Slide 4 of 158
Spies
I never had any thought . . . when I set up the CIA, that it would be injected into peacetime cloak-and-dagger operations. Some of the complications and embarrassment that I think we have experienced are in a part attributable to the fact that this quiet intelligence arm of the President has been so removed from its intended role . . .
HARRY TRUMAN
Everywhere -- and the United States is no exception -- there are criminals who will do anything for money. But it is one thing to murder a creditor, a Senator or a jealous husband, and quite another to assassinate the President of the United States.
Hired killers are rarely employed by a parapolitical or paramilitary group. They are much too dangerous. Their connections, their morals, and their insatiable avarice pose too many problems for a responsible organization. On the other hand, a number of individuals active in groups like the John Birch Society, the Patrick Henry Association, and the Christian Crusaders would be only too happy to volunteer for an ideological crime. But, although successful assassinations have on occasion been the work of fanatics, serious-minded conspirators would prefer not to rely on idealists. History tells us why.
The Tsar's Prime Minister, Stolypin, was shot to death in 1911 during a performance of Rimsky-Korsakov's "Tsar Saltan" at the Kiev Opera.(1) The assassin, a lawyer named Dimitri Bogrov, was convinced he had acted in the cause of freedom, and many others before him had sacrificed themselves in the struggle against the Tsars. But fanatics like Bogrov who are prepared to die for a cause are few indeed, and the nihilists lost more men than the imperial families.
Today, professional soldiers and guerrilla warriors have taken up where the nihilists left off. They are just as courageous, but often less successful. In Germany, in 12 years of Nazism and 5 years of war, despite the Kreisau Circle and the numerous groups that claimed in 1946 to have belonged to the underground, despite the work of the Allied intelligence services and the plots hatched by several high-ranking officers of the Wehrmacht and the OKW, Hitler was never assassinated. Two officers, however, tried.
The first planted a bomb on one of Hitler's aides, claiming it was a bottle of cognac. The bomb was due to go off in the plane carrying the Fuhrer to the eastern front, but it failed to explode. The assassination attempt was never discovered. It was publicized later by its author, who meanwhile had recovered his "bottle of cognac."
The second, more serious attempt was the work of Colonel Klaus Yon Stauffenberg. His failure dealt a deathblow to the plot of July 20, 1944. Stauffenberg either didn't dare or didn't care to shoot Hitler.(2) Instead, he placed his briefcase, containing the equivalent of a pound of TNT,(3) under the conference table where Hitler was sitting and left the room, claming he had to make a phone call. The TNT was set off by a detonator a few minutes later.
But Colonel Yon Stauffenberg, while a brilliant cavalryman, was a poor saboteur. His bomb would have killed Hitler, and probably most of the other officers present, if the conference had been held, as was usually the case at Rastenburg, in the casemate of a cement blockhouse. The closed quarters would have magnified the compression, and the explosion would have proved fatal. On that hot July day, however, the conference was held instead in a wooden barracks with the windows open. Hitler was only knocked to the floor and slightly wounded by the explosion.
Colonel Von Stauffenberg was mistaken in his choice of an explosive. TNT is excellent for blowing up railroad lines and bridges, but for this type of operation Von Stauffenberg should have used a defensive grenade of the type used by the German Army, along with a phosphorous grenade and, as an additional precaution, a bottle containing about a pint of gasoline. The explosive power of the blasting agent would have been amplified by bits of flying steel and the heat from the phosphorus and the gasoline. Regardless of where the meeting was held, the explosion would have done its work. Those officers who weren't killed immediately would have been burned alive. But despite their small chance of survival, it would nevertheless have been wise to verify the success of the operation before giving the signal for a revolt that resulted in hundreds of executions, including that of Von Stauffenberg, about whom any biographer is forced to conclude that he was a total failure as an assassin. His technical incompetence caused the collapse of the German resistance and probably cost the Allies several more months of war.
Another Colonel, the Frenchman Bastien Thiry, attempted in 1962 to avenge the honor of the French Army by assassinating General De Gaulle. He set up an ambush using submachine guns at an intersection in the suburbs of Paris one evening when the General's car was due to pass on the way to the airport. The car, an ordinary Citroen, was going about 40 miles an hour. On a signal from the Colonel (a brandished newspaper), the gunmen fired more than 100 rounds, but neither the General nor his wife nor the driver nor the security agent accompanying them was hit. The tires were shot out, but the driver accelerated immediately, and the General disappeared over the horizon.
