Why "management" is a lie

Our "secret weapon" in all of the struggles for military excellence is the web page. This is our battleground where we can clearly condemn business "management" and other non-sense creeping into military culture and turn the tide against it. We have to tell you that "management" doesn't really work in civilian life, either. People are people. They need Leadership, not bean-counter assholes who will stab them in the back for a percentage point. We have forgotten that we are all Americans (HUMAN BEINGS)and in this together. If you get fired and you get despondent, its my kids that might get run over if you become a "loser" or a drug addict/alcoholic. The fundamental values implied in the term "management" is basing decisions APART from human concerns using statistics (numbers). Its like "political science" replacing Statemanship. Its Machiavelli instead of Abraham Lincoln. "Military science" versus the Operational Art. Others can argue about the mix of human concerns versus statistics implied in "management", 100-0, 80-20, 50-50 etc and our shelves are filled with books on this.

But from a moral perspective, "management" means leadership decisions without humanity. In war, if you do not look at the enemy in human terms you will not fight him correctly (statistics, his equipment) and may even lose. Management is treating human beings like machines when they aren't. You may get away with treating people like machines in civilian life where society is an artificial reality and people must make a living, but it will fail miserably on the battlefield where the FULL FORCE of human creativity PLUS technology can be arrayed against it. Especially when lives are on the line.

The following reirement speech and description of "zero defects" mindset creeping back into the military best sum up the taint "management" philosophy creates in the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. military in general. The only thing I disagree with is that the AF guy is quitting by retirement. "THEY" (Those that want to "manage" men to their deaths) WIN WHEN WE QUIT. We should NEVER QUIT because this is OUR COUNTRY, OUR ARMY, OUR FREEDOM, OUR WORLD that hangs in the balance. Join the Guard/Reserve, work a civilian job, build a web site, design gear, BUT NEVER QUIT UNTIL THE MILITARY IS ALL THAT IS HAS TO BE.

We have to because WE MUST.


AWACS CREWDOG RETIREMENT SPEECH

Major Leiss retired last month. I couldn't attend the ceremony, but his speech is the current talk of the "little people." People were so impressed that they asked that he type this up. Now at the ceremony, he wasn't reading off of anything, he just stood there, and looked directly at the wing leadership reps that were there: XXXXX, XXXXXX and some other dude.

When he was through talking, there was a 4 minute standing ovation. After the ceremony, the wing reps, instead of hanging around to shake his hand, beat feet!


Speech Given By Major Todd J. Leiss
On the Occasion of His Retirement, 10 July 1998

I have been very lucky in my life. I was born to great parents that have always supported me. Then to marry my wonderful wife Kathy, who also has great parents, and who have also been very supportive. Our parents have visited us wherever we were stationed, including Guam. Kathy and I have been blessed with two wonderful children: Jason and Ryan. I am very lucky. During my career I have flown with the U.S. AWACS, NATO AWACS, the British, and the French. Recently, I trained the "now" Japanese Mission Crew Commanders, and I have to tell you that nobody does AWACS better than us!!!

My father was drafted in May 1941, seven months before Pearl Harbor. My parents were married in 1943, and shortly afterwards he left for England. He landed at Normandy about 30 days after D-Day. My father was in General Patton's Third Army, in the Fourth Armored Division. He fought at the Battle of the Bulge, crossed the Rhine at Worms, and marched half-way across Czechoslovakia before they were told to turn back and give it to the Russians. The men of my fathers generation saved the world, then came home and built the America we know today. I am very proud of what they did. However, I am also proud that I have never had to fire a shot in anger, and, except for a few days, our country has been at peace for my entire 20-year career. The only way that we have been able to maintain that peace has been to maintain our strength! During these 20 years, I have learned a few things that I will share with you today: Know No Hatred, Golden Apples, Honor, and Management.


Know No Hatred:

Growing up in N.Y., a lot of fathers sat around the kitchen table every night blaming all their problems on black people. - And they didn't call them blacks. When I was sent by the Air Force to Texas A&M University, I went out with some friends. One of the girls, after hearing me speak, said she hated Yankees. For her whole life her father sat around the dinner table blaming all his problems on the Yankees. When I was stationed in Germany, I had some Dutch friends. One told me that his father sat around the dinner table blaming all his problems on the Germans. Because of hatred, I have spent many years orbiting over Bosnia and Saudi Arabia.

