery attack before and during the ground attack. A number of bunkers remained, and the 1st battalion, 7th marines rolled these up from the flank. In less than two hours Iraqi resistance in this area collapsed.

Then TF Ripper turned to the west and attacked al-Jaber airfield. TF Shepherd, which had followed TF Ripper through the breach, screened the north with its LAVs. The Iraqi 56th Armored Brigade had been stationed at the airfield, but it had moved west to stiffen the defenses in front of the 2nd marine division. Only an infantry brigade, reinforced by a company of old T-62 tanks, remained at the airfield. At 1600 hours TF Ripper attacked in a wedge formation, with the 3rd Tank Battalion at the point. Within two hours they had secured the objective. Then the task force assumed defensive positions to await its relief by TF Grizzly. Once relieved, TF Ripper received orders to attack toward Kuwait International Airport, its final objective.

Task Force Papa Bear delayed the start of its deliberate breach of the Second Defense Belt until its direct support artillery battalion could displace north of the First Obstacle Belt to provide fire support. By 1500 hours on February 24, the artillery was in place and was shelling Iraqi positions. At 1520 the task force began breaching the Second Defense Belt, this portion of which was defended by the 22nd Brigade of the 5th Mechanized Division. TF Papa Bear encountered the same difficulties in the breaching as had TF Ripper. In Lane 1 a mine knocked out the M60 roller tank which was proofing the lane. Unable to extract the tank, the engineers moved to an alternate site and began clearing a new lane. The work on Lane 2, however, went well, and the lane was open by 1600 hours. Both assault companies of the 3rd battalion, 9th marines, passed through this lane, while the engineers continued work on the alternate Lane 1. As soon as the assault companies got through the minefield, they moved forward and began clearing Iraqi trenches. They caught five Iraqi tanks attempting to withdraw from their positions and destroyed them. After receiving mortar and small arms fire, the marines called in artillery and gunships. After a thorough pounding, the main Iraqi strongpoint fell. This caused the collapse of the rest of the position and the surrender of several hundred Iraqis. The 1st Tank Battalion followed the infantry through Lane 2. Then they wheeled east and smashed through a line of dug in tanks and infantry, destroying some 14 tanks. At this point the reserve units from the 22nd and 501st Iraqi Brigades began withdrawing to the northeast. At 1700 hours the 1st battalion, 1st marines followed the tank battalion through Lane 2 and began enlarging the breachhead to the north. By 1800 hours Iraqi resistance to the north had largely ceased. The engineers had completed the alternate Lane 1. Work on a third lane, however, was stopped when a tank equipped with a mine rake was disabled while proofing the lane. As darkness fell, the task force halted and consolidated its positions.

Figure 20. Situation within Kuwait 1800 Hours February 24, 1991

In spite of technical difficulties with the MICLIC and MK-154 line charge and Iraqi opposition, the 1st marine division conducted very successful breaching operations on February 24. They succeeded in breaching two well prepared defense belts, the second of which was quite well defended and seized their objectives ahead of schedule and with relatively light losses. Figure 20 shows their advance in the context of the entire country of Kuwait. The expected Iraqi counterattacks had not materialized, although intelligence reports indicated movements of Iraqi armor north and east of the breach sites.

c. 2nd marine division

As Figure 20 shows, the 2nd marine division was assigned a sector to the west of the 1st marine division. The mission assigned to the division was to break through the Iraqi defense belts and attack to the north to destroy enemy forces in the sector, seize al-Jahra and the al-Mutl'a Pass, and thus cut off Iraqi forces in Kuwait City and southern Kuwait. To accomplish this mission, MG Keys and his staff developed an elegantly simple breaching plan. Since the division had no experience in breaching, they used an amphibious assault as a model -- an area in which the entire division had a great deal of experience. A breach approach sequence table was developed and a breach control group activated to ensure orderly and timely traffic flow through the breaches. Combat engineers would lay out six lanes from six departure points along a 12-kilometer front at the Berm. These were named like beaches: from left to right Red 1, Red 2, Blue 1, Blue 2, Green 1, and Green 2. Each lane would be marked about every 250 meters by appropriately colored plastic garbage cans, filled with sand and spray-painted with lane numbers and phase lines. The lanes would converge down to a four-kilometer front at the First Obstacle Belt and then continue in parallel until past the second belt. Figure 21 shows the entrance to one breach in the First Defense Belt. The blue banner with the numeral 3 indicates that it is lane Blue 3. The route up to it was marked with blue garbage cans spray-painted with 3. The garbage can just below the left banner is marked "PL" for phase line.

Like the 1st marine division, the 2nd marine division conducted detailed reconnaissance to determine the details of the First Defense Belt. Based on the information obtained, together with that available from overhead photography and other sources, the division commander selected a breach site between gathering centers 17 and 18 of the Umm Gudair Oil Field. This site supported the division's scheme of maneuver and avoided all Iraqi fire trenches in the area. To conceal the location of the actual breaching site, the division cut eighteen gaps in the border berm all across the division sector instead of the six required at the breaching site. In addition, the 2nd Light Armored Infantry (LAI) LAV armored car battalion was ordered to conduct an active screening operation, beginning on G-3, February 21, in the northwest corner of the division sector. The battalion conducted this operation so vigorously that the Iraqis reported that the ground offensive had begun and that they had repelled an assault by a full marine division. Figure 21. Entrance to Lane Blue 3 at First Defense Belt

Again for simplicity, responsibility for the actual breaching operation through both defense belts was assigned to one unit, the 6th marine regiment, which was reinforced with the 8th Tank Battalion (a Marine Corps Reserve unit), Task Force Breach of the 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion (CEB), and the 1st battalion, 8th marines. The commander of the 6th marines, in turn, assigned each of his mechanized battalions responsibility for two lanes as follows:

 Lanes Red 1 and 2: 1st battalion, 6th marines with Company B, 2nd CEB

 Lanes Blue 3 and 4: 2nd battalion, 2nd marines, with Company D, 4th CEB

 Lanes Green 5 and 6: 1st battalion, 8th marines, with Company C, 2nd CEB

Each infantry battalion had one tank company in direct support. Early in February, the 6th marines were released from their defensive mission, and the breaching task organization shown above was activated. The regimental task force conducted training and rehearsals on a breach training area which mirrored the actual breach site. Thus each combat engineer company conducted several rehearsals with the infantry battalion it supported.

The following equipment was available to the task force to support the breaching operation:

 18 AAVs with MK-154 three-shot mine clearing line charges,

 2 M60A1 dozer tanks,

 16 M60A1 tanks with track-width mine plows,

 4 M60A1 tanks with mine rakes,

 22 AAVs for the engineer squads,

 15 M9 Armored Combat Earthmovers (ACE),

 39 M58 MICLIC trailers,

 6 M1A1 tanks with mine plows, and

 4 Armored Vehicle Launched Bridges (AVLB).

At 0530 hours on February 24, the lead elements of the 2nd marine Division crossed the border berm and began their offensive -- an hour and 30 minutes after the attack of the 1st marine Division. The attack was preceded by a brief but intense artillery preparation. Some 1,430 rounds, most carrying bomblets, were fired in only 11 minutes. None of the planned smoke rounds were needed. There was light rain, and this, together with the smoke from the burning Umm Gudair Oilfields, provided sufficient concealment. Shortly after 0600 the 6th marine Task Force closed on the First Obstacle Belt and began the breaching operation.

