60,000 men in the rear of Ninth Army and forced the Germans to fight on two fronts. They tied down strong forces and increasingly menaced the army rear. Russian supply arrived by a road leading via Poselok Nelidovo toward Bely.

In order to eliminate this danger and regain full freedom of action, General Model, commanding the Ninth Army, planned Operation SEYDLITZ, a concentric counterattack which started on 2 July 1942. During the first stage of the operation the Germans, in difficult forest fighting, dislodged the Soviet forces from their deeply-echeloned positions and hemmed them into a narrow area. A quick German thrust into the Obsha valley anticipated the apparent enemy intention of breaking through the newly-formed German switch position northeast of Bely. The Russians attacked simultaneously from the inside and the outside and attempted to escape through the breach thus made. The enemy units were split along the Obsha River and encircled in two pockets. All Russian attempts to break out were frustrated. Russian forces northeast of Bely directed relief attacks from the outside toward the pockets. These attacks were also repulsed. Strong tactical reserves, which the enemy brought in by forced marches via Poselok Nelidovo, arrived too late. After a battle lasting eleven days Operation SEYDLITZ ended with a complete German victory.

An improvised cavalry brigade, the formation of which General Model had ordered when Operation SEYDLITZ was still in the planning stage, played a major role in this success. Its organization was unique in many ways. Since most of the terrain was very swampy or covered with extensive marshy forests, the brigade was to be organized in such a manner that it would be able to fight in any terrain and under any weather conditions. It was even to be mobile in mud.

The first organizational problem was the procurement of men and equipment. Obviously only officers and enlisted men with combat experience in the East could be selected for such a specialized unit. Moreover they had to be trained cavalrymen? None but tough, healthy, brave men who were in no way pampered and who felt a close kinship with nature could be used. Replacements from the western theater or the zone of the interior were therefore out of the question because the troops from the West were softened by the easy ways of occupation life, and the recruits from the training camps at home lacked combat experience. Even though the latter had received a certain amount of specialized training for the eastern front, these recently inducted Soldiers were incapable of enduring the physical hardships which the Russian theater imposed on the

individual. There was not a commander in the field who was not aware that the difference between war in the East and war in the West was the difference between day and night.

General Model therefore decided to pull out the reconnaissance battalion from each of the eight divisions under his command and place them at the disposal of the newly appointed brigade commander. This was a very favorable solution for the brigade--but hard on the infantry divisions, for the reconnaissance battalions were valuable combat units and were greatly missed by their parent divisions.

a. Organization and equipment of the brigade

The organization and equipment of the brigade was as follows:

(1) A headquarters staff with one signal communication troop.

(2) Three cavalry regiments, each consisting of one or two mounted troops and three to four bicycle troops, with a total of five troops per regiment. Within a few hours all mounted troops of the regiments could be assembled and a complete cavalry regiment formed for an emergency. Each troop had twelve sections and each section was equipped with two light machine guns. Thus each troop had twenty-four light machine guns and two heavies. In addition, officers and enlisted men were equipped with submachine guns when possible.

(3) Each bicycle troop was issued two horse-drawn wagons, which carried ammunition, baggage, and rations. Of course, these wagons were drawn by small native Panje horses because only they could master the terrain. The mounted troops had German military mounts. Mobility in mud was achieved because the Panje horses and wagons could pull through practically anywhere.

(4) In addition, the brigade included an engineer company, a medical company, and one motorized and one horse-drawn supply column.

(5) Tanks and antitank units were to assist the brigade whenever terrain conditions permitted. Each regiment had only six organic light infantry howitzers. Additional artillery support was also to be provided when necessary. The assistance of infantry and additional artillery units for flank protection was promised in case of a deep penetration or a break-through.

b. Training and commitment of the brigade

After about four to six weeks of combined-arms training, the brigade was committed south of Olenino along the Luchesa River. A so-called Rollbahn led from Olenino southward which, although it was supposed to be a fairly good highway, was really no more than an unimproved country road. Short stretches of corduroy road covered particularly wet, swampy sections. Only the Luchesa valley was clear of woods to approximately one to three miles in width. Large, swampy forests extended on both sides of the valley with but a few clearings of varying sizes. Small, swampy creeks flowed through the woods. Maps and interrogation of local inhabitants provided the Germans with exact information on the terrain behind the enemy lines. Once the brigade had broken through the Russian positions at the edge of the woods, it would have to contend with swampy forests ten miles in depth where scarcely a path was to be found.

A panzer division was committed to the right of the brigade with the mission of attacking along the Rollbahn to the south. Since the Russians rightly expected the main effort of the attack along this axis of advance, the division was faced by a very difficult task. From aerial photographs and the interrogation of deserters it was known that strong enemy fortifications such as road blocks and fortified antitank positions were situated along the Rollbahn. The positions farther east and west from this road were not as strongly fortified but were secured by mine fields in which there were only a few gaps. The Russians thought it most improbable that a major attack could be launched east of the Luchesa River because the Germans would be unable to move [medium-to-heavy] tanks up to the line of departure through the swampy forests. They also felt certain that a tank attack across the open terrain, the Luchesa River, and through the mine fields would hardly be hazarded.

Approximately ten days before the attack the brigade moved up to the line-of-departure. Intensive reconnaissance of the intermediate terrain began immediately with the assistance of veteran tankers. [Cavalrymen: know what's GO and what's NO-GO for the vehicles on hand] Within a short time a complete picture of the enemy positions and the intervening terrain was available. From this picture, it was obvious that, after the necessary preparations, an attack with armored support was definitely feasible.

For Operation SEYDLITZ the cavalry brigade was attached to its right neighbor, the panzer division which was to advance along the Rollbahn. The brigade was to thrust through the ten mile-deep forest in one sweep and, if possible, cut the Russian supply line on the north-south highway if the main body of the panzer division was unable to make any progress. Six artillery

14

batteries and one tank company with fourteen [light] tanks were attached to the brigade for the execution of this mission.

The unit adjacent to the left, an infantry division, was not to jump off until the next day after the initial attack had been successful. For the first day the left flank would therefore be exposed. In the marshy forest terrain this was not a matter of particular concern because a small covering force would surely prove sufficient.

