PPT Slide
IDF Colonel David Eshel writes:
"The Israeli command had anticipated the possibility of a well executed crossing in their operational concepts. A plan based on the techniques of Soviet forced river crossing operations was well known to Israeli intelligence; even a film of such a river crossing maneuver was available and shown in training. But in actuality, surprise was complete - tactically as well as technically. The Israelis were neither prepared psychologically nor militarily to accept the fact that the Egyptian Army was capable of effectively mounting such an intricate operation.”
The fact that there would not be extensive air support came as a great shock to the Israeli troops who, lacking the vast artillery forces of their opponents, had been trained to take air support for granted...
So, although we were not prepared, we attacked with part of our forces on 8th October, just as they arrived, and again that was a mistake because we did not have the power, and again we suffered great losses. Only later did we decide to organize first and to switch to an offensive, when we were prepared to concentrate all our forces.”