As the list of equipment indicates, the 2nd marine division did not have any of the locally manufactured "Roller Dude" mine rollers only available since coalition forces had months of time to "get their act together". which the 1st marine division used for proofing the breached lanes. Consequently, the 2nd Division adopted a slightly different breaching procedure. Both divisions began by launching one to three line charges to make the initial breach. Since the 2nd Division had no rollers, however, they used a single pass of a tank with either a mine rake or track width mine plow both to clear any remaining mines and to proof the lane.

In Lanes Red 1 and 2 and Blue 3 and 4, the breaching operation went well. Although about half the line charges failed initially to detonate in the minefield, demolition men dismounted and, working under indirect fire, set them off by hand. The tanks with mine plows or rakes pushed aside any remaining mines without problems, and by about 0730 four lanes had been opened through the First Defense Belt, and the 1st Battalion, 6th marines and the 2nd battalion, 2nd marines had passed through the breach. The distance between the two Iraqi defense belts was only about 5 kilometers at this point. Without pausing, the marines continued the advance. Lanes Red 1 and 2 were completed through the Second Defense Belt by 0900, and Blue 3 and 4 by 1030. Resistance stiffened as the marines moved north. However, the regiment had the support of the division's artillery and of Cobra gunships.

In Green Lanes 5 and 6, on the other hand, the breaching team encountered considerable difficulties. At this point the minefields had greater depth and a larger number of mines. In addition, they included British Bar Mines, which the Iraqis had captured in Kuwait. These were resistant to the overpressure produced by the MICLICs, and many of them had been fitted with anti-disturbance devices so that they detonated on contact with mine plows. There were also power lines running across the minefield. In Lane Green 5 the breaching team began its task shortly after 0600 by launching a line charge from an AAV. After the charge had been detonated, an M60 with a track width mine plow proofed the lane. The AAV then followed the tank and launched another line charge. This line charge went over a series of high tension power lines. When it detonated, it brought down some of the lines but did nothing to clear the lanes. The tank with the mine plow moved forward to clear enough space to give the AAV a clear shot. It hit a mine, probably a bar mine, which disabled the tank but did not injure the crew. The AAV cautiously backed out of the minefield, and a second M60 plow tank was sent in. It followed the same route as far as the disabled tank and then made a detour to the left. The AAV followed and detonated a second line charge to extend the lane. The second tank began plowing and was about 20 meters in front of the disabled tank when another mine exploded, ripping off its track. The AAV had used all three of its charges and withdrew. A third M60 plow tank, this one towing a MICLIC entered the minefield. It launched the MICLIC and then began plowing to proof the lane. It was within about 20 meters of the far side of the minefield when it also hit a mine. With three M60 tanks disabled in the minefield, work on Green 5 came to a halt while more engineer equipment was brought forward. Lane Green 5 through the First Mine Belt was not clear until about 0930.

In Lane Green 6 things did not go much better. Approaching the First Mine Belt, the crews of both the plow tank and the AAV missed the stake which the Iraqis had left to mark the forward edge of the minefield, and the AAV hit a mine. Fortunately the 6,000 pounds of line charges inside the vehicle did not explode, but the vehicle lost three road wheels, and a crewman broke a leg. The lead tank was thus blocked in the minefield with mines on three sides and the disabled AAV to the rear. A second AAV was brought forward, took up a position about 70 meters to the left of the original lane, and fired a line charge. It failed to detonate and had to be detonated by hand. A second M60 plow tank then proofed the lane, and the AAV pulled forward and launched a second line charge to extend the lane. After the M60 plow tank had proofed the lane, Green 6 was declared open for tanks at 0736. The commander of the first unit to move through, B Company, 4th Tank Battalion, ordered the lead M1 tank (loaner from the U.S. Army) to plow the lane as an additional precaution. About two-thirds of the way through the minefield, the tank hit a mine. Although there were no injuries, the tank was disabled and the lane blocked. At this point the commander of the M60 plow tank blocked in the minefield decided that his best choice was to go forward. He reached the far edge of the first minefield without incident, executed a 180 turn and came back through the minefield to ensure that it had been adequately cleared, making a detour around the disabled AAV. The lane was declared open for tracked vehicles at 0830, and the 1st Battalion, 8th marines began moving through the First Mine Belt.

The breaching operation on the Green Lanes in the Second Mine Belt began about 1100. Again there were difficulties. In Green Lane 5 a plow tank detonated another mine and was disabled. Because of the shortage of engineer equipment, work on Green Lane 5 was abandoned and all efforts concentrated on the remaining lane, Green 6. Two line charges broke their arrestor cables and flew free into the minefield where they could not be detonated. Two others had to be detonated by hand. In spite of these problems, the lane was finally opened shortly after noon. This lane was renamed Green 5 -- the original Green 5 was never cleared. A lane to the southeast, originally intended to carry return traffic, was designated Green 6. This sixth lane was finally declared cleared and safe about 1345.

Once through the Second Mine Belt, the three lead battalions of the 6th marine regiment pushed out to enlarge the breachhead. The 1st battalion, 6th marines, turned to the left and rolled up much of the 14th Brigade of the 14th Iraqi Infantry Division. the battalion then pushed into the 7th Infantry Division Sector, destroying part of the 19th Infantry Brigade and pushing the rest of it away from the breaching sector. In the center the 2nd battalion, 2nd marines and its supporting tank company overran the rest of the 14th Brigade. On the right the 1st battalion, 8th marines, with its tank company seized an area of trenches and destroyed some 15 tanks and 22 other vehicles. They established contact with the 1st marine division near al-Jaber Airfield. The 2nd LAI Battalion passed through the Blue Lanes and began screening to the northeast of the division sector. By sunset the division had closed on Phase Line Red, as Figure 22 shows.

At 1500 the Tiger Brigade (U.S. Army 1st Brigade, 2nd Armored Division) began moving through the Red and Blue Breach Lanes. In Red Lane 2, however, one of the M1A1 tanks of the 3rd Battalion, 67th Armor, hit a mine in the berm left by the mine plows. The tank was disabled with a broken track and the lane blocked. The damage was minor, however, and there were no injuries. The lane was reopened within a few minutes, and the tank was repaired and returned to action by the next day. After passing through the minefield, the brigade then moved west and took up a position on the left flank of the division sector. This flank was open and an Iraqi counterattack from that direction was considered a major threat, since Joint Forces Command North (JFC-N) was to attack later and planned to operate primarily in the western part of its sector. While moving into its positions, the Tiger Brigade suffered its first fatality. A HMMWV of the 502nd Military Police Company detonated an antitank mine; one Soldier was killed and another wounded.

