General Omar N. Bradley, in an address to the graduates of the Command and General Staff College, 1 July 1949, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

[Editor: I will provide up-dates in brackets]

HISTORICAL examples of Airborne operations conducted during World War II were close, vertical envelopments by parachute and glider forces or airlandings in enemy territory. These operations were in direct cooperation with surface action of other ground forces which linked up quickly with the Airborne units.

In the few years since VJ- day, the Airborne picture has considerably changed.

Only specialized Airborne units were initially concerned with this type of warfare; now every Army unit is becoming vulnerable. The favorable trend in developments of cargo type airplanes and the improved loading facilities which are being incorporated into these airplanes has provided an alternate method for transporting troops to areas of disturbance. The planners of today are thinking in terms of airheads established entirely by Airborne and air-transported Corps equipped with air-transportable howitzers, tanks, bulldozers, and other essential weapons and vehicles, they visualize using the pod or pack-plane to provide detachable units enabling the airhead to set up field communications stations, command posts, control towers, hospital units, shelters and supply warehouses, all delivered by AIR.

Carriers for an Airborne Army Transport type aircraft which are currently included in the development program and approach the desirable military characteristics as carriers of an Airborne Army are:

1. The C-119, a medium cargo type airplane, is intended for use as a parachute, glider tug, or air-landing airplane. It has exits, in addition to cargo doors, to permit rapid discharge of parachute troops and accompanying supplies.

This plane will transport all items of equipment included in the standard infantry division with the exception of tanks, the anti-aircraft armament, and some of the heavier engineer equipment. This airplane possesses practically all of the ideal military characteristics of a medium cargo plane.

[Today, this role is fulfilled even better by the turbo-prop C-130]

Military planners today are thinking in terms of airheads established by Airborne and air-transported Corps, equipped with air-transportable weapons and vehicles and maintained by fleets of transport aircraft

Many new types of aircraft are being developed and tested as the carriers of an Airborne Army of the future. The C-119 medium cargo plane, carries 42 troops or a 2 1/2- ton truck and a 105-mm howitzer. The C-123 medium assault cargo plane is designed to carry 60 troops or a 2 1/2- ton truck and a 105mm howitzer.

[The C-130 Hercules carries 92 troops AIRLAND or a 105mm howitzer/truck, the C-17 Globemaster III carries 154 troops or 54 troops and 167,000 pounds of cargo]

The C- 124 Globemaster II long-range heavy cargo plane, which carries 222 troops or one light tank, M-24.

[Today the long-range heavy cargo plane is the C-5B Galaxy which can carry 73 troops AND a heavy M1 tank or 2 M1 heavy tanks]

The H- 16 large transport helicopter with detachable pod is capable, of carrying 3 to 4 tons of cargo or 40 troops. The detachable pod idea is also being adapted for use with conventional aircraft.

[The bad news is pod-equipped aircraft in the USAF didn't take place, YET. The Army CH-54 with a pod was retired. Still a GREAT IDEA, we need to do]

2. The C- 124, a heavy cargo type air-plane, is intended primarily for air-landing operations with secondary employment as a parachute or glider tug airplane: it has parachute exits as well as cargo doors. This plane will not carry the medium tank; however, it will lift the light tank. All other heavy items of equipment contained within the standard infantry division can be lifted by this plane. One of the primary disadvantages of the C-124 is that heavy cargo drops have been sacrificed in order to obtain nose loading.

3. Assault , cargo aircraft are intended for use as parachute or assault landing airplanes, using small fields normally suited to cargo gliders. Both parachute exits and cargo doors are included in these airplanes. The assault cargo air-plane is designed to eventually replace the glider. This type of aircraft includes the C-122, C-123, and C-125, all of which will lend a great deal of versatility to the employment of Airborne or air-transported forces at relatively close radii of action.

4. An interesting development in aircraft is the cargo helicopter. The H- 16, a combination cargo-troop carrier, and the H- 17, primarily a cargo carrier, will tremendously increase the flexibility of amphibious, river crossing, mountain, and other special operations. Military planners also visualize using helicopters for movement of bulk cargo and supplies within an airhead or a similar isolated area

Airborne Problems
It must be understood, however, that Airborne forces possess certain inherent weaknesses which are due partially to the cargo versus distance limitations of present-day cargo airplanes. The development program for cargo aircraft is progressing very satisfactorily. Nevertheless, much remains to be done in this field. Some of the more apparent problems are:

1. Landing gear; perhaps further development of the track-laying type will reduce requirements for prepared landing fields.

2. Shortening landing and take-off ability.

3. An improvement of glider tows.

Neither the Army nor the Air Force planners minimize these problems. Needless to say, the future employment of Airborne forces will be greatly enhanced by the continued development of more efficient transport type aircraft. The Berlin Airlift proved conclusively that movement of large cargo tonnages, entirely by air, is not only feasible but an acceptable method of transportation. The average cargo tonnage delivered per day by the Airlift during the spring of 1949 approached 8,OOO tons per day.

Heretofore, the logistical considerations involved in large Airborne operations have tended to restrict the possibilities for this type of warfare. Some military writers have not only soft-pedaled academic employment of large Airborne forces, but they have declared them to be "impossible". However, by virtue of aircraft developments, particularly in assault type aircraft, medium and heavy cargo aircraft, and helicopters, it is mandatory that we explore and determine the feasible scope and scale of this type of military operation.

