Overlook the turret from the BFV and look just at its hull and its essentially a MEDIUM ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER (APC). However it can only carry a reduced-size 7 infantrymen squad since the actual turret takes up space. Some have suggested as Stanley Crist has of actually removing the turret to lighten the BFV and get more dismounting infantry inside.
Consider the turret, but look only at its 25mm autocannon (M242 Bushmaster or "Chain Gun") and its co-axial 7.62mm M240C Medium Machine Gun (MMG), and the BFV is in essence a LIGHT TANK or infantry fire-support vehicle at the weight penalty of a MEDIUM TANK. Pointed upward, the 25mm gun can be an Air Defense Artillery (ADA) weapon. This is why the BFV is a part of the Immediate Ready Company (IRC) assigned to support the forced-entries of the 82d Airborne Division in the aftermath of the retirement of the AIR-DROPPABLE M551 Sheridan light tank battalion and cancellation of the AIR-DROPPABLE M8 Armored Gun System though it handicaps the Paratroopers into having to secure a landing strip for USAF C-17 aircraft to AIRLAND the IRC. C-17s airlanded BFVs and mech-infantry that guard TF Hawk in Albania and were sent forward into Kosovo with 82d Airborne Paratroopers to be the first U.S. peacekeepers on the scene. Its why ADA branch has adapted Stinger Surface-to-Air Missile pods onto BFVs to create the M6 Bradley Linebacker system.
Look at the TOW missile launcher, and you have an ATGM TANK DESTROYER or ITV. This is the reasoning behind eliminating the Improved TOW Vehicle (ITV) "E" company from the force structure. The M113-based ITV was created when squads were still in APCs. It replaced the flex-mounted (external) TOW of the AT Section of the Weapons Platoon (2 TOWs and 3 x 81mm Mortars per company). Once the BFV was fielded with its own TOW at squad level, no need for ITV. Unfortunately, "we threw out the baby with the bathwater" with the Division '86 redesign and eliminated the company mortars, also losing INDIRECT FIRE CAPABILITIES vital in mountainous and urban terrain. Suddenly, Infantry realized that it lost 6 APCs (2 x M901 ITVs, 3 x 81mm M125 Mortar AFVs, and the 1 M113 FDC) per company, so it artificially ginned up a solution called the "E-Company" to try to recover some of those slots and capabilities. Now we had the ludicrous organization of ITVs trying to overwatch units that they could not keep up with. We'd be better off by expanding the Bn Mortar Platoon into a Company of 12-18 tubes of M1064A3 120mm mortar AFVs. Armor did something similar, but much better hidden. Since WW I, tanks had 5 per platoon, 17 per company (3 platoons + 2 HQ), and 54 per battalion (3 companies + 3 HQ). Div '86 changed the tank platoon from 5 to 4 tanks, and cut BN HQ from 3 to 2. Battalion would have only 44, for a loss of 10 tanks. How to fix? Easy, add 4th tank company, for 58 total (overall GROWTH by 4 tanks)!
A "dumb" High Explosive Plastic (HEP) TOW missile would make an excellent building/bunker busting weapon but Engineer branch is not considering it on a proposed Bradley Engineer Fighting Vehicle, and they would be wise to retain some of their M113A3s for terrain agility for their Sappers.
BFV/APC COMPOSITE HEAVY/LIGHT BRIGADE FORCE STRUCTURE
However, all is not well with 1-vehicle-doing-the-mission-of-3. As LTC Chester Kojro, USAR so eloquently states in his letter to Infantry magazine, May-August 1998; the problem with the BFV is we are "combining arms at too low a level in one vehicle, making it a combined target". His solution of regaining the balance in our mechanized infantry battalions by making them a 2/3ds M113A3 force to get more dismounted infantry on the ground (7-13 per APC) and 1/3d BFV force to act as the light tank/fire support is right. We could begin with a light/medium Mechanized Infantry Force structure in the 8 x U.S. Army National Guard Divisions by insuring we keep M113A3-equipped Infantry Battalions in the force structure and adding the HMG/RPG resistant applique' armor that they were supposed to have added all along. The Army National Guard is actually more blessed than the active Army because it hasn't heavied up all its mechanized infantry battalions and made their infantry "miniature tankers", and could lead the way for the rest of the Army towards a more balanced and more capable mechanized infantry force structure. A good "test bed" unit would be the 149th Infantry Brigade in Kentucky which has an infantry battalion with M113A2s (needs to be upgraded to A3 standards with uprated engine, spall liners, external fuel tanks etc.) and is set to receive the Alabama Army National Guard's elite' 1-167th Infantry Battalion which has BFVs and a long fighting tradition dating beyond the Civil War as the 4th Alabama. This unit would become the "high-speed" mechanized infantry innovators for the entire Army once its realized that throwing money (via equipment purchases) at a problem is not always a solution and newer-and-for-a-different-purpose (BFV-heavy armor protection/firepower for mounted warfare: "ARMORED INFANTRY") isn't always better than the-right-purpose-modernized (M113A3-light armor/firepower with absolute best terrain agility for dismounted warfare; "MECHANIZED INFANTRY"). Then we would have the best of both systems---a LARGE dismounted infantry maneuver force required to push a stubborn OPFOR off key terrain to free mobility corridors at places like NTC and more importantly, clear restrictive terrain of enemies with RPGs and ATGMs in real battlefields like Kosovo.