If you watch the news, it is hatred that is causing major problems around the world: in the Middle East, Ireland, and many other places. Once when I worked in the 552 Wing Exercises, I went to Jordan. I was staying in a nice hotel. On Friday evening they had a wedding in the hotel. Everyone was dressed in fancy suits and nice dresses; it looked like the weddings the Italians have back home in New York. They had a great party with Middle Eastern music and dancing. The very next week I stayed at a nice hotel in Israel. At the hotel on Friday night there was a wedding, everyone was dressed in nice dresses and suits, and the music was Middle Eastern. It looked like an Italian wedding.

If you tried to tell those people that they have so much in common, they would think you were the one that was crazy. If you put an Irish Catholic next to an Irish Protestant you cannot tell the difference, but they hate each other. This hatred makes it so these countries cannot have what we have. They are being held back from the progress we are benefitting from, and their economies are in shambles.

In our Air Force, we have a wide variety of people, with backgrounds from around the world. Some individuals have ways that seem strange to us, but it is this diversity that makes us strong. We have people, right here, who, because of their cultural background, look at things in different ways and help us improve every day. So, if you see hatred, try to stop it. If you can't stop it, get away from it. If you find yourself sitting around your kitchen table blaming others for your problems, then it's time to make a change in your life.


Golden Apples:

When I was young, the way my mother got me to do things was by offering me Golden Apples. In school, for doing good work, the teachers would give us gold stars. Early in my Air Force career, when I was offered a bad deal, I was always offered a good deal to make up for it. I would go anywhere they needed me, knowing I would get a good deal in return. When I was here from 1985-1990, we had a lot of good TDYs and some not so good. I had my share of bad deals, but in return I got good trips too. I went remote to Iceland, and once my remote was over, I was promised an assignment to Geilenkirchen (a very good deal).

When was the last time you saw a really good deal? There are no more Golden Apples! Here in the training squadron, we fly 40 sorties per month, our crews are tired and they get no benefits for working the long hours or putting in the extra effort. So many are leaving the Air force. If they wanted us to stay, you would think they would offer us a few Golden Apples! On an 11.5-hour sortie, we could fly to Hawaii. We could fly to Alaska; we could fly to Germany, or Norway, or England. If given the vision, some creativity, and freedom, we could make our training missions fun, educational, and a Golden Apple that makes people want to stay in the Air Force. Or, how about a TDY to someplace nice, like Tyndall AFB? Give us a scheduled day off; make it a 4-day trip. Give the crews a break and let them have a little Golden Apple. A lot more would stay.

As for myself, I was offered four more years in the Air Force. I received a letter that said mark this box if you want to stay and mark this box if you will retire at 20. If they wanted me to stay, maybe one person on the Wing staff could have talked to me and offered me a reason to stay. If they wanted me they would have said that I was valuable, and that they needed me and my experience. I understand how things work, I know they couldn't promise me much, but they could have offered me a small Golden Apple. I guess they didn't have any to give. It's not the flight pay. For most of us, it is not the money, it's not the flight pay; many enjoy the challenging work and long hours. What makes us decide to stay in the Air Force are the Golden Apples, and they seem to be all gone.


Honor:

The white in our American flag stands for truth, the blue for honor. Growing up, my parents told me not to lie or cheat, and to keep your promises. If something happened and you couldn't keep your promises, then apologize. Then, it is up to you to make things right. As a supervisor, we make a promise to the Air Force that we will take care of our subordinates, give them guidance, and punish them if it is required. We are responsible for their performance reports and awards, and we must take the time to do it right. When we fail, we hurt those people for the rest of their careers; it doesn't matter if you're a SSG or an Airman, a Captain or a Colonel, you must take the time to do it right. If you are going in ten directions, and over-tasked, you must tell your supervisor to give you the time you need to do what's right. If you do not, then you are not living up to the honor the Air Force expects of you.

What we see of our leaders and the things that they allow to happen to their people, make me wonder where their sense of honor is. Three years ago, I was reassigned to Tinker after 8 months and 4 days at Dover AFB. This was done because the Secretary of Defense mandated a build-up to 40 crews in an effort to reduce our TDY rate. The training squadrons worked their butts off to produce 40 crews. Numerous others were non-voluntarily assigned here. What has that promise gotten us? Less than 25 crews. What happened to their promise? Back in the 965th AACS, shortly before I came to the 966th AACS, the Squadron Commander had a brilliant idea. He insisted we fly as hard crews (my 5th hard crew experience in AWACS).

