"What they saw explains why the marines got all the publicity. There were more marine photographers and photo equipment in the building than could possibly be imagined. To the troopers, it appeared as though the marines viewed Lebanon as a photo-op; the Army considered it serious business"

"Lebanon Intervention-1958" by Lawrence "Larry" Lenahan, Airborne Quarterly--Summer 1998 Page 21

One of the first casualties in war is THE TRUTH.

Taking advantage of this for decades has been the marine corps (mc) propaganda machine which seeks to further the McBureaucracy at the expense of the Nation and its defense. The truth is that had it not been for the intervention of the U.S. Ambassador, the McGlory hogs would have been wiped out by expertly positioned Lebanese guns in 1958---25 years later--in 1983---there was no reprieve as a truck loaded with explosives slaughtered the cocky McBluffers, leaving 265 dead and U.S. prestige shattered in the middle east. "What goes around, comes around" The truth in the case of the Lebanon 1958 crisis was that the U.S. Army deployed Airborne Battle Groups to the country--1st Airborne Battle Group, 187th Infantry (Rakkasans) of the 24th Airborne Brigade from Germany.

For the official history of the Lebanon Crisis click here

To learn more about how the marines were almost slaughtered in 1958, read on.

At approximately 0600, 15 July 1958 at Gablingen Kaserne, a suburb of Augsburg, Germany, some 55 miles west of Munich, the concepts of raid deployment and joint services operations moved from contingency planning to reality. Paratroopers throughout the 1st Airborne Battle Group 187th Infantry, 24th Airborne Brigade, 24th Infantry Division were rudely awakened by sergeants loudly yelling "Alert".

At approximately the same time all personnel who were living off the Kaserne received a phone call at home telling them a practice alert had been called. A number of officers of the 187th were away from Gablingen, scattered over 2,000 square miles of Bavaria. They had to be tracked down and told to report back to Gablingen immediately. They had been away preparing for a war game pitting the skills of another division's troops against the 10th Special Forces Group stationed at Bad Tolz.

While alerts were a common event in Germany, this one was different. Instead of loading on deuce-and-a-halfs and other assorted vehicles, and moving out to a wooded location in the forests of Bavaria, the troopers were directed to get their gear together and then go to the mess hall for breakfast. At the same time, the entrance to the Kaserne was sealed to anyone leaving, trooper or German national. Thus commenced the United States' first application of a new concept, Rapid Deployment.

Some time in 1956, probably before the Suez Crisis, Brigadier General David W. Gray, then Chief of the Operations Division, Department of the Army, later commander of the 24th Airborne Brigade and Army Task Force 201, was directed to draft instructions to United States Army Europe (USAREUR) for it to develop contingency plans for a limited crisis intervention in the Middle East. USAREUR assigned the task to the 9th Infantry Division. It developed a plan involving a Task Force, which apparently consisted of a reinforced regimental combat team. Later in 1956, when the 11th Airborne Division replaced the 9th Infantry, it inherited the plan. Planners in the 11th ABN modified it for use by Airborne units the newly created Pentomic concept which replaced Regiments with battle groups.

The planning leading up to Operation Bluebat and the activation of the Army Task Force 201, of which the 187th was an integral element, designated as Task Force Alpha (Alpha), preceded the Suez Crisis of October 1956. Although the United States' was not directly involved in the Suez crisis, its position of prestige in the Middle East suffered because of it. Contributing to the loss of prestige was the United States' earlier withdrawal of support for the Aswan High Dam project. The withdrawal of support caused Egypt's President Nasser to seek aid from the Soviet Union.

The United States' response to the perceived foothold by the Soviets in the Middle East was to initiate a diplomatic counteroffensive, the cornerstone of which was the "Eisenhower Doctrine." The Doctrine was an offer of military and economic assistance by the United States to a nation that believed it was in danger of coming under the Soviet Union's direct or indirect domination, regardless of whether it was attributable to subversion or invasion by another country.

THE THREAT

On 13 April 1957, shortly after Congress approved the Eisenhower Doctrine, King Hussein of Jordan uncovered an attempted pro-Nasser coup d'etat. The U.S. quickly agreed to the King's request for aid by sending the Sixth Fleet to the Eastern Mediterranean as a demonstration of American concern; and 10 million dollars was sent as the first installment of a new economic and military aid program. Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan--the regional members of the Baghdad Pact--were also of concern to the United States because of their ties to the West.