REPLACE EVERY 4TH BFV WITH A M113A3
In open terrain at NTC, we were OPFOR holding the high ground, BlueFor in BFVs never sent or had enough infantry to dislodge us, so we closed the mobility corridor and wiped out the entire M1 Abrams Main Battle Tank (MBT) and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) force.
In closed terrain at Camp Shelby, we were BFV BlueFor that did send out the few infantry it could cram into the back of each BFV to clear/hold terrain but discovered it had to kill OPFOR AFVs and infantry in our own sector using hand weapons since getting too close to our BFV's 25mm chain gun arc of fire killed our men from discarding sabot rounds. If the BFVs moved in close for better fire control, the vehicles/crews exposed themselves and got killed by enemy tanks and AT weapons fired by enemy infantry.
Old BFV with jump seats and turretless AMEV with bench seats--we could fit 10 without the turret, 7 with
Even with bench seats instead of the infamous jump seats, each turreted BFV can only carry 7 infantrymen in the back and realistically can only be a long-range base-of-fire to them. 7 infantrymen per vehicle doesn't muster enough men to take ground from the enemy as pointed out by several senior Army officers recently in Infantry magazine. If we field a team to employ the M240B Medium Machine Gun (MMG) as a portable closer-range base-of-fire, it removes riflemen from the maneuver force. The 3 most senior men per BFV are turned into "tankers" (Driver, Gunner, Bradley Commander) who end up with vehicle movement/turret weaponry as an answer to every tactical problem mentality, and distort training focus epitomized by the Master Gunner status/position sought by many in our infantry units.
To solve this problem, an Infantry Master Tactician's course needs to be established at Fort Benning, Georgia to insure infantry fire/maneuver tactics not just vehicular gunnery are valued in our Mechanized Infantry units. The Infantry Master Tactician rating would be the Senior ranking infantryman in the BFV platoon who fights from the ground not the BFV turret. He would insure that training focus does not center around becoming "mini-tankers" through the endless application of gunnery tables.
We need to "remove" the turret in the 4th vehicle in the BFV platoon so we can have more space inside the vehicle to carry MORE INFANTRY---a full-sized ASSAULT SQUAD that can provide a CLOSE-IN base-of-fire for the platoon on the ground. The simplest way would be to replace the 4th BFV with a different vehicle sans turret already in the Army inventory in large numbers: the legendary, combat-proven M113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier (APC). As LTC Kojro points out in his letter to Infantry magazine, BFV/APC force would insure that enough infantry could be delivered on the ground to win the battle. The M113A3 has bolt-on provisions for applique' armor proof against 30mm fire. It already cmes with external fuel tanks and spall liners. The up-engined M113A3 is actually faster than the BFV. The M113A3 has space to fit 13 men: a MK-19 40mm Heavy Machine Gun (HMG) and M240B MMG Team AND a Rocket (AT4/SMAW-D)-Missile (Javelin) Team could be easily carried onboard. The only Soldier turned into an "armor crewman" would be the M113A3's driver. The MK-19 HMG team would operate from the TC's cupola while the vehicle is on the move.
The Rocket/Missile Team would fire the Javelin soft-launch from the top troop hatch using shoot n' scoot tactics. The M240B MMG can be fitted to the left or right antenna mount using the ACAV universal mount, preferably with a gunshield. Upon direction of the BFV Platoon Leader, the Assault Squad can go to the ground and follow the rifle squads forward to set up a base of fire separate from the AFV element which would be referred to as the "5th Squad" when operating without infantry mounted inside. The MK-19 HMG with its indirect fire capability more than offsets the loss of the 4th BFV turreted 25mm gun since it can strike at dead spaces the 25mm's flatter trajectory cannot reach. The MK-19 can be vehicle mounted in the M113A3 with the Assistant Gunner handing a steady supply of belts to the Gunner in the TC's rotating cupola or ground mounted using a tripod. The Rocket/Missile teams can be positioned where they can best engage enemy AFVs and/or eliminate enemies in buildings/bunkers.