Each crew was given four "INVIOLATE" leave opportunity windows throughout the year. If you wanted to take leave, you had to sign up for one of those "inviolate" leave windows. If your parents scheduled their 50th wedding anniversary outside your window, you'd better tell them to change it. If you had already scheduled your wedding, you had better move it. Because, you had to fly with your crew, and take leave with your crew. Well, they needed another crew in Saudi and our crew was picked. It didn't matter that other crews hadn't gone on the last two rotations, and ours had. Our crew was going. I asked what about our "inviolate" leave window" - "Well, you-know, these things happen". Yes, I do know these things happen. I do know things change in the Air Force, but did our squadron commander or anyone else apologize to our crew for breaking his promise to us? Never! The rules he made were only inviolate for us to change, but not for him.

Today, we don't see a whole lot of honor among our leaders. They stand in front of us and tell us they are helping us, working for us, that, in the Air Force, people come first. Then when things get tough, we don't see them at all. As a supervisor, I could not take care of the people who worked for me. If someone was trying to complete their education I could not protect their schedule. If someone's wife was threatening to divorce them if they didn't stay home for a while, I couldn't help them. It seemed like everyday someone would come running into our flight yelling, "I NEED A WD (or CT or ASO) TO GO AWAY FOR THE REST OF HIS LIFE !!! RIGHT NOW"!!! And, if they didn't have something in their schedule, they were going and I couldn't help them.

Other people would put things into the schedule like Sandbox, Crayon Class, or Basket Weaving to make it look like their people were doing things. But, I could not, I couldn't lie. Of course, as soon as my poor guy was gone, someone else would come running into the flight yelling, "HOW COME THIS GUY THAT HAS BEEN TDY FOR 220 DAYS HASN'T DONE HIS WASAT (Continuation Training)"? I couldn't supervise the people I was charged to supervise. I couldn't help the people I was supposed to help. All I did was screw them. There was no honor or truth in it, and I was so thankful when I was asked to come to the 966th , where sanity reigns.


"Management":

"Managers" are now running our Air Force. They even call their new programs "Management"; things like Total Quality MANAGEMENT, and Operational Risk MANAGEMENT. They sit in meetings all day and review statistics and surveys, numbers that they think show them how things are going with those of us that are out there doing the job every day. Even our Squadron Commanders don't know what is going on in their own squadrons. They can't, because they have to spend all their time in meetings.

Those of us that have been around for a while can always tell when the managers are not comfortable with the statistics they are seeing. Instead of going out and talking to the troops, they stay locked in their ivory towers, and from out of their meetings we start to hear the worst words a crew member can ever hear: "Hard Crews". These managers say things like "Don't say 'can't' to me"; this is a CAN-DO outfit. But from them we get: You can't land early after flying 11.0 hours with no activity; you can't cancel your sortie after sitting on the ramp for six hours, when the regulation says three hours; you can't go to the Chow Hall to eat when Alice's (the flight line snack bar) is closed; you can't be trusted with a $10 comm. cord - but we issued you a $250 head set.

Once they decided on a Friday afternoon to solve the missing comm. cord problem by taking all 24 of them off all of the AWACS planes and issuing them as a kit to each crew. Problem was, that, when the crews showed up on Monday morning at 0600L, they didn't know anything about it. So the crews had to jump through their butts to sort it all out. Eventually the meeting goers decided it was a bad idea. If they had asked us ahead of time, those that are out flying every day, we could have told them.

Recently, I was called by the command post at 3:00 in the morning after an 11.5-hour sortie, because they couldn't find a comm. cord. The Crew Chief and I had walked through the jet after we landed, and we had both signed the 781 stating that the comm. cords were all there. I guess, as a Major my signature is worthless. Some of the decisions they make in those meetings are incredible. When I was in Saudi two years ago, we had just moved to Al Karj. We got an FCIF that said we couldn't have personal flashlights or leathermans. Have any of them ever had to walk 1/4 mile to the toilet without a flashlight, or lived in a tent without a leatherman?