The 2nd marine division's breaching operation had been quite expensive in terms of equipment, though not in casualties. The division's losses in breaching equipment included seven M60 tanks equipped with mine plows, two AAVs, and one M1A1 tank with track width mine plow. In addition, a Direct Support Command armored D7 tractor was disabled by a mine while attempting to widen Lane Blue 3. During the breaching operation the division fired 34 MK-154 line charges. Eight of these deployed but had to be detonated by hand. Eleven M58 MICLIC line charges were fired, of which five did not function properly. The malfunctions included one air burst and two broken arresting cables, in addition to two MICLICs which had to be detonated manually.

Figure 22. 2nd marine division Attack on February 24, 1991

In spite of these difficulties, the 2nd marine division's operations on G-Day, February 24, were successful. The division had opened six breach lanes through the two Iraqi defense belts against considerable opposition. Then the bulk of the division had moved through the minefields and seized its initial objectives. By the end of the day, it had overrun the Iraqi defense positions and eliminated the better part of two Iraqi divisions, the 7th and 14th Infantry Divisions. Iraqi troops had initially displayed dogged fighting qualities when attacked frontally but surrendered quickly when flanked or attacked from the rear. By nightfall large numbers of Iraqis were surrendering. The 6th marine regiment reported more than 4,000 enemy prisoners of war, and the 2nd LAI Battalion reported 3,000. Moreover, the division had accomplished these successes with remarkably light casualties: two killed in action (one marine and one Soldier) and twelve wounded in action.

4. Joint Forces Command North (JFC-N)

a. Sector, Mission, and Plan of Attack

As Figure 23 indicates, Joint Forces Command North (JFC-N) was assigned a sector from the west flank of the 1st marine expeditionary force (MEF) to the Wadi al-Batin, which formed the western boundary of Kuwait with Iraq. The mission assigned to JFC-N was:

 Attack on G+1 and penetrate the Iraqi 1st and 2nd tactical echelon forces

 Seize the Headquarters of 1st Iraqi Corps at Al Abraq

 Protect the right flank of VII (U.S. Army) Corps

 Seize Ali Al Salem Air Base and link up with the 1st MEF

 Establish blocking positions outside Kuwait City

 Be prepared to continue the attack to the north or to participate in the liberation of Kuwait City.

To accomplish this mission, MG Sulaiman planned a two-pronged attack. The Saudi and Kuwaiti forces, organized into Task Force Muthannah and Task Force Saad, would attack on the right. The main attack would be conducted on the left by the II (Egyptian) Corps, which included an Armored Division, a Mechanized Division, and the 1st Ranger Regiment. The

Figure 23. Joint Forces Command North (JFC-N) Sector and Plan

Syrian 9th Division would follow the Egyptians as the JFC-N reserve. The coalition was reluctant to put the Syrian forces in the lead, because they had essentially the same Russian equipment as the Iraqis -- which presented obvious dangers of confusion and friendly fire.

The attack of JFC-N was planned for G+1, February 25, just as was the attack of VII (U.S. Army) Corps to the west. By midmorning on February 24, however, the advance of the marines and JFC-E that had less distance to go was proceeding so rapidly that Gen. Schwarzkopf and Gen. Khalid decided to advance the time of the attack. Consequently, JFC-N launched their attack at 1600 hours on February 24, twelve hours earlier than planned.

b. Saudi and Kuwaiti Forces

The Saudi and Kuwaiti forces were grouped into two task forces. Task Force Muthannah consisted of the 20th Saudi Mechanized Brigade and the 35th Kuwaiti Mechanized Brigade. Task Force Saad comprised the 4th Saudi Armored Brigade and the 15th Kuwaiti Infantry Brigade. Most of the Kuwaiti brigades had been formed in Saudi Arabia from refugees. Although eager to fight, they were short on training. However, the 35th Mechanized Brigade was an exception to this generalization. The brigade had fought well against the Iraqi invasion and had withdrawn to Saudi Arabia only after running low on ammunition. See Section C.1. The tanks which the brigade had lost in these initial battles had been replaced by M-84s, Yugoslav versions of T-72s upgraded with laser rangefinders and ballistic computers. The mission of the Saudi and Kuwaiti forces was to attack, seize 35th Brigade's former base and Ali Al Salem Air Base, link up with 1st MEF, and be prepared to participate in the liberation of Kuwait City.

The Saudi forces in JFC-N used the same techniques to breach the Iraqi minefields as the forces in JFC-E. In both cases they accomplished the breech by hand, and their success was based on thorough training under realistic conditions and detailed reconnaissance. Four days before G-Day, the Saudis began conducting strong combat patrols into Kuwait. In this zone the Iraqi outposts protecting the First Defense Belt had been abandoned and there was only desultory, unobserved artillery fire. Hence, just as in the JFC-E area, the Saudis began lifting mines by hand in order to clear lanes through the minefields. Although in this area the mines were buried, they were easy to detect, because the soil on top of mines was a different color from undisturbed soil. When the two task forces launched their attack on the afternoon of February 24, they encountered no real difficulty in passing through the First Defense Belt. The Iraqi defense appears to have been relatively weak in this area, and the primary concern of the JFC-N commander was that the Saudi and Kuwaiti forces not advance so rapidly that their flanks would be exposed. After an hour's advance, therefore, the Saudi and Kuwaiti advance was halted to wait for the Egyptians.

c. II (Egyptian) Corps

In the Egyptian sector the II (Egyptian) Corps faced a formidable series of obstacles and an enemy who anticipated a major attack. The 20th and 30th Iraqi Infantry Divisions had been especially assiduous in laying minefields and setting up other obstacles. Not only was the series of outposts protecting the First Defense Belt fully manned, but additional mines had been laid between the outposts -- in effect creating a third belt of minefields. Between this outpost line and the First Defense Belt a series of fire trenches had been constructed all across the front in the sector. MG Salah Halabi, the Corps Commander, planned to use his Ranger Regiment to sabotage the fire trenches in the zone of attack. Then the 3rd (Egyptian) Mechanized Division would attack, conduct a deliberate breach of the minefields, and continue to the north to seize Al Abraq and the headquarters of 1st Iraqi corps. The 4th Armored Division would pass through the breach and continue the attack to the northeast.

To carry out the deliberate breach, the Corps had the following countermine equipment:

 8 full-width mine rakes, mounted on M-60 tanks with blades

 18 MICLIC trailers

 64 MICLIC charges (6 of these were of Egyptian manufacture and designed to detonate automatically immediately after deployment)

This countermine equipment was all placed in support of the 3rd Mechanized Division, which divided it equally between the two assault brigades, the 10th and 222nd Mechanized Brigades. Each brigade planned to clear four lanes, which were named Red 1, 2, 3, and 4 and Green 1, 2, 3, and 4.

The Egyptian Army had encountered fire trenches during their wars against Israel. In, fact, MG Salah had commanded the first assault company across the Suez Canal in 1973, when Egyptian commandos had sabotaged the Israeli system. On the night of G-1, February 23, teams of Egyptian rangers used similar techniques to sabotage the ignition systems of the Iraqi fire trenches on a four-mile front in the planned attack sector.

At about 1300 on February 24, after Gen. Schwarzkopf and Gen. Khalid decided to advance the time of the attack, MG Sulaiman met with MG Sallah at the Egyptian Corps Headquarters. At this meeting the two generals decided that, rather than disrupt the carefully prepared plans for the assault by trying to change all the times on such short notice, the Egyptians would make a two-battalion "raid" on the Iraqi outpost line and its minefields. MG Sallah decided to use two tank battalions from the 99th Armored Brigade of the 3rd Mechanized Division to conduct this raid and shifted countermine equipment to them for this operation.

