Set-Up for Failure: U.S. Light Infantry Advisors Make Georgians into Mirror-Image Narcissists who Foot-Slog and Truck-Hop; Have Asses Handed to Them by Combined-Arms Russian Light and Medium-Weight Air-Mech Infantry with Tanks, Artillery and Aircraft

NOTE the stranded rubber tire in the foreground of the victorious MT-LB light tracks...rather fitting as the Georgian's embrace of American-style wheeled truck light infantry narcissism resulted in their defeat...


Past Georgian History Fighting Against Russia

South Ossetia is a very small place. Population 70,000, 2/3rd Ossetians (North Ossetia is part of Russia) & 1/3rd Georgians. There seems no doubt that this current round was started by the Georgian government, nor that some Russian peacekeepers have been killed

There is no readily apparent just solution here. Let it secede & then have a democratic majority vote for union with Russia & the 1/3rd of Georgians will be annoyed. On the other hand the Georgian government is clearly killing civilians which is not to be supported. On the 3rd hand, looking at the map it is clear the Georgia's boundaries would be less manageable after secession - as Russia's are after the departure of Estonia. Does Russia actually wish to be expanded by expanding a new minority group, however pro-Russian they may be?

Legally it is part of Georgia but then the same applies to Kosovo.

And that is the real problem. Georgia is a NATO satellite though, thankfully, not a NATO member or we would be committed to a war.

Georgia's Oil & Natural Gas Pipelines

Nearby Turkey's Oil & Gas Pipelines

Oil Pipelines: what the West (and neocon corporation cronies) really cares About

Damn sure the [corporation-controlled] western press will be siding with the Georgians. Before the 2 elections in the "orange revolution" in the Ukraine there were a similar 2 elections in the "rose revolution" in Georgia, with exactly the same tactics, a party with exactly the same name & equally obvious western funding of one side. The only difference was that in Georgia, the opposition, having narrowly lost the first election, with western observers crying "fraud", they won the second with over 90% of the vote, with western observers happy.

Georgia is thus now a NATO satellite. Our media, which managed to report Yugoslavia for 18 years without mentioning that the "moderate multiculturalists" we were helping were actually (ex-)Nazis publicly committed to genocide. I think they will again know which side they are supposed to report from.

The Russians cannot be expected to be neutral on this for 2 reasons. Firstly precisely because Georgia has become a western satellite in an area of the world where Russia has always been the only regional power. If they let semi-Russians be defeated, killed & possibly ethnically cleansed everybody will think they can push them around. Secondly because Kosovo has established a precedent. If NATO can grab Kosovo then what Russian government can accept that NATO has a right to tell them the same cannot happen here? This was warned at the time of Kosovo's "independence". In fact up till now the Russians have been opposed to legal secession, partly because they have stood for the rule of international law, when we have not.

Because Georgia is a NATO satellite & wishing to be a NATO member it seems unlikely that this war was started without NATO approval. If so it is an extremely stupid piece of adventurism. There is no genuine NATO interest here, unless starting a fight is in our interest. We should stand clear.

Russian Aviation expert Venik Reveals the U.S./NATO and others Subsidized Georgia's Military Built-Up--NOT TO DEFEND THE COUNTRY--but to Subjugate the South Ossetians

Georgia's Attack on South Ossetia: Washington's Role

* Aug. 15th, 2008 at 11:13 PM
For photos and the original article, please visit:

Elusive NATO Membership

At the NATO Summit in Bucharest in April 2008 Georgia was denied Membership Action Plan. Aside from Russia's vehement opposition, the key issues outlined in the NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan, accepted by Georgia in October 2004, remain unresolved. These issues are: Georgia's antiquated military equipment, insufficient training and deployability of its forces, and, most importantly, unresolved ethnic conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Georgia responded to these challenges by requesting U.S. help with training and rearming its forces. The emphasis was made on reducing the size but increasing the quantity and mobility of Georgian army battalions. [EDITOR: with wheeled trucks?] The 2007 Georgian Strategic Defense Review (SDR) outlined an overall reduction of the country's armed forces from about 28,000 personnel (excluding civilian contractors and reservists) in 2006 to just 18,755 in 2015. Despite this reduction, since 2004 Georgia has been actively acquiring modern weapons. The SDR assumption was that ethnic conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia will be settled by 2012 and Georgia will be ready to join NATO.

There was a little problem with this plan, however. President Saakashvili's second term in office is to end in 2012 and there was no guarantee that he would still be in office by the time Georgia was ready to join NATO. With military aid from the U.S., addressing the issues of training, restructuring and rearming Georgian armed forces was only a matter of sticking to the timetable worked out by American advisors. The simmering ethnic conflicts in the two breakaway republics were the big unknown. It seemed highly unlikely that either Abkhazia or South Ossetia would come under Tbilisi's control voluntarily. One option would have been to grant the two provinces wide-ranging autonomy. However, such an action would not have been accepted by Saakashvili's ultra-nationalist supporters in the parliament.

Preparing for War

As part of its rigorous rearmament program, Georgia purchased 30 x towed (122-mm D-30) and 12 x self-propelled (152-mm “Dana”) howitzers from the Czech Republic in 2006; 6 x Mi-24B/P and 2 x Mi-8MT assault helicopters from Ukraine in 2005; 31 x T-72 [EDITOR: medium] main battle tanks from Ukraine and the Czech Republic in 2005; 25 x 120-mm mortars from the Czech Republic and Bosnia also in 2005; 20 x BTR-80 [EDITOR: wheeled] armored personnel carriers from Ukraine in 2005; 12 self-propelled 152-mm 2S3M howitzers from Ukraine in 2004; one x Mi-35 assault helicopter from Uzbekistan in 2004; 40 x BMP-2 [EDITOR: tracked] APCs from Ukraine in 2004; 14 120-mm mortars from Bulgaria in 2004; 6 x 122 mm RM-70 MLRS systems from the Czech Republic in 2003; and other heavy weapons, including fast attack craft, more mortars, howitzers and helicopters. (Source: Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, August 2008; see the complete list of Georgia's weapons acquisitions since 2000 at the end of this article).

Georgia's defense budget has grown from USD $20 million in 2001 to USD $734 million in 2007 and over USD $900 million in 2008. Accounting for inflation, this is roughly a 40-fold increase in military spending in just six years. So when Irakli Alasania, Georgia's UN Ambassador, tells the UN Security Council that his country is “a small and peace-loving nation”, the logical should be: what does a peace-loving nation need with so many new howitzers, mortars, armored personnel carriers, tanks, missile boats, and helicopter gunships? According to the World Bank statistics, the GDP of Georgia has grown from USD $3.2 billion in 2001 to USD $6.39 billion in 2005. The CIA World Factbook puts Georgia's GDP for 2007 at USD $10.29 billion – an optimistic estimate so far not confirmed by the World Bank. Even so, between 2001 and 2007 Georgian military budget grew 40 times, while the country's GDP increased about three-fold. Where does Saakashvili get the cash to rearm his army?

Even if Georgia spent its entire ten-billion-dollar GDP on defense, its army still would not have been a match for the Russian military. Was Saakashvili throwing money to the wind, wasting precious resources of his impoverished nation on a hopeless stand-off with Russia? Not at all. If Georgia was getting ready to fight a war with Russia, its primary spending category would have been air defenses. However, take a closer look at the list of Georgia's weapons acquisitions over the past eight year: there are no signs of any major air defense purchases. Instead, we see lots of mortars, howitzers, tanks, helicopters, and even two landing ships. Georgia was preparing for a war against separatists in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

So what does Georgia have in terms of air defenses? According to the August 2008 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, Georgian air defenses consist of the following: “30 SA-7 Strela-2/2M (Igla) Manportable Surface-to-Air Missile, 5 ZSU-23-4 [23mm] Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Systems, 12 ZU-23-2 [23mm] Anti-Aircraft Artillery, 4 100mm Anti-Aircraft Artillery, 4 57mm Anti-Aircraft Artillery.” In other words, Georgia was hardly a threat to the Russian Air Force. Still, Georgia was able to down two Russian aircraft: an Su-25 ground attack jet and the Tu-22M3R reconnaissance plane (a version of the Tu-22M3 supersonic bomber), piloted by Col. Igor Zinov, a 50 year-old Tu-22M3 instructor pilot stationed at the Flight Test Center at Akhtubinsk. The Russians admitted the loss of the two aircraft and said that the Tu-22M3R was shot down by the Georgians using an S-200 (NATO designation: SA-5 Gammon) long-range SAM secretly purchased from Ukraine in late 2007.

The “Georgia Strikes Back With Air Defenses” article in the August 11 issue of Aviation Week cited unnamed U.S. analysts saying that “...the Georgians are probably operating the SA-11 Buk-M1 (low-to-high altitude) and the (low-to-medium altitude) Tor-1M mobile air defense missile systems.” However, neither Buk-M1 not Tor-1M are known to be in Georgia's inventory and it seems that the Aviation Week editors need to check their sources more rigorously. Regardless of the situation with the downed Russian Backfire, it is clear that Georgia did not expect to fight the Russians in any considerable numbers.

What Were They Thinking About?

According to the Georgian attack maps, obtained on August 11 by a forward unit of the Russian 4th VDV regiment from a captured high-ranking Georgian staff officer, Tbilisi's plan called for a blitzkrieg invasion of South Ossetia in the early morning of August 8, followed by a three-pronged invasion of Abkhazia on August 11, which was to involve the Georgian army's naval component. This explains Georgia's acquisitions of landing craft, naval helicopters, and high-speed missile boats. Preparations for the war against the breakaway regions, it would seem, have been carried out for years, starting during the administration of Saakashvili's predecessor – the USSR's former Foreign Minister and independent Georgia's second President Eduard Shevarnadze.

It is interesting to note, that, according to the captured plan, a major portion of the Georgian forces involved in South Ossetia was to be redeployed for the August 11 invasion of Abkhazia (at least a day's drive from South Ossetia for heavy vehicles, plus another day would have been needed for combat deployment). Evidently, Georgia's military planners did not anticipate any substantial problems in South Ossetia and fully expected the operation there to be concluded by the end of Saturday, August 9 at the latest.

