John Gordon IV and Peter A. Wilson
May 27, 1998

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ii FOREWORD

Since the end of the Cold War nearly a decade ago,there have been repeated calls for the U.S.Army to make major changes to accommodate to a transformed geo-strategic environment. Specifically, advocates of major change believe the Army should become strategically agile while maintaining a high in-theater combat and mobility capability. Forexample, much of the design work associated with the Army After Next(AAN)exercise series has focused on the development of a next generation of combat forces which have very high strategic/theater mobility and dramatically enhanced combat power. Unfortunately, some of the concepts associated with the AAN are true "leap-ahead" technologies that even in the most favorable budgetary circumstances and development schedules will not likely be available during the 2020 timeframe. At present, the Army appears to have settled on the selective modernization of its current force structure that is a mixture of very light and ultra-heavy combat formations; a "barbell posture." This approach provides an inadequate strategy for dealing with near-term political military challenges and acting as a transition to a true next generation Army.

The purpose of this monograph, therefore,is to stimulate a debate within the Army as to whether there is a credible transition strategy to modify a portion of its force structure to gain some ANN-like attributes-enhanced strategic responsiveness coupled with enhanced theater agility and combat power. The authors believe there is a mix of extant and near-term combat systems and technologies that will allow the Army to create a number of "aero-motorized" divisions within likely budgetary constraints by the endof the next decade. These medium weight combat units would exploit the large investment the Air Force is making to modernize its strategic and theater airlift fleets during the first decade of the 21st century. The authors believe that forces equipped with light armored vehicles, next generation combat aviation, and enhanced indirect fire

iii

support will provide the Army with a strategic "fist." [2005 EDITOR WTFO? The Army parachute airdropped M551 Sheridan light tanks in Panama in 1989, where were the RAND authors? Asleep in bed?] Aero-motorized forces can be used either as part of a leading edge of a large and inherently slower to deploy expeditionary force or as a central combat component of future lesser contingencies including operations other than war. Finally, the aero-motorized concept will allow the Army to develop thoroughly the doctrine and concept of land forces operations that have the strategic agility of current light forces and approach the combat power of current heavy forces-major features of a desired next generation Army.

The Strategic Studies Institute strongly encourages readers to participate in a continuing discussion on the future of American landpower and the challenges it holds for the U.S. Army.

LARRY M. WORTZEL Colonel, U.S. Army Director, Strategic Studies Institute

iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUTHORS

JOHN GORDON IV graduated from The Citadel in 1977 with a bachelor's degree in history. He also holds a masters in international relations from St. Mary's University in San Antonio, Texas,and a masters in business administration from Marymount University in Arlington, Virginia. Currently, he is a candidate in George Mason University's Public Policy Ph.D. program. Following graduation from The Citadel, he entered the Army as a Field Artillery officer. His assignments included the 82d Airborne and 2dInfantry Divisions, the Field Artillery School, and Training and Doctrine Command Headquarters. For the last 4 years of his Army career, he served at Headquarters, Department of the Army where he was the Chief of the Doctrine Team in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans(DCSOPS). He was also the leader of the Army's Deep Attack/Weapons Mix Study(DAWMS)team.[2005 EDITOR: this is an Army version of the AF airstrike mentality except it does it without airplanes] While in DCSOPS, Mr. Gordon was a member of the Army's Roles and Missions Commission team and represented the Army at several Quadrennial Defense Review(QDR)panels. He is the author of over 30 articles in various publications such as Army, Military Review, Joint Force Quarterly, Naval Institute's Proceedings, and Georgetown University's National Security Studies Quarterly. He joined RAND in May 1997.