Two hours later, at 1500 hours, the Egyptian artillery began a 20-minute preparation, which included fire from BM-21 multiple rocket launchers as well as fire from 122mm and 155mm guns. As soon as the preparation ended, two battalions of the 99th Armored Brigade attacked through gaps in the berm which engineers had cut the day before. The four lead tanks in each battalion were equipped with mine rakes and towed MICLICS. The attack was made slightly to the left of the sector where the rangers had sabotaged the fire trenches. Hence, when the Iraqis ignited the remaining fire trenches, the flames concealed the advancing troops. The breaches of the outpost line minefields were made between Iraqi strongpoints, far enough from each so that they could not bring effective fire on the attacking force. The raid was quite successful. By sunset on February 24 the 99th Armored Brigade had opened four lanes and was through this minefield. The plan called for the tanks to drop the rakes after passing through the minefield. They were to be picked up by the following mechanized brigades, which were to conduct the breach of the two principal mine belts. This plan proved too complicated, and the complete tank-rake systems were actually transferred to the following mechanized brigades.

The two mechanized brigades of the 3rd Mechanized Division followed the two tank battalions through the outpost minefield. In order to be in position to assault the First Defense Belt at the planned point, they needed to move slightly to the right, to the location where the Egyptian Rangers had sabotaged the fire trenches. By this time, however, darkness had fallen, and the two-kilometer space between the outpost line and the first fire trenches was extremely congested. The two brigades became intermingled, and the confusion required some time to sort out. Fortunately, the fire trenches had mostly burned out by this time, and Iraqi artillery fire was unobserved, sporadic, and ineffective. By dawn on February 25, the brigades were in position to launch the assault on the First Defense Belt.

The assault was conducted by the 10th Mechanized Brigade on the left and the 222nd on the right. Both brigades had recovered the mine rakes from the 99th Armored Brigade; thus each brigade had four tanks with mine rakes. Each of these tanks also towed a MICLIC trailer and each was followed by an engineer M113A1 towing another MICLIC. Each of these breaching teams was assigned to one of the eight planned breach lanes. In addition, each of the breaching brigades had two additional engineer platoons attached for the breach. The minefields in this area were only 70 meters deep, so one MICLIC was sufficient to make the breach in most cases. Even though the fire trenches in the breach sector had been sabotaged, they remained obstacles, since they were six to eight feet deep. Some of the trenches were bypassed, but Armored Vehicle Launched Bridges (AVLB) were used to cross most of them. The two minefield belts were 100 to 150 meters apart in this area. Hence, the Egyptians continued the breaching operation through both minefields without a significant pause. During the breaching operation two platoons of tanks in each brigade provided suppressive fire. Nevertheless, the breaching forces and the accompanying infantry received indirect artillery fire for about 45 minutes before counterbattery fire could suppress the Iraqi artillery.

The breaching forces encountered some problems, especially in the leftmost lane, Red 1. The breaching tank assigned to this lane backed up and tipped the MICLIC trailer on its side. Then the tank continued forward without the crew realizing that the trailer was being dragged in its side. When the tank attempted to fire this MICLIC, the explosion caused extensive damage to the tank, although no Soldiers were killed. In addition, a MICLIC charge on a trailer behind an M113A1 blew up, killing two Soldiers and injuring several others. As a result of these difficulties, Lane Red 2 was opened much more quickly than Red 1. The breaching tank from Red 2 moved to Lane Red 1 and successfully breached the minefield from the enemy side. Its rake hit seven mines (some AT and some AP) without missing any, but its effectiveness after seven hits was questionable. In spite of these difficulties and the continuing Iraqi artillery fire, the Egyptians completed eight lanes soon after noon.

As soon as the lanes had been cleared through the minefields, the two mechanized brigades passed through and prepared to attack the Iraqi trench lines, which were located about 500 meters behind the Second Minefield Belt. The 10th Mechanized Brigade attacked to the left and the 222nd to the right to roll up the Iraqi defenses. The Iraqis appeared ready to mount a defense, but as soon as the Egyptians came within small arms range white flags appeared. Soon more than 1,500 Iraqis had surrendered, and the Egyptians spent most of the afternoon of February 25 collecting the remnants of the 20th Infantry Division.

Although some Iraqi small units in the outpost line fought well, most of the Iraqi units facing JFC-N were fighting without leadership. Most field grade officers and Ba'ath party members had left their units to attend mysterious "important meetings" elsewhere. Others simply left. They either left orders for the next few days or telephoned their orders to the units -- in many cases from Baghdad. For the Iraqi units they left, this made resistance much more difficult and surrender much easier.

To protect the breach site, the 10th Brigade set up blocking positions to the left and the 222nd Brigade to the right. The 99th Armored Brigade followed the two mechanized brigades through the minefields and set up blocking positions against any counterattack from the north. Preparing to continue the attack, the engineers of the 3rd Division widened the lanes to expedite the passage of the 4th Armored Division. By the end of the day on February 25, the Egyptians had successfully breached the Iraqi obstacle system and were preparing to continue the attack. Their casualties had been quite light: some 11 killed and 84 wounded, mostly from artillery fire during the breaching operation.

5. VII (U.S. Army) Corps

a. Sector, Mission, and Plan of Attack

The VII (U.S. Army) Corps, with one mechanized and three armored divisions and heavy artillery and engineer support, made the main effort. It was assigned a 115 km sector just west of the Wadi al-Batin, which formed the boundary between Kuwait and Iraq. See Figure 24. The mission of the corps was to break through the Iraqi defenses and attack to the north. After outflanking the Iraqi units defending in Kuwait, the Corps would pivot and attack to the east to destroy the Iraqi Republican Guard Divisions located in northern Kuwait and across the border in Iraq. The VII Corps attack was originally scheduled for G+1, February 25, just as was that of JFC-N. By midmorning on February 24, however, the marines and JFC-E were advancing so rapidly that Gen. Schwarzkopf Advanced the time of the attack. Consequently, VII (U.S. Army) Corps actually attacked at 1500 hours on February 24.