It is evident that Saakashvili's generals did not expect an overwhelming military response from Russia. The Georgians timed their assault on Tskhinvali – South Ossetia's capital – to coincide with the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games. With Putin in Beijing mingling with Western heads of states, perhaps the expectation on the part of Tbilisi was of a more cautious Russian response, at least until the end of Putin's visit to China. However, it would have been extremely naïve for Saakashvili and his generals to pin all of their hopes on Putin's absence from Moscow and the ability of Bush to contain Putin's reaction. Georgia had to have something more substantial in terms of guarantees of Russia's non-involvement.

Washington's Role

On August 10 Russian news agency RIA Novosti quoted South Ossetian official representative in Moscow Dmitry Medoev saying that there were several Negroes among the Georgian troops killed during the fighting in Tskhinvali, raising speculation in the Russian press that American military or private (Blackwater is known to operate in Georgia) instructors might have been directly involved in combat.

Over the past few years, hundreds of U.S. military instructors were sent to Georgia to train Saakashvili's army. Several senior Pentagon officers were permanently stationed in Tbilisi to coordinate these training activities. According to the captured map of Georgia's planned invasion of Abkhazia, up to two-thirds of the country's entire military force were to be involved in the operation. It is inconceivable that the U.S. military personnel in Georgia was completely unaware of preparations for such a massive operation.

The Americans had to have known that Georgian artillery was preparing to slaughter hundreds of civilians in Tskhinvali. They had to have known about the large-scale movements of Georgian troops and heavy weapons. Even if American troops stationed in Georgia did not directly participate in the actual combat, there is no doubt in my mind that they knew the details of the planned massive operation against the separatists and, most likely, were involved in the planning stage of this war.

Did the Russians Know?

No matter how you look at it, this war was a huge gamble on Saakashvili's part. The headquarters of the Russian North-Caucasus Military District and well over a hundred thousand of Russia's most combat-ready units are located in Vladikavkaz – just a 20-mile drive along the Military-Georgian Road to the Georgian border. Even more Russian forces are stationed in nearby Ingushetia and Chechnya. Several large Russian Air Force bases with dozens of combat-ready aircraft are located within fifteen minutes of flight from Georgia. For Saakashvili – and, by extension, for his masters in Washington – Russian military involvement made a difference between a major geopolitical victory and a humiliating defeat. Whatever the Georgians and the Americans were planning together, they had to be sure that the Russian military was not going to interfere. The most interesting question of this war is what made them think that.

Obviously, one way to look at this situation is to acknowledge the obvious – the U.S. military personnel in Georgia knew about the planned actions against South Ossetia and Abkhazia – and to suppose that Saakashvili jumped the gun before all the preparations were completed. While it is possible that Saakashvili took an unauthorized initiative, it is extremely unlikely. Rice's recent trip to Tbilisi and the apparent ease with which she convinced Saakashvili to sign the peace deal that heavily favors Moscow is a good illustration of how well Washington controls the president of Georgia. Therefore, Saakashvili's “Olympic” jump into South Ossetia had to be, if not ordered, then at least strongly encouraged by the White House. We have to conclude that the U.S. had good reasons to believe that the Russians will not get involved; or, at the very least, that they will not have enough time to respond.

This is another good point: timing might have been the key to this operation by Georgia. The situation along the border between Georgia and South Ossetia was never calm. However, during the few weeks leading to Georgia's attack on Tskhinvali there has been an increasing number of Georgian mortar attacks against South Ossetia's territory. Some attacks were quite intense, but none were followed up by any ground operations. Any military cadet will tell you that sporadic and seemingly random shelling of your positions by the enemy is a sign of an upcoming attack. The enemy mortars your positions near the front line to identify their locations and to gauge your response tactics and your timing.

The Russians, obviously, knew about the attacks but did not respond in any obvious military way, other than with the usual diplomatic rhetoric and an occasional incursion of its fighter jets into South Ossetia. Were they being careless or did they already know about the upcoming Georgian invasion of Tskhinvali and were making preparations of their own? Some suggest that Russia's lightning-fast response and the number of forces involved is a sign that its military was ready and waiting. It's a possibility: lack of any visible reaction from the Russians to the mortar and artillery attacks by the Georgians might have convinced Tbilisi and Washington that it was safe to act. On the other hand, Russia already had huge military presence at its bases in Vladikavkaz. These are some of Russia's best troops used regularly in Chechnya.

A few days ago we all had a chance to witness Saakashvili's impressive self-preservation instincts during his PR trip to Gori. His belligerent public speeches aside, Saakashvili is not a man who would risk his political career and his life to go to war, if he was not reasonably assured of victory. My impression is – and this is strictly my personal opinion – that Saakashvili did not jump the gun but launched the invasion of South Ossetia with the express permission from Washington. I also suspect that the Russians knew about the attack in advance. They may not have known the exact timing or the details, but they made sure the tanks were fueled and the Soldiers had their milk and Wheaties in the morning.

Georgians chose to attack as the Olympic Games opened in China. If I was a Russian commander expecting a Georgian attack in the next few days or weeks, Friday, August 8, would have been marked on my calendar with a big red star. Did any of you wonder why Putin and not Medvedev went to the opening ceremony in Beijing? The Chinese press wrote on August 3 that Putin will be in China to “personally inspire Russian athletes to win gold medals”, as well as to promote the Sochi-2014 Winter Olympics. Perhaps Putin was in Beijing to inspire and promote, or maybe he had good reasons to think that Georgia would invade South Ossetia at the time of the opening ceremony and did not believe Medvedev would be able to handle Bush, Sarkozy, and Co.

-- Venik

One of Venik's readers points out that slaughtering civilians as a pre-lude to an attack to get enemy Soldiers more concerned about their families than fighting is a tactic used in the past by U.S. advisors from MPRI.

(Anonymous) wrote:

Aug. 20th, 2008 11:30 pm (UTC)

"Was Georgian attack on South Osetia meant to be another operation "Storm"? Bravo, Venik.

Keep up the good work. Good stories, insightful comments as always! You raise the million dollar question of what were the Georgians thinking and the U.S. involvement. Georgian advance on South Osetia and brutal shelling of Tshinvalli reminds me of a similar U.S. project in Croatia, retake of Serbian Krajina, the operation "Storm" in 1995. "Storm" was planned and commanded by Pentagon, working through high ranking "retired" US generals from the notorious MPRI private mercenary firm, something nobody any longer denies. MPRI was involved at different times in Georgia along with Blackwater and possibly many others. Their instructors have plenty of experience in working with "indigenous" thugs. It's not the real question who was involved from them! It is easier to say who wasn't!

The striking similarities:

1. The attack on Krajina, a UN protected zone, also started with a brutal most indiscriminate night shelling of the Krajina capitol Knin, killing 2.000 civilians and wounding peacekeepers. This was one of the important trademarks of the U.S. plan.

2. Aim of the shelling was to send most civilians fleeing from their homes never to return and become a trouble factor again. Serbs out of Croatia, Osetians to Russia. Both Serbs and Osetians were territorial armies with families at home within artillery range. By shelling their families the U.S. planners wanted to crush their willingness to fight and make them run back to homes to rescue their loved ones from rubble. It worked with the Serbs!

3. Both operations depended on the heavy use of artillery against the civilians and the overwhelming use of tanks. In Croatia, U.S. aircraft provided air support to Croats hitting Serb command centers. In Georgia, it was "a bridge too far" for the U.S. air force, but they did what they could?

4. What else went wrong? Croats and the U.S. were dealing, with at that time pliant and cooperative Serbian president Milosevic, who knew about the U.S. intent and agreed not to intervene, in spite of the whole U.S. operation turning more brutal, than anybody expected, sending over 400,000 Krajina Serbs into exile, killing 5.000, a destiny South Osetians were sure to follow if there weren't for the Russians. U.S. and MPRI officials had even won Milosevic's agreement not to militarily intervene on the side of Krajina Serbs, (which he was obliged to do by ageements) when they visited him weeks prior to operation, although the U.S. had tricked him over the fate of another Serb populated area East Slavonia. Did Georgia U.S. masters had similar plan for Abkhasia? We also have fingerprints of "Dick" Holbrooke all over the Krajina attack. What was he doing in Tbilisi last week calling into a live CNN program trying to sell his pathetic anti-Russian agenda once again? In Kosovo, he sat down on the mosque floor with the Albanian and Al-queda terrorists taking his shoes off, promoting their agenda. Anyone who has seen this picture can still feel the smell of his feet and socks! Smell of his dirty socks from Washington clearly reaches Georgia and further on as far as China! Maybe this time Georgian U.S. masters got carried away after so many color revolutions and hostile territory takeovers from peoples they see as obstacle to their global dominance?

5. The U.S. military planners fingerprints are - make no mistake - all over the Georgian attack plan on S.Osetia in 2008. as well as they had been over Croatian attack on Krajina in 1995. Any independent historian can see through this!

6. Check out the well documented history of the 1995. "Storm" and you will be able to draw many more comparisons such as the extensive use of drones prior to the assault and the artillery provocations. In Croatia drones were operated by the Americans, while in Georgia the job was outsourced to the Israelis. This outsourcing worked well in the Kosovo war? Ukraine played a key role in arming Croatia as well as Georgia. The logistics of it was clearly under close U.S. and NATO supervision.

Time of both attacks was early August. Storm was launched on August 5 and it lasted for 36 hours. The same time, that Georgians and their masters planned to engage in South Osetia, before moving on. Make no mistake, the same planners and masters are behind both attacks and we all know who they are, don't we?

Venik agrees and points out that the Georgians made a half-hearted attempt to blow up the tunnel leading from Russia into South Ossetia that failed. Most Russian troops were AIRLIFTED so even if the massive tunnel that is heavily guarded was blocked it wouldn't have stopped the Russians from invading."