One way to look at the Assault Squad in the M113A3 is that its the BFV's turret weaponry in man-portable, more terrain-adaptable form:
40mm HMG substitutes for the 25mm chain gun
7.62mm MMG substitutes for the co-ax MMG
Javelin ATGM substitutes for the TOW
BFV Platoon
PL with 1st Rifle Squad in BFV
2d Rifle Squad in BFV
PSG with 3d Rifle Squad in BFV
4th Assault Squad in M113A3
If all 4 Infantry Squads go to ground, the vehicle force becomes the "5th Squad"
More Infantry
With 7 infantry in 3 BFVs (21) plus 11-12 in the M113A3, each BFV platoon would have 32-33 men on the ground instead of the tortured, overloaded 28 we have now. We would finally have enough infantry to dislodge the enemy from mobility corridors, and actually perform infantry tasks not just be relegated to being security guards for tankers. If we fail to clear defiles of enemies with AT weapons and RPGs with our own infantry, we will pay for this in blood like the Israeli Defense Force did in Lebanon in 1982.
More and better quality firepower
The BFV Platoon gains indirect-fire capabilities with the M113A3's MK-19 GMG that can reach into dead spaces the enemy is using to hide, and pulverize building rooftops/windows in urban combat situations (Military Operations in Urban Terrain). The GMG can also be ground mounted so its carrier can move to a better hide position or perform other tasks.
Because the top troop hatch of the BFV cannot be kept open due to safety considerations, the infantry in the back are blind to what is going on around them, a serious liability in MOUT as the Russians learned the hard way at Grozny in the Chechyan war. The M113A3 with its ability to have infantry scanning outward from the top cargo hatch can detect nemy ambushes and attacking aircraft early and return fire from the mounted HMG and MMGs firing behind gunshields. The BFV force would gain a fire/forget, shoot n' scoot capability from Javelins fired from the M113A3 top cargo hatch that the sit-still-and-track TOW ATGM on the BFVs cannot perform. The roomy interior of the M113A3 allows large amounts of ammunition, rockets and missiles to be carried compared to the cramped BFV.
More Terrain Agility
The M113A3 can be used by the PL and key leaders to make a Leader's recon with less chance of giving our intentions away to the enemy since the M113A3 is smaller, quieter and doesn't look like a BFV. The M113A3 can also swim without preparation to cross small rivers/lakes.
The Javelin Command Launch Unit (CLU)'s forward looking infared (FLIR) vision can be used from the top troop hatch without wearing down the vehicle's batteries as operating a BFV's turreted FLIR sight would.
Less cost to the Army
Eliminating 1 BFV per BFV Platoon would save the Army $$millions of dollars in operating and maintenance costs since the M113A3 sips JP-8 and is very easy to maintain compared to the fuel-guzzling BFV.
Replacing the current BFV TOW which has to be guided by the operator all the way to its target with the fire/forget Follow-On-To-TOW (FOTT) with 5-10 kilometer range makes the BFV the most lethal AFV killing AFV in the world, bar none. This includes the mighty M1 Abrams MBT and its Chobham armor copy cats which can be targeted and killed by FOTT, Javelin and other top-attack munitions long before they can get within main gun range. The BFV force with FOTT becomes the overwatch force for the MBT component of the composite Armored Brigade, creating a better synergism for mounted warfare. The M113A3 force would have the ability to swim and more terrain agility than its heavier BFV counterparts, easily air-delivered if needed in a contingency. The best listing of the pros/cons of the M113A3 and BFV are found in the January-February 1995 Armor Magazine article; "M113A3s maximize capabilities for contingency operatons". The light mechanized battalion of the composite Armored Brigade insures
THE BFVS: INFANTRY MASTER TACTICIANS NEEDED
But, the technical problem with the BFV is with its operators, not the vehicle itself. Although too heavy, the BFV could be low-velocity airdropped by a C-17 if we expediteded the development of a 60k LVAD air-delivery parachute system. Although the infantry in the back are unable to view the battlefield heads-out like in the M113A3 top troop hatch, this can be corrected by a new top cargo/TOW ATGM loading hatch with an Assistant Squad Leader (ASL) observation dome and giving him a hand-held Global Positioning System (GPS) and a topographical map. We can make more space inside to carry more infantry as you will read about later.