LTG Franks' plan included a feint and an envelopment, much like the overall theater ground plan. On the east flank of the corps, the 1st Cavalry Division, still the theater reserve at this time, would conduct a series of feints and limited attacks at the Wadi al-Batin to convince the Iraqis that the main corps attack would come at this point. While Iraqi units reinforced against these attacks, the 1st Infantry Division would conduct a deliberate breach of the Iraqi Defense Belt farther to the west, along the division boundary between the Iraqi 48th and 26th Infantry Divisions. The 1st (UK) Armored Division would follow the 1st Infantry Division through the breach and then turn to the east to destroy the Iraqi armored reserves threatening

Figure 24. VII (US) Corps Sector and Operations on February 24, 1991

the right flank of the corps. The 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment would lead the 1st (US) Armored and the 3rd (U.S. Army) Armored Divisions around the lightly defended Iraqi west flank.

b. 1st (U.S. Army) Infantry Division

The 1st Infantry Division's deliberate breach of the Iraqi Defense Belt was obviously a key to the success of the VII Corps attack. Consequently, it was planned very carefully and rehearsed several times. MG Rhame, the division commander, planned to concentrate his forces on a very narrow front and support the attack with massed artillery fires. The two lead brigades would mass their forces on a narrow front, penetrate the defenses, and then roll up the flanks to enlarge the breach. The division massed 241 tanks and more than 100 M2 Bradleys on a frontage of 6 kilometers -- a density recalling those of World War II battles. At the points of penetration, U. S. mechanized battalions were attacking Iraqi platoon positions. Moreover, the Americans knew precisely where the Iraqi positions were located. The Air Force had produced extremely detailed aerial photographs of this area, and these had been supplemented by photographs from satellites and from low level drones. Figure 25 compares the U. S. Intelligence information on some of these positions with captured Iraqi diagrams of the same positions. The captured Iraqi commander of the 110th Infantry Brigade of the 26th Infantry Division ruefully commented that the Americans had more accurate information on the location of his troops than was available to him.

This detailed information on Iraqi positions made the planned artillery fires very effective. To support the attack, a tremendous amount of artillery was available. In addition to the division artillery of the 1st Infantry Division and that of the 1st (UK) Armored Division, three entire artillery brigades and 10 Multiple Launched Rocket System (MLRS) batteries were allocated to support the attack. This amounted to more than 350 howitzers or 22 guns for each kilometer of the attack zone. This density also approached that of World War II battles -- at Kursk, for example, the Russian 6th Guards Army had 26.3 guns and mortars per kilometer of front. Originally, the U. S. fire plan called for a three-hour fire support program before the attack, but this was shortened to an intense 30-minute barrage when the time of the attack was advanced.

The division also did a great deal of planning and rehearsal for the actual breaching operation. To be sure, the Iraqi Defense Belt at this point was not nearly so formidable as in the marine or Egyptian Corps sectors. There was only one belt of minefields, and

Figure 25. Iraqi Positions Facing 1st Infantry Division: U. S. Intelligence Template and Iraqi Diagram

each of the minefields was reported to be less than 100 meters deep. Nevertheless, the 1st Division planners treated the breaching problem with great seriousness. At first, they planned to breach lanes in the minefields by using three tanks with Track Width Mine Plows in echelon. Each of the following two tanks would slightly overlap the path of the lead tank to create a cleared lane at least two tank widths wide. Although this approach was in accordance with doctrine, it did not work well in tests in the desert. The outside edge of the plows of the following tanks dug into the piles of spoil left by the lead tank, lifting the inside edges a few inches and causing the blades to pass over test mines. The first demonstrations of the MICLIC were also not very promising. One company commander noted that by January 26, he had witnessed seven MICLIC firings, only two of which worked properly. Consequently, the commanders decided to use a tank with a track width mine plow to clear each lane, with a mine roller or mine rake to proof the lane. Thus each breach team would lead with a track width mine plow, followed by a roller or a mine rake, followed by an Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge with two MICLICs, followed by an engineer squad in an M113A2. Each of the four leading battalion task forces, supported by a company of engineers, would open four one-way lanes initially, plus an additional return lane for each task force.

At 0530 hours on February 24, the 1st and 2nd Brigades moved through gaps the engineers had cut in the border berm and attacked the Iraqi security zone, a 10 kilometer deep area south of the main enemy fortifications. Their mission was to eliminate the enemy observation posts and local security patrols in preparation for the deliberate breach scheduled for the next day. Each brigade advanced with two battalion task forces leading. Each task force was spread across a 6 km front. By 0915 the operation had been completed. Opposition was light -- many of the Iraqis surrendered. Although this preliminary attack alerted the Iraqis, it blinded them as to precisely where it would come and eliminated their ability to put observed artillery fire on the advancing U. S. units. The 1st Infantry Division units regrouped and prepared for the deliberate breech the next day.

Thus when the time of the attack was advanced, the lead brigades were ready to move out, although the change produced major difficulties for artillery and logistical units. At 1400 hours a concentrated, 30 minute fire support program began. In this brief period of time some 11,000 rounds of artillery and 414 MLRS rockets, dispersing more than 600,000 explosive bomblets (Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions -- DPICM), were fired into the sector. Even though the Iraqi units were dug in, the psychological impact of the artillery preparation was enormous. As the commander of the 48th Infantry Division later described it, "The earth shook!" The targeting was also quite good. For example, artillery positions were prime targets in an effort to reduce fire on the units conducting the breach. The Iraqi 48th Infantry Division Artillery Group had had 100 guns on January 17. During the air campaign, it lost 17 guns. During the artillery preparation, every one of the remaining 83 guns was destroyed.

At 1500 hours the 1st Infantry Division began the attack, with the 1st Brigade on the left and the 2nd Brigade on the right. Each brigade attacked with two mechanized infantry heavy battalion task forces forward and a tank heavy task force in reserve. Each of the two lead companies in the leading task forces had two breaching teams. The remaining tanks and all the M2 Bradleys put suppressive fire on the Iraqi positions. The breaching followed the drills which had been rehearsed many times. A tank with its Track Width Mine Plows lowered led each team through the minefield. In the 2nd Brigade these were followed by tanks with rollers to proof the lanes. In the 1st Brigade, however, Combat Engineer Vehicles with mine rakes were used. Engineers dismounted from their M113A2s to mark the lanes. The AVLB mounted MICLICs stood by, ready for use in case of problems, but none were fired during the breach. (However, one MICLIC was later fired on a protective minefield located 3 kilometers northwest of the breach zone.) The remainder of the task force's tanks and Bradleys followed through the sixteen cleared lanes. As soon as each of the tanks with blades reached the trench lines, each turned 90 degrees and drove down the trench, filling it in. The other tanks and the Bradleys provided covering fire. No infantry dismounted to clear the trenches. Figure 26 shows detailed sketches of the breaching operation conducted by Company D, 3rd Battalion, 37th Armor as part of the 2nd Brigade. The same drill was used by the other breaching companies, except that the units of the 1st Brigade used mine rakes instead of mine rollers. While the two breaching task forces in each brigade enlarged the breach, the tank heavy task force in reserve, the 4th Battalion, 17th Armor and the 1st Battalion, 34th Armor, passed through the breached lanes and fanned out to deepen the bridgehead. They destroyed scattered artillery positions, several trucks, and a number of bunkers and machine gun positions. By the end of the day the 1st and 2nd Brigades had reached Phase Line Colorado, about 20 kilometers beyond the Iraqi front line of defense. During the night, the 1st Infantry Division took up defensive positions and prepared to continue the attack the next morning.