Colonel Thiry was a graduate of the foremost scientific school in France, the Ecole Poly technique, the students of which are renowned for their reasoning power. Moreover, he was a leading aeronautical specialist and, like Von Stauffenberg, a disinterested patriot. But, as far as assassinations were concerned, he too was a failure.(4) Like Von Stauffenberg, he was executed, and from a technical point of view his failure is understandable. He was an amateur, and assassinations are not for amateurs. His plan was of interest to the men at Dallas because its target was a moving vehicle. An attack on a moving target presents special problems which we shall examine later. In any case, these are problems that can only be solved by a specialist.
The Committee needed professionals who were accustomed to planning clandestine and risky operations, and who had the proper mentality -- in other words, professionals who had not lost their amateur standing. The men best qualified for this type of job are undoubtedly the specialists of the intelligence services like the Soviet KGB and the CIA, which have a special section for assassinations. It is safe to assume that nothing is impossible or surprising in the world of espionage, in the widest sense of the term. Obstacles that would hamper organized criminals or conscientious conspirators can be overcome or avoided more easily by those who are known as "spies."
Spies! The spy trade has come a long way since A. Curtis Roth wrote in the Saturday Evening Post in 1917:
"Scientific spying knows no ethics, owns no friendships and enjoys no code of honor. It delights to operate through degenerates, international highbinders and licentious women. It shrinks before no meanness or blackguardism to attain its ends, even callously conducting official houses of prostitution for the entrapment of the unwary."
Twenty-five years later, Winston Churchill described it as "plot and counterplot, deceit and treachery, double-dealing and triple-dealing, real agents, fake agents, gold and steel, the bomb and the dagger."
Today, the cloak and the dagger have been replaced by scientific administration. Intelligence organizations, be they American or Russian, direct activities that run from routine murders to full-scale revolutions. The necessary technicians are trained and available. They can be used for official ends, but they may also be corrupted and their abilities exploited for more questionable purposes. Once we step into the world of these organizations and the individuals who work for them, it is no longer possible, as we have done in preceding chapters, to set out and analyze the facts in logical order. Espionage activities know no logic, nor is it possible to learn the entire truth. If the Warren Commission devoted several thousand pages to Oswald, it did so not only to conceal the nature and the origins of the plot, but also because Oswald, immersed in the muddy waters of the intelligence world, had anything but a simple life. The object of this book is not to study his short and picturesque history, which in the end has little significance, nor to provide a detailed description of the organization and activities of the CIA in the period between 1960 and 1963.(5) But it is necessary to know something about the CIA in order to understand the Oswald affair, and to draw together all the threads that lead to the 22nd of November.
The CIA celebrated its twentieth anniversary in September 1967. It was created on September 8, 1947, by the same law that instituted a unified Defense Department and established the National Security Council.(6) Its mission was the coordination and evaluation of intelligence information, but it immediately branched out into special operations, which took on such importance that the Plans Division was organized in 1961 to plan and carry them out.(7) In 1949 a law was passed exempting the CIA from disclosing its activities, the names and official titles of its personnel, their salaries, and the number of persons it employed. The Director of the CIA was authorized to spend his entire budget(8) on the strength of his signature, without ever having to account for the way in which it was spent.
This provision enabled the CIA to become, during the Fifties, a sort of "invisible government" which expanded its authority when Allen Welsh Dulles became Assistant Director in 1951, then Director on February 10, 1953.(9) Six months later, in August 1953, the CIA proved to the world just how powerful it had become when General Fazollah Zahedi replaced Mossadegh as Prime Minister of Iran. In 1951, Mossadegh had nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and confiscated the Abadan refinery with the support of Tudeh, the Iranian Communist Party. The CIA succeeded in having Mossadegh arrested, and the leaders of Tudeh were executed. A consortium of the major oil companies thereby signed a 25-year agreement with Iran granting 40% of the shares in the former Anglo-Iranian to Standard Oil of New Jersey, Gulf Oil, Standard Oil of California, Socony Mobil and Texaco. A few months later, in April 1955, nine other independent American companies were given a share in the operations. The CIA man who directed the operation was Kermit Roosevelt,(10) a State Department consultant for Middle Eastern and Communist affairs since 1947. When "Kim" Roosevelt left the CIA in 1958, he was hired by Gulf Oil as its "director for governmental relations." He became vice-president of Gulf in 1960. (He is also a consultant for Socony Mobil.)