Venik's reader continues:

"You are surely right about the tunnel. I mean, what is the point in leveling Tshinvalli from the American planners point of view other than killing several thousand so as to make the rest of the population run toward Roksi? U,S. obviously didn't want any Osetians left in Georgia, neither Serbs in Kosovo or Krajina. They just don't want anyone even distinctly pro-Russian behind their back close to their new bases. It only means one thing. Gearing up for a war against Russia. I think the mercenary firms such as MPRI, Blackwater, Dyncorp have become sloppy. The Generals who had them founded 15 years ago mostly sold their businesses to others cashing in. Operation "Storm" in Krajina was a brainchild of Gen. Vuono. We shall find out sooner or later which U.S. General is responsible for the "Clean field" fiasco in South Osetia... Dr Rice is supposed to be a "Russian expert", but any high school kid in the U.S. could think of a better Russia policy than she ever could. The poor thing is obviously just another sad product of affirmative action, is she? In order to make more profit, the mercenaries and the U.S. embassy in Tbilisi probably kept reporting back to Washington how training and arming of Georgians was a big success, while privately confiding over a beer or two that they wouldn't trust Georgians with turning hamburgers at McDonald's, which some of the trainers put it exactly that way. Maybe some started beleiving their own lies? But at NATO they had to know better! Could this have been a subtle Franco-German attempt to undermine the U.S.? I think that the same policy makers in the U.S., mostly the leftovers of the Clinton era have tried to replicate a "Krajina" sneak attack they once used against Milosevic, simply because they are products of years of brown-nosing without any other merit or qualities, they are complete ignorants and do not know better. After Russia responded they were simply perplexed! They will now try some new tricks or hire somebody who knows them, but it is probably to late now for the U.S. to try to revert the tide. I think that NATO messing up with the Serbs for 7 -8 years in the 90-ies bought Russia crucial time to get back on it's feet. If there wasn't for Serbia making trouble for NATO and the U.S. in Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo - Georgia may have been pushed into this adventure 5-10 years ago and NATO could have moved against Russia much faster? 9/11 could have struck the US in 1995 instead of 2001! Hitler did the same mistake loosing 4 key months on breaking Serbia just for the fun of it, delaying "Barbarossa" and we all know what happened next? But this is a "long war", not the "world war", and time scales are a little different?

2D Maneuver

August 8 - During the night and early morning, Georgia launched a military offensive to surround and capture the capital of separatist Republic of South Ossetia, Tskhinvali [55] thus breaking the terms of the 1992 ceasefire and crossing into the security zone established therein [56]. According to Russian military, some Russian peacekeepers have been killed during this attack [57]. The heavy shelling, which included Georgian rockets being fired into South Ossetia [58] left parts of the capital city in ruins, causing a humanitarian crisis which Russian government sources claimed amounted to genocide. The news of the shelling was extensively covered by Russian media prior to the military reaction that followed, as Russia claimed to have responded in defence of South Ossetians against what they called "a genocide by Georgian forces." [59] Russia claimed up to 2,000 dead in Tskhinvali following the shelling.

Georgian Military Order of Battle

18 August 2008 Updated.


Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2008 16:48:44 +0100 (BST)
Subject: Georian ORBAT update for Cryptome
You seem to have only part of the Briefing, here is an even newer version,


Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion HQ Kobuleti

(With around 205 T72 Medium Battle Tanks and 40 old T55 Medium tanks)

NOTE on Armoured units: either the Ind Tank battalion had been increased to a full Brigade with at least another two Ind Tank Battalions in addition or each of the four fully operational Infantry Brigades operated as Mechanized Brigades each with a Tank Battalion.


1st Infantry Brigade HQ Gori

2nd Infantry Brigade HQ Senaki

3rd Infantry Brigade HQ Kutaisi

4th Infantry Brigade HQ Vaziani

5th Infantry Brigade HQ Khelvachauri (not fully operational)


The Special Force Brigade is responsible for conducting reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, and counter-terrorism operations.


Artillery Brigade HQ Gori

began in earnest.


Offensive military training with large numbers of armoured vehicles, artillery and ground attack aircraft has been carried out regularly since June 2005.


Several Battalions of Special Operations Forces have received significant training and large supplies of modern military equipment from the United States in recent years.

In addition the Russians captured intact at least 65 T72 MBT, 15 BMP AIFV, many BTR80, MTLB and other AFV. Artillery including D30 and Yugoslavia. It also has a bilateral military cooperation agreement with the U.S. These underlying military agreements have served to protect Anglo-American oil interests in the Caspian sea basin as well as pipeline routes.

Both the U.S. and NATO have a military presence in Georgia and are working closely with the Georgian Armed Forces. Since the signing of the 1999 GUAM agreement, Georgia has been the recipient of extensive U.S. military aid.

Barely a few months ago, in early May, the Russian Ministry of Defense accused Washington, "claiming that [U.S. as well as NATO and Israeli] military assistance to Georgia is destabilizing the region." (Russia Claims Georgia in Arms Buildup, Wired News, May 19, 2008). According to the Russian Defense Ministry

"Georgia has received 206 tanks, of which 175 units were supplied by NATO states, 186 armored vehicles (126 - from NATO) , 79 guns (67 - from NATO) , 25 helicopters (12 - from NATO) , 70 mortars, ten surface-to-air missile systems, eight Israeli-made unmanned aircraft, and other weapons. In addition, NATO countries have supplied four combat aircraft to Georgia.

The Russian Defense Ministry said there were plans to deliver to Georgia 145 armored vehicles, 262 guns and mortars, 14 combat aircraft including four Mirazh-2000 destroyers, 25 combat helicopters, 15 American Black Hawk aircraft, six surface-to-air missile systems and other arms." (Interfax News Agency, Moscow, in Russian, Aug 7, 2008)

NATO-U.S.-Israeli assistance under formal military cooperation agreements involves a steady flow of advanced military equipment as well as training and consulting services.

According to U.S. military sources (spokesman for U.S. European Command), the U.S. has more than 100 "military trainers" in Georgia. A Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman "said there were no plans to redeploy the estimated 130 U.S. troops and civilian contractors, who he said were stationed in the area around Tblisi" (AFP, 9 August 2008). In fact, U.S.-NATO military presence in Georgia is on a larger scale to that acknowledged in official statements. The number of NATO personnel in It is worth noting that under a March 31, 2006, agreement between Tblisi and Moscow, Russia's two Soviet-era military bases in Georgia - Akhalkalaki and Batumi-

Gazeta: Georgia’s weapon supplies impress analyzers

05:19 | FOCUS News Agency

Moscow. Georgia

Georgia has bought from Bosnia and Herzegovina a shipment of long-range 262-millimetre reactive systems for fusillade M-87 Orkan MLRS. Besides, seven Grad LAR MLRS, used for shooting in 13 directions at a time at a distance of up to 45 km, were bought from Israel, from the Czech Republic – six MLRS RM-70.

What is more, from Ukraine and the Czech Republic, AGS-17 “Plamya” from Ukraine, anti-mechanized flame throwers “Fagot”, fabricated in Bulgaria and licensed in the times of the Soviet Union.


This is published in the latest edition of Military technology:

22 x Su-25KM; 13 x Su-25UB; 11 x L-39 and 2 x L-29 Ground Attack aircraft


SECOND SOURCE: 5 x SU-17, 8 x Su-25/25K, 1 x Su-25UB (other sources say 17), 9 xL29, 9 x Mi-24, 17-25 x Mi-8/17, 7 x UH-1, Israeli Hermes 450 UAV


(Unconfirmed presence of 5 x Su-17, 4 x Su-24, 12 x MiG-25, 18 x MiG-21 and numerous Su-25 airframes at the TAM Tbilisi Aerospace Manufacturing (Tbilaviamsheni” former Soviet GAZ-31 factory), at least one MiG-21UM was in flying condition. However this facility which produces the upgraded Su-25 fighter jet, with technical support from Israel was heavily bombed on several occasions during the conflict and significant damage may have resulted)


3 Combat Helicopter squadrons with

1 x Mi-35 "Hind" ; 19 x Mi-24-P "Hind" and 21 x Mi-24-V "Hind" Attack helicopters

Other units operate

18 x Mil Mi-14 ; 16 x Mi-8 "Hip"; 6 x Bell-212; 40 x UH-1H and 2 x Mil Mi-2 Transport helicopters (many of which have now been armed)


of Leninisi in 5 kilometers from downtown Tbilisi.*

Tbilaviamsheni” aviation factory*


Air Defence Units include around 80 old SA2 Guideline, SA3 Goa, SA4 Ganef and SA5 Gammon static and mobile missile systems. Some rather more modern Western missile systems are reportedly now available.

Equipment includes

15 BUK-M1

38 S-125

18 9K33 Osa

35 ZSU-23-4

15 C-60

40 MT-LB with towed ZU-23



The strength of Navy is 892 from which 178 are Officers, 405 NCOs, 119 Conscripts and 42 Civilians. Navy Headquarter and Main Naval Base are located in Poti. Small Naval base located in Batumi. Naval Squadron is located in Poti.


7 ex-French La Combattante II Fast Patrol Boats armed with 2 OTO-Melara 76mm/L62 guns, modified anti-aircraft guns, and Exocet missiles, 11-13 P 269 Lindos Fast Patrol Boats armed with 2 C802 anti-ship missile batteries and AK-630M guns (Ukraine)




Mobilized - around 25,000 Officers and Men

Well-equipped with several Motorized Brigades.


PART 1 Georgian War video documentary

PART 2 Georgian War video documentary

[60] The extent of civilian casualties was later disputed in a number of sources. [61] President Saakashvili later claimed that the Russian side has deployed tanks into the disputed region before he gave the order for Georgian forces to attack.[62] At Russia’s request, the United Nations Security Council held consultations on 7 August at 11pm (U.S. EST time), followed by an open meeting at 1:15 am (U.S. EST time) on 8 August, with Georgia attending. During consultations, Council members discussed a press statement that called for an end to hostilities. They were unable, however, to come to a consensus.[63]. In the morning, Georgia announced that it had surrounded the city and captured eight South Ossetian villages.[64] An independent Georgian TV station announced that Georgian military took control of the city.[65]

Russia sent troops across the Georgian border, into South Ossetia. In five days of fighting, the Russian forces captured the regional capital Tskhinvali, pushed back Georgian troops, and largely destroyed Georgia’s military infrastructure using airstrikes deep inside the smaller country's territory

August 13 - All of the remaining Georgian forces, including at least 1,500 civilians in the Kodori Valley, had retreated to Georgia proper.[79][80] Russian tanks were seen at Gori. Russian troops were seen on the road from Gori to Tbilisi, but turned off to the north, about an hour from Tbilisi, and encamped. Georgian troops occupied the road six miles (about 10 km) closer to Tbilisi.