The first difficulties arose when the fourteen tanks had to be moved up to the line-of-departure through the swampy forests. Forty-eight hours before the beginning of the attack a company of engineers with power saws started to cut trees at intervals of about one yard along the edge of the forest so that the trees fell on open ground along a stretch leading through the assembly area. In a very short time and with relatively little effort a tank path was built which in effect was a corduroy road with about one-yard-wide gaps. Few branches had to be cut off the trees. For obvious reasons this road could only be used by a limited number of tanks and tracked vehicles. [EDITOR: not even feasible with wheeled trucks]

A few hours after the engineers had gone to work, the tanks started to move into their assembly area in daylight. This was possible because the wooded terrain afforded sufficient cover. The noise of the tanks was drowned by harassing fire and low-flying reconnaissance planes. All tanks arrived at their destination without incident. Experienced mine-clearing squads were assigned to each tank and ordered to ride on the tanks.

The attack started at 0300. During the artillery preparation the tanks started out together with the cavalry troops. Their movements were favored by a heavy fog which covered the river valley. They crossed most of the intervening terrain without encountering resistance. A ford across the Luchesa River which had been reconnoitered in advance was found to be adequate for the fourteen tanks. Enemy mine fields were immediately recognized by the experienced tankers and engineers and the lanes through the fields were found and widened. Suffering no losses, the tanks and cavalry suddenly rose in front of a completely surprised enemy. In one sweep the first and second lines were overrun and great confusion seized the Russians. The tanks had accomplished their mission. They could not penetrate any farther into the enemy-held forest without sufficient reconnaissance and additional preparation, and were therefore ordered to halt and stay in reserve. By then the cavalry had penetrated the enemy lines three to four miles.

The situation on the right was entirely different. Here the panzer division was to advance along the Rollbahn. The Russians

15

were prepared for an attack. The German tanks ran into deeply echeloned antitank positions which were camouflaged with the usual Russian skill. The infantry also could not make headway and suffered heavy casualties in the forest fighting. The entire operation seemed in danger of bogging down.

At noon the brigade received orders to pivot toward the west with all available forces and to attack the Rollbahn from the east. One regiment turned to the right and thrust toward the Rollbahn through primeval forest swamps. At times the men sank in up to their knees. Direction had to be maintained by compass. The troops performed seemingly impossible feats and the surprise attack was a full success. By nightfall the regiment controlled a stretch of the Rollbahn, the pressure on the panzer division subsided, and the enemy was in an untenable position. The Panje supply wagons were able to move through the swamps and bring rations and ammunition to the completely exhausted troops.

On the following morning the continuation of the attack met hardly any resistance. On the other hand the physical requirements were extraordinarily high since the men had to traverse six miles of wooded swamps. Before noon the brigade emerged from the forest and a few hours later the first heavy equipment arrived. The terrain ahead extended over a wide area and Russian columns, single vehicles, and individuals could be seen moving about in wild disorder. It was obvious that the enemy command had lost control over its troops. The Russian defense lines had collapsed and the German divisions were advancing everywhere.

c. Conclusions

Even though Operation SEYDLITZ would probably have been successful without the cavalry brigade, it would have involved a much greater loss of men and equipment. During the eleven days of the operation 50,000 prisoners, 230 tanks, 760 artillery pieces, and thousands of small arms were captured. The situation of Ninth Army had been improved by the elimination of these Russian forces in its rear. The army rear area was safe except for partisan activities.

The composition of the brigade proved to be effective. The proper training for such a special mission requires from six to eight weeks with troops already experienced in Russian warfare. Before the attack the units must be in their jump-off positions for at least two weeks in order to become well-acquainted with terrain conditions through intensive reconnaissance. All intelligence and reconnaissance information must be carefully

Page 16

rechecked because the slightest inaccuracy can result in failure in that type of terrain.

Preliminary training in teamwork between armor and cavalry is of definite advantage. In an attack over this kind of terrain it may occasionally happen that the cavalry advances too fast. In that case the tanks must radio the cavalry to slow down because terrain difficulties prevent them from keeping up. Portable radio sets are not always reliable because of the density of the forest, and telephone communications therefore have to be used extensively. For that reason each regiment must carry more than the customary quantity of wire.

If possible every officer and enlisted man should be equipped with a submachine gun.

[EDITOR: we have this now with the M16/M4 assault rifle-carbine]

Rations should be concentrated; the lighter they are, the better. The American combat ration (K ration) would be well suited, particularly since it is also protected against moisture.

[EDITOR: we should issue dehydrated LRP rations and carry more water instead of crap MREs]

It would be advantageous to equip troops with rubber boots and impregnated raincoats, camouflage jackets and windbreakers, because dew causes a high degree of moisture in the underbrush.

[EDITOR: we have Gore-Tex jackets/trousers--need them in Multi-Cam]

Camouflage covers for steel helmets are essential and camouflage in general is of utmost importance.

[EDITOR: we need to rag-top camouflage our helmets]

The commissioned and noncommissioned officers must be versatile and able to make quick decisions and improvise. Every officer must be able to act independently and ready to assume responsibility. Detailed inquiries addressed to higher echelons cause delays and unfavorable developments which can usually be avoided. Leaders with good common sense and a portion of recklessness are best suited for such special assignments.

[EDITOR: then get rid of the bureaucracy. Make units self-reliant and self-contained NOW. Use the BATTLEBOX system: combatreform.org/battleboxconcept.htm]

The scholarly-type of officer who relies chiefly on maps is completely out of place.

[EDITOR: if you have maps, use 'em. If not or even if you have them, personal reconnaissance is vital. combatreform.org/maptruths.htm]

In general, it may be said that the composition and equipment of the cavalry brigade proved effective for the special mission of advancing and attacking through marshy forests and along muddy paths.