Its Iranian success consolidated the power of the CIA, which in the years that followed multiplied its interventions and carried off some brilliant operations, the best-known of which took place in Guatemala and behind the Iron Curtain, where the CIA attempted to split up the Communist Bloc. It was the West German intelligence service, a step-child of the CIA, that set off the East German revolt of June 17, 1953, that was checked by Soviet intervention and caused 2,000 dead or wounded in East Berlin alone. In 1956, the CIA was behind the Hungarian uprising, which proved even more costly to the Hungarian people.
The CIA established several intelligence rings in the USSR and multiplied its special missions. Between 1956 and 1960, its U2 spy planes furnished valuable intelligence on airfields, the locations of planes and missiles, rocket experiments, special ammunitions dumps, submarine production and atomic installations.(11) In Egypt the CIA, under the cover of Ambassador Jefferson Caffrey, who was acting on instructions from John Foster Dulles, played an important role in the 1952 overthrow of King Farouk and the seizure of power by Colonel Neguib, and later in the latter's overthrow by Colonel Nasser.
In 1954, the CIA overthrew the Guatemalan regime of President Jacob Arbenz Guzman because of his "Communist leanings," and replaced him with one of their puppets, Colonel Castillo-Armas, who immediately denied illiterates (who made up 70% of the population) the right to vote and returned to Frutera(12) the 225,000 acres of land that President Arbenz had confiscated. One million acres which had already been distributed to the peasants were taken back, and a committee was created to fight communism in the country.(13)
The CIA also suffered failures -- in Indonesia against Sukarno in 1958, in Laos with Phoumi in 1960, in South Vietnam with Ngo Diem between 1956 and 1963,(14) or partial successes, as in West Germany.(15)
Nor did the CIA confine its activities to the hotspots of the world -- the Middle East, Southeast Asia, the Central and Latin American "protectorates," and the Iron Curtain countries. The CIA was naturally strongly established in the socialist countries such as Yugoslavia, and in neutral states like Austria and Switzerland, but it was also active, for economic and political reasons, in zones of international tension throughout the world. In some cases, for example in Algeria, these reasons were directly opposed.(16) In 1955, the CIA intervened in Costa Rica, one of the most stable and democratic of the Latin American nations, where it tried to overthrow the moderate socialist government of President Jose Figueres.
Thus, endowed with complete autonomy, a virtually unlimited budget, and a de facto co-directorship under the Eisenhower administration, the CIA in the period between 1953 and 1960 developed into a world power.(17) The CIA was represented in 108 different countries, commanded submarines and jet planes, and controlled 30,000 agents under the cover of diplomatic, commercial, industrial, journalistic, military, technical, labor, university and secret activities.
The CIA, of course had competition. The Soviet KGB has been described by Allen Dulles as a "multipurpose, clandestine arm of power, more than a secret police organization, more than an intelligence and counterintelligence organization. It is an instrument for subversion, manipulation and violence, for secret intervention in the affairs of other countries" (a definition that seems equally applicable to the CIA). Apparently, the budget of the KGB is about the same as that of the CIA, which means that it employs many more agents, since a Russian costs far less than an American.(18) Most of the agents employed by both organizations are "legal," which means that they have a diplomatic cover job abroad. According to Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, who was executed by the Russians in 1963 for espionage activities in favor of the United States, three-quarters of all Soviet diplomats abroad, and all of the consular personnel, are members of the KGB.
This percentage is far lower in the United States; about one-third of all American embassy and consular personnel belongs to the CIA, although the figure varies widely from country to country.(19) When Kennedy became President, an American Ambassador had no more authority over the CIA "Station Chief" in his embassy than a Soviet Ambassador had over the KGB "resident."
The CIA had infiltrated all the international organizations of which the United States was a member, even UNESCO and the FAO, and its agents operated in all the NATO centers in Europe. In 1961 the CIA was represented in every country in the world, even Iceland (where it had 28 agents and two offices, one at the US Embassy at Reyjkavik and the other at the military base at Keplavik), Uganda, Surinam, the Ryukyu Islands, and Sierra Leone. Photographs and reports from its agents poured in from all over the world to Langley,(20) where they were analyzed by photo-interpretation experts and fed into Walnut, the CIA's electronic computer.