August 15 - Reuters stated that Russian forces had pushed to 34 miles (55 km) from Tbilisi, the closest during the war; they stopped in Igoeti 41°59′22″N, 44°25′04″E, an important crossroads. According to the report, 17 APCs and 200 Soldiers, including snipers, participated in the advance; the convoy included a military ambulance, and initially, three helicopters.[citation needed] A Reuters witness said the Russian military convoy advanced to within 55 km (34 miles) of Tbilisi on Friday. That day, United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also traveled to Tbilisi, where Saakashvili signed the 6-point peace plan in her presence.

3D Maneuver

August 11 - Russia ruled out peace talks with Georgia until the latter withdrew from South Ossetia and signed a legally binding pact renouncing the use of force against South Ossetia and Abkhazia.[69]

On that night, Russian Paratroopers deployed in Abkhazia carried out raids deep inside Georgian territory to destroy military bases from where Georgia could send reinforcements to its troops sealed off in South Ossetia. Russian forces entered and left the military base near the town of Senaki outside Abkhazia on the 11th, leaving the base there destroyed.[70]

Venik writes:

Additional 1,000 Russian airborne assault troops from three assault companies were airlifted to Abkhazia on August 11, when it became know that Georgia planned to attack Abkhazia as well, after attack maps for the Operation Cliff have been found on the high-ranking Georgian staff officer captured by a unit of the Russian 4th VDV regiment. [16] About 50 Russian fixed-wing aircraft (mainly Su-25 ground attack jets) and assault helicopters participated in the operation. Less than 48 hours later Georgian army suffered hundreds of casualties and was retreating in disarray across all of Georgia, leaving their armor, trucks, firearms, and uniforms behind. [17]

Gori was shelled and bombed by the Russians as the Georgian military and most of residents of the Gori District fled.[71][72][73] Since Gori is along Georgia's main highway, its occupation by Russian forces, combined with destruction of a railway bridge, cut Georgia's lines of communication and logistics in two.

An independent Russian military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer speculated that "Russia's invasion of Georgia had been planned in advance, with the final political decision to complete the preparations and start war in August apparently having been made back in April." [74] A U.S. Defence official said that there was no obvious buildup of Russian forces along the border that signaled an intention to invade.

Unnamed transport aviation units used for air-lift of units of 76th and 98th Airborne Divisions, Spetsnaz of 45th Detached Reconnaissance Regiment to South Ossetia and unnamed units of VDV to Abkhazia

Venik concludes:

The Georgian army's command structure collapsed during the first few hours of the war. This was primarily due to Russia's air superiority. Approximately 10,000-15,000 Russian troops were fighting the 28,000-strong Georgian army. The Georgian retreat begun while most of the Russian forces were still in transit from their bases in North Ossetia. The Georgians retreated so fast, the vast majority of the 15,000 Russian troops deployed to Georgia never got a chance to fire a single shot. Much has been said about Russia's “overwhelming air superiority” over Georgia. In reality, most of the operations over Georgia were carried out by just five squadrons of old Su-25s belonging to the 58th Army. [EDITOR: too bad we don't have our A-10s owned and operated by the U.S. Army to have similar effectivesness] It should be mentioned that Georgia's Su-25 “Scorpion” attack jets – locally produced and upgraded by Israel – were technically superior to the older Su-25s used by Russia. Furthermore, Georgian T-72 tanks, upgraded by Ukraine and Israel, were a good match for the Russian T-72s deployed by the 58th Army. Georgian artillery and MLRS was also comparable and in some cases even superior to the similar systems fielded by the 58th Army.

The second part of Georgia's plan, according to the captured military maps, called for a follow-up assault against Abkhazia to begin just two days after launching the operation in South Ossetia. Attacking South Ossetia would have made no sense without also attacking Abkhazia. Airfields and ports in Abkhazia would have enabled the Russians to send reinforcements. And the Russians did send reinforcements to Abkhazia as soon as they learned about Georgia's plan to attack the province: about a thousand Russian paratroopers and light armor were airlifted to Abkhazia on August 11 to provide support for a counter-attack by Abkhazian self-defense force against Georgian troops in the Kodori gorge.

Tskhinvali is the capital city of South Ossetia

Firing massive salvos of 122mm Katyusha rockets into civilians is a war crime and immoral

Tskhinvali was shelled by the central Georgian government on 8 August 2008 with BM-21 "Grad" mobile artillery rocket systems in an attempt to regain the breakaway republic of South Ossetia. Many civilians were killed, while the majority of the population left the town and fled into North Ossetia-Alania. After the bombings, the Georgian army invaded the city in an attempt to gain control of the capital.

Venik explains WHY the civilians were immorally targeted by the Georgians:

Surprising as it may sound, Georgia's attack plan against South Ossetia and Abkhazia had a good chance of success and there was at least one recent precedent. Operation Storm was a large-scale military operation carried out in 1995 by Croatian armed forces in Krajina, a small region of former Yugoslavia populated predominantly by ethnic Serbs and controlled by Serbian separatist forces. Croatian troops were armed and trained by the U.S.-based Military Professional Resources Incorporated with the approval of the U.S. government. [21] Just as with Georgia's attack on South Ossetia, Operation Storm was launched overnight in early August. The opening attack by Croatian forces targeted densely-populated areas with massed artillery barrages, driving well over 200,000 civilians – mostly

21. “Operation Storm”, Wikipedia; ethnic Serbs – out of the region.22 The assault lasted for only 36 hours and was the largest land offensive in Europe since WWII. By the time the operation was over, ethnic Serbs no longer comprised majority in Krajina.

Unlike Krajina, South Ossetia is surrounded by mountains and the only route of escape for the refugees is a narrow, two-lane (without shoulder), poor-quality road, framed by cliffs and ravines. The Rokskiy tunnel, linking Russia's North Ossetia region with South Ossetia is also a narrow, two-lane passage more than three-and-a-half kilometers long. In other words, this road could have been easily overwhelmed by tens thousands of South Ossetian refugees trying to escape Georgian attack, thus preventing Russian armor from reaching the zone of combat in a timely manner. This would have given Georgian forces ample opportunity to reach the southern end of the tunnel and to easily block it.

There can be no question about it: civilians in Tskhinvali were the primary target of the Georgian artillery assault. South Ossetia had a small military force with about two dozen outdated T-55 tanks. [23] The only armored vehicles available to the 530 Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia before August 7 were light armored personnel carriers, trucks, and two helicopters. [24] There were no heavy fortifications, no extensive minefields, and no concentrations of armor that would have warranted Georgia's use of massed artillery, including dozens of high-caliber howitzers and multiple-launch rocket systems. Most of the fire was concentrated on the city itself, leaving Tskhinvali in ruins with at least 438 residential buildings destroyed or seriously damaged, according to a UNOSAT report.[25] The Investigative Committee established by Russia to investigate the deaths of civilians in South Ossetia concluded that the Georgian forces committed genocide against the Ossetians. Alexander Bastrykin, the chief investigator, said that so far the Committee's 211 investigators have compiled more than one hundred volumes of evidence of Georgian atrocities and questioned 3915 witnesses. [26]

Why not just destroy the tunnel to ensure that the Russians cannot send reinforcements? Destroying the tunnel would have prevented Ossetians from leaving what Georgia calls the “Tskhinvali province”, thus defeating the entire purpose of the operation. The entrance to the tunnel is heavily guarded by Russian troops, leaving an airstrike the only viable attack option. In order to take the tunnel out of service for a useful amount of time, one or more heavy aviation bombs had to be placed directly on the southern entrance to the tunnel. At the beginning of the conflict, Georgia was known to operate at least a dozen of Su-25 “Scorpion” attack planes – an Israeli-upgraded version of the Soviet-designed Sukhoi Su-25, produced by Georgia's Tbilisi Aerospace Manufacturing (TAM) and first shown to the West at the 2001 Le Bourget airshow in France [27].

The “Scorpion” features modern avionics system, including a glass cockpit and day/night weapons delivery and navigation system compatible with NATO standards. The aircraft is also equipped with a new weapons pylons allowing it to carry Western air-to-ground munitions, including precision-guided bombs. In 2001, Georgia had 30 Su-25s of various types available for export, with 20 more airframes under construction and earmarked for the “Scorpion” upgrade. [28] However, Georgia's limited inventory of precision-guided bombs and the Georgian Air Force's lack of experience using such weapons would have made any attempt to take out the Rokskiy tunnel a likely failure, prompting an immediate response from Russia. In the initial airstrike, the Russian Air Force destroyed several Georgian airbases, including the airfield near Senaki, where Georgian Su-25s were based. Once Georgia attacked South Ossetia and it became clear that the Russians were prepared to respond, Georgia was unable to destroy the tunnel. Georgia's only attempt to blow up Rokskiy tunnel came on August 16, when two civilian SUVs packed with explosives tried to approach the southern entrance to the tunnel. The first vehicle was disabled by Russian snipers long before it could reach its target and the hapless demolition crew was forced to make a getaway in their remaining vehicle. [29]

The Russian army responded on the following day by moving its own forces into the city and attacking the Georgian army. On 10 August Georgian forces pulled out of Tskhinvali, which was captured by the Russian army after intense fighting. The town was heavily damaged during the battle. The Jewish Quarter - one of the town's unique neighborhoods was also destroyed.[4]

The cities of Tskhinvali and Gori are located in the valley of the Greater Liakhvi River, within about 20 miles (32 km) of each other. The Georgian military was based at Gori, while Tskhinvali was the primary objective of the Georgian forces. It was suggested by Civil Georgia, that the ultimate goal of the Georgian forces was to control the Roki Tunnel, which is the sole major land route from Russia to South Ossetia.[11]

The Georgian Army entered the province of South Ossetia, during the early hours of August 8, 2008, after a prolonged [122mm rocket] artillery (BM-21) onslaught on the city of Tskhinvali.[12] By 04:45 a.m. the Georgian State Minister for Reintegration, Temuri Yakobashvili, announced, that Tskhinvali was nearly surrounded by the Georgian forces.[13] After hours of artillery bombardment, Georgian forces moved into the city and were heading toward the city center, where they were met with fierce resistance from the South Ossetian rebels. There, according to media reports, hand-to-hand fighting occurred and several Georgian [T-72 medium] tanks were destroyed. However, the Georgians kept advancing through the city, burning the separatist presidential palace. In the end, the Georgian army managed to take control of a big part the city, after only a few hours of intense urban combat.[10] However, despite the Georgian claim, that Tskhinvali was captured and Georgia now controls two-thirds of South Ossetia's territory, reports were coming out of the city, that there were still some pockets of separatist resistance.