These meeting goers hardly ever fly, and, all to often, when they are on the schedule, they call two days before the flight and cancel because they have to go to a meeting! Naturally, this causes the crew dogs to go through a mad scramble, rearranging their whole schedule because the Wing management failed to live up to its commitments. During their meetings, they think it's so easy to change a squadrons rotations. Recently they went from 60 days to 45 days and within two weeks back to 60 days. Every time they make even what looks like a minor change on one of their slides, they screw every single person in the squadrons, from the Airmen to the Lt Cols, not to mention every promise those people made to their families. But to the people in the meetings, it was just a number on a slide - no Big Deal!

As for me, tell me now I'm going away next year for 90 or 120 days. Let's say from December to June. Then just leave it alone!! So I can plan my life, so I can arrange for my family to spend some time together. So I can let my children know when I will be with them, when we can plan a vacation, when I can coach their little league team. I can't do it now, because those guys in the meetings never seem to leave the schedule alone, do they? It is even rarer to see anyone from our Wing staff in Saudi or Turkey. And, when they do come, they stay for a week and just get in our way.

How often have you seen any of them go on a deployment and take the place of a crew dog, so he or she can stay home for just one rotation? I have a statistic for them to look at during their meetings. See how many people in the Wing and Operations Group have earned an Aerial Achievement Medal since they have been assigned there. It only takes 20 sorties. I'll bet there aren't many. When I was young I went out with a girl whose mother was a shut in - she watched soap operas all day, every day. She came to believe that what happened on those shows depicted the way that the world really is. Soap operas were her reality. Now our managers have become like that old woman. They stay shut in their meetings and have no idea of what is really going on with those of us who are doing the job. The Air Force doesn't need any more managers. The Air Force needs leaders! Leaders who are out with the troops, and seeing what's going on every day!

Now, it is time for me to go. I know it is because I find myself sitting around my kitchen table every night blaming all my problems on the Air Force's managers.

Thank you all for coming. I will miss you and the Air Force very much. For my entire twenty years, in spite of its problems, I have loved every day.


DON'T QUIT, MAJOR LEISS!!! Retire, take a vacation...come back and FIGHT for your AIR FORCE! WE are COUNTING ON YOU!

AIRBORNE!

A U.S. ARMY OFFICER WRITES!

In his book on the military culture, Making The Corps, Pentagon reporter Thomas E. Ricks criticizes the Army for being frightened of intellectual argument. He writes, "ask an Army captain or major what would happen to his career if he were so open about criticizing his own service's leadership, and watch his face go ashen." Dr. Williamson Murray, a renowned military historian, echoes Rick's claims of "intellectual cowardice" by the Army in his article, "Military Culture Does Matter." Dr. Murray warns of the danger of an Army culture that dissuades thinking. He refers to "the current draft of Army Regulation 600-20 [which] suggests that the senior leadership in the Army wants to 'proscribe an officer from even holding certain views which contravene official policy, much less from espousing them." Dr. Murray contends that such policies will lead to an Army "that remain[s] totally enmeshed in the day-to-day tasks of running [its] administrative business, that ignore[s] history and serious study, and that allows [itself] to believe [its] enemies will possess no asymmetric approaches [is], frankly, headed for defeat." Even internally, active and retired officers mention a severe deficiency within the Army discouraging academic debate concerning its decisions concerning doctrine, force structure and personnel issues. In the forward of LTC Bob Leonard's new book, The Principles of War for the Information Age -- which intellectually challenges Army doctrine based on the age-old principles of war -- Major General Robert Scales, commander United States Army War College, scorns the officer corps for its lack of debate. He writes "Increasingly, our young army officers do not include themselves in the great doctrinal debates, nor are they challenged enough to investigate the principles which form the very basis of our profession." The question General Scales should ask is what is causing this aversion?