Figure 26. Breaching Operation Conducted by Company D, 3rd Battalion, 37th Armor

As soon as the combat forces of the two lead brigades had passed through the minefields, corps engineers of the 588th and the 317th engineer battalions began widening the cleared lanes to facilitate the passage of the 3rd Brigade and the 1st (UK) Armored Division. Each lane was widened to about 100 meters and marked with painted 4 by 8 foot signs, arrows, and funnel markings leading into and out of the minefield. The lanes were labeled alphabetically from left to right. Figure 27 shows how these markings appeared to a British unit making the passage on February 25. Since these corps battalions had no mine clearing equipment except hand-held mine detectors, it was fortunate that there were not many mines. (However, the British 32nd Armoured Engineer Regiment, which led one of the British columns to the breaching site, had Aardvark mine flails, but they were not needed.) In widening the 8 lanes in the 1st Brigade Sector, for example, the 317th Engineers found only about 6 mines. There were, however, large numbers of unexploded Coalition bomblets. Although these presented no danger to armored vehicles, they could disable wheeled vehicles and could be fatal to anyone on foot. During the widening operation, the engineers interrupted traffic about every 45 minutes to destroy mines and bomblets.

The 1st Infantry Division's breaching operation was very successful. Before the attack, U. S. planners had estimated that breaking through the Iraqi Defense Belt might require 18 hours and that casualties in the engineer and breaching units would be heavy -- up to 80% in some estimates. In fact, the breach was accomplished in less than two hours, and casualties were very light. (In the 1st Brigade one Soldier was killed by a bomblet and there were a few wounded. There were no casualties at all in the 2nd Brigade sector.) During the day the 1st Infantry Division had breached the Iraqi Defense Belt, destroyed two brigades of the 26th Infantry Division (434th and 110th Brigades) and captured 2,500 prisoners. The 3d Brigade was scheduled to pass through the breach at first light on February 25, followed by the 1st (UK) Armored Division.

c. 1st (U.S. Army) and 3rd (U.S. Army) Armored Divisions and 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment

As Figure 24 indicates, the 1st (U.S. Army) and 3rd (U.S. Army) Armored Divisions were assigned attack sectors to the west of the 1st Infantry Division. Their mission was to attack to the north and, moving quickly, outflank the Iraqi units in Kuwait. Then they would turn and attack to the

Figure 27. Signs for Cleared Lane November

east to destroy the Iraqi Republican Guard Divisions. Their initial objective was the Iraqi logistical base of al-Busayyah, some 120 km north of the border.

The Saddam Line, the Iraqi Defense Belts and minefields which began on the beaches of the Gulf and extended westward all along Kuwait's southern boundary, ended in the sector of the 1st Infantry Division. Hence the 1st (U.S. Army) and 3rd (U.S. Army) Armored Divisions did not face the problem of making a deliberate breach in minefields covered by fire. They did expect, however, to encounter protective and defensive minefields during the advance, and were prepared to breach them. What they were less well prepared for was the large numbers of unexploded bomblets they encountered. The first encounter with one of these bomblets occurred near the border berm, when an NBC team dismounted from their Fuchs NBC reconnaissance vehicle. One of the soldiers threw a rock at a bomblet and detonated it, injuring all three soldiers. Such bomblets remained a serious problem for the remainder of the war, and a considerable engineer effort was devoted to clearing them.

Since there were no extensive minefields or defensive positions in their sectors, the 1st (U.S. Army) and 3rd (U.S. Army) Armored Divisions conducted an advance to contact. The 1st Armored Division was assigned a 25-km sector, while the 3rd Armored Division had only a 15-km front. Hence the 1st Armored Division advanced in a wedge formation, with the 1st Brigade in the lead followed by the 2nd and 3rd Brigades abreast. Because of its narrow sector, the 3rd Armored Division advanced in a column of brigades, with each brigade in a wedge formation. In both divisions each brigade had an engineer battalion in support, and the engineers were positioned well forward to provide in-stride breaching, breach marking, and other mobility support. The 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment advanced about 30 minutes ahead of the two armored divisions to clear minor enemy forces and locate any major ones. The regiment had been reinforced with the 82nd Engineer Battalion and three artillery battalions, in addition to its organic engineers (the 84th Engineer Company) and artillery.

The Line of Departure for the two armored divisions was the berm which marked the boundary between Saudi Arabia and Iraq. At 0530 on February 24, 16 dozers of the 19th Engineer Battalion, a Corps battalion, began cutting breaches in the berm. By noon they had cut 45 lanes, each 8 meters wide, through the berm and by mid afternoon more than 250 lanes. At 1430 lead elements of the two armored divisions began crossing the berm. The 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment had moved through the berm the day before and was already some 20 kilometers inside Iraq. On February 24, the regiment began its advance at 1430 hours. An aerial screen from the 4th Squadron and a thin line of Bradleys led the way. The 1st and 3rd Squadrons followed on line 10 kilometers behind, with a denser formation of M2 Bradleys and M1 Abrams tanks. They advanced rapidly -- more than 40 kilometers in two hours. They encountered no minefields and only light opposition, although some of the lead elements fought fleeting engagements with small Iraqi units during the afternoon. For example, Troop L on the regiment's eastern flank reported nine engagements over a space of twenty kilometers against T-55 tanks, BMPs, infantry, and bunkers. They destroyed one T-55, a PT-76 light tank, and a BMP and took 300 prisoners. Behind the cavalry screen the leading brigades of the armored divisions began moving through the berms. By 1800 hours the lead elements had advanced some 15-20 km into Iraq. However, the berms continued to act like filter and slow down the divisions, in spite of the large number of passages cut. A U. S. armored division is a large organization, with more than 8,000 vehicles. The 1st Armored Division in wedge formation stretched about 80 kilometers from front to rear, and the 3rd Armored Division, in a column of brigades, over 100. Thus much of the divisions' combat power was still in Saudi Arabia at the end of the day. After discussions with his division commanders, LTG Franks decided to halt the advance of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment to allow time for the armored divisions to close up. The attack would continue at dawn the next day.

6. XVIII (U.S. Army) Airborne Corps

a. Sector, Mission, and Plan of Attack

The XVIII (U.S. Army) Airborne Corps was the westernmost corps of the Coalition Forces. Its mission was to defend the western flank, to attack to the Euphrates River to cut Highway 8, the principal line of supply and withdrawal of the Iraqi forces in Kuwait, and then to attack to the east to assist VII (U.S. Army) Corps in the destruction of the Iraqi Republican Guard armored and mechanized divisions. To accomplish this mission, the corps was assigned an unusually disparate collection of forces: a French light armored division, an American Airborne division, an American Air Assault division, an American mechanized infantry division, two American aviation brigades, and an American armored cavalry regiment.