Notice the interface with STUG turretless assault gun light tanks

www.youtube.com/watch?v=eMpuasQvBYg

History of the British Paras and Commandos (Over-View)

Part 1

Right after Dunkirk, Churchill calls for 5, 000 volunteers to raid the coast, called "Commandos" after the mobile Boers who in South Africa stymied the Brits, 10 commandos or regiments of 500 men, no royal marines allowed to join since they had to help man guns on RN ships, Admiral Keys hero of WW1 Zebrugge block ship raid in WW1 put in charge, Churchill knew talent and placed such men (like himself) in power, special ferries delivered shallow-draft landing craft, 2^nd Commando trained to be paratroopers using Whitley bombers, renamed 11^th SAS, everyone self-reliant, initiative-taking, knew how to use enemy weapons, Norwegian fish oil raids bagged hundreds of Germans, captured an Enigma machine cipher wheel and one commando telegraphed Hitler asking him where his Soldiers were? Dumbass Hitler then placed 250, 000 troops in Norway for rest of the war!

www.youtube.com/watch?v=xvY4n-PNcxM

Part 2

LayForce wiped out covering British withdrawal from Crete taken by German Paras, Keys resigns in protest over Army interference, Mountbatten a competent destroyer captain, takes over, Vaagso raids, Mad Jack plays bagpipes, use of smokescreen munitions from RAF bombers to mask landings, Commandos take back Norwegian volunteers to join their force! 16^th SAS becomes Parachute Regiment, raids Bruneval readar station, USS Campbeltown converted to look like a German destroyer packed full of explosives to ram dry docks

www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hro6FnJjM8U

Part 3

Montgomery's demo team destroy pump house but cannot get back to motor launches to exfiltrate back to England, captured the Campbeltown skipper is lectured by German interrogator about how foolish to ram the docks with a flimsy ship when BANG!!!!! it blew up killing over 300 Germans who were souvenir hunting! Disastrous Dieppe raid, Commandos under Peter Young and Lord Lovat take out shore batteries to protect the ships

www.youtube.com/watch?v=_aDk9YMNue4

Part 4

Leader of bayonet assault wins the VC, American Rangers' first action of WW2, Laycock takes over from Mountbatten who went to southeast asia to replace incompetent Auchinleck, Commandos spearhead role for conventional forces in North Africa, Italy, Major Howard asked his glider pilot to slide through the wire which it did and his men overcame the defenders quickly, interesting men linking arms and raising legs on bench seats before crash landing--smart technque to avoid men flying loosely, Lord Lovat's commandos race 10 miles on foot and bikes to reinforce Howard's men, Operation Market-Garden fiasco begins

www.youtube.com/watch?v=r0MC-SiQcuA

Part 5

Jeeps in gliders don't make it, Frost takes Bridge but only has a battalion, Frost is shown after the war describing battle at the bridge to current Paras, couldn't get his exposed foot sloggers across to seize south end of it, a mere armored car's machine gun fire thwarted them, Walcheren island raided to clear Germans so ships could reach port of Antwerp, Rhine river crossings, Red berets of the Paras and Green berets of the RM commandos kick ass today, as seen in the Flalklands war

www.youtube.com/watch?v=mzaGWjRH6L8

Bicycle-Infantry and Cycle-Commandos at Bruneval and on D-Day

By Air--Glider & Parachute:

Martin Caidin and Jay Barbree's masterpiece book, Bicycles in War has the most detailed account of the British Parachute raid on Bruneval radar station in 1942 on pages 111-123, Chapter 9, "The Great Bicycle Commando Raid":

Throughout this book we have referred to the many occasions when the bicycle was adopted as the favorite mobile weapon for guerrilla fighters, special forces, members of the underground, and other special organizations that moved and fought with stealth as their ally.

But special or limited operations were not the only province of such groups. There were occasions, and we have seen some of them, when the bicycle became a primary weapon for a daring and critical operation on what must be considered a major scale.

Among such actions, the one that stands out from all the others took place in February 1942. It demonstrates about as perfect a use of the bicycle as was ever planned.

Our story begins at night, high over the French coast along the English Channel. At midnight the world was a silent clash between deep darkness and the sporadic brilliance provided by the light of a silvery moon that rode high along the tumbling rims of snow clouds. The clouds themselves formed a line of battlements towering over the coastline of France along the English Channel. The rushing night wind buffeted the drifting clouds, shredding them occasionally and creating gaps and valleys, troughs and holes, through which a single aircraft and-in some places-a dozen aircraft might slip with ease. This is precisely what happened at midnight: through the gap of one great cloud ravine, gliding like silvery metallic minnows against the mile-high towets of clouds, flew a long formation of Whitleys.

The Whitley was, by contemporary standards, an ancient machine, a bomber that had seen its best days in years past, a combat machine that dared not venture into skies filled with new German fighters. But while it could no longer perform adequately in the thick of aerial conflict, it flew well, and it had a capacious fuselage into which men, instead of bombs, might fit. And if a special effort needed to be made, the lumbering Whitley could carry both men and bombs.

So it was this night. The bomb bays carried their bulging cases of death, and the bellies of the airplanes were crowded with men. British commandos, clumsy in fighting gear and parachutes. Cold, jammed together, uncomfortable, waiting to plunge into action.

The British formation of bombers was detected by the enemy. German radar, German acoustic detectors, German ears saw and heard the line of aircraft and plotted their probable target. Those targets ahead of the bomber formation were alerted about the chances of a raid. Antiaircraft installations rumbled into action and at remote airfields Luftwaffe pilots hurried with sleep-heavy eyes to their machines.

There was no immediate rush to meet the bombers. They were swinging inland along a course that would take them to an industrial target some distance away. So the Nazis paid little attention, except for tracking, as the old bombers droned over the coastline. And no one on the ground saw the dark shapes tumble from the bellies of the Whitleys. Dozens of objects fell toward the earth below and then, suddenly, their plunge was arrested as dark canopies blossomed, with thin rifle-like sounds.

www.youtube.com/watch?v=GPK-sR5pnjQ

An entire commando force had left the old Whitleys, which continued on with a diversionary bombing strike.

The men floated easily and silently through the cold air.

They had selected their landing area well, in open fields far from any community. The commandos assembled quickly. It had been a good drop. They were eight miles from their objective. If they continued to move as planned, maintaining silence, there was every chance they would burst with complete surprise upon the Germans.

As guards searched the area, the other men unfolded strange contraptions of metal bars, wheels, spokes, pedals, and handles. Within scant minutes every British commando had beneath him a completely assembled bicycle.

Quickly the paratroopers loaded their gear-grenades, ammunition, machine guns, iron rations, explosive charges.

Using hand signals instead of voice commands they pedaled away, following a narrow trail covered with a thin layer of fresh snow.

The men rode steadily through the night along the French coastline. Eight miles ahead of them lay a huge and secret radar installation, the most advanced system of its kind. It was a powerful weapon in the hands of the Germans, used fqr tracking aircraft flying to Europe from Britain. Knocking out the radar would effectively poke a stick in the electronic vision of the Nazis. Leading the commando force was Maj. John D. Sheffield. [EDITOR: then Lieutenant John Frost was a subordinate leader of this raid]

The major crossed his fingers. If events kept unfolding the way they had so far, they could do their job and get out without suffering heavy casualties. Knocking out the radar installation might turn out to be a bigger bite than they could handle. The radar system was critical to German air defense on the (Continent and the Nazis were sure to have set up bristling defenses on the ground. Sheffield shrugged to himself. They'd know soon enough.