The Russian Ministry of Defence also reported, that at least 10 Russian Soldiers were killed and 30 wounded in the initial Georgian shelling of the Russian peacekeeping forces base at Tskhinvali.[14] This number was later revised to 13 killed and 150 wounded.[15]

On August 8, Russian ground forces with air support crossed the international border into South Ossetia from the Russian republic of North Ossetia-Alania.[16] The Russians reportedly reached Tskhinvali several hours later, with two armoured battalions of the 58th Army.[17]

Both sides (Georgia and Russia) used armoured vehicles and artillery, during the fight for the city.

Russian force structure still has too many wheeled trucks to carry sustainment supplies that are easily ambushed

On August 9, the Russian 58th Army commander Lieutenant General, Anatoly Khrulyov, was wounded in a Georgian ambush.

Movements of opposing forces around Tskhinvali. Blue arrows show Georgian movements, red arrows show Russian Parliament of South Ossetia after the fighting. After the Russians and South Ossetian fighters drove the Georgians out of the outskirts of Tskhinvali, the Georgian units regrouped with armored reinforcements from Gori. On the later half of August 9, the regrouped Georgian forces reportedly launched a new offensive against South Ossetian and Russian defenders of Tskhinvali, using heavy tube and rocket artillery, while heavy fighting was reportedly underway on the city outskirts with Georgian forces, breaking through the defense and the rebel sources reporting three enemy tanks destroyed.[18] Just before midnight a five-hour artillery onslaught on the city ended, but the fighting with the Georgian infantry in the south of Tskhinvali continued. Civilians still remained in the basements with no food or water. The South Ossetian forces complained, that Georgia had not yet provided a peace corridor to evacuate the civilians, caught up in crossfire.

By August 10, the joint Russian and South Ossetian forces regained control over the city, as the Georgian forces withdrew.[19] However, according to the Russians, some Georgian snipers and mobile infantry groups still remained in Tskhinvali.[20]

While there was no ground fighting in Gori on August 9 or 10, this launch point of the Georgian military was attacked from the air and residential areas were hit by Russian aircraft.[21]

Georgia had but one battalion (?) of Israeli-upgraded T-72 medium tanks


Pics from:



We do not endorse the Georgia oppression of the majority of the South Ossetian populace who want to be a province of central Russia by U.S. neocon puppet Saakashvilli.

Moreover, we do not trust ANYTHING the corrupt Leo Strauss neocon Bush administration says or does which is always driven by greed and immorality of the highest order. They could have deliberately neo-"conned" the Georgians into provoking the Russians to attack to re-establish their favorite boogieman, the "Russian Bear" so as to feed the nation-state war-lusting military, industrial, congressional, think-tank complex (MICC-TT). We know for certain that the U.S. advisors were giving them incompetent, light infantry, foot-slogging techniques no match for a nation-state war against a combined-arms Russia and questionable even for chasing sub-national conflict rebels. The Bush lunacons gladly used Georgian light infantryman to help prop up their security/reconstruction/oil racket in Iraq, however. While doing George Bush's dirty work they neglected the common defense of their own country, while acting as thugs for their own mini-neocon to oppress the people of South Ossetia--who want out of Georgia. We can clearly see why now.

They are lucky the Russians didn't take control of the oil pipeline running west<--->east not far from Gori. Guess they really just wanted to help the South Ossetians, huh?


A MORAL and COMPETENT U.S. military composed of professionals with consciences would REFUSE THIS MISSION, PERIOD. An immoral and incompetent U.S. military BUREAUCRACY would take the mission on and botch it, as we can see.


SF "Green Beret" Advisors arrive in 2002 to make Georgians into Light Infantry Narcissist Retards

Egomaniacs with "drive-on rags" dressed to look like special feces troopers ride in back of unarmored jeeps along roads, ready to gunsling...

Roadkill ready to be lit up and incinerated....

Competent military advice for Georgia would be to FORTIFY THEIR INTERNATIONAL BORDER with Russian by a security fence, create anti-tank ditches, minefields and strongpoints in both the low and high ground; mutually supporting by long-range fire to give a mechanized attacker pause like the Finns did with their Mannerheim line to repel the Soviet Red Army in WW2. Just look at the DMZ separating north and South Korea. Slowing down a Russian invasion would give time for the Georgian National Guard to be called to duty in the south to set-up multiple mountain pass blocking and maneuver forces. However, since when do American light infantry narcissists pick up a book on WW2 combined-arms tactics? They are the ones who screwed up Task Force Smith in Korea in 1950 and had their asses handed to them by the Red Chinese when the marines bugged-out leaving MacArthur's 8th Army holding-the-bag. They are too busy in sports PT attire and the gym when not doing lawn and building care and "marksmanship and dismounted battle drills" to study their alleged profession as they ply their "From Here to Eternity" racket.

The out-classed Georgian light narcissists RAN when overwhelmed by the Russian army.

Homosexy PATCHES and macho insignia--but NO EFFECTIVE CAMOUFLAGE

The BBC finally decided to shine a light on the Georgian army's brilliant performance and casualties in this short but devastating for Georgia war:

Feet poked out of green military body bags. They were on the floor and in the cabinets - 16 bodies I counted. This was just from the first part of the day, staff said.

"They've been dying before we could treat them," one doctor told us later.

A senior doctor said the hospital had been handling an average of 350 casualties each day. ..

As the week progressed and the news got worse, we heard more and more Georgians denouncing their government for getting into this unequal war...

Much of Georgia's American-trained army is in disarray. Many troops have taken off their uniforms and returned home.

We came across several units who admitted they had no orders and did not know what to do. But there are still Georgian troops posted along the roads and highways, close to Russian lines.

(Source: “Georgia reeling from war with Russia”, by Andrew North, BBC, August 18, 2008)

Venik adds:

Two factors doomed Saakashvili's attack plans: Russia expected the attack and early in the war it was able to establish complete air superiority. While Georgian military planners and their American advisers anticipated at least a possibility of a Russian counterattack, Georgian troops on the ground seemed shocked by Russia's forceful response. This initial shock led to a complete disintegration of Georgian command and control structure. Entire battalions dropped their equipment, changed out of military uniforms, and retreated in disarray.[32] Georgia's quick defeat in this war is particularly stunning, considering that the Georgian army spent months planning and forward-deploying troops and armor. The units of Russia's 58th Army, on the other hand, were still at their home bases in Russia at the time of the Georgian attack.

This is yet more proof that American numbered SF groups need to themselves learn how to be good light mechanized infantry with their own high-technology M113 Gavins so they have sound military expertise top pass on to others (Foreign Internal Defense = FID, Coalition Warfare = CW) as well as to do direct action (DA) and special reconnaissance (SR) missions better than from a foot-slog or truck hop.

In fact, the Russians should fortify the southern border of South Ossetia TO KEEP THE GEORGIANS OUT in the ways outlined above.

The only thing the narcissist Georgian military is good at is being Bush necon fascist thugs who terrorize unarmed civilians.

Interior ministry troops advance toward anti-government protesters down Tbilisi’s main avenue on 7 November 2007 (PA Photos). From Venik: beating unarmed civilian is the Georgian army's main speciality. Take a closer look at the hexagonal dish in the background on the right and the round dish on the left: these are the American Technology Medium Range Acoustic Devices (LRADs), aka the "sonic guns" - some of the most inhumane "non-lethal" weapons designed to apply HF sonic vibrations to your internal organs.

ACIG reports Georgia could or used to be able to build their own SU-25 "Frogfoot" attack planes able to render close air support. They could have also provided air superiority if the Georgian narcissists had a brain.

Where were they? Why were the handfuls of SU-25s they had lined up on vulnerable airfields and not dispersed and camouflaged to operate from stretches of highway like the Swedes do?

Fitted with beyond-visual range (BVR) air-to-air missiles like the U.S. AMRAAM, SU-25s could have repelled the Russian Air Force fighter-bombers and their own SU-25s from rendering Close Air Support (CAS) and denied their VDV Airborne paratroops from landing to effect decisive 3D maneuver that blocked reinforcements from reaching their forces trying to block the Russian advance from the north through Tskhinvali.

Again, since when do light infantry narcissist give a crap about air superiority or air cover? They ain't the ones flying the planes, wearing the jumpsuits and getting the chicks afterwards; Tom Cruise, "Top Gun" style. If there is no "ego biscuit" in it for them, light infantry narcissists do not care.

Combat Pics from Georgian War from the 58th Army which took Tskhinvali and maneuvered to the outskirts of Tibilisi, Capital of Georgia


Posted: Wed Aug 13, 2008 11:13 pm

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Post subject: The war in South Ossetia: 89 photos Arkady Babchenko


We present a set of photographs from the war in South Osetia made by Arkady Babchenko, one of the editors of Russian war veterans Almanac ”Art of War” ( Arkady went with Russian troops on the route Vladikavkaz – Tshinval - Zemo Nikozi – Gori and participated as journalist in the battle for Georgian village Zemo Nikozi. Photographs were prepared and placed in the Internet by Chief Editor of the Almanac Ilya Plekhanov.

