The U.S. Army National Guard is in a hurry to "keep up with the Joneses" in the Active Army and has made a serious mistake in converting M113 mechanized infantry units to M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs) In the hope that they will guarantee bigger budgets ("Cash cow" mentality) and get the ok to do real-world missions. The National Guard has failed to see the modern battlefield clearly and to realize that the BFV is a HEAVY vehicle designed for a Cold War confrontation in the open plains of Europe against Russian tank armies NOT the force projection contingencies and peacekeeping missions of the post Cold war era. We are turning in a superb light armored vehicle that can be modernized--into a M113A3 ACAV with gunshields and applique' armor proof against RPGs and auto-cannon that can be readily used in Air-delivered real world missions (look at Australian Army M113s leading the way in East Timor) in favor of a heavy vehicle that will sit in the motor pools of CONUS. Newer isn't always "better" especially when its for a specific purpose that is now mostly obsolete.

HOW THE BFV IS KILLING MECHANIZED INFANTRY

The old model jump-seat BFV can only carry 6 dismounting infantrymen in the back, whereas a M113A3 could carry 9-13 men who could leave the vehicle and seize/hold terrain. A unit that converts to BFVs forces 3 x 11B infantrymen to become tankers in training, outlook and are simply stuck in the turret. This is not what they signed up for when they enlisted to be infantry. As BFV NET training begins, many of these hard-core infantrymen leave the unit. Then as the unit becomes fully crew-qualified in the BFV, its remaining infantry find that they sit in the back as second-class citizens unable to view the battlefield since the top troop hatch has to be closed to prevent the turret from swinging into them or concussion from the 25mm gun or TOW ATGM backblast killing them. As BFV gunnery takes precedence over dismounted infantry action driven by a handful of "Master Gunners" dismounting infantry lose interest in the unit and go elsewhere where they can be infantry. Soon you have empty BFVs that cannot even secure the terrain ahead for its own safe passage (Armored infantry) let alone deploy from the vehicle to seize terrain/destroy enemies (Mechanized infantry) -- and BFV unit defeats at NTC and JRTC are a constant reminder of the BFV as a force structure failure.

We haven't even gone into the BFV's complexity as a vehicle that eats up training time, frustrates the infantry into becoming "Mini-mechanics" and results in a force not ready to fight...or of the money spent on BFVs that could have been used to send Soldiers to NCOES schools like PLDC, BNCOC, ANCOC, or HOOAH! Schools like Pathfinder, Air assault, Mountain warfare etc that result in more people leaving the unit, units becoming undermanned and eventually closed down. Just compare the infantry skills of a M113 NG unit BEFORE and then after the BFV is introduced---there is only X amount of time available to a NG unit. A Ranger combat vet told me recently: "The BFV is too complicated for a National Guard unit one weekend a month to master and maintain...it takes an active duty unit to do it properly "

THE M113A3 GAVIN IS A BETTER VEHICLE THAN THE BFV FOR CLOSED TERRAIN

There are fixes to the BFV's problems---making Armor 19-series MOS Soldiers BFV crewmen, creating a "Infantry Master Tactician" senior dismount force Soldier to counter-act BFV Gunnery mentality and balance the training to include dismounted infantry action, putting newer model BFV bench seats in to squeeze 7 men into the back etc. The NG can and should as a "MACOM" push the regular Army into authorizing a BROWN BERET be worn by ALL combat arms Soldiers in the Army to empower them with enthusiasm of effort that they are not just ordinary "cannon fodder" but an elite of the Army. But these changes require the active Army to change its ways (doubtful) and still at best will give us undermanned NG BFV units unable to dismount enough infantry to be anything more than local security for tanks, open desert armored warfare NOT true mechanized infantry. The U.S. Army has 6 divisions worth of BFV armored infantry, why does it need more NG Divisions of BFV Armored infantry? What the U.S. Army of today and tomorrow desperately needs is a LIGHT MECHANIZED INFANTRY that can air-deploy rapidly to closed terrain fights and peacekeep, a force in modernized M113A3s with ACAV gunshields--a force structure that the National Guard already has.

The M113A3 ACAV, can swim without preparation, can be air-dropped and "stuff" 5 or more at a time from USAF C-17 fixed-wing aircraft, can rumble over soft terrain and not smash bridges/road infrastructures. It can go almost anywhere a man can walk and requires no combat engineers to bridge it across obstacles, Combat engineers use M113A3s to swim across rivers to establish crossings for the heavy force. Its infantry fight with their heads out behind gunshields to return fire on the enemy in closed terrains like the jungles of Vietnam by Tan Son Nhut airbase or the streets of Saigon, where M113 ACAVs saved the day during the 1968 Tet offensive. The BFV is NOT an improvement over the M113, its designed for something entirely different--a war in open area Europe not closed terrain. A closer study of the two vehicles would have shown this.

TIME FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD TO LEAD THE WAY

The endless wailing about the inadequacies perceived and real about the NG can be put to rest by the NG leading the way for the rest of the U.S. Army in heeding the call of the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, General Shinsecki for "more mobile and lethal light forces" by keeping and fully utilizing M113A3 ACAVs in its force structure to be a LIGHT MECHANIZED FORCE for the U.S. Army. The simple solution is to NOT switch over entire Battalions to M2 BFVs, but to retain M113A3s in the NG force structure, creating COMPOSITE Mech-Infantry units.

This can be done in several ways:

1. Big picture: Keep entire BDEs with M113A3s, no BFVs allowed. BFV/M113A3s mixed as mission requires.

2. Medium picture: Battalions with 2 BFV Companies and 1 M113A3 company, or 2 M113A3 companies and 1 BFV Company

3. Little picture: Each BFV Company has a portion of its infantry moved by M113A3s instead of BFVs

At the technical level of war, the M113A3 benefits are enormous to the NG and the Total Army. We have a low-cost force that can deploy rapidly by AIR to peacekeep. We have a force that can operate in the jungles of far east asia that is not road bound and easily ambushed. The M113A3 Gavin ACAV force can be para-dropped with the 82d Airborne Division, giving it armored mobility/firepower lost when the M551 Sheridan light tank was retired and not replaced by the M8 Ridgway Armored Gun System as promised.

If the NG wants to be a "player" on the world scene, it needs to offer to the U.S. Army capabilities that it can't provide itself---a LIGHT MECHANIZED FORCE in M113A3 ACAVs is exactly what is needed today. Trying to replicate the active Army including its mistakes---is a road to ruin--if we want to stop armories from being closed, Soldiers leaving the Guard and "C-3" to be the label worn by our Mech-infantry units than our current course must be changed. We have the vehicle in our possession to achieve the goal of being the premier Light Mechanized C-1 combat-ready Force in the Army and the world--the M113A3 ACAV, all we need is the wisdom and the courage to do so.