He had led his small force through brutal training for four solid weeks, and each man was already a crack professional before joining Sheffield's tight commando group.

Every man knew as well as did Sheffield the layout of their objective. The vital radar site lay near the village of Bruneval in northern France, about twelve miles north-northeast of Le Havre.

As well-defended as was the radar installation, British army officials were gambling everything on the fact that the enemy would never dream an attack would be launched against the well-defended site by bicycle. It seemed too incongruous, this concept of trained killers pedaling their way into the mouths of German guns.

Well, now they were for it. Sheffield and his commandos maintained a steady pace on their bicycles, on the way to their moment of destiny. The Royal Air Force had flown them in. If they did their job and survived to get away, the Royal Navy would be waiting for them on the beach to bring them out.

There was only one small hitch about that. First, the commandos had to wrest control of the beach away from the Germans.

Intelligence advised Sheffield and his men that the radar installation itself appeared to be housed within a cabin, standing deep inside a pit. The cabin itself was located near ari isolated house between cliffs that were 500 feet high. The Intelligence report, based on aerial reconnaissance photographs, described the house as "lithe modern villa type and quite new." Undoubtedly taken over for the convenience of the Germans, judged Sheffield. Yet the information had presented a serious problem.

The towering cliffs eliminated any hope of making an assault from the sea. Long before a small striking force could work its way to the radar site it would come under a withering crossfire. The answer was the parachute and the bicycle.

Even as the commandos rode toward their objective, the old Whitleys were dumping their bombs on a distant target, and hoping the Germans would see nothing unusual in their flight pattern.

Sheffield thought of one beach area in particular. It lay about a quarter of a mile south of the radar installation, a small steeply sloping beach of pebbles and sand lying at the foot of high chalk and flint formations. He hoped to see that pebbly stretch of sand on schedule, for it was there the Navy would pick them up for the dash home across the Channel. Sheffield concentrated his thoughts again on the defenses of the radar site. Most of the work crew, he had been told, would be German specialists attending to the radar equipment itself. They might or might not be armed. That situation would have to be handled as events developed.

Immediately adjacent to the radar installation, the Nazis had prepared an extensive trench with regularly spaced dugouts, where the commandos might encounter heavy machine-gun fire. A short distance from the site was a powerful pillbox covered by a machine-gun detail and situated right on the edge of a cliff, so that it looked down on the radar installation. Just south of Bruneval was another pillbox. Both pillboxes were so located that they could cover the cove in a devastating crossfire.

Four hundred yards inland from the radar site was a farmhouse with a German garrison of unspecified strength, but believed to be strong in numbers. A small wooded area embraced the farmhouse, which was designated on Sheffield's map by the name of le Presbytere.

In all, the radar site was defended by fifteen separate posts, most of which covered approaches to the beach. The others were pointed seaward. Intelligence guessed that the German force in the immediate vicinity of the radar installation-the guard force-numbered about 100 men. Perhaps a mile or two away, the Germans had garrisoned a full regiment of infantry, and a few miles beyond that was quartered an entire battalion equipped with armored cars. Any assault force that moved in daylight would also face attack from German fighters based on fields in the area.

The strike, therefore, had to be executed with speed and precision or the commandos would be cut to pieces.

The commandos bore down steadily on their target.

Luck had been with them in several ways. A bright moon reflected ideally along the snow-covered path before them, providing the men with more than adequate visibility without risking lights. And the light snow cover softened the inevitable small noises such a group might make. They reached their first planned stop point, only 200 yards from the bulking radar installation, without any alarm being sounded. Everything was going with clockwork precision.

Staying low, muffling their movements, the men looked to their commander for final orders. Immediately, Sheffield divided his attack force into four units. He would take the first group of commandos in a wide-open assault against the house nearby. The major believed the reserve troops and a good number of the permanent guards would be in the house. If he could catch them unawares--in fact asleep--he could wipe out a dangerous part of the resistance that could be mounted against them.

The second commando unit was ordered to move against the radar installation proper. Group three would cover this move, taking up a position between the le Presbytere farm and the edge of the cliffs. The fourth and last unit was assigned to work its way around the cliffs to reach the beach. If any opposition was encountered there, it was to be ruthlessly cut down. At all costs the beach must be secured by the remainder of the commando force for the purpose of embarkation.

Everything was set. The men remounted their bicycles and Major Sheffield passed the word to commit. The first and second groups pedaled furiously toward the isolated house and the radar post. Still no alarm! As quickly as they reached their objectives the men leaped off the bicycles and rushed to attack position. Sheffield headed straight for the farmhouse door. A heavy boot smashed it open and the major dashed inside, weapon at the ready. No one in sight. Sheffield blew a loud blast on his whistle and other commandos rushed in on his heels, moving swiftly to break into the four rooms on the ground floor. They were all empty. At once Sheffield pounded up the stairs, four men with him, to the second landing.

"Hiinde hoch!" he called, shouting an order to surrender. A single thunderstruck German Soldier brought his the radar site. But that accounted only for enemy personnel in the immediate area. Sheffield realized that reinforcements would soon be rushing to the scene.

As things turned out, the troops assigned to permanent garrison duty were already on the move. The first sign that all was not well came with a long burst of probing machine-gun fire from the nearby farm of le Presbytere. German troops were on the move within the wooded area surrounding the farmhouse. First things first, reasoned Sheffield. Return to the house and get his men out. Firing on the run in short bursts, the first group with Sheffield raced back to the house where the twelve men were standing fast. Now the men ran outside again, crouching low and weaving from side to side. The German troops were completely over their initial surprise and laying down a heavy fire. Miraculously, only one man was hit. Despite his wounds, he kept up with the rest of the men.

Sheffield's group, joining up with the third-or covering-unit, scrambled to set up a heavy defensive fire in the vicinity of the radar post. The demolition team needed time to set their explosive charges.

"Well," murmured Sheffield when told he would have to hold off the Germans for awhile, "we'll jolly well give you the time you need. Get to it, lads." The Germans moving in from the farm worked their way steadily toward Sheffield's force. The commandos held their fire until the last moment, then cut loose with a withering blast at the advancing enemy. As Sheffield had figured, the return fire from the British force was so heavy, and caught the Germans with such surprise, that they held back on further advances and resorted instead to heavy firepower. Two German machine guns, well protected from return fire, hammered at the British in the radar post. Bullets slammed into the house in a steady rain of death.

