UNITED STATES ARMY POWER PROJECTION IN THE 21st CENTURY: THE CONVENTIONAL AIRBORNE FORCES MUST BE MODERNIZED TO MEET THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF'S STRATEGIC FORCE REQUIREMENTS AND THE NATION'S FUTURE THREATS.
Michael J. Kazmierski , Major, Infantry, U.S. Army
"The days in which one battleship could "face down" a small power navy have all but disappeared; . . . at some point in the foreseeable future, U.S. . . . freedom of passage will be actively challenged by regional [Third World] navies." (34)
Key countries in the Third World are clearly aiming for control of the local seas. India already has 2 aircraft carriers, 6 guided missile destroyers, (15) anti-submarine warfare frigates and between 14 and 18 submarines (some nuclear powered). Brazil has also looked to the nuclear submarine option to project naval power. Their stated maritime goal is:
"to prevent any future enemy of Brazil from making use of the seas." (35) Not surprisingly, many other Third World countries are working to acquire nuclear-powered submarines. These submarines will present a special problem for U.S. naval forces in the future, when one considers the small number of anti-submarine ships and aircraft that the U.S. has spread throughout the world. Moreover, anti-submarine systems, which use sonar to detect submarines, are only marginally effective at ocean depths less than 600 feet. This makes significant parts of the Third World oceans, with depths less than 600 feet, particularly hostile to U.S. sonar systems. (36) The Soviets have provided over 300 ships to Third World countries in the past eight years. This number includes over 50 major surface combatant ships and 17 submarines. (37) Western countries are also selling shipping to the Third World. And further contributing to this expanding naval threat, several Third World countries now produce and export destroyers, frigates and submarines as well as hundreds of small patrol boats from which anti-ship missiles can be launched. (38)
"major military facilities such as airfields, [ports,] fixed communications sites and large headquarters [will] become rarities because of their vulnerabilities." (43)
In the ten days the MPF brigade requires to deploy, the future Third World forces should have little difficulty destroying the initially committed marine battalion with conventional forces or rendering the port, beach or airfield unusable with chemical ballistic missiles. The vulnerability of the marine forces is yet another threat to the Airborne forces of the future. In the joint operations of the past, like Grenada, marine forces complemented the Airborne forces with their additional firepower in the form of marine and navy aircraft and additional ground combat power in the form of a MEU. With the increased threat to these forces, comes the likelihood that in the future, the Airborne forces will be forced to conduct offensive operations independent of the marines. The strategic speed of the Airborne is 40 times that of the ship-bound Marines. With only a MEU available for amphibious operations in the first ten days of a crisis and the potential requirement for force projection inland, there may be little choice but to respond initially with the Airborne forces, in conjunction with the Air Force and readily available navy forces. As Colonel Peter J. Boylan in his article, "Power Projection, Risk and the Light Force," said,
"It seems plausible that, in situations where the use of military force is being considered . . . the risk involved in applying that force
may be smallest at the very onset of the situation. . . . This early response, . . is likely to have a singular inhibiting effect upon the potential adversary and may tend to paralyze his initiative and restrict his options." (44)
CONCLUSION - FUTURE THREATS AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE AIRBORNE FORCES
As with any military operation, a mission analysis and an analysis of the enemy are critical to the success of a mission. For the future Airborne forces, the mission will probably remain the same: to deploy rapidly anywhere in the world and be prepared to conduct combat operations to protect U.S. national interests. The enemy, however, is changing significantly. This chapter has identified many of the threats that must be considered in future force projection missions. The mechanization of the Third World forces, the proliferation of ballistic missiles and the availability of weapons of mass destruction are only a few of the future threats that the modernized Airborne forces will be expected to deal with. With the increasing instability of the Third World, the U.S. will almost certainly be involved in a situation that will require a deployable, versatile and lethal Airborne force that can conduct combat operations in this future threat environment and successfully accomplish their mission.
CHAPTER FIVE ENDNOTES
1. GEN John W. Foss, "The Future of the Army," Army Times, March 5, 1990, p. 14.
2. Debra van Opstal and Andrew C. Goldberg, Meeting the Mavericks: Regional Challenges for the Next President (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1988), p. xii.
3. GEN Carl E. Vuono, The U.S. Army: A Strategic Force for the 1990s and Beyond (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army White Paper, Jan. 1990), p. 8.
4. Senator John S. McCain III, "Proliferation in the 1990s: Implications for U.S. Policy and Force Planning," Strategic Review, Summer 1989, P. 12.
5. Ibid., p. 18.
6. Iraqi Leader Threatens Attack With Nerve Gas," Kansas City Star, 3 April 1990, P. A-1.
7. GEN Carl E. Vuono and Secretary of the Army Michael P. W. Stone, The Posture o the U.S. Army - Fiscal Year 1991 (Washington, D.C.: Presented to the Second Session, 101st Congress), p. I-5.
8. Michael Dunn, "Until the Imam Comes: Iran Exports Its Revolution," Tactics and Technologies, 1987, p. 155.
9. Ibid., p. 156. 10. Mark P. Hertling, "Narcoterrorism: The Unconventional War," Military Review, March 1990, p. 17.
11. Augusto Varas, Militarization and the Internatio l," Race in Latin America (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1985)Tp 46_47.
12 Ibid., pp. 65-67.
13 Steven Zaloga, "Soviet Arms Exports: Cutbacks Ahead?" Armed Forces Journal, Dec. 1989, P. 20.
14 Ibid.
15 Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power: Prospects For Change (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Sept. 1989), p. 23.
16 Zaloga, P. 20.
17 United States Army, Army Focus (Washington D.C.: HQDA (DACS-DMC), Nov. 1989), P. 7.
18. A New Missile Threat," National Review, Aug. 1988, p. 15.
19. Varas, p. 67.
20 Varas, p. 66. Also, Opstal and Goldberg, p. 11.
21 McCain, P. 18.
22. Douglas Stanglin and Richard Chesnoff, "'Ihe Missile Trade in Launch Mode," U.S. News & World Repor:L, 25 July 1988, P. 32.
23. McCain, P. 16.
24. McCain, pp. 11 and 17.
25. Opstal and Goldberg, P. 14.
26. McCain, P. 15.
27. COL A. F. Bulstov, "Combatting Airborne[50] Assault Forces," (JPRS-UKJ-88-010) VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, 4 April 1988, P. 27.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., p. 26.
30. William S. Lind, COL Keith M. Nightengale, et al., "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation," Military Review, Oct. 1989, pp. 4-5.
31. Stanglin and Chesnoff, P. 37.
32. Edward N. Luttwak, Historical Analysis and Projection for Army 2000, Volume 1, Part 17, Soviet Airborne Forces 1930-1983, (DTIC B085085, March 1983), pp. 70-71.
33. Opstal and Goldberg, P. 23.
34. Ibid., P. 11.
35 Ibid., P. 12.
36 Ibid.
37 Soviet Military Power, P. 23.
38 Varas, P. 67.
39. Guy de Bakker, "Anti-Ship Missiles: A Market Lull," International Defense Review, Feb. 1990, pp. 156-157.
40. Ibid. pp. 156-159.
41. James F. Dunnigan and Austin Bay, A Quick and Dirty Guide to War (New York: William Morrow and Company Inc., 1985), P. 250.
42. United States Army Command and General Staff College Student Text 100-1, Navy and Marine Corps (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CGSC, June 1989), P. 11/18.
43 Lind, Nightengale, et al., P. 5.
44. COL Peter J. Boylan, "Power Projection, Risk and the Light Forces," Military Review, May 1982, P. 64.