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"The Army expects the IBCT to provide...a rapidly deployable early-entry combat force that is lethal, survivable, and capable of operating in all types of military operations, from small-scale contingencies like the Balkans' missions to a major theater war."

GAO Report - May 2002

To equip its early-entry force, the Army has selected the Stryker Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV). However, many individuals have questioned the wisdom of this decision, and expressed the opinion that the M113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) is a more capable and cost-effective vehicle for the Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs).

In 2001, Congress mandated a "side-by-side" test of the IAV and M113A3 to determine which is the better choice. Army leadership maintained that such a test would squander financial resources without revealing anything new. This study will review publicly available information to determine if indeed sufficient data already exists to make a rational decision in this matter.

On 12 September 2002, Army Test and Evaluation Command began a 16-day field test of the Stryker and M113A3. Since the Army News Service reported that the test will be conducted primarily on roads - a condition that favors wheeled vehicles like the Stryker - this report has been prepared to show aspects of both vehicle types that may not be covered in the formal comparison.

Ten variants of the IAV are planned, but this study focuses on three: the Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV), the Mortar Carrier (MC), and the Mobile Gun System (MGS). The Stryker ICV, MC, and MGS will be compared to the M113A3 APC, M1064A3 Mortar Carrier, M8 Armored Gun System (AGS), and the Mobile Tactical Vehicle Light (MTVL), which is a "stretched" version of the M113A3.

The MTVL has not been included in the Army's evaluation, which is unfortunate as it provides mobility equal to that of the heavy force's M1A2 tanks and M2A2 Bradley fighting vehicles. The M113A3 delivers mobility comparable to that of the Abrams and Bradley, while use of the Stryker - according to the GAO report (GAO-02-442) - might impede an infantry or armored division's ability to achieve its full combat capabilities.

As can be seen herein, wheeled vehicles like the Stryker "stryke out" when it comes to the mobility required for the full spectrum of terrain, climate, and types of operations in which the Army has participated in the past, and can be expected to engage in the future.

The M113A3 and MTVL can be produced by conversion of older M113s, at much lower cost than the expensive Stryker ICV. Using the M113A3 or MTVL would have multiple benefits - lower cost, utilization of surplus vehicle inventory, and providing an infantry vehicle better suited to employment over the entire spectrum of military operations.

Due to their ability to stow a greater number of mortar rounds, the M1064A3 and MTVL mortar carriers can deliver indirect fire support for a more prolonged period than the Stryker MC, as well as providing greater survivability for the crewmen.

The M8 AGS and its bolt-on, anti-RPG armor are fully developed, type classified, and ready for production, whereas the Stryker MGS and anti-RPG armor require continued development. Because its autoloader cycles faster than that of the Stryker MGS, the M8 AGS can engage multiple targets more quickly. Also, since it carries more main gun ammunition than the Stryker, the M8 can remain in action for a longer period. More critically, the Stryker MGS is too tall and heavy for transport by C-130 aircraft.

The USAF C-17 can transport 2 fully combat loaded Strykers, so to deploy a 319-vehicle Stryker Brigade Combat Team will require 160 C-17 sorties.

The USAF C-17 can transport 4 fully combat loaded MTVLs, so to deploy a 319-vehicle MTVL Brigade Combat Team will require 82 C-17 sorties.*

The USAF C-17 can transport 5 fully combat loaded M113A3s, so to deploy a 319-vehicle M113A3 Brigade Combat Team will require 68 C-17 sorties.*

*Assumes use of the M8 AGS for the Mobile Gun System, and M193 Fox for the NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle).

Since the primary reason for the Brigade Combat Team concept is to deploy maximum combat power in the minimum time frame, the Stryker is a poor choice. The C-17 can transport twice as many MTVLs, and more than twice as many M113A3s, for a much more efficient and effective use of this limited-availability airlift resource. In addition, unit integrity of the infantry platoons is superior with the MTVL and M113A3, since all four of a platoon's vehicles - together with assigned personnel - can be transported on one aircraft.

Delivery of Stryker vehicles by C-130 is also an inefficient use of airlift. Depending on the flight distance involved, 13 or more C-130 sorties will be required to transport only a dozen Stryker ICVs and personnel.

The M8, M113A3, M1064A3, and MTVL can be airdropped onto the battlefield, thereby providing enhanced strategic mobility. This option does not exist with the Stryker, which is too big for parachute delivery from C-130 aircraft.

With a tow cable attached to its front end, an eight-wheeled USMC LAV-25 is pulled from the Croatian mud where it had been hopelessly mired. Note the nose up angle, indicating that each pair of tires has dug deeper into the mud than the preceding pair. The LAV-25 is an earlier generation in the vehicle family that evolved into the Stryker, and shares the same basic flaws regarding cross-country mobility.

A tracked M113 wades deep into a Bosnian mud pit in order to tow out a wheeled vehicle that became stuck. Mud ordinarily poses little problem for tracked vehicles.

A Stryker Mobile Gun System drives through soft sand. Note that - like the USMC LAV stuck in mud - each pair of tires is digging deeper into the sand than the preceding pair. In soft ground, these eight-wheel drive vehicles are always trying to crawl out of the ruts that they are in the process of digging.

 Tracks distribute a vehicle's weight evenly over the surface. This enables deep, soft sand to be traversed with ease, in areas that a wheeled vehicle would find impassable.

Wheeled vehicles, like this USMC LAV-25, require the use of snow chains in order to operate effectively in snow. This is another group of items for which stowage space is required, and the time needed for installation and removal of snow chains can potentially slow the pace of winter operations.

Tracked vehicles like the M113 can operate quite effectively in snow-covered terrain, without the need for traction-enhancing devices.

Tracked vehicles can easily climb over automobiles and other obstacles that cannot be surmounted by wheeled armor. This capability is very useful in any scenario, and its lack can result in mission failure.

 Tires are very vulnerable to damage from gunfire, battlefield debris, and sharp rocks. In the 30 January 1991 battle for Khafji, the first coalition attack was stopped when Iraqi small arms fire flattened the tires of the Saudi wheeled armor. Four weeks later, the Marine assault on Kuwait Airport was also brought to a halt when the tires of several LAV-25s were shredded as a result of running over artillery fragments.

More recently, the Stryker company that participated in Millennium Challenge 2002 had to replace 13 tires during the 96-hour NTC rotation! How many more tires would have required replacement if the OPFOR had been shooting bullets instead of MILES lasers? "Run-flat" tires are not a solution - if you have to limp into a fight, you might not be able to crawl out! Tracks don't have to be changed after every battle.