In addition, the CIA controlled the most colossal propaganda apparatus of all times, concealed behind the names of more than 600 different companies. Hundreds of organizations were financed wholly or in part by the CIA.(21) The CIA controlled, directly or through subsidies, radio stations, newspapers, and publishing houses in the United States and throughout the world.(22) Some, like Praeger, Doubleday, and Van Nostrand, agreed to publish propaganda works such as Why Vietnam? Its influence even extended to television and the motion picture industry. Until 1956, it controlled the Near East Broadcasting Station, with the most powerful transmitter (located on Cyprus) in the Middle East, and a newspaper chain in Beirut run by a double agent for the CIA and the British Secret Service, Kamel Mrowa, that published the dailies Al Hayat and Daily Star. In 1958, it installed seven clandestine radio stations based in Aden, Jordan, Lebanon and Kenya to counter Radio Cairo and defend the "independence" of Iraq (sixth largest producer of oil in the world, and the only Arab state that is a member of the pro-Western Baghdad Pact). In North America, the CIA operated a shortwave radio station, WRUL, used to broadcast coded messages to its agents, and it had an interest in the gigantic Voice of America transmitting complex located at Greenville, North Carolina, the most powerful radio station in the world. In Europe, Radio Liberty (transmitters at Lampertheim in West Germany and Pals in Spain) employed 12,000 persons in its offices in Paris, Munich and Rome, and Radio Free Europe had 28 transmitting stations in West Germany (at Frankfurt and Munich) and in Portugal. The principal radio stations operated by the CIA in the Far East were located at Taipeh, Formosa, Seoul, Korea, and at three places along the coast of Japan. It also controlled stations in Australia and in the French-owned islands of the Pacific.
Beginning in 1955, the CIA extended its intelligence networks on the continent of Africa, which up till then, with the exception of Egypt and Libya, had been considered of secondary importance. It established itself solidly in Algeria, the Republic of South Africa, the ex-Belgian Congo, French West Africa and the. Portuguese African colonies. Latin America and the Caribbean were controlled by its American Division.
When Kennedy entered the White House, preparations were already underway for an invasion of Cuba. The project had originated with an executive order signed by President Eisenhower on March 17, 1960, authorizing the clandestine training and arming of Cuban refugees. The operation was directed by Richard Mervin Bissell, Jr., a brilliant graduate of the London School of Economics and former professor of economics at Yale who had joined the CIA in 1954 and, as director of its Plans Division, had supervised the U2 project. Bissell's original plan included the organization of guerrilla troops in Cuba itself, but the shortage of qualified volunteers and the lack of support among the Cuban population and Castro's army rendered this impossible. Instead, Allen Dulles decided on a military invasion of the island by Cuban exile forces.
The CIA immediately began looking for a suitable training site. At the beginning of April, 1960, Robert Kendall Davis, First Secretary of the American Embassy in Guatemala and the local CIA Station Chief, visited Guatemala President y digoras at his official residence, situated out of precaution on the grounds of the Guatemalan military school.(23) Ydigoras, who had no sympathy for Castro and who was also faced with a mounting budget, agreed to allow the CIA to train "special forces" on a base in Guatemala. The CIA chose the "Helvetia" coffee plantation at Retalhuleu, which covered 5,000 acres, was easy to guard, and offered 50 miles of private roads. There it established a training center for saboteurs and combat forces equipped with barracks and a swimming pool.
At the end of May 1960, the CIA met with representatives of the five Cuban exile groups, which joined in a common front, the Cuban Revolutionary Council, for which the CIA opened bank accounts in New York, New Orleans, and Miami. The majority of the Cuban exiles lived in Florida or Louisiana. Word spread quickly that something big was in the wind and that there was no lack of funds. Volunteers poured in, and a first contingent of men described as "geometrical engineers," departed for Guatemala at the end of May 1960.
The CIA provided military specialists and foreign technicians, mainly German and Japanese contractuals, to train the Cubans as radio operators, paratroopers, frogmen, saboteurs, and in the techniques of BOA.(24) In August, an airstrip was constructed, and the first planes, camouflaged as civilian aircraft, landed at Retalhuleu.(25) An airlift was established between the CIA bases in the United States and the base at Guatemala. The volunteers who applied to the recruitment offices camouflaged behind the names of various associations in New Orleans and Miami were interrogated, their background was checked, and they were tested in the training camps run by the CIA in the Everglades near Miami and on Lake Pontchartrain in Louisiana before being flown from a clandestine airport, Opa Locka or R2, to Retalhuleu.
