Are we very close in character to the U.S. Army in 1950's Korea?
"The primary purpose of an Army - to be ready to fight effectively at all times - seemed to have been forgotten.... The leadership I found in many instances was sadly lacking and I said so out loud. The unwillingness of the Army to forgo certain creature comforts, its timidity about getting off the scanty roads, its reluctance to move without radio and telephone contact, and its lack of imagination in dealing with a foe whom they soon outmatched in firepower and dominated in the air and on the surrounding seas - these were not the fault of the Soldier, but of the policymakers at the top."
----General Matthew B. Ridgway, U.S. Army
What does this mean? It is a question of when, not if the Army will fail in action with terrible consequences for the President in power.
Zulus destroyed the British force, the Government fell in short order.
Sadly, Armitage and Coats understood this. How long will it take Rumsfeld and others to come to terms and is there any will at all to address it?
Forgive me for expressing some frustration.
There is no doubt that at some point in the near future, sound military reform ideas will get a hearing from the new Bush defense team. Unfortunately, the absence of Armitage and Coats suggests that this crowd is coming to power without a carefully thought-out plan and without a full appreciation of the challenge. This means a loss of valuable time and opportunity while they study the problems.
Consider what they do not yet understand:
First, inside the Army, General Officers have been picked for nearly ten years now on the basis of their PT scores, not their GT scores.
Since Clinton took office, the additional emphasis on form over substance through sycophantic behavior has worsened.
Oh yes, and do not promote those with real warfighting credentials based on demonstrated competence under direct-fire.
Second, the danger lurking in the short run involves a combination of what I call the "Zulu" type threat and the "Boxer Rebellion" type scenario.
What I mean is outlined below.
Zulu type irregular foe
The British deployed 1200 troops to suppress the Zulus. Thanks to a combination of incompetent senior leadership, as well as inadequately trained and improperly equipped Soldiers, 20,000 Zulus armed only with spears overcame them in 1879.
Today's world contains plenty of Zulu types that are more than capable of destroying the IBCT/MEU in minutes. Look what one truck bomb did to the MEU (called a MAU back in 1983) Just as the Royal Navy could do nothing to rescue the British Army from destruction in 1879, air power will not rescue the IBCT/MEU. It is the "wrong stuff', not the "right stuff" for the future. Instead, future Zulus may turn out to be people riding in toyota pick ups armed with cell phones, RPGs, automatic weapons and a UAV here or there plus a cruise missile or two for good measure.
Boxer rebellion type scenario
In 1900, the contemporary equivalent of the Western Allies or the international community had to put some 30,000 troops ashore in China to relieve the beleaguered international community in
Peking.
The multinational troops were always outnumbered, but thanks to superior training, organization, leadership and equipment, they were unstoppable. Their intervention ended the old Chinese regime and resulted in the installation of China's first Republican government. Today, we could not do what the British-led force did in 1900. We would arrive too late, we could not conduct integrated, joint warfare and we could not integrate allies to fight effectively with
us.
A few sea mines and a handful of cruise missiles would keep us from operating over the beach.
Some '80s air defense technology would shoot down significant numbers of our aircraft.
Most important, we do not understand the criticality of replacing bad old regimes with new ones. The ultra conservative type-paradigm continues to dominate thinking to the point that any such contingency would be rejected on the grounds that it required 100,000 troops instead of 35 to 40 thousand. In other words due to Army inefficiency needed power projections will be limited or ruled out.
Finally, the Boxer rebellion is the most likely type of future scenario for which our forces should be prepared, but the IBCT + MEU cannot do it. That is why it is critical to reorganize the force now, change personnel policies and to incorporate 80% of the current equipment into a new joint force design that puts robust army combat power on the ground from the sea and the air quickly.
Third, instead of recognizing the range of possibilities after WW II, we dismantled the Army and put our faith in strategic bombing and the arrival of a few marines to take the surrender and get some publicity shots. You know the rest of the story.
Strategic bombing did nothing to deter or stop the North Koreans or Chinese and the Army's condition was abysmal through much of the war.
Today, national missile defense stands an excellent chance of turning out to be as irrelevant as strategic bombing in 1950.
This is not to say that NMD is wrong. On the contrary, theater missile defense is critical now and should lay the foundation for NMD; But as General Ridgway's description of the Army in 1950 suggests, today's "Army of One" is very close in character to the U.S. Army in Korea.
FEEDBACK!
An infantry officer writes:
"Other food for thought re: Korea. I've heard it said somewhere that the reason that the U.S. Army went full bore in the implementation of tracked vehicles for almost every piece of rolling stock in the inventory (to include tracked CSS vehicles like the M548) in the late 50's early 60's was their "discovery" that wheeled vehicles lacked the "mobility" in the Korean War. In particular, truck tires were frequently punctured in urban areas where debris littered the streets. That may bear some research."
Yours? Email 1st TSG (A)