The Russian Army stresses combining arms together to get maneuver effects; here medium-weight 45-ton T-72 tanks and light 15-ton BMP-2 infantry carriers move in concert over the flat, open terrain between mountain ranges along the general line of the major Greater Liakhvi river feeding the civil populations. Note that the vanilla hull armor (no applique' armor or explosive reactive armor (ERA) tiles like on the nearby T-72s to defeat chemical energy (CE), shaped-charge RPG and ATGM shots) of the BMP-2s is not trusted as the dismounting light mechanized infantry rides on top.

Notice how the top hatches of the T-72 open FORWARD to act as shields and the loader's has a vision window.

Georgian army not adapted to closed mountain terrain warfare: as incompetents unskilled at combined-arms warfare, the Georgians made over into American-style light infantry narcissists did not exploit the high ground to the left and right of the river plain to block Russian mechanized forces from swarming through this open terrain. To go up steep closed terrain, is difficult and strenuous for both walking men and light tracked tanks; this elevation translates into DISTANCE and before long rifles and light/medium machine guns are OUT OF EFFECTIVE RANGE; making walking infantry unable to control the ground below by fire. This is why in MOUNTAIN WARFARE, weapons RANGE is everything. Light MECHANIZED infantry with tracked light tanks, mules and carts can transport direct-fire heavy machine guns, autocannon, ATGMs and indirect-fire, high-angle mortars up steep slopes and from there, block with kinetic (KE) energy bullet and high explosive (HE) shells and land mines, obstacles anyone trying to pass below. That the U.S. military advisors did not supply the Georgians with M113 Gavin light tracks to create an effective mobile, mountain defense is proof of their own light infantry-centric, KE bullet gunslinging incompetence. Compare this to the video below of how Swiss PanzerGrenadiers are ready for mountain warfare:

Georgian army not adapted to open terrain warfare: The Russian equivalent to our M113 Gavin is their 6-roadwheel MT-LB, seen here scooting across the flat, open terrain between Georgian mountain ranges. Light infantry on foot on this exposed open, terrain is highly vulnerable and cannot move fast enough at 1-4 mph to avoid severe fire effects from an enemy. That U.S. advisors trained Georgians to be weak light infantry moved by wheeled trucks along roads and on foot for this open terrain without tracked armored mobility is yet another military malpractice.

Here Russian self-propelled howtizers (SPHs) aka tanks with artillery guns are firing across the long ranges of the Georgian plains to suppress the enemy troops who are exposed and on foot. As they are suppressed, their own light and medium-weight mechanized infantry can move in for the kill via tracked mobility. Counter-battery fire or CAS aircraft to stop the Russian SPH artillery from landing requires some direction finding (DF) skills to do crater analysis or get an electronic distance/direction from a radar; yet another military deficiency of the Georgians we subsidized.

Farmland to grow food will always be in abundance that is open terrain for medium to heavy tank equipped forces to traverse; provided livestock get out of the way!

As a light tracked tank under 20 tons, the BMP-2 has a low ground pressure to go cross-country and avoid predictable roads where land mines and ambushers are likely to await. They most likely hit the Georgians from unexpected directions which was key to their success. American light infantrymen talk a great game about "stay off the roads" and the "easy way is mined" so long as they don't have to get on a TRACKED vehicle the "mech pussies" use in heavy Army units, then its suddenly AOK to be in a wheeled truck on roads and getting incinerated. Narcissism comes first in all things.

I cannot read Russian to ascertain if the white markings are macho graffitti or a serious identification marking somewhat justified in ruining vehicle camouflage.

The dismount Soldiers getting in the way of the BMP-2's 30mm autocannon traverse doesn't seem to be a problem; but as soon as firing has to start they are going to have to jump off. They would be better off standing through top hatch or hatches and have at least some initial armor protection at the instant of taking enemy fire with the option then of dropping back inside and buttoning up to ride through say artillery or mortar fire or dismounting. By sitting on top their only options are to hand on or jump off and be exposed to all sorts of enemy fires.

This picture shows a curious tactical decision to have the BMP-2s with mounted infantry lead the tanks so as to clear-out any enemy ATGM or RPG gunners or represents the tail-end of the column since a journalist is present and the T-72 tanks are brining up the rear.

The benefits of mech infantry are shown here: troops don't need to carry rucksacks on their back which severely inhibit mobility from a possible 7 mph down to a 1 mph at least until they can shed the weight. Someone then has to guard the rucksacks and the men are fatigued to get to that point. In contrast, the light mech infantrymen here are rested and energetic. You can see one Russian Soldier with a buttpack--if done right one can live entirely from one and not even need a rucksack even if without a "mother" vehicle. What is questionable is their lack of helmets and body armor; the trade-off for that full 7 mph foot mobility to gain 100 meters of movement every 30 seconds makes sense to avoid direct fire from rifles and machine guns but it will not get one out of a mortar or artillery barrage where just a little body armor can be life-saving. Since the Georgians are inept at using supporting arms, the direct-fire threat may be the first threat to adapt against.

The individual camouflage of the Russian mech infantry is not good; they should have rag-top helmets and tan-colored uniforms for this dry terrain. Their contrasting colors will aid Georgian gunners to aim-in on and hit them with DF. The lack of projected or engine smokescreens from their BMP-2s to spoil enemy aimed fire is another weakness.

Here the mobility gains of not wearing head or body armor are shown but the weakness of telescoping disposible rockets for HE shock action. He appears to have a SHMEL RPO flame or RPG-22 rocket in his left hand that will have to be unfolded from a halt to fire. The Chinese PF89 disposible rocket has ready-to-fire controls to save precious seconds when trying to get into firing position.

Notice his boots have Vibram-style lug soles for traction.

Note the WHITE ARM BAND for some kind of command & control and/or identification friend or foe (IFF) purpose. The French Foreign Legion use colored arm bands for similar reasons. We wore glint tape arm bands for Panama in 1989.

Notice the Russians lack a SKEDCO type conveyance or an all-terrain cart to move wounded men. Stretchers take two men to carry and if a fight underway, wounded men must wait and possibly die.

Also notice no Quik-Clot type agent to stop major bleeding, only pressure dressings.

Close-up of leg wound shows the need for ballistic knee pads like TACARM offers to prevent such injuries.

Again, Quik-Clot powder or wadding should be inserted into the would to stop the bleeding and prevent infection.

If men are to ride on top of tanks they should have seats with belts to hold them on board especially if they are wounded.

ALL combat vehicles must be able to CASEVAC wounded men in a pinch--waiting for a specialized ambulance is not wise.

Another view of the interior of BMP-2s being readied to carry a tubular metal stretcher carried wounded inside. SKEDs could easily serve this purpose as well as get the wounded men to the tracks or ammo from the tracks to the dismounts.

Note the AK-74 5.45mm assault rifles with wooden stocks and iron sights--no red dot collimators or night vision devices.

Another weak area is the exposed arms that should have a small TACARM ballistic elbow/shoulder pad that would have prevented or lessened this Soldier's injury.

Wound close-up treated with pressure dressing; he should live.

Notice his combat uniform top is tucked in for wear under body armor. His trouse belt is not strong enough for life support lifting, need a Rigger's belt especially for mountain rope work. Mech infantry must be able to dismount and go up and down mountain terrain to clear the way for their tanks.

Some Russian Soldiers are seen wearing at least chest body armor with plates; so its unclear if this Soldier was wearing this when hit by what looks like an AKM 7.62mm x 39mm Georgian round either glancing at an angle or deflected by his armor saving his life.

Note the horrible wound channel.

Shouldn't his wound be filled with some anti-infection powder and be sewn closed immediately with on-scene surgical repair medics? By the time he gets to care that can close the wound up it will certainly be days too late to prevent severe scarring.

A lot of Russian and Georgian Soldiers are seen wearing running shoes for slight mobility advantages. Some paint to darken their white appearance wouldn't hurt to help evade targeting in the first place. This running shoe-clad, young Russian Soldier sans body armor is sitting on top of a MT-LB.

As the Russians entered built-up areas they encounter the BS wheeled trucks the Georgians used along the roads and fire them up; easily mobility killing them at their air-filled rubber tires. It looks like the hapless Georgian was trying to replace his flat tires with his vehicle nose in a ditch.

Here is how a light infantryman with a narcissist's "PT stud" homosexy body will end up looking like driving around in an unarmored, gasoline-powered, wheeled truck on roads and getting lit up by enemy firepower. He looks actually better than narcissist USN Navy SEAL Scott Helventson looked like after gasoline incinerated in Fallujah, Iraq in 2003.

The light narcissist infantry mantra of "PT...marksmanship and battle drills" isn't going to save you if you are stupid in a wheeled truck....

"We will drive wheeled trucks out-of-contact with the enemy, then dismount and fight".

The Russians "didn't get the memo" and lit up the stupid Georgians in this unarmored wheeled truck.

So much for picking & choosing when battle begins on the non-linear battlefield. I'm sure some lighttard will say a laptop computer would have told them ("Situational Awareness") when/where to flee from their Cargo trucks and Land Rover--NEXT TIME.

Tell that to the families of the dead Georgians who there will BE NO "NEXT TIME" to be stupid again.

This Land Rover doesn't LOOK so bad, its "just" knocked out and its driver killed. Some consolation over being incinerated, huh? What's with the BLACK paint job? Were the Georgians trying to be "special" operations and all-so-homosexy? Or just getting used to the color they will be once consumed in fire?

Note the U.S.-supplied PASGT Kevlar helmet with woodland camouflage cover (no ragtop to break outline) on the dead Georgian wheeled victim.

With friends like us, who needs enemies? He might be presentable in an open casket funeral ceremony.

The rear door fuel tanks reveal this to be a BMP-1 likely under the mis-employment of the Georgian lighttards as a destroyed jeep is next to it. Go where the wheeled trucks can go, you will die with them, too.

If Georgians want to flee the battlefield in some stolen civilian cars they might get themselves lowered a notch or two by some tank tracks...