Sheffield was more than content with the standoff. So long as the Germans kept their distance his demolition team could complete their work. Then the situation began to change swiftly. The lights of three vehicles were seen in the distance, coming toward the radar site.

Sheffield looked about him. It was going to get very sticky in a hell of a hurry.

"Let's get cracking!" he shouted to the demolition squad. "Move it, lads! Reinforcements are coming in and we bloody well can't hold them off for long!" His words were almost drowned out in another burst of machine gun fire.

"Sir!" a commando shouted back. "We're done! Charges all set!" "All right!" Sheffield bellowed to his men, sensing that there was no time to waste. "Everybody start moving out! Get to the beach!"

They began moving from the house, crouching low, the men situated in the rear cutting loose with bursts of machine-gun fire to cover the withdrawal. For the first time since they had left England, they abandoned their bicycles. The remainder of their travels would be across six hundred yards of open, rough country, south of their position, toward the village of Bruneval.

But now they had a pack. of hellhounds at their heels. German reinforcements had rolled to the scene and German firepower seemed to increase with every moment. It was to their advantage that the enemy seemed to overestimate the strength of the commando force. They moved toward the British in careful stages, covering every move with heavy blasts of machine-gun fire. The commandos were forced to retreat in stages, running twenty or thirty yards, then turning and digging in to fire furiously at their pursuers.

The going was getting uncomfortable even for Sheffield when the sky split wide apart with a terrifying mushroom of red flames. Instantly there followed an ear-shattering crash of thunder. The commandos answered the blast of their demolition charges with shouted cheers, and an enthusiastic burst of fire in the direction of the Nazis. No matter what happened now, their mission was fully successful. Another blast ripped through the radar site and an angry red fireball licked upward, churning within itself like a thing alive. Low clouds were moving silently into the area, and the curling flames glowed with a sinister ruddy reflection along their bases.

Sheffield saw his men staring with fascination at the blood-red flames. "All right!" he shouted. "The sightseeing is done with. Let's move it!" Retreat, fire in short, massed bursts, then run like hell and flop down in the thin snow for another ripping fire at the Germans. They were at the cliffs and a voice called hoarsely. "The boats are here. It's all right, fellows. Come on down, and hurry it up, will you?" Sudden elation became shock when German machine-gun posts on each cliff opened up with stuttering bursts. The troops in the pillbox had waited out the retreat in silence, knowing the commandos must venture into their crossfire when they tried to work their way down to the beach. Now Sheffield and his men were being cut up by fire from their front and rear.

"Dig in!" he roared to the commandos.

They had taken immediate hits. One man died instantly as he took the full effect of a long burst. A second commando tumbled wildly through the air, collapsing with several bullets in his legs and a third fell with three rounds in his abdomen. His stunned friends found him alive and cursing his luck. No one believed it then, but the man would be carried to safety and would survive the raid.

Sheffield was trying to figure a way out of the mess when a voice called up to him from the beach. "Don't come down, whatever you do! The beach isn't secured yet!" Sheffield recognized the voice of Lieutenant Frost, commanding the fourth unit of commandos. It wasn't difficult to figure what had happened. Frost's group had run into stiff German resistance. All they could do was hold on until more commandos arrived.

Sheffield ordered one group of his men to concentrate their fire on the machine guns atop the cliffs. With those weapons pinned down, he led a force of commandos through the narrow pass and down onto the beach to link up with Frost's men. The unit firing at the cliff top Germans then withdrew hastily and joined Sheffield.

With full strength at hand, the major began the rush against German outposts along the beach. The biggest problem was a pillbox bristling with machine guns. Sheffield and several men with him went in low, against the pillbox walls, and hurled grenades through the gun slit. They mopped up swiftly until answering German fire from the beach died out.

Further along the beach, the commandos discovered a small house that had remained unknown to them. Within the house a single German orderly clung to his telephone, trying to explain to a major from the nearby garrison that the explosions along the beach were from grenades thrown by British Commandos. Unable to understand the words because of the noise of gunfire and exploding grenades, the German officer was reduced to cursing and shouting. He never had the chance to finish. The commandos burst into the house and the German signalman threw up his hands. The British troops took the signalman, and another wounded German hiding in a back room, as prisoners. These two men, along with one soldier captured along the edge of the cliff, were the only prisoners taken during the raid.

Sheffield peered at his watch. It was two-thirty in the morning. The commandos had been on French soil twoand-a-half hours. Off the coast, the Navy rescue force had been watching, spellbound, as the night lit up with explosions and the glowing fireballs of tracer bullets. Finally they received the pickup signal and started in. Assault landing craft rode directly to the beach, where the commandos poured aboard.

Heavy German fire from machine guns swept the beach. Further out to sea, supporting ships opened fire with heavy weapons. British guns raked the cliff tops with thundering blasts that killed many enemy defenders and tore huge chunks from the nearly vertical walls.

The German fire died abruptly, and the assault ships pulled away from the beaches. Of the commando force that rode its bicycles along the French coastline, eight men were left behind. One had been killed. The other seven never made it to the beach, but Sheffield could no longer wait for them. The boats had to break from the beaches. As they headed back for England he counted his casualties. One dead, seven wounded, seven missing. They were fifteen miles from the French coast when dawn broke. Spitfires flew protection cover. But Sheffield and his men were looking at the beach fading in the distance, where the ruins of the shattered radar installation were still smoking.

Keith Flint in Airborne Armour pages 120-121 describe how the 6^th Airborne Armored Reconnaissance Regiment used not only tracked Tetrarch light tanks but tracked Bren gun carriers and folding bicycles for reconnaissance as well:

As far as the recce function went, Go To It! summarises the regiment's activities in the following fashion:

Initially it had been deployed with 8^th Parachute Battalion in the Bois de Bavent where it had set up O.P.s watching the area bordered by Troarn, Caen, Ranville and Escoville. It had provided valuable information for the divisional commander, acting as his eyes and ears in the forward areas. As well as using "B" Squadron's Bren carriers and Dingo scout cars, the regiment deployed patrols mounted on bicycles deep into enemy held areas. These obtained information on enemy dispositions, including vehicle parks and armour FUPs, which resulted in successful air strikes and bombardments by the cruiser HMS Mauritius.