The government of Lebanon was unique because its virtual existence was determined by the willingness of diverse religious groups and clans to honor the terms of an oral covenant agreed to by the major Muslim and Christian leaders some twelve years earlier. From the earliest days of planning, Lebanon was considered a country at risk. One of the main reasons for this was that Lebanon was perceived by its neighbors to be more pro-western than pro-Arabic because of its actions during and after the Suez Crisis. During the three year period of general unrest. Essentially, there was an ongoing political struggle between the religious and clan groups; and an ideological struggle causing polarization between Lebanese nationalism and growing pan-Arabism. Lebanon's authorities, most of whom were Christian, insisted on two things: maintaining the country's autonomy and cooperating with the West.

The degree of risk was to increase markedly in 1958 as a crisis situation evolved. Feeding on the unrest of the population and the riots, Egypt, which was receiving aid from the Soviet Bloc, had on 1 February 1958, merged with Syria and Yemen to form the United Arab Republic (UAR) and initiated a psychological war against Lebanon's President Chamoun. Additionally, Syria was contributing to the problem of sending arms and economic assistance to the rebels in Lebanon. While the United States government was concerned with the developments in Lebanon, there was also a deep concern that it might be called upon to intervene in Lebanon. The concerns can best be stated as a concern that the presence of American troops would be construed as an intervention in a purely internal conflict centered upon the interest of Lebanon's President Chamille Chamoun to continue in office after his constitutionally limited, single, six-year team expired. The Eisenhower administration did not have the desire to have American troops deployed on the Beaches of Beirut if the Lebanese armed forces themselves were not attempting to put down the conflict, or if, even worse, the Lebanese armed forces might resist and American or allied landing. This later concern almost became reality shortly after the first U.S. marines landed.

8 May 1958, was a fateful day in Lebanon, marked by the assassination of the left-wing editor of a daily Beirut newspaper known for its outspoken pan-Arabism. The next day, 9 May, saw Lebanese opposition groups call a general strike, and riots break out in the city of Tripoli. The rioting quickly lead to a civil war in Lebanon, which in turn rapidly assumed the proportions of an armed stalemate. On 13 May 1958, a band of Druze attacked the president's palace in Bay-al-Din. Disturbed by these events, President Chamoun advised the ambassadors of Great Britain, France and the U.S. that he might be calling on them for military assistance.

Early in June, the Lebanese Foreign Minister, in compliance with one of the Eisenhower administration's conditions for intervention, lodged before the U.N. Security Council an official complaint of interference in the internal affairs of his country by the United Arab Republic. Accepting the complaint on its face as valid, the Security Council voted to send observers to Lebanon.

In contrast to the troubles brewing in Lebanon, neighboring Iraq posed no anxieties to the U.S. as it was firmly aligned with the U.S. During the early hours of 14 July this would change when King Faisal and Crown Prince Adbul Illah were assassinated in a coup d'etat. In Lebanon, jubilation broke out in areas where the anti-Chamoun sentiment prevailed. Fearful that he might be the next head of state to be assassinated, President Chamoun requested military Republic (UAR) intervention, and quickly, within forty-eight hours. Washington also had received very reliable information that a similar coup d'etat had been scheduled against King Hussein of Jordan for 17 July.

THE REACTION

President Eisenhower, at 1830, 14 July, issued a directive that the first echelons of American forces were to arrive in Lebanon by 0900, Washington time, the following day. The Eisenhower Doctrine authorizing the President to provide military and economic assistance to requesting nations to preserve their independence was being tested.

At 1400, the Chief of Naval Operations had ordered the U.S. Sixth Fleet (Mediterranean) eastward to land marines in Lebanon; the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) alerted U.S. Forces in Europe and the Tactical Air Command in the United States to be ready for immediate military action; around 1830, the JCS activated the Specified Command Middle East (SPECOMME) and designated Admiral James L. Holloway, Commander in Chief, North Atlantic and Mediterranean as the Commander in Chief, SPECOMME (CINCSPECOMME). Until the activation of Bluebat, Adm. Holloway in the capacity as CINCSPECOMME was a commander without assigned forces. When the word reached Admiral Holloway that the Specified Command was being activated, he had less than fifteen hours in which to establish a beachhead at Beirut. Prior to the United States' involvement in the Lebanon crisis, between 2,000 and 4,000 people injured or killed, primarily in the Muslim areas of Beirut and Tripoli.

Word was passed on to high-level Army commanders in Europe that an alert might be called. At 0200, Germany, on 15 July the lowest level of a multi-level alert was called. During most of their tour in Germany, the 187th and 503rd alternated their alert status. The one called on 15 July should have resulted in the 503rd being assigned as the lead element. But, due to a recent injury to the leg of the 503rd's commander, Col. Hayes, Gen Gray assigned the alert to the 187th. Gen. Gray knew that because of recent training at Hohenfels and the previous day's jump into Gablingen the 187th was totally prepared for what was about to unfold.