Ichabod Georgian?

This head-recessed into sexy load bearing vest looking like without any BALLISTIC PROTECTIVE MATERIAL reveals another dead Georgian light narcissist wannabe complete with a couple U.S. G.I. 1 quart canteens. He's wearing surplus U.S. black defective "trac-shun" sole boots again being bad camouflage and a fire risk with all the black shoe polish one usually adds for the "spit 'n polish" homosexy parade-ground military look. These boots are 4.2 pounds and mobility killers.

Liar, Liar, Pants on Fire!

This Georgian has been set on fire from the crotch down..perhaps he had a Molotov Cocktail in his hands and a Russian tracer round turned him into a flaming corpse?

Another possibility is a white phosphorous grenade exploded....your observations are welcome here...

Let's help the Georgians become screwed-up like us restricted to roads with our cast-off 6x6 M35 "Deuce and a Half" (2.5 ton cargo capacity) trucks!!

No armor kits, no wide tires to even give them a fighting chance...oh wait..."they will creep up on the enemy's lines, THEN dismount to fight!"...Yeah, Right!




Note all the captured sleeping pads...ponchos...why its a lighttard's yard sale!

Where are the truck's machine gun mounts? Sand bagging?


The advisors "advising" have to first know of these things themselves.


EWWWW. "Urban terrain" (is it OPEN or CLOSED?) ahead. Time to dismount, foot-slog and die said the Georgians before they became human BBQ.

The COG of this conflict is South Ossetia's oblast, semi-independant capital city. The Russians took it and now own it by MANEUVERING around it not barging into its center like the dumb Georgians did before losing it to rebels and the Russians.

Why is this disposible rocket being shown?


Its a late-model U.S. made M72A3/4/5/6/7/8? LAW made by either Talley Defense or others and supplied to the Georgians! Note the operating instructions in ENGLISH.

Here's what a RPG-18 looks like:

WHO killed these T-72s?

These Georgian T-72s were knocked out by first Russian peacekeepers with a RPG-7 aimed at the turret/hull junction and then South Ossetian rebels. Watch PART 1 of the Georgian war video documentary. At 8:20 into the video. This broke the morale of the Georgians who fled the city since they have only a battalion's worth of tanks at best. The Georgians tried to foolishly hold a cross-roads in the open? ERA will not help you if RPGs are aimed at weak spots where these tiles are not there.

Note the fuel and high explosive ammunition incinerating everyone inside and popping the turrets even though very heavy with 125mm guns.


Another Georgian BBQ?

This is what happens when you employ bad tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) and let your tanks get shot at from all directions. Who's side are you on? Helping the enemy doesn't help your side.

Some fleeing Georgians are captured. Note the RPG-7? launcher nearby.

The man dressed in weird camouflage might be a South Ossetian rebel who helped identify these prisoners. They are in deep trouble and may "disappear".

Russian Soldiers can live in the field under harsh conditions far longer than our troops but at some point sickness and disease turns this hardiness into a liability. Every tracked tank should have showering/bathing and drinking water facilities built-in so this potential health risk doesn't have to be indulged.

Is this a MANPADS SAM launch against the MI-17 "Hip" helicopter our photojournalist is in? Or is it an anti-MANPADS flare from the helicopter itself?

If this is a SAM, its not aimed at the photojournalist's helo so he is lucky...maybe we'd not have these pictures?

Gotta love that HUGE FUEL TANK in the MI-8/17 series helicopters ready to burst and incinerate everyone inside. Taking some "hits" for aerodynamic drag by external fuel bulges like the CH-47 Chinook has is proven to be far safer than HIT & INCINERATED and on top of this, the CH-47 is still our fastest helo able to go over 200 mph...

Arkady Babchenko, one of the editors of Russian war veterans Almanac ”Art of War”


Russia has recognized South Ossetia and Ahkazia as republics belonging to them and not Georgia.

Russia is also deploying short-range ballistic missile launchers of the SS-21 "Tochka" type in South Ossetia. The missile will give Russia immediate strike capability across much of Georgia's territory if they try any more war crimes again.,25197,24219963-2703,00.html

General Nogovitsyn said yesterday Russian troops were setting up a buffer zone around South Ossetia with eight military posts in Georgian territory. Russia's military is also aiming to enforce a no-fly zone over the area for Georgian planes.

Since when does dictator Bush get off giving $1 BILLION of our tax dollars away to murdering thugs without Congressional approval?

What he wants is his neocon puppet figurehead in power so his corporations can get rich off the oil pipeline running across Georgia.

Bush announces $1B in aid for nation of Georgia

By JENNIFER LOVEN, Associated Press Writer 12 minutes ago

WASHINGTON - President Bush on Wednesday announced $1 billion in new economic aid to Georgia to help the pro-Western former Soviet republic rebuild after Russia's invasion.

"Georgia has a strong economic foundation and leaders with an impressive record of reform," Bush said in the statement announcing the aid package that was obtained by The Associated Press. "Our additional economic assistance will help the people of Georgia recover from the assault on their country, and continue to build a prosperous and competitive economy."

Vice President Dick Cheney, due in Georgia on Thursday, planned to make the massive aid package a major highlight of his discussions with Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili. Cheney, in Azerbaijan on Wednesday, is on a tour of three former Soviet republics that are wary of Russia's intentions in what Moscow likes to call its "near abroad."

The administration is delaying an announcement on some sort of punishment of Russia for its actions against Georgia and its refusal thus far to comply with a French-brokered cease-fire. However, the decision to shower tiny Georgia with such substantial aid and have Cheney talk about it in Moscow's backyard would likely be seen by the Kremlin as highly provocative, if not a punitive measure in and of itself.

Flags of the New Russian Republics

That said, the U.S. has found during this conflict that it has little leverage with newly enriched and empowered Russia. Moscow has recognized the independence of the two separatist regions in Georgia that are at the heart of the conflict, but has drawn condemnations but little else from the United States and Europe.

Sack-of-Shitvilli running for his life when a Russian SU-25 flew over!

If the Bush lunacons thought baiting the Russians to stop a Georgian genocide to boost idiot McCain's popularity ratings as former Russian leader Putin sugggests, they are again showing the Republican party is packed full of immoral, incompetent and dangerous fascists who MUST NOT BE KEPT IN POWER BEYOND THE NOVEMBER ELECTION.

Sexy Fascist Neocon VP Wannabe Sarah Palin: Clueless About Georgian War (and she'd not a blonde so that cannot be an excuse!)

Why do the good-looking gals have to be such air-heads?

Georgia is a punk nation led by a mini-neocon clone of Bush....if we accept it into NATO we would be obliged to defend it FROM RUSSIA when it goes off on its ethnic cleansing expeditions against Russian citizens who don't want to be a part of their nation-state...

whatever happened to Foreign Policy 101 from George Washington's warning about entangling alliances?

Subject: Palin dangerously wrong about Georgia 171241?cid= 3272

Palin leaves open option of war with Russia

FORT WAINWRIGHT, Alaska -Alaska Gov. Sarah Palin left open the option Thursday of waging war with Russia if it were to invade neighboring Georgia and the former Soviet republic were a NATO ally. "We will not repeat a Cold War," Palin said in her first television interview since becoming Republican John McCain's vice presidential running mate two weeks ago.

Palin told Charles Gibson of ABC News that she'd favor including Georgia and Ukraine, both former Soviet republics, in NATO despite opposition by Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Asked whether the United States would have to go to war with Russia if it invaded Georgia, and the country was part of NATO, Palin said: "Perhaps so."

"I mean, that is the agreement when you are a NATO ally, is if another country is attacked, you're going to be expected to be called upon and help," she said.

Pressed on the question, Palin responded: "What I think is that smaller democratic countries that are invaded by a larger power is something for us to be vigilant against ... We have got to show the support, in this case, for Georgia. The support that we can show is economic sanctions perhaps Russia, if this is what it leads to."

She added: "It doesn't have to lead to war and it doesn't have to lead, as I said, to a Cold War, but economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, again, counting on our allies to help us do that in this mission of keeping our eye on Russia and Putin and some of his desire to control and to control much more than smaller democratic countries."

Palin spoke the same day Putin insisted that Russia has no intention of encroaching on the sovereignty of Georgia, following a brief war that left Russian troops in firm control of two breakaway regions. Putin also aggressively defended the decision to send troops to Georgia, saying Russia had to act after Georgia attacked South Ossetia last month.

On other matters, Palin said she "didn't hesitate" when McCain asked her to be his running mate, a surprise selection that shook up the presidential race.

"I answered him 'yes' because I have the confidence in that readiness and knowing that you can't blink, you have to be wired in a way of being so committed to the mission, the mission that we're on, reform of this country and victory in the war, you can't blink. So I didn't blink then even when asked to run as his running mate," said the 44-year-old Palin, who has been in office less than two years.

Questioned about whether she felt ready to step in as vice president or perhaps even president if something happened to the 72-year-old McCain, Palin said: "I do, Charlie, and on January 20, when John McCain and I are sworn in, if we are so privileged to be elected to serve this country, we'll be ready. I'm ready."

Gibson also read Palin a comment she made in her former church — "Our national leaders are sending U.S. Soldiers on a task that is from God" — and asked whether she thought the United States was fighting a holy war.

Palin said she was recalling Abraham Lincoln's words when she made the comment and said: "I would never presume to know God's will or to speak God's words."

She said she didn't know if her son Track who is headed to Iraq was on a mission from God.

"What I know is that my son has made a decision. I am so proud of his independent and strong decision he has made, what he decided to do and serving for the right reasons and serving something greater than himself and not choosing a real easy path where he could be more comfortable and certainly safer," Palin said.

Ranger Larry thinks NATO can reign-in the Georgians if allowed into NATO (I don't and I don't want Georgia in NATO or any neocons ruining America with fascism anymore). Here is his thoughts:

"One of the nice things about being a NATO member is that it's an INTEGRATED command structure of a DEFENSIVE alliance. So, the most the Georgians might be able to do is slip small units on foot across the borders to go after S.O. and AZ fighters. NATO, especially the French and Germans, aren't going to allow Georgia to enter NATO without some severe restrictions on what the Georgians can do. Neither France nor Germany want the natural gas supply from Russia cut off in January. They'd really like the Georgian pipelines secured and protected, so I'd expect some decent ADA anti-missile defenses and radar/sensors, along with help in building alternate pipeline routes buried underground to dissuade the Russians from launching.