LTG Luck and his staff developed a plan which took maximum advantage of the strong points of each of his subordinate units. The mission of protecting the Corps (and Army) western flank he assigned to the French 6th Armored Division, which had two regiments (battalion-sized formations) of heavy armored cars mounting 105mm guns, one regiment of AMX-30 tanks, and infantry and engineers mounted in VAB wheeled wheeled armored personnel carriers. The division was given operational control of the 2nd Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division, transported by wheeled trucks, to provide additional infantry. The French division was also supported by the U. S. 27th Engineer Battalion and 18th Artillery Brigade. The mission of attacking quickly to the Euphrates to cut Highway 8 was assigned to the 101st Air Assault Division, with its hundreds of helicopters. The 24th Mechanized Infantry Division was to attack through Iraqi forces in its sector to the Euphrates and then turn east to attack the Republican Guard Forces. The 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment would protect the right flank of the corps and maintain contact with the forces of VII Corps. The remainder of the 82nd Airborne Division, mounted in trucks, would follow the French 6th Armored Division. The attack was scheduled for G-Day, February 24. Figure 28 shows the plan for the initial attacks.

b. 6th (FR) Armored Division (Daguet)

There were very few roads or trails in the entire XVIII Corps area. In the 6th (FR) Armored Division sector, however, the Iraqis had constructed a paved, two-lane road from Sammawah on the Euphrates River south to the Saudi Arabian border near Rafha. At the small town of As Salman this road connected with another highway parallel to the Euphrates and to the border. In an area without other roads, these were naturally a focus for XVIII Corps logistical planners, who needed high speed routes for their many wheeled vehicles. The north-south route was called Main Supply Route (MSR) Texas, and the east-west route MSR Virginia. The roads also attracted the concern of Iraqi planners. Although they did not anticipate major operations west of the Wadi al-Batin, they recognized that the north-south road through As Salman would provide a possible route of approach into the heart of Iraq. Hence the Iraqi 45th Infantry Division, a veteran of the Iran/Iraq War, was assigned responsibility for its defense. The division headquarters was at As Salman, and two of its brigades were located on the north-south route. (The third brigade was located in the 101st Airmobile Division sector.)

The 6th (FR) Armored Division was assigned the mission of attacking the Iraqi forces in its sector, seizing the airfield and road junction at As Salman, and defending the west flank of the XVIII Airborne Corps. To accomplish this objective, BG Janvier, the division commander, and his staff developed a rather complex plan, which is shown in Figure 29. The French planned to attack along two parallel axes. The main effort, with the tank regiment, a mechanized infantry regiment, and the 2nd Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division, would be

Figure 28. XVIII Airborne Corps Plan of Attack

Figure 29. Overall Scheme of Maneuver for the 6th (FR) Armored Division

in the east, where the road and the bulk of the Iraqi forces were located. As Salman, with its airfield and the headquarters of the Iraqi 45th Infantry Division was Objective White. The location of the forward elements of two Iraqi brigades was Objective Rochambeau. On the west axis the principal forces were two armored cavalry regiments equipped with the AMX-10RC, a six-wheeled heavy armored car with a 105mm gun. This force would screen against any attack from the west and would be in a position to assist the main effort by attacks from the flank should this be necessary. The objectives shown on this axis were possible locations of Iraqi company positions. Both forces would have massive artillery support. In addition to the French artillery regiment assigned to the division and the division artillery of the 82nd Airborne Division (with 105mm howitzers), the American 18th Artillery Brigade (with 155mm howitzers and MLRS) provided direct support. Thus the division had about 100 guns and rocket launchers to support its attack. The French artillery commander commented that no French division in history had ever had so much artillery support. Additional fire support was provided by the two French combat helicopter regiments and the U. S. Air Force.

The terrain did not favor the attack. Just north of the frontier was a steep natural escarpment that stretched all across the division sector. This escarpment was accessible to vehicles only at a few passes without considerable engineer effort. The southern objectives shown on Figure 29, Nachez, Falcon, and Montcalm, represented seizing the passes and controlling the escarpment in order to launch the attack. A relatively few troops on the escarpment, with the passes mined, could easily conduct an effective defense and inflict significant losses on the attacker. BG Janvier, the division commander, was quite concerned about the danger of mines. He wrote, "Mines and chemical weapons are my principal worries. Undoubtedly mines will be located in the passes that I must seize in order to launch the attack. There will probably also be mines in front of the defense positions, where the Iraqis are thoroughly dug in. There will probably also be mines around the airfield at Al Salman."

To defeat the mine threat, the French had three remote-controlled AMX-30 tanks equipped with KMT-5 mine rollers, in addition to hand-held mine detectors and probes. In addition, six U. S. MICLICs from the 27th Engineer battalion were attached. These were towed by French VAB wheeled armored personnel carriers of the 6th Foreign Legion Engineer Regiment. Two U. S. engineers rode inside the armored personnel carriers to launch the MICLICs. The mine rollers and the MICLICs were expected to be very useful in case extensive minefields were found in the flat terrain to the north, but neither would be very effective in clearing mines from the passes in the escarpment.

Fortunately, the Iraqis decided not to mount a serious defense of the escarpment. The commander of the Iraqi 45th Division decided instead to position his major forces astride the highway, with the 841st Brigade east of the highway and the 842nd Brigade on the west. The escarpment was occupied only by the light forces of the 17th Border Guard Brigade, who had neither the forces nor the will to mount a sustained defense. On the night of 23/24 February the 6th Division seized the critical passes in a series of infantry small unit engagements. The 2nd Foreign Legion Infantry Regiment took Objective Nachez, the 2nd Brigade of the 82nd Airborne captured Objective Falcon, and the 3rd French Marine Infantry Regiment occupied Objective Montcalm. There was very little opposition, and no significant mining. However, MSR Texas was cratered at the top of the escarpment. The Border Guard withdrew very quickly and played no further part in the campaign.

The main offensive began at first light on February 24, after an artillery and air bombardment. By 1130 hours the French had reached the Iraqi position at Objective Rochambeau. The Iraqis were dug in on both sides of the highway. Instead of attacking straight up the highway, the 4th Dragoon (Tank) Regiment swung to the east and attacked from the flank. The Iraqis were unprepared to face an attack from this direction and, after a brief firefight, began surrendering in large numbers. Although the French identified what appeared to be protective minefields, these proved to be either dummy minefields or dud bomblets. One member of the 6th Foreign Legion Engineer Regiment, however, was wounded by a bomblet while checking one of these minefields -- the first French casualty of the operation. By the end of the day, the French were in possession of Objective Rochambeau, except for its northern tip, which was called Objective Chambord. Their advance toward Objective White and As Salman was delayed more by the large numbers of surrendering Iraqis than by Iraqi opposition or minefields -- by 1700 hours they had captured more than 2,000 prisoners of war.

On the west axis the French encountered a number of company and platoon positions but no minefields and no significant opposition. In the Iraqi positions they found abandoned food, water, ammunition, and even weapons. Hence the French forces advanced rapidly during the February 24 through Objectives Pollux, Nimes, and Valence. By the end of the day they had reached Objective Castor and were prepared to assist in the attack on Objective White the next day.

Thus on the first day of the ground war the French had been very successful. They had seized their planned objectives and destroyed about half the combat power of two brigades of the 45th Division. They were poised for an assault on As Salman and its airfield and road junction on the following day. Although the French had been quite concerned about possible Iraqi minefields and were prepared to breach them, they actually encountered only some small protective minefields.

c. 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)

The objective of the 101st Airborne Division, Highway 8 just south of the Euphrates River, was too far north to be supported from the division's base in Saudi Arabia. Consequently, the division planners decided to establish an intermediate base, Forward Operating Base (FOB) Cobra about 90 miles north of the border. The location they selected was just south of the east-west road which began at As Salman (MSR Virginia) and was only about 35 kilometers from that town. MG Peay planned to seize the area with his 1st Brigade, bring in supplies both by land and by helicopter, and use the base to cut Highway 8.