By Sea--Landing Craft

Notice the British Soldier carrying a Cushman motor scooter on his shoulder!

Interesting how the folding bike minimizes itself for troop transport in air, land, sea vehicles!

The Battle for the Cross-Roads Town of Caen

Operation Market-Garden: by Parachute & Glider, Overland: Not En Masse like the D-Day Success

www.youtube.com/watch?v=o44BvtQxOV4

The video above is Part 3 of a new, thought-provoking Series on the Battle for Arnhem in 1944 asks the question, WHERE WERE THE FOLDING BIKES? when the British Army needed them to reinforce LTC John Frost's 2^nd Battalion of the 1^st Brigade of the 1^st British Airborne Division holding the north end of Arnhem bridge over the Rhine river? Details of this research can be found on the constantly updated web pages below:

Airborne forces are essentially CAVALRY as explained by LTG James M. Gavin in his influential 1954 Harper's magazine article; "Cavalry and I Don't Mean Horses"

Early Airborne forces once they left their aircraft going 100-300 mph lost the MOBILITY DIFFERENTIAL of Cavalry and became walking 1-4 mph infantry--a condition folding bikes for 10-25 mph speeds can solve. The time of the greatest opportunity to surprise the enemy and an Airborne force's greatest vulnerability is right after the drop--had the British who used folding bikes en masse on D-Day used them in quantity on the flat terrain west of Arnhem they could have swarmed upon Arnhem bridge before Germans on foot could have gotten into blocking positions or switched to Frost's open "Lion" route if opposed at "Leopard" and "Tiger" routes. Mobility and time is of the essence in a coup de main.

www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Market_Garden

Wikipedia reports:

Two of the three battalions of the 1^st Parachute Brigade found themselves slowed down by small German units of a training battalion which had quickly established a thin blocking line covering the obvious routes to Arnhem. Lieutenant Colonel John Frost's 2^nd Battalion was advancing far south of this position and so found their route largely undefended. They arrived at the bridge in the evening and set up defensive positions at the north end. Of the other battalions, the 3^rd had only covered half the distance to the bridge when they came to a halt for the night, the rear of their column being under attack and needing time to catch up. The 1^st Battalion was similarly fragmented, yet they pushed on around the flank of the German line throughout the night, but frequent skirmishes resulted in their making little more progress. Two attempts to take the bridge span including the south end were unsuccessful.

British General Montgomery tried to cross several major rivers by 3D Airborne maneuver coup de mains, yet on the most vital bridge over the Rhine no such direct action was taken to ostensibly avoid anti-aircraft flak. If you are going to do an INDIRECT VERTICAL ASSAULT you must close the distance quickly with GROUND MOBILITY.

The British are great deep thinkers about war and their innovations like the tracked tank, the landing craft for amphibious warfare, light tanks in gliders are just a few of their thinking ahead and doing TANGIBLE THINGS to get ahead. What they lacked in WW2 was the flexibility to take what they had and improvise on the spot ruthlessly for decisive effects, no doubt they were very war-weary having began fighting the Germans in 1939. Since the British were tired and the 1^st Airborne Staff not very competent, its clear now they should have "stacked-the-deck" in their favor with lots of folding bikes to speed to Arnhem bridge ASAP hopefully without a fight--to conserve their fighting ranks. Simple bike transportation doesn't cost a fortune nor demand all the maintenance that "mechanization" with powered tanks invokes cold sweats in the mind of the light infantry narcissist. So why wouldn't a light infantryman want to travel at 10-25 mph instead of 1 or at best 4 mph on foot? The British at times asked this question in WW2 and used bikes, at others they didn't and disasters followed. It has something to do with the flexibility of mind--those that can decentralize and delegate control to trusted subordinates can use mobile, dispersed bike troops like Yamashita did to take Malaya/Singapore; if one's mind is weak and inflexible, a slower walking pace is chosen and the alleged safety of caution turns into bloody head-long charges into enemy strength. The bike is a tool for maneuver warfare of a Cavalry force.

One of the sad truths of war is that even the pressures of survival in combat and as a nation-state are NOT A GUARANTEE that what's best is going to over-ride prejudice and malpractice of racketeers. The British people had to demand Winston Churchill be their leader and it was he who brought back Hobart to active-duty to save the day on D-Day. With the Germans on the run after the Normandy break-out, the British generals thought they could "pull a fast one" and not even have fast-moving detachments of bicycle troops to reinforce an Airborne unit if stranded on the far side of one of the rivers. German Paratroop General Kurt Student knew right away to attack landing paratroops and had his men converge by bicycles and STUG turretless assault guns on Arnhem--and we all know how that action resulted.

Just a few hundred bikes at Arnhem's drop and landing zones would have have ended WW2 sooner by 6-8 months with us reaching Berlin before the Soviets--and would have saved MILLIONS of lives and prevented there being a "Berlin Wall" and "Iron Curtain".

TechnoTactical Errors in our force structure and equipment can have STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES. Let's hope we can realize this before its too late and its more than a bridge at stake.

By Glider

By Parachute

In 1942, British Airborne "Cycle Commandos" struck at Bruneval Radar station using folding bicycles. Flying in Whitworth bombers which also dropped bombs to confuse the Germans, the Cycle-Commandos were paradropped 8 miles away from their objective for secrecy. Using their bikes for ground mobility, the Paratroopers closed on their target silently and captured the necessary radar components and prisoners to bring vital intelligence back to England by sea landing craft.

Details:

www.6th-airborne.org/bike.html

Details & Photos:

Airborne re-enactor equipment page
BSA Airborne Bicycles
BSA Airborne Bike Page
David Gordon's BSA bike page

Type G Apparatus - Folding Bicycle

In WW2 bicycles, were a cheap and lightweight method of giving mobility to infantry. This was particularly true for Airborne troops, who were obviously much more limited in the size and number of vehicles that could accompany them. The British Airborne forces had a unique bicycle designed to be folded in half and parachuted down. While somewhat bulky by today's standards, the bike is remarkably light. The bike could either be dropped separately or strapped to the parachutist. A member of the [6^th Airborne re-enactors] unit has acquired and restored one of these interesting pieces.

BSA Folding Airborne Bike rigged to be dropped separately

Following are several more photos of this particular bike along with several wartime photos. All of the following text is taken from the war-time military manual for the "Type G Apparatus", the folding bicycle.