There are two examples that I will use to illustrate the Army's "intellectual cowardice." In July 1997 the Army approved its new officer management system OPMS XXI. In October 1998 the Army approved a new division redesign entitled Division XXI. Both decisions demonstrate the Army's willingness to put on the blinders and go, but debate on such issues was confined to senior officers and their protĂ(c)gĂ(c)s! This view is based on discussions with officers connected with both projects and the lack of debate in Army journals during their development and after the decisions were made to implement them. Both decisions were organizationally conservative, or "safe." And while both were fundamentally designed by many bright officers, their ideas or courses-of-actions had to be passed through layers of committees comprised of conservative senior officers called "Councils of Colonels," and then passed through the final filter of the Army, its four-star general officer club. To be allowed access to the inner circle of the Army an officer has to possess the number-one Army criterion for "thinking" -- a perfect "performance personnel file." As in the words of another captain, "this culture dissuades all but the most exceptional leaders" from debate on many important issues within our Army. The pursuit of the perfect file does not allow for controversy or conflicts with one's superiors. Even demonstrated proof of strength of character, and ability to challenge, to demonstrate innovation through publishing articles in Army journals, does not allow officers access to the senior level decision making process if officers do not have the prerequisite perfectly clean file. Salesman were sent out with glittery Power Point presentations to "sell" the decisions to the officer corps. But, no debate was considered in the decision making process. Furthermore, if the Army has such confidence in their decisions, why did the "brass" have public affairs issue detailed statements on what officers should and should not say regarding these decisions, or why was a lot of money spent making colorful pamphlets to convince everyone how good these systems were? Why not let the actual decision speak for itself?

Another proof of lack of confidence in these decisions is the lack of debate on these policy adjustments in Army journals. If an outsider were to examine Army journals (with exception), they would think these two decisions were perfect due to the lack of challenges to their merit. This is a dangerous trend for our Army. The lack of debate is due to the perception on the part of officers that if they do challenge decisions, it is thus challenging senior officers, and this will harm their careers. One officer put it best,

"Captains who would likely do more harm to their careers by speaking out than by just shutting up, doing the best they can, then opting out for a career in which they are better respected and can better provide for their families. Maybe my generation is more selfish than past generations, but the vast majority of guys that I know who are captains in the military are extremely dedicated to grooming top-notch units capable of defending their country. They just don't see a lot of return dedication."

The Army is a culture that sees argument toward the upper echelons as disloyalty. The Army culture reminds me of a teenager: neither can accept the fact that you can argue with them with their best interests at heart but love them at the same time. In Principles, LTC Leonard adds to General Scale's remarks regarding the lack of debate on Army doctrine and personnel issues. He writes, "The problem is that it is not rigorous. It has yet to seriously challenge basic beliefs and gut-level issues. Military and civilian leaders are still in their comfort zone concerning the character of future war."

How did the Army culture end up this way? I can summarize by saying it is to due to personnel policies derived from the Progressive Era at the turn of the 20th Century, and the obsession with mobilization for World War III. These were implemented with good intentions, but ended up creating unintended negative consequences. These policies include the "up-or-out" promotion system (mandated by law), which is related to a subjective, highly inflated evaluation system. These combined are used to determine promotions and selections by a centralized board of officers composed of senior officers who make the decisions based on "selection by exception" or the method of looking for deviance or an error in weeding out officers on no more than a single "negative mark." These practices are also related to personnel management policies derived from personnel management theory called "equity," or the practice of giving everyone a "fair" chance at critical positions needed for promotion and selection. Finally, when combined with a bloated officer corps at the middle and upper levels, maintained to support "up-or-out" and the Army's subtle concern with mobilization, the above mentioned factors force officers into a few key "jobs" such as company-level command and S3/XO time with little time to learn or to gain experience. To the unit, the process resembles a revolving door. Thus, officers are not allowed to make mistakes, in any form, or "rock the boat" without paying for it on a promotion board. The Army has created whole generations of risk-averse officers who consider intellectual challenges risky to their career well-being.

The Army has created a culture where intellectual debate is discouraged except via e-mails with no signature blocks or in "letter's to editors" with unsigned pieces. The Army's personnel policies inherently allow selection and promotion boards to self-perpetuate themselves by selecting officers who resemble those who compose the boards, or those who have the patronage of a four-star general. This is dangerous for an organization such as the Army that must face future threats such as fighting in urban environments, combating international terrorism, conducting operations against those who won't fight by our game plan, and conducting OOTW operations that will not go away. The personnel, doctrinal, and force structural decisions we make now affect how we will conduct these future operations. As Warren Bennis states in "Followers Make Good Leaders Good," (in Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence, 3d Ed.) "organizations that encourage thoughtful dissent gain much more than a heightened air of collegiality. They make better decisions."


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