The reason why the BFV is not being fully maximized is a mental mistake in that we have transplanted a 25mm chain gun and 7.62mm co-ax version of Main Battle Tanks' Gunnery Tables into the "reason d'etre" for the BFV unit's training plan. Gunnery takes up all of a MBT crews' time, why would it be different for the BFV? BFV Gunnery tables have become the sole yardstick of the effectiveness of a BFV unit and its a one-dimensional, one-mission focus that overlooks the APC and TANK DESTROYER roles the vehicle and personnel are supposed to be capable of.
The way to change this is by designating the Senior most dismounted infantry Assistant Squad Leader (ASL) or perhaps Company 1SG or BN CSM a real job, other than monitoring police call as the "INFANTRY MASTER TACTICIAN" (IMT), or "Master Tactician" for short. This can be done NOW, for no cost by any forward-thinking innovative Mechanized Infantry Brigade, Battalion or Company commander. The "Master Tactician" would be the dismounted force counterpart to the mounted-perspective "Master Gunner". The Master Tactician would plan, supervise and conduct the Company's dismounted force training and insure that the APC role of the BFV does not get overlooked in the training plan. The Master Tactician should be a separate career track for the who does not want to go into the BFV turret and eventually become a Master Gunner.
With Infantry school approval, the Infantry Master Tactician could stay in his position to an extended rank of E9 so he can have the clout within mechanized infantry units to insure a balanced training plan takes place and the dismounts do not become second-class citizens because they are not BFV crewmen. In fact, the Master Tactician should be able to go to the Warrant Officer Course (WOC) and become a warrant-officer infantry Platoon Leader, leading the entire infantry platoon if he desires it. Infantry skill and expertise would not evaporate by Soldiers leaving the unit due to pressures to rise up the rank ladder. Just as Army helicopter pilots have learned that career stability and time are needed to master, their complex weapon systems, so must the BFV Master Gunner and Master Tacticians, both should be able to reach a higher enlisted rank and stay in the fighting force or attend WOC and become a fighting Platoon leader. This would create a new source to insure all infantry platoons are officer-led, and hope for the light infantryman that if he is assigned to a mechanized infantry unit that he does not have to become a "mini-tanker" in order to advance and stay in the Army. The Master Tactician would initially earn his title by being an Expert Infantryman Badge (EIB) holder and graduating from the 7-week Bradley Leader's Course (BLC) at Fort Benning, Georgia. Eventually the Infantry Master Tactician rating should be expanded to be Army light and heavy unit wide by its own course taught by the Ranger Training Brigade at Fort Benning which would include advanced topics like Close Quarter Battle (CQB) for MOUT, advanced marksmanship, weapons employment using night vision devices, tracking, Fire Support coordination, BFV tricks--like using field phones to keep engines off in the defense, M113A3 airdrop rigging, swimming, a diversion to Pathfinder school--where they would learn how to sling-load the M113A3---a sort of teaching lightfighter skills "Ranger School"without the harassment/sleep deprivation for the mech infantry. The Infantry Master Tactician would return to his unit as the Subject Matter Expert (SME) in infantry tactics to pass on to the men and a key advisor to the commander.
NG Retention would be greatly improved by an increased emphasis on dismounted infantry tactics for dismounted position Soldiers ALL of which would be able to attend Ranger school using National Guard Bureau (NGB) reimbursement.
A lesson from history:
Read the Ambrose's books, Citizen Soldiers, is by far my favorite. Great stories about the men and Leaders who pulled off the campaign in Europe.
I just had to relate this story of the ADC of the 29th ID, Brig. Gen. Norman "Dutch" Cota. This is the kind of thing that never fails to amaze me. I keep shouting to everyone I know that people do well when they are trained but falter if it's not what they expect. This is another story about muscle memory and it's training affect. No story I've ever read or seen so clearly illustrates this. I will quote it in total.
Big. Gen. Norman Cota, Assistant Division Commander of the 29th (The man who cleared Omaha Beach, depicted by Robert Mitchum in the film, The Longest Day), came on a group of infantry pinned down by some Germans in a farmhouse. He asked the captain in command why his men were making no effort to take the building.
"Sir, the Germans are in there, shooting at us," the captain replied.
"Well, I'll tell you what, Captain," said Cota, unbuckling two grenades from his jacket. "You and your men start shooting at them. I'll take a squad of men and you and your men watch carefully. I'll show you how to take a house with Germans in it."