In March of 1957, whether by happenstance or design, Gen. Gray was transferred to Germany to serve as the Assistant Division Commander of the 11th Airborne Division, where he would become intimately involved in the planning for any deployment. As the plans underwent refinement, it was envisioned that the execution would be as an airdrop or air land in Jordan. Entering Lebanon was not considered. Most importantly, the Division's planners, a very small group, had been given instructions to keep their planning activities quiet, as were others whose units would have a role in Bluebat, should it become a reality. The planning was classified as top secret, with a strict need to know policy enforced at all times.

A meeting was held in London, in September of 1957, for the purpose of acquainting USAREUR and Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (NELM) representatives from the area commands of the Army, Navy and Air Force, who would probably be part of any intervention operation. Between September and November, the JCS advised Admiral Holloway, Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean eastward to land marines in Lebanon; the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) alerted U. S. Forces in Europe and the Tactical Air Command in the United States to be ready for immediate military action; around 1830, the JCS activated the Specified Command Middle East (SPECOMME) and designated Admiral and Mediterranean as the Commander in Chief, SPECOMME (C{NCSPECOMME). Until the activation of Bluebat, Adm. Holloway in the capacity as CINCSPECOMME was a commander without assigned forces. When the word reached Admiral Holloway that the Specified Command was being activated, lie had less than fifteen hours in which to establish a beac~ead at Beirut. Prior to the United States' involvement in the Lebanon crisis, between 2,000 and 4,000 people were injured or killed, primarily in the Muslim areas of Beirut and Tripoli.

Prince Abdul Illali were assassinated in a coup d'etat. In Lebanon, jubilation broke out in areas where the antiChainoun sentiment prevailed. Fearful that he might be the next head of state to be assassinated, President Chainoun requested nnli~tary Republic (UAR) intervention, and quickly, witlijii forty-eight hours. Washington also had received very reliable liifonnation that a similar coup d'etat had been scheduled against King Hussein of Jordan for 17 July.

Word was passed on to high-level Army cominander~ in Europe that an alert might be called. At 0200, Germany, on 15 July the lowest level of a multi-level alert was called. During most of their tour in Germany, the 187th and 503rd alternated their alert status. The one called on 15 July should have resulted in the 503rd being assigned as the lead element. But, due to a recent ii~ury to the leg of the 503rd's commander, Col

Haynes, Gen. Gray assigned the alert to the 187th. Gen. Gray knew that because of recent training at Hohenfels and the previous day's jump into Gablingen the 187th was totally prepared for what was about to unfold.

In March of 1957, whether by happenstance or design, Gen. Gray was transferred to Germany to serve as the Assistant Division Cominander of the 11th Airborne Division, where he would become intimately involved in the planning for any deployment. As the plans underwent refinement, it was envisioned that the execution would be as an airdrop or air land in Jordan. Entering Lebanon was not considered. Most importantly, the Division's planners, a very small group, had been given instructions to keep their planning activities quiet, as were others whose units

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would have a role in Bluebat, should it become a reality. The planning was classified as top secret, with a strict need to know policy enforced at all times.

A meeting was held in London, in September of 1957, for the purpose of acquainting USAREUR and Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (NELM) representatives from the area commands of the Army, Navy and Air Force, who would probably be part of any intervention operation. Between September and November, the JCS advised Admiral Holloway, Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM) that the overthrow of the government of Jordan, and, to a lesser extent, the probability of a coup d'etat in Lebanon, were distinct possibilities. The JCS also advised, in such an event, that rapid U.S. military action might be required. Planning for these contingencies was directed as a matter of urgency.

At a meeting in November 1957, again in London, but this time with more representatives of area commands in attendance then at the earlier meeting, Admiral Holloway, who had responsibility for the area where the intervention was likely to occur, issued the first Op Plan speci~ing a joint Army, Navy, Marine, Air Force Operation in Lebanon. Since the Sixth Fleet, which was assigned to the Mediterranean, was perpetually on the move, its proximity to Lebanon at a given time could range from very close to quite distant; it was decided the plan should be geared to addressing this issue. The Sixth Fleet's proximity to Lebanon on 15 July 1958 was the sole reason a Marine contingent arrived first on the scene. Had the Sixth Fleet been in the Western Mediterranean at the time, the 187th would have gone in first.

If the Specified Command was activated and the Army was called upon to participate in an intervention, the Army's organization would be designated Army Task Force 201. The Task Force would consist of five forces:

Force Alpha which would consist of the Task Force HQ and one airborne battle group from the 11th Airborne Division, Force Bravo, a second airborne battle group also from the 11th, to be deployed as circumstances warranted; Force Charlie, support units drawn from bases in Germany and France and designated 201st Logistical Command; Force Delta, other units which would be sea-lifted; and Force Echo, a medium tank battalion which would be sea lifted from Bremerhaven, Germany.