Wouldn't be surprised to see French & German engineering firms building La Ligne Maginot/WestWall/Atlantic Wall structures all along the borders, especially in valleys where roads run. I really don't see anyone from Europe/US putting a brigade in Georgia; the NATO shield would be aerial and dependent on Georgian choke point fortifications and plenty of cheap rocket launchers. Air power would come from Balad and Turkey.

The Russians aren't exactly supermen in the way their enterprise was run. They had a stupid enemy who failed to prepare for a riposte. Sort of like a guy named Hussein...

And the Russians aren't about to risk it all for Georgia. Corrupt living has a way of softening revolutionary zeal. I see it as a live and let live situation: the Russians can possibly overrun Georgia if they bring in more troops, but the Georgians/NATO can make it too expensive on the ground (choke points) and in far too many places (Cuba, Venezuela) and arenas (economic, travel). And if the Georgians improve their country, while the Russians don't do much in S.O. and AZ, there will be a backlash from the ethnics who will realize they weren't even kissed and no one used lubricant or protection."


Former USMC Captain Carlton Meyer writes:

"Mike, you gathered lots of stuff on Georiga, good job.

You should note that two U.S. infantry battalions were in Georiga when they attacked north.

Do a search for "Immediate Response" Georgia


UHO. We dodged a bullet. The neocons almost got us caught up in a yet another unjust war.

Vaziani military base is close to the capital Tbilisi to con the Georgian fascist mini-neoconartists into feeling the U.S. was there to back them (and make the Russians back off) when they proceeded to slaughter South Ossetians and do their land grab.

'Immediate Response' underway in Republic of Georgia
Jul 15, 2008
BY Georgia National Guard

WINDER, Ga. (Army News Service, July 15, 2008) -- About 300 Georgia National Guard Soldiers arrived in Tiblisi, Georgia, Monday for Immediate Response 2008, a three-week international exercise to help build relationships with coaliton partners from several Eastern European nations.

Soldiers and marines from the United States, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Ukraine will conduct this joint training exercise at Vaziani Military Base and the surrounding area. The annual, bilateral security cooperation exercise is conducted between U.S. , NATO and coalition partners, to focus on interoperability training and theater security cooperation, officials said.

A seven-member team from the American Forces Network-Europe is also in the Republic of Georgia conducting live radio programming and radio/TV news coverage for the 1,000-plus U.S. troops, along with allied servicemembers deployed to the training area. AFN-E deployed its Tactical Mobile Radio and Television System to the exercise for the third consecutive year.

The state of Georgia will be represented in the exercise by the 1st Battalion, 121st Infantry, headquartered in Winder, Ga.

"This is a great opportunity not just to prepare for future missions in Afghanistan, but to build the relationship our state has with the country of Georgia," said Maj. Matthew Smith, commander of the 1st Battalion, 121st Infantry. "I've really enjoyed working with Soldiers from the other Georgia as we've prepared for this exercise."

Highlights of the joint training exercise include marksmanship, patrolling and combat lifesaving exercises. A day is devoted to gathering sergeants together from the various countries to train together on the particular challenges of being non-commissioned officers.

"The training will be a great developmental opportunity for the Republic of Georgia because they have a young NCO corps, and they stand to learn a lot from our NCOs," Smith said.

"It's also a great opportunity for our NCOs, because they'll learn how to work with foreign counterparts, and to learn the cultures and customs of our allies," said Command Sgt. Maj. Calvin Wilcox, 1st Battalion, 121st Infantry.

The nation of Georgia has provided consistent support to coalition Global War on Terrorism operations and is the third-largest force contributor to Operation Iraqi Freedom, behind the U.S. and United Kingdom.

Ranger Larry writes:

Date: Sun, 31 Aug 2008 16:11:52 -0400 Subject: Georgian War comments To:


Good presentation and nice use of supporting videos to prove points.

Re: the MANPADS. My depth perception sucks big time, but it almost looks like those are ATGMs fire from ANOTHER helicopter at targets on the ground. I suggest this only because the smoke trails seem to be higher than the burning rocket motor.

Good analysis of Georgian unpreparedness and lack of understanding of what they were trying to accomplish as I said in my 8-20-08 comments attached below:

"Smedley Butler said much of what you said quite a few years ago. I bet from the first army ever formed onward, there were complaints about the same things: money and ego. "I heard Og's brother got the club contract." "Og thinks he's a big shot, doesn't he? Wearing that sabertooth skin all the time." The Georgians screwed up big time:

1. They went into South Ossetia with "heavy" (for Georgia anyway) forces and attacked Russian "peacekeeper" barracks. The alleged objective was Ossetian "militias". Oops. You go after militias with light forces so you don't get tempted by any number of things to do more damage against a much more powerful enemy. You keep your elements from being a causus bellum by keeping them small and mobile. It becomes low level clan/tribal fighting. NATO could have assisted by setting the Georgians up with sensors to watch for militia elements approaching overland. Aerostats, anyone? Sound systems? OPs with thermals to look for militias crossing in bad weather/low visibility? Equipping police forces with sensors to augment the Georgian armed forces?

2. If Georgian intel was so poor they didn't know the Russians were looking for an excuse to attack, the Georgians can have lifetime job security with any number of US intel agencies. [And the quote from the US official who said there was no evidence of a Russian plan to attack just proves the point.]

3. As I said elsewhere, the Georgians had 15 years to shape the battlefield to limit the abilities of the Russians to catch light forces in the open or get into battle in a coherent formation. They didn't; sucks to be them. This isn't Kansas, Toto. It's the Balkans, which means existing roads are the only way to get around; there are choke points and kill zones abounding, IF you prep them with the cheap stuff (rockets, mines, RPGs, unmanned MGs,etc.) to cause serious problems for less than first class units with poor logistics.

4. When living next to a big neighbor with a history of empire, be nice, but be prepared to inflict heavy casualties on invading troops and have plans to hit the big guy's rear areas, especially airfields. "Qui desideret pacem, praeparet bellum". Think of it as the Swiss or Finnish model of fighting." Choke points abound in mountain areas. Went to Pittsburgh in August for the Jewish War Veterans national convention and took the PA Turnpike. Now the Alleghenies will never be mistaken for the Rockies, but it wouldn't take an IOBC grad long to figure out how to slow down or stop a large mech force if you had the time to prepare things. Interstate 81 runs northeast from the Harrisburg area and is in a valley, so now you'd be in open terrain like the Russian vehicles in the farmlands.

Think "La Ligne Maginot" and "Mannerheim Line" with people versed in C3D2 to make sure the sites are protected and in depth.

"Russian Soldiers can live in the field under harsh conditions far longer than our troops but at some point sickness and disease turns this hardiness into a liability. Every tracked tank should have showering/bathing and drinking water facilities built-in so this potential health risk doesn't have to be indulged." In lieu of built-in drinking water/shower facilities in each APC, suggest two things:

1. On the outside, it looks like an ordinary sports bottle. On the inside, there's a miracle: an extremely advanced filtration system that makes murky water filled with deadly viruses and bacteria completely clean in just seconds.

The Lifesaver removes 99.999 percent of water-borne pathogens and reduces heavy metals like lead, meaning even the filthiest water can be cleaned — immediately.

It will be a boon to Soldiers in the field, so it's winning accolades from the military.

It also stands to revolutionize humanitarian aid. It could be the first weapon in the fight against disease after a natural disaster, like the one in Myanmar this week.

I attended the Lifesaver’s launch at DSEi London, the world’s largest arms fair. Its inventor provided a pool of dirty pond water as a test subject, and I drank some after it was filtered. Not only did it look pure once it passed through the Lifesaver, it tasted pure, too.

The process takes only 20 seconds and is simple enough: scoop some water, pump it through the filter and you’re ready to go. The instructions are displayed in pictures on the side of the bottle, so it can be used by anyone, removing the language barrier.

Outdoor enthusiasts may find it useful, but the Lifesaver is perfect for the military. The bottle is designed to “scoop and go,” so Soldiers won’t have to carry the added weight of clean bottled water. They can pick some up out of any source and keep moving.

As an added bonus, the bottle can shoot a pressurized jet of water from any angle, which will be useful for washing wounds free of contaminants and debris.

Other filters use ceramic pores and can’t catch most bacteria and viruses, but the Lifesaver uses microscopic pores a mere 15 nanometers across — about one-hundredth the width of a spider’s silk — narrow enough to stop the tiniest threats. That means virtually nothing — not even bacteria and viruses — can get through.

And since the bottle uses a carbon filter, it makes water safe and sterile without any chemicals, removing that iodine or chlorine taste.

The bottle weighs about 1.5 pounds and can filter one and a half pints of clean drinking water each go. Its replaceable filter can handle more than 1,500 gallons of dirty water before it has to be replaced. And since it won’t process any water once the filter has expired, it will be impossible to drink contaminated water by mistake.

Michael Pritchard, a British entrepreneur, designed the Lifesaver in the wake of freshwater shortages that followed the 2004 tsunami and Hurricane Katrina.

Delivering bottled water to disaster areas is difficult, especially in places like Myanmar, where the government is currently interfering with efforts to distribute supplies and aid. If disaster victims had access to the Lifesaver, they could have ongoing access to clean water without the need for airlifts.

Delivering those planeloads of water is expensive, too. An U.S. Army study revealed that the cost of delivering bottled water to Afghanistan was $4.69 per gallon. Pentagon figures on Hurricane Mitch showed the cost of air freight was even higher: $7.60 per gallon.

Just one Boeing C-17 transport plane full of Lifesaver bottles would provide 500,000 people with access to safe drinking water for up to 16 months — saving millions and saving lives.

Several of these in a GAVIN would allow purified water to be loaded into jerry cans for ease of handling and use by occupants."