Cota led his squad around a hedge to get as close as possible to the house. Suddenly, he gave a whoop and raced forward, the squad following, yelling like wild men. As they tossed grenades into the windows, Cota and another man kicked in the front door, tossed a couple of grenades inside, waited for the explosions, them dashed into the house. The surviving Germans inside were streaming out of the back door, running for their lives.
Cota returned to the captain. "You've seen how to take a house," said the general, still out of breath. "Do you understand?"
"Yes, sir."
"Well, I won't be around to do it for you again," Cota said. "I can't do it for everybody."
A little later on Ambrose points this interesting detail out about the training of Soldiers for Normandy.
"Where had that captain been for the last six months? He had been in training to fight the German Army. He had been committed to offensive action, trained to it, inspired to it. But no one had thought to show him how to take an occupied house. He knew all about getting ashore from an LCVP, about beach obstacles, about paths up the bluffs, about ravines, about amphibious assault techniques. But no one had shown him how to take a house, because there were no standing houses on Omaha Beach, so that wasn't one of his problems."
To me that showed excellent leadership on Cota's part but some serious problems with overall training. It's probably not possible to cover all aspects of Infantry training in a short time but this should be covered in an advanced (infantry branch) officer course. It also occurs to me that your idea of a master infantry tactician would help solve some of these kinds of problems. The only way to compensate for lack of training is with leadership. Gen. Cota had it. Problem solved, lesson learned.
BFV AS APC: MORE SPACE NEEDED
The Active-duty Army has removed the early model BFV jump seats and replaced them with bench seats such that they believe that 7 men can be fitted inside to field a 3 x 9 man squad force structure inside 4 BFVs in the Infantry platoon as the new FM 7-7J Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad explains. However, the cost to modify the older M2A0 BFVs to the M2A2 Operation Desert Storm (ODS) configuration is about $1,000,000 per vehicle. For the Army National Guard, this same amount of money would be better spent buying GPS systems and getting instant situation/map awareness and better mounted/dismounted land navigation abilities..
The solution can be found in the 101st Air Assault Division which faces the same dilemma of trying to get large number of shooters on the ground with a limited number of vehicles. As described in Col Dan Bolger's superb book on JRTC; "The Battle for Hunger Hill", the "Screaming Eagles" REMOVE THE SEATS from their Blackhawk helicopters and fit 19 Sky Troopers per UH-60L instead of the with-seats-13. Taking this technique into the BFV, we should REMOVE ALL THE SEATS AND WATER TANKS from the early-model M2A0 BFVs so we can match the 3 x 9 force structure of the active-Army NOW, not wait for more $$$ to come our way. The only exception would be the seat needed to stand to reload TOW missiles. Sleeping mat pad material would be cut and glued to the floors. The enlarged dismount squad per NG BFVs would sit on the floor belted with a cargo strap safety belt, parachute-jump style.
Another idea might be to use modified milk crates with cushions and seat belts for safety. The modified milk crates would have a cushion seat top to allow ammo cans to be stored inside to maximize the limited space inside the BFV. The portable milk crate jump seats could be strapped to the floor of the BFV if more rigidity is needed.
The rucksacks of everyone inside the BFV need to be strapped to the outside of the armor skirts using the top and bottom handles there to lift them up for road wheel cleaning. The inside of the BFV free of the unsanitary water tank and jump seats would have more space and be streamlined for fast ingress/egress without snagging and seat folding/unfolding by the dismounting infantry maneuver force. Folding ladders should also be quick-release strapped (not bungee-cords that can shake free) to the lower skirt area for upper story building-entry capabilities in MOUT.
HERE ARE BFVs during Desert Storm, note how their rucksacks are on the OUTSIDE to save space inside
BFV as TANK DESTROYERS
The most lethal AFV-killing weapon on the BFV is the TOW ATGM, yet its high cost per missile makes it a neglected weapon in training that we have to play catch-up with in a real war emergency in order to get proficient with it. HMMWV TOW units have target boards mounted on HMMWVs that could be used to train BFV crew on TOW firing. The NG Division/BDE electronic repair shops should be conversant in how to make a target board. We need every BFV to fire old TOW ATGMs at least once a year at Annual Training (AT). Every BFV unit should have empty TOW tubes to practice loading drills.
THE FOTT is an important improvement to the BFV and should be adopted as soon as possible. The best use of FOTT would be a M113A3 variant with a rapid-fire and reload capability since this vehicle could be used in the Light Infantry Division "D" Company Anti-armor units as well as in Heavy Divisions.