PETER A.WILSON graduated from Princeton University in 1966 with a B.A. in political science. He then attended the University of Chicago where he earned an M.A. in political science in 1970.Mr. Wilson is a member of the senior staff at RAND. During the last several years, he has been working on a number of interrelated projects including the co-authorship of the "The Day After" policy exercise series which have explored the implications of major challenges(counter proliferation, strategic information warfare, and electronic commerce)to post-Cold War national security planning. Mr. Wilson is co-teaching a course at Georgetown University's School for Foreign Service that will use the RAND exercise experience to examine the implications of the se new technologies to a significant change of the early 21st century definition of national security. Mr.Wilson's written works have appeared in Parameters, Naval Institute's Proceedings, National Defense University Press, the Progressive Policy Institute, Washington Quarterly, and include the co-authorship of several major RAND studies.

v

THE CASE FOR ARMY XXI "MEDIUM WEIGHT" AERO-MOTORIZED DIVISIONS: A PATHWAY TO THE ARMY OF 2020

The ability to project lethal forces-in the air, on the sea, or on the land-will be essential. Toward that end, our ability to project combat power anywhere in the world will require new technologies, operational concepts, and capabilities to meet new challenges. First among these new challenges is the need for much smaller force "footprint "characterized by fewer but more capable attacking troops and platforms supported by an even smaller logistics element. Priority challenges will also include an enhanced military responsiveness distinguished by its increased range of employment and resulting in reduced exposure of our forces.

National Defense Panel Report December 1997

Overview.

The authors contend that today's Army is essentially a "barbell" shaped organization: very light or very heavy forces with little in the form of "middleweight" units. One of the fundamental decisions that the Army must make in the coming decade is whether it intends to continue this organizational structure or modify it modestly or radically.

If major modification is appropriate, what are the options?

Fortunately, the Army has several years to consider such issues. Probably for at least a decade the United States and its allies will not be confronted by a major military competitor or a collection of medium-sized states that are capable of successfully threatening our vital interests with "conventional" combined arms forces. 1 That does not mean that some regional adversary could not achieve a short-term success by invading and seizing territory from its neighbor.

Furthermore, that "smash and grab" strategy could be 1 Reinforced by the deft threat or actual use of nuclear, biological, chemical(NBC)weapons-a feature described as a plausible major theater war(MTW) scenario by both the Quadrennial Defense Review(QDR) and National Defense Panel(NDP). Additionally, future opponents are likely to exploit long-range missile systems(both ballistic and cruise)armed with advanced non-NBC munitions to threaten the military viability of any future U.S. Expeditionary force. Such a victory could certainly be reversed; for the foreseeable future the United States and its friends can certainly turn back overt aggression if they choose to do so. The critical strategic question is whether the United States and its allies will be prepared to reverse this act of aggression. Under the shadow of a NBC/missile threat, the cost might be perceived as very high especially if the United States has not adapted its forces to that plausible contingency. 2

One of the clear premiums of future U.S. combined arms forces will be their ability to rapidly deploy into a menaced theater and operate in the face of enhanced NBC and long-range missile threats. The early deployment of a high performance combat force will have a profound impact on the probability, duration, and overall cost of a major campaign.3

More probable than MTWs is the possibility that the United States will be confronted by a whole series of lesser crises or small-scale contingency(SSC)operations. Civil wars that threaten to spill into other nations, relatively limited armed struggles between religious and/or ethnic groups, and breakdowns in civil order within "failed states" are all examples of the kinds of operations where U.S.forces could conceivably be deployed. Significantly, many areas where such breakdowns in order could occur are where the United States does not have forces permanently stationed ashore. Finally, many of these future conflicts will take place in an urban environment, which reflects the global migration from the countryside to the cities. Should the United States elect to intervene with ground force, deploy- 2 ments from distant locations would have to take place. This changing reality has a significant impact on how the future Army should be configured. 4

The "Barbell" Army.

The Army has undergone at least four major organizational eras since the end of World War II. First was the immediate post-World War II force. This was the Army that fought the Korean War. Organizationally, doctrinally, and in its equipment, this force was virtually identical to the World War II Army. Second was the mid-1950s "Pentomic" army that was a controversial attempt to organize the land force for nuclear combat. The "Pentomic" era is generally regarded as a failure. 5 Third came the Vietnam-era force.