All of these activities were conducted in that special atmosphere of mystery and secrecy so dear to intelligence people, with false identity papers, planes without lights, post office box addresses, fake license plates, security checks, "advice," and informers -- official or otherwise. Anti-Castro fanatics of bourgeois background rubbed shoulders with unemployed or hungry Cuban refugees, Castroist agents, mercenary pilots, US Marine Corps instructors, mail collectors, Japanese karate specialists, arms dealers,(26) soldiers of fortune, Army Colonels, and extremist orators. Under the scrutiny of the FBI they milled about and crossed each others' paths, play-acted, pretended not to know one another, flew, fought, talked of their island home or drugged themselves in hotel rooms, apartments, or bungalows rented by the CIA using the names of tourists or non-existent companies. From time to time, top CIA men from privileged backgrounds, exuding Anglophilia and a gentlemanly attitude, came to inspect their troops.
Across the water in Cuba, these events were followed attentively by Ramiro Valdes, chief of the Cuban Intelligence Service, and Sergei M. Kudryatsev, Soviet Ambassador to Cuba and a veteran KBG agent. The CIA knew, of course, that they knew, but the preparations dragged on. Dulles requested Bissell to speed up the training. He wanted the invasion carried out before the November, 1960 Presidential elections. But there were delays in the recruiting and training of the Cuban pilots needed to parachute supplies and carry out bombing raids.
In September 1960, despite all the extra efforts, the overtime and the bonuses, the invasion force still wasn't ready. Then bad weather intervened. The CIA realized that it would have to postpone the operation until the spring of 1961. The extra time was used for additional training and to strengthen the logistics of the operation.
On October 20th, 1960, towards the end of his electoral campaign, Kennedy declared that the United States should "attempt to strengthen the non-Batista democratic anti-Castro forces in exile, and in Cuba itself, who offer eventual hope of overthrowing Castro." This campaign position, which probably contributed to Kennedy's victory, reassured the CIA, but it placed Kennedy in an uncomfortable position when he was confronted with the impending invasion the following spring (he had been partially informed of the plan in his capacity as President-elect by Allen Dulles in November, 1960).
The invasion was a disaster. The remnants of the Cuban exile brigade were captured in Cuba. The CIA had lost the first round. The second was won a year later, in October 1962, by Kennedy, when he persuaded the Soviets to dismantle their Cuban missile bases. On December 24, 1962, 1,113 captured survivors of the invasion brigade were traded for a large quantity of medicine and drugs.(27) On December 29th, Kennedy paid homage to their courage in Miami. In January 1963, 450 of these men, including 200 officers, were retrieved by the CIA, which had begun to organize another invasion force. Once again they were sent to camps in Florida and Louisiana, where they were trained until the spring of 1963.(28)
But the CIA did not go unpunished for its failure. Kennedy had decided to take the intelligence agency in hand. He blamed it not only for the Cuban fiasco, but for activities in Central and South America and the Far East which ran counter to his foreign policy.(29) After relying during the first months of his administration on the experts, Kennedy had ordered a member of his staff, McGeorge Bundy, to represent him in Special Group 54/12.(30) But he was dissatisfied with the results. Dulles was condemned. He was allowed a few months of respite to save his face, but on November 29, 1961, he was replaced by John McCone.
The Kennedy's choice of McCone was surprising. McCone was a good Republican, but he was hardly as pure as Douglas Dillon. His entire career had been spent in the oil industry. In 1937, at the age of 35, he had been one of the founders of the Bechtel McCone Parson's Corporation of Los Angeles, which specialized in the construction of petroleum refineries and electrical power plants in the United States, Latin America and the Middle East. During the Second World War, McCone's California Shipbuilding Company(31) had earned huge profits. Later he took over Panama Pacific Tankers, a fleet of oil tankers. In 1961, he owned a million dollars worth of stock in Standard Oil of California.(32) After his appointment, he offered to sell them,(33) but the Senate Armed Services Committee concluded that this was unnecessary, although Senator Clark of Pennsylvania protested that the American oil industry, like the CIA, was deeply involved in the politics of the Middle East.