The spring and early summer of 1958 were busy tinies for the troopers of the 1 ith Airborne. Early in the year, a decision had been made not to return the Division to the continental United States. Instead, it was to be deactivated ,in Germany on 1 July of that year; and the 24th Infantry Division would be activated in its place. However, it was decided to maintain an Airborne presence in Germany; so two of the 1 lth's battle groups, the 1/187th and 1/503rd, would remain on jump status, and collectively be designated as the 24th Airborne Brigade. In making this decision, the Army decided that those troopers in the 11th who had not completed their overseas tour of duty would replace the troopers of the 187th and 503rd who were going home. The transfers of troopers took place during May and June.

Something happened in May that has yet to be answered. An Alert restricting the troopers of the 187th and 503rd to their marshaling areas was held. While most Alerts lasted only a

few hours, this one lasted seven days, and culminated on 24 May in a mass air drop of the 503rd at Wamer Kaserne in Munich. Following the alert, Gen. Gray was sent in mufti on a hurried trip to Cyprus to meet with British planners.

The purpose of the trip was to develop plans for a combined U.S.- British operation in Lebanon and/or Jordan. Shortly after that meeting, the plan, including an alternative with the U.S. going solo, was formulated in Cyprus. It was that plan which was assigned the code name Bluebat. Subsequent directives authorized coordinated US/UK planning with respect to Lebanon alone.

At the time of the July alert, it was not visualized that there would be ajoint U.S. Marine and Army operation.

Up until the 17 May alert, all of the planning for contingency operations had been closely guarded. One of the reasons why the planning had taken place so secrefly

was the fact that the Army units assigned to the Task Force were also assigned to NATO. The U.S., justifiably, was concerned that its NATO partners would object to the weakening of its Forces if the U.S. diverted some of its units assigned to NATO defense for other purposes.

The 17 May alert uncovered a number of deficiencies in Bluebat. To the extent possible these were worked on and corrective actions taken. The period between 17 May and 15 July 1958, saw many changes taking place; new leadership aiid soldiers were being transferred in; Airborne support units were being reduced in size; and the Airborne Brigade and new leg units were being formed. Nevertheless, training the 1 87th's and 503rd's troopers had to continue. Also, the 187th's and 503rd's days with the 24th Infantry Division were numbered. Both units were scheduled to return to the conunental United States in early

1959

1 July 1958 was sad day for the Airborne. The I lth Airborne's colors were cased for the last time while the I 87tli was away training. The Division which had served its country well in the Pacific Theater during World War 11 would pass into history. It had been chosen by General McArthur to be the first American division to occupy Japan after World War 11; and it had been the parent division for the 187th Airborne Infantry Regiment prior to its designation as the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team for deployment to Korea.

The troopers who had completed their tour of duty in Gerniany returned home; those who had not, were assigned elsewhere. The lucky ones were either assigned to the 187th or the 503rd, both of which would remain on active jump status as part of the 24th Airborne Brigade, 24th Infantry Division.

The 187th returned to Gablingen from two weeks in Hohenfels, a huge training area in southern Gerrnany, on 14 July via air drop from U.S. Army UIA Otter aircraft. After two weeks (it seemed a lot longer) of hard training in Hohenfels, the troopers looked forward to resting a bit, cleaning their gear, getting passes, and getting back into the routine of barracks life.

pick up a second canteen. Instructions of this type

most unusual and further raised their interest as to what was happening; no one had told them anything.

manner of speaking, from the time the troopers were told of the alert until they were told to board the trucks, they had been hanging around waiting for any word as

was happening.

Prior to depaiting for Hohenfels, the 187th ha'~

out its GRANDIOS plans; all personnel had packed their "B" bags, and had stored their other personal effects

cardboard containers. It be would be several weeks after the deployment before they received their "B" bags in Lebanon, and close to four months before they were al

to open the cardboard boxes. Dick Becker, a short-timer with H & H Company who ended up in Lebanon for a few days, never did see his personal effects again. When

returned to Gablingen en route home, he found the Kaserne tightly locked up; and his personal effects were never shipped to him.

Wlijle the 187th was sianding by, awaiting orders to move to the marshaling area at Furstenfeldbruck Air Base, in Munich -- a forward deployment base for NATO air units

The Air Force unit that would be providing the airlift was the 322nd Air Division. It was as Gen. Gray put it. sort of a vagabond airline that on any day might have aircraft scattered all the way from India to Africa to United States." In other words aircraft had to be called in from great distances; and indeed they were.

Although the Sixth Fleet was at that time stealning away from the Eastern Mediterranean, elements of one of the U.S. Marine landing teams was sufficiently close to Beirnt that it could comply with President Eisenhower's directive, and establish a beachhead south of Beirut, adjacent to the international airport. The balance of the Marines would

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