General Notes

Stores Ref. Number: The Stores Ref. Number of the parachute is 15C/84 Weight of folding bicycle: The weight of the folding bicycle and parachute is 32 1/2 lb.

It is necessary to throw the bicycle vertically downwards through the door of the aircraft to prevent the parachute fouling the tail. Tests were made by A.F.E.E. from a C-47 with satisfactory results.

Airborne Bicycle General

The frame of the bicycle is elliptical and is hinged at two points. The slackening of two wing-nuts enables the frame to be folded so that the two wheels lie side by side. The wheels are lashed to the frame to prevent their turning and a type Q parachute with 12 ft. Canopy, as described in A.P. 1180A, Vol. I, Part 2, Sect. 2 Chap. 4, is attached to their circumference. Any partial bending of the handlebars on landing can usually be corrected by hand.

Parachuting with the Airborne bicycle from either Dakota or Stirling Aircraft is simple and requires little equipment. The bicycle is suspended from the parachutist´s body by a quick-release strap when jumping and is always released and lowered to the full extent of a 20 ft suspension line during descent.

Preparation of Bicycle

Fold the bicycle and push the pedals through into the stowed position. Lower the handlebars and raise the saddle so that the latter will receive most of the landing shock.

Strap both wheels together, securing them to the rear chain stays to prevent them from rotating (An Army-issue valise strap is most suitable for this.). Tie one end of the 20ft. suspension line to both the wheels in such a position that when the cycle is suspended by the line the saddle is lowermost. This is important to prevent damage to the handlebars.

Method of Attaching Bicycle to Parachutist

Commencing from the free end, plait the suspension line to ensure that it will pay out quickly and easily without forming loose coils likely to foul the cycle. Take the free end and tie it to the lower left leg strap of the parachute harness. Finally, suspend the bicycle from a quick-release strap passing round the back of the parachutist´s neck.

Method of Jumping with Airborne Bicycle

When making an exit from [C-47] Dakota aircraft, hold the bicycle slightly forward and to the right-hand side, as shown in fig. 2. Take care to avoid fouling the forward edge of the door and catching the brake cable of the bicycle on the door jettison handle. Step well out to avoid being brushed along the side of the aircraft. As soon as the canopy has developed, release the bicycle by pulling the loose end of the quick-release strap.

---

British Para en route to Arnhem bridge walking his folding bicycle

By Tank

German Radhfahrtruppes (Bicycle-Infantry) converge on Arnhem

As Elite Panzerjager (tank hunter) Anti-Tank Forces

The German Army in WW2 had several light bicycle infantry cavalry companies in every infantry division's reconnaissance battalion. The reason was to have an unit MORE MOBILE THAN THE MAIN BODY THAT WAS WALKING. The German infantry also had light tank assault guns embedded with them to work together just like the M113 Gavins we need today.

Dr. Leo Niehorster's excellent organizational web pages document these facts.

http://niehorster.orbat.com/index.htm

http://niehorster.orbat.com/011_germany/41_organ_army/41_id_01-welle.html

World War II Armed Forces - Orders of Battle and Organizations

Last Updated 01.05.04

German Army Organization Infantry Division (1st Wave) Infanteriedivision (1. Welle) 22 June 1941

 

Diagram of German Infantry Division in WW2

   

1. Welle Infantry Divisions
Division   (Commander on 22.06.1941)	W.K.	Infantry	Other Units	Comments
1. Infanterie-Division.   Gen.Maj. Kleffel	I	1 Regiment 22 Regiment 43 Regiment	1
5. Infanterie-Division.   Gen.Maj. Allmendinger	V	14 Regiment 56 Regiment 75 Regiment	5
6. Infanterie-Division.   Gen.Lt. Auleb	VI	18 Regiment 37 Regiment 58 Regiment	6
7. Infanterie-Division.   Gen.Lt. Frhr. v. Gablenz	VII	19 Regiment 61 Regiment 62 Regiment	7	recon battalion: 2 bicycle companies, no heavy company, but 1 lt IG platoon (mot), 1 AT platoon (mot)
8. Infanterie-Division.   Gen.Maj. Höhne	VIII	28 Regiment 38 Regiment 84 Regiment	8	recon battalion: 2 bicycle companies, no heavy company, but 1 lt IG platoon (mot), 1 AT platoon (mot)
9. Infanterie-Division.   Gen.Maj. Frhr. v. Schleinitz	IX	36 Regiment 57 Regiment 116 Regiment	9
11. Infanterie-Division.   Gen.Lt. v. Böckmann	I	2 Regiment 23 Regiment 44 Regiment	11
12. Infanterie-Division.   Gen.Maj. v. Seydlitz-Kurzbach	II	27 Regiment 48 Regiment 89 Regiment	12
15. Infanterie-Division.   Gen.Lt. Hell	IX	81 Regiment 88 Regiment 106 Regiment	15
17. Infanterie-Division.   Gen.Lt. Loch	XIII	21 Regiment 55 Regiment 95 Regiment	17	recon battalion: 2 bicycle companies, no heavy company, but 1 lt IG platoon (mot), 1 AT platoon (mot)
21. Infanterie-Division.   Gen.Maj. Sponheimer	I	3 Regiment 24 Regiment 45 Regiment	21	recon battalion: 2 bicycle companies, no heavy company, but 1 lt IG platoon (mot), 1 AT platoon (mot)
22. Infanterie-Division (Luftlande)   Gen.Lt. Graf v. Sponek	X	16 Regiment 47 Regiment 65 Regiment	22	recon battalion: 2 bicycle companies, no heavy company, but 1 lt IG platoon (mot), 1 AT platoon (mot); no heavy artillery battalion; all antitank companies had 3x sPzBü + 9x 37mm Pak; 3 supply columns, 6 supply columns (mot), 2 P.O.L. columns (mot); 1 division park. Airlanding equipment was in depots back in Germany.
23. Infanterie-Division.   Gen.Maj. Hellmich	III	9 Regiment 67 Regiment 68 Regiment	23
24. Infanterie-Division.   Gen.Maj. v. Tettau	IV	31 Regiment 32 Regiment 102 Regiment	24
26. Infanterie-Division.   Gen.Maj. Weiss	VI	39 Regiment 77 Regiment 78 Regiment	26
28. Infanterie-Division.   Gen.Lt. Sinnhuber	VIII	7 Regiment 49 Regiment 83 Regiment	28
30. Infanterie-Division.   Gen-Lt-v. Tippelskirch	X	6 Regiment 26 Regiment 46 Regiment	30
31. Infanterie-Division.   Gen.Maj. Kalmükoff	XI	12 Regiment 17 Regiment Regiment	31
32. Infanterie-Division.   Gen.Maj. Bohnstedt	II	4 Regiment 94 Regiment 96 Regiment	32	Pionier Bataillon 2
34. Infanterie-Division.   Gen.Lt. Behlendorff	XII	80 Regiment 107 Regiment 253 Regiment	34
35. Infanterie-Division.   Gen.Lt. Fischer v. Weikersthall	V	34 Regiment 109 Regiment 111 Regiment	35
44. Infanterie-Division.   Gen.Lt. Siebert	XVII	131 Regiment 132 Regiment 134 Regiment	44	Art.Rgt. 96; Pzjg.Abt. 46; Pion.Btl. 80; Nachr.Abt. 64.; recon battalion without armored car platoon.
45. Infanterie-Division.   Gen.Maj. Schliepper	XVII	130 Regiment 133 Regiment 135 Regiment	45	Art.Rgt. 98; Pion.Btl. 81; Nachr.Abt. 65; recon battalion without armored car platoon.
46. Infanterie-Division.   Gen.Lt. Ktiebel	XIII	42 Regiment 72 Regiment 97 Regiment	46	Art.Rgt. 144; Pzjg.Abt. 52; Pion.Btl. 88; Nachr.Abt. 76; recon battalion without heavy company, but with armored car platoon.
50. Infanterie-Division.   Gen.Lt. Hollidt	III	121 Regiment 122 Regiment 123 Regiment	50	recon battalion: 2 bicycle companies, no heavy company, but 1 lt IG platoon (mot), 1 AT platoon (mot); the infantry regiment antitank companies had 12x 37mm Pak; the antitank battalion companies had 9x 37mm Pak + 2x 50mm Pak.
72. Infanterie-Division.   Gen.Lt. Mattenklott	XII	105 Regiment 124 Regiment 266 Regiment	72	Art.Rgt. 172; Radf.Schw. 172; no Field Replacement Battalion; the infantry regiment antitank companies had 12x 37mm Pak; the antitank battalion companies had 9x 37mm Pak + 2x 50mm Pak.