What was the reason behind Kennedy's choice? It has been suggested that "with a conservative Republican at the head of the invisible government, the President clearly thought the political fire would be somewhat diverted."(34) The fact is that the world of intelligence was repugnant to President Kennedy, although he was well aware of its power.(35) He put off this problem until later, considering it of only secondary importance. It was not resolved until after his death.(36)
In the spring of 1963, the anti-Castro invaders were killing time in Florida and Louisiana. Many of them had been surprised and disillusioned when the- Air Force and Navy planes had failed to come to their rescue in 1961 at the Bay of Pigs. Their resentment had been aggravated by their captivity in Cuba, and their CIA superiors did nothing to calm them.
In the first months of 1963, President Kennedy couldn't hold a press conference without being asked about the "16,000 or 17,000" Soviet technicians reported to be in Cuba. The President was concentrating on an end to the Cold War, which meant peaceful coexistence with the USSR and the maintenance of the status quo with Castro. But the CIA failed to take the diplomatic thaw seriously, and word never reached the lower echelons. Everything proceeded as before. In the training camps hope, money and ammunition continued to be dispensed. Preparations were speeded up, and security precautions were multiplied. The techniques of secret warfare, the post office boxes, the clandestine airstrips, the meetings in the Turkish baths and the encounters in the railroad stations, the messages in the toilets, the passwords, the pseudonyms and the smuggling flourished, all the more so since the CIA had grown suspicious of the federal government and distrustful of the DIA. Meanwhile, the FBI carefully noted every encroachment of the CIA on its territory.(37)
On October 17, 1962, in New York, the FBI uncovered and seized a cache of arms and ammunition belonging to Castroist Cubans and arrested three men, including Robert Santiesteban Casanova, an attache at the Cuban United Nations Mission. This was only one of the many episodes in the quiet but growing conflict between the CIA and the FBI over the limits of their respective jurisdictions. Their struggle for power grew steadily more serious.
To the anger of the exiles, the impatience of the CIA, and the investigations of the FBI, something else was added: the training officers who belonged to the Minutemen and other extremist organizations remained in contact with the leaders of these movements, and in particular with disgruntled military officers like General Walker.
One of the CIA men in New Orleans was named Guy Banister. A former FBI agent and member of the Minutemen, he had worked for the CIA since 1958. His office was located at 544 Camp Street. His deputy, Hugh Ward, also belonged to the Minutemen and to an organization called the "Caribbean Anticommunism League," which had been used as a CIA cover group since the Guatemalan operation in 1954. One of the people who frequented 544 Camp Street was a young man named Lee Harvey Oswald.
NOTES
3. Trinitrotoluene, a stable and very powerful explosive.
10. Theodore Roosevelt's grandson and a cousin of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.
12. A subsidiary of United Fruit.
20. Langley, Virginia, 10 miles outside Washington, where CIA headquarters are located.
24. Techniques for the recuperation and reception of personnel and supplies parachuted into an area.
32. Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on the Appointment of John McCone, January 18, 1962.
37. Their rivalry was a result not of the discrepancy in
their power on the international scale, but of the evolution of their
activities. Counterespionage in the United States is the exclusive
responsibility of the FBI, and more particularly of its secret Division
(domestic intelligence), which in 1963 was headed by William C. Sullivan.
This division is in charge of espionage, sabotage, and subversion. It
handles more than 100,000 cases a year, and it is responsible for most of the
successes (both known and unknown) in the United States in the field of
counter-espionage in the past 20 years. It was the FBI that exposed the
National Security Agency employees (Martin Mitchell, Petersen, and Sergeant
Dunlap) who were working for the Soviet Union.
The FBI had known for some time that the CIA was behind several "illegal
acts" committed on its territory, and the CIA was aware that the FBI was
behind several official denunciations that impeded its operations. The FBI
bragged that its reports were more accurate and less hysterical than those of
the CIA, while the CIA considered the FBI a bunch of choir boys.
When the CIA (which is prohibited by law from operating within the United
States) extended its activities on American soil, setting up reception centers
and training bases in several states, the resulting confusion and risk of
infiltration led to encounters, protests, and finally to blows. Soon the two
intelligence powers were setting traps for one another and organizing
reprisals.