The helicopters for the initial assault were scheduled to take off at 0530 hours on G-Day, February 24, but they were delayed for two hours because of dense fog. At 0727 hours the 66 UH-60L Blackhawk and 30 CH-47D Chinook helicopters carrying the first 500 soldiers took off. Forty minutes later they began to touch down in the landing areas. After touchdown the infantry fanned out to secure the landing areas and the artillerymen prepared their 105mm howitzers to fire. The landing was unopposed. Only two minutes after the infantry had landed, support troops began arriving to set up refuel points. At about 1000 hours, however, AH-1S Cobra attack helicopters reported Iraqi troops dug in along the east-west road. This was the 1st Battalion, 82nd Brigade of the 45th Iraqi Infantry Division. After an intense bombardment by Air Force A-10s, Cobra and Apache helicopters, and 105mm artillery, the Iraqi battalion commander and his 340 men surrendered. The afternoon was devoted to bringing in more troops and supplies. Eventually more than 300 helicopter sorties were used to ferry troops and equipment into FOB Cobra in one of the largest Air Assault operations in military history. In addition, a convoy of some 700 vehicles arrived soon after dark. Their arrival marked the opening of a land supply route, MSR New Market, cut through the desert by the division's 326th Engineer Battalion. They had encountered no mines and relatively few bomblets. By the end of the day, FOB Cobra was secure and helicopters operating from FOB Cobra had begun to attack traffic on Highway 8.

d. 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment

In the XVIII Corps plan the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) had the central role of blocking the route south of the Euphrates River with heavy forces to prevent the escape of Iraqi forces in Kuwait and then attacking to the east in coordination with VII Corps to destroy the Republican Guard armored and mechanized divisions. This mission would require the division to move farther and faster than the other mechanized and armored divisions in the theater. However, the division sector contained no fortified Iraqi Defense Belt, no extensive minefields, and, in the portion of the sector close to the Saudi border at least, virtually no Iraqi forces. The division's west flank would be protected by the 101st Airborne Division, which was scheduled to advance even more quickly. The division and Corps east flank would be covered by the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, which would maintain contact with VII Corps.

Like the VII Corps and JFC-N, the 24th Division was originally scheduled to attack on G+1, February 25. Because of early coalition success, however, the time of the attack was advanced to 1500 hours, February 24. General McCaffrey began the division attack with three brigades on line: the 197th Infantry Brigade on the left, the 1st Brigade in the Center, and the 2nd Brigade on the right. Each brigade had an entire combat engineer battalion attached. Six hours before the main attack the division's reconnaissance unit, the 2nd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, had moved across the border and begun scouting to the north along the two axes of advance, X-ray on the left and Yankee on the right. The reconnaissance produced little evidence of the enemy, and the rapid advance of the brigades confirmed the scouts' reports. About 45 km. into Iraq the division transitioned into a formation with two brigades abreast and the 1st Brigade following the 2nd Brigade on the right.

During this advance, battalions of the 24th Division generally moved in "battle box" formation, with a cavalry troop screening 5 to 10 miles to the front and four companies in the corner positions. Heavier units of the battalion -- tanks or Bradleys -- occupied the front corners. One company often advanced outside the formation to provide flank security. Inside the box were the logistical vehicles carrying the ammunition, food, water, and fuel needed to continue the advance in jumps of about 40 miles. The box covered a front of about 4 to 5 miles and extended about 15 to 20 miles front to rear.

Following the armored cavalry screen, the division advanced rapidly to the north, maintaining a speed of 25 to 30 miles per hour. In the flat, virtually featureless terrain, the brigades and battalions kept on course with the aid of long-range electronic navigation, a satellite based triangulation system in use for years before Desert Storm. Some small units also had commercial Global Positioning Systems (GPS). Of course, many follow-on and logistical units did not have this equipment. To prevent their getting lost, engineers from the 36th Engineer Group marked the routes with blinking, light-sensitive yellow construction lights mounted on engineer stakes. Combat Heavy Battalions of the 265th Engineer Group assumed the mission of improving these routes for wheeled traffic.

About midnight MG McCaffrey halted his lead brigades about 75 miles inside Iraq, on a line roughly as far north as Objective White (As Salman) in the French 6th Division Sector and just south of Forward Operating Base Cobra in the 101st Airborne Division Sector. Thus on February 24, all three divisions of XVIII Airborne Corps had established positions deep inside Iraq and were poised to continue the attack on the following day. Only the 6th Armored Division had encountered any serious opposition, and even this was much lighter than had been anticipated. Unlike the situation farther to the east, there were few Iraqi minefields in the XVIII Airborne Corps sector and they had little effect on the operations on February 24.

7. Summary of Operations on G-Day, February 24

As they prepared to launch the ground offensive on G-Day, February 24, the Coalition Forces faced a formidable task. From the beaches of the Persian Gulf to a point west of the Wadi al-Batin the Iraqis had constructed two formidable Defense Belts with deep minefields and prepared entrenchments. Although the Coalition Forces had procured additional countermine equipment and trained intensively to breach these defense belts, they expected to have difficulties and feared that casualties might be heavy. At the end of the day, however, the Saudi Arabian forces, the two marine divisions, the Egyptian 3rd Mechanized Division, and the U. S. 1st Infantry Division had all succeeded in breaching the Iraqi defense belts and were poised to continue the attack. Casualties had been remarkably light. Farther to the west, where there were no extensive fortifications and minefields, the French 6th Armored Division, and the U. S. 101st Airborne and 24th Mechanized Infantry Divisions were moving quickly around the flank of the Iraqi defense and were already threatening the Euphrates River valley and the Iraqi lines of communication with their forces in Kuwait.

Figure 30. 24th Mechanized Division Attack on February 24, 1991

To be sure, even after the Coalition Forces had breached the main Iraqi Defense Belts, many other Iraqi minefields remained. But their tactical importance was much less. Instead of two dense belts of minefields, covered by artillery and small arms fire and stretching across the entire southern border of Kuwait, what remained was only a number of relatively small protective and nuisance minefields. Many of these could be bypassed relatively easily as the Coalition Forces continued their advance. By the end of the day on February 24, the Coalition Forces had essentially resolved the bulk of their problems with the Iraqi minefields.

M. FEBRUARY 25, 1991 (G+1)

1. Joint Forces Command East (JFC-E)

At dawn on February 25, Joint Forces Command East (JFC-E) resumed their advance. Task Forces Othman and Omar continued their advance north against the light resistance of the Iraqi 18th Infantry Division and with very few casualties. Their advance was slowed more by the large number of Iraqis who surrendered than by organized Iraqi resistance. By evening they had reached Schuaiba and Ahmadi, about 10 km. south of Kuwait International Airport. Task Force Abu Bakr, the 2nd Saudi Arabian National Guard Brigade, continued to advance up the coastal highway. The number of roadblocks and barriers diminished as they moved north. The Saudi Arabian Marine Battalion of Task Force Tariq liberated the Kuwait Naval Base of Ras Al-Jalayh. Late in the evening the Kuwaiti Resistance reported that the Iraqis were withdrawing from Kuwait City, and the Kuwaitis began organizing a reconnaissance force to verify these reports.

2. 1st marine expeditionary force (MEF)

a. 1st marine division