http://niehorster.orbat.com/011_germany/39_organ_army/kstn_0353.htm

World War II Armed Forces - Orders of Battle and Organizations

Last Updated 31.12.00

German Army Organization Cavalry Bicycle Company 1 September 1939

 

Radfahrerschwadron KStN 353 dated 01.09.1939
1 Officer (K) as Company Commander (Pistol)
Company Headquarters     Headquarters Section         1 NCO as Headquarters Section Leader (Rifle)(on bicycle)         1 Messenger / Bugler (Rifle)(on bicycle)         1 Messenger / Blinker Signaler (Rifle)(on bicycle)         1 Messenger (Rifle)(bicycle)         3 Messengers (Rifles)(on motorcycles)         1 Motor Vehicle Driver (Rifle)         1 car, light, cross-country (Kfz. 1)         3 motorcycles     Medic Section         1 Medic NCO (Pistol)(on bicycle)         4 Stretcher Bearers(on bicycles)     Combat Trains         1 Senior NCO as First Sergeant / Trains Leader (Pistol)         1 NCO as Armorer (Pistol)         1 NCO for Equipment (Rifle)(on motorcycle)         1 Assistant Armorer (Pistol)(on motorcycle)         1 Assistant Armorer (Pistol)         5 Motor Vehicle Drivers (Rifles)         1 Motorcyclist (Rifle)(on motorcycle with sidecar)         3 Bicycle Mechanics & truck escort (Rifle)         1 Clerk (Rifle)         1 Cook (Rifle)         1 Cook & truck escort (Rifle)         2 motorcycles         1 motorcycle with side car         1 car, medium, cross-country (Kfz. 18)         1 truck, light, open, cross-country for field kitchen         3 trucks, light, open, cross-country for equipment and ammo         9 light machine guns (as equipment reserve)     Baggage Trains         1 Enlisted in charge of baggage / clerk (Rifle)(on motorcycle)         1 Tailor (Rifle)         1 Cobbler (Rifle)         1 Driver (Rifle)         1 truck, light, open, for baggage and equipment	3 Rifle Platoons, each with     1 Officer (Z) as Platoon Leader (Pistol)(on bicycle)     Platoon Headquarters         1 Messenger / Bugler (Rifle)(on bicycle)         1 Messenger / Blinker Signaler (Rifle)(on bicycle)         1 Messenger (Rifle)(bicycle)     3 Rifle Squads, each with         1 NCO Squad Leader (Rifle)(on bicycle)         1 Assistant Squad Leader (Rifle)(on bicycle)         1 MG Gunner (Pistol)(on bicycle)         2 Assistant MG Gunners (Pistols)(on bicycles)         7 Riflemen (Rifles)(on bicycles)         1 light machine gun Light Mortar Section     1 NCO as Mortar Section Leader (Rifle)(on motorcycle)     3 Gunners / (Pistols)     6 Assistant Gunners (Rifles)     6 Motorcycle Drivers (Rifles)(on motorcycles with sidecars)     1 motorcycle     6 motorcycles with sidecars     3 light mortars (50mm)
Totals: 4 Officers, 24 NCO, 152 Enlisted; 134 Rifles, 46 Pistols, 18 LMG, 3 Light Mortars; 7 motor vehicles, 7 motorcycles, 7 motorcycles with side cars, 138 bicycles.

---

FEEDBACK!

itsg@hotmail.com

"Hi Mike,

Funny you should send me that site. I have looked in there a number of times, now and again. Saw the whole thing about the bikes some time ago when I was tricking out my own mtn bike...which when I get home I'll send you a picture of it.

The concept of bike mounted light infantry is one I do believe we'll see again in the future. As petroleum becomes harder and more expensive to come by, it would be a natural choice for any force that doesn't want to get mixed up with the logistical and humane aspects of utilizing horses. Limited and precious petrol will have to be reserved for logistics.

As a sell to the mech army these days, I doubt you'll see widespread acceptence. But just like mule trains in Italy, you'll see scenarios where the usefulness and speed of bikes will not go unnoticed.

It has certainly not gone unnoticed by AAFES who sells scads of them for getting around bases like Camp Vic, where not everyone gets to have a car...

---Dave Pollard, How to Save the World.