Employment of Airborne Forces
The establishment of an airhead by an Airborne force, deep in enemy territory, is a comparatively new concept, and offers significant possibilities which are worthy of consideration by the military student.

To fully appreciate the possibilities of this type of operation, we must first accept the FACT that large Airborne operations are an existing military potential of our country. The large Airborne operation may be the only, and in some situations the most economical, means by which certain missions can be accomplished. In any ease, fully equipped Airborne forces will be able to strike at far distant points and will be totally supplied by air.

Furthermore, tbe Army must be prepared to participate in and ready to shoulder the responsibilities involved in the execution of such operations. Potential Airborne operations comprising parachute-glider troops and air-landed troops can be classed into four fundamental categories:

1. The first type is the use of large Airborne forces in the establishment of an airhead deep in enemy territory. This category contains two further ramifications which are:

a. Employment of a large Airborne force, contemplating a link- up with con-ventional land forces after an extended period of operation.

b. Employment of a large Airborne force on an independent land mission sustained entirely by air transport.

2. The second type of employment of Airborne forces involves a relatively early juncture withother land forces. This type of mission will normally be in support of the over-all ground mission and closely coordinated with that effort.

3. The third type of Airborne operation is the employment of Airborne forces to seize a base which will provide facilities for the furtherance of a common mission for the same or another service.

4. The fourth type of Airborne operation is the employment of Airborne forces to neutralize enemy installations which do not present suitable targets for complete destruction by combat air operations alone. This type operation takes the form of a raid with detailed plans for withdrawal of the force after accomplishment of the mission. Withdrawal plans may include a getaway by air, sea, overland, or a combination of all three.

An Airborne force landed deep in enemy territory and constituting an independent invasion is capable of delivering tremendous shock and striking power. Accordingly, unless the military planners whose task it is to formulate long-range outline war plans include provisions for adequate transport aircraft of suitable size, range, and speed, large Airborne invasions, will not be possible. Moreover, the operational planner and the procurement planner, on the national level, must integrate their planning efforts to such an extent that the operation plan is in essence married to the procurement plan.

During World War II, the "air war" was virtually won in the spring of 1944. However, the procurement schedule for bomber type aircraft continued at the same tempo throughout that year and the following year. Had the procurement planners and the operational planners foreseen this situation, it is logical to presume that the bomber schedule would have been decreased and the cargo aircraft procurement schedule stepped up.

Relying upon the sound professional judgment of those individuals in whom rests the responsibility for our military destiny inthe event of future war, we can assume that the necessary tools will be available to support large Airborne operations.

What, then, is the Army's responsibility in the execution of this type mission?

Capabilities Required
Before considering this question in detail, it is necessary to eurvey the capabilities that must be possessed within the military structure of the Armed Forces in order to achieve success in the establishment of an airhead deep within enemy territory.

While there are several contributory factors, tbe four outstanding capabilities which must be possessed by the Armed Forces are:

1. Such operations are not feasible until the Air Force has gained and is able to maintain air superiority.

2. The operation must achieve strategic and tactical surprise.

At the Berlin end of the Airlift, experience was gained in the 'mass unloading of aircraft. Above, coal being unloaded from C- 54B at the Gatow Airfield. Above, heavy equipment being unloaded at Templehof from a C-82. Below, some of the supplies flown into Berlin to construct a runway.- U.S. Air Force photos.

4. The Airborne force must be capable of establishing and maintaining a greater build-up of troops, equipment, and supplies than the enemy is able to bring against the airhead.

A quick analysis of these four salient capabilities reveals a complete dependency upon air transportation and air protection in each of the four. This, again, emphasizes the necessity in long-range planning for Airborne operations of large-scale variety.

From strictly an Army point of view, there are two prime responsibilities involved in supporting large-scale Airborne operations. The first responsibility is far-reaching and one that must be decreed by Department of the Army policy. This is the degree of air-transportability to be obtained by every unit presently contained in the type field army. Any unit in the field Army that is essential for combat, combat support, or service support of an operational force, but which cannot be transported by prospective aircraft, has no justification for continuing in its present form. The development of Maginot Line type of armor and armament for Army purposes is not only planning in retrospect but is as archaic as the catapult. World War II was a war of movement, primarily surface movement. However, it requires no great amount of speculation to conclude that World War III will be a war of movement in space, depending upon surface movement for the necessary support in the accomplishment of strategic missions. The "Trojan horse" for the Army of the future will be the cargo-troop carrier airplane.

The second responsibility of the Army in supporting large-scale Airborne operations calls for the development of procedures, doctrine, and a command structure for the logistical support of forces in the airhead, many sources of information are available for constructive thought and guidance in this development. The most excellent source currently available is the record of the Army's functional responsibilities in connection with the Berlin Airlift. Logistical Support for the Airhead Before considering certain aspects of the Berlin Airlift, it is appropriate to scan briefly the present concept of providing logistical support to an airhead.

Present doctrine accepted in Army service schools states that an air cargo re-supply organization, an Air Force service unit, will be present on departure airfields to receive, store, classify, pack, and load all supplies for air shipment forward to destination airfields. The supplies are received from the Communications Zone or one of its sections which has been delegated the responsibility of supporting the operation. The air cargo re-supply organization is a cellular organization composed of a head-quarters and from one to eight re-supply teams. These service units are located at designated departure airfields and perform the functions for which they have been designed. In exceptional cases, this organization will assist unloading air cargo

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