Organizationally, the Army of the 1960s owed much to the World War II model and was a large conscript force whose divisions were modeled on the armored division of World WarII and whose fundamental tactics were based on massive application of firepower and armored shock tactics.

The most important innovation for "high intensity" ground war was the creation of the mechanized infantry division with each infantry battalion equipped with organic armored carriers. [2005 EDITOR: and what were these vehicles? Why do you not name them? Do I detect a deliberate misrepresentation of the facts?]6 In Vietnam, the Army focused on the exploitation of helicopter technology to free it from the "tyranny of terrain. "Following our geo-strategic defeat in Vietnam, the Army slowly moved into the successful Army of Excellence period, which is still in effect.

During the 1980s some experimentation included the permanent assignment of an attack helicopter brigade to the armored and mechanized divisions, the creation of the 9th "high technology light division"(motorized infantry division) and the Light Infantry Division. 7

The air combat brigade concept became institutionalized while the motorized concept died during the late 1980s due to a lack of investment in a light armored vehicle family and hostility from both the Armor and Infantry branches of the Army.

The light infantry division concept became the Army's 3 model for air transportable units. Structurally, today's Army is quite similar to the force at the end of the Vietnam period-a mix of very light and very heavy units. This is the force that is on the verge of being transformed into Army XXI with a focus on major upgrades in command, control, communications, and computers(C4) and improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance(ISR) systems. Currently, this concept does not call for any major change in organization or concept of operations for either the light or heavy combat formations.8

With the brief "Pentomic" era and 9th Motorized Infantry Division experiments being the exceptions, a hallmark of the post-World War II Army is that it has had a "barbell" characteristic. The Army has been generally configured into either very heavy armored and mechanized units armed with large numbers of heavy fully tracked vehicles or very light infantry-type units that are primarily foot mobile. One division, the 101st Air Assault remains as a positive legacy of the Vietnam experience. Of course, both types of forces include a wide variety of sub-units, artillery, aviation, all kinds of support organizations. A glance at today's Army is illustrative. [2005 EDITOR: WRONG. Heavy units have LIGHT tracked M113 Gavin "APCs" that you praised earlier that are ideally suited to fix light infantry unit's lack of armored mobility, protection and firepower. And these tracked AFVs are also a "positive legacy" dating before the Vietnam war.]

The Current Army

Light Forces

82ndAirborne 10thLight 25thLight

Medium Forces

101stAirAssault

Heavy Forces

1stArmored 1stInf(M) 1stCavalry 2ndInf 3rdInf(M) 4thInf(M)

The 10-division Army of 1998 has six "heavy" armored or mechanized divisions on one end of the spectrum and three air transportable or light divisions on the other end. The single airmobile division lies somewhat in the middle. While 4 the 101st Airborne(Air Assault)division is not encumbered with large numbers of armored vehicles, it is never the less logistically equivalent to a heavy division and difficult to move strategically due to the large numbers of current generation helicopters that are difficult to self-deploy over long distances.

The Need for Medium Forces.

What the Army has lacked since 1945 are "medium" forces that combine a degree of mobility, firepower, and protection greater than the generally foot-mobile light forces, yet are less strategically and operationally cumbersome than the heavy armored and mechanized units. The latter require either prepositioning, relatively slow sealift,or wide-scale rail/heavy equipment transporter (HET) support in order to deploy into areas where forces are not already stationed. [2005 EDITOR: Nonsense. LIGHT tracks do not need HETs.]

During the Cold War, the primary and potentially most challenging Army missions were the defense of Western Europe and Korea. In both locations the Army had relatively large forces in place. The deployment penalty associated with armored units weighed heavily on military planners and led to a great dependence upon prepositioned equipment sets(POMCUS)and sealift. When the Gulf crisis took place in August1990, the United States was fortunate to be confronted by an incompetent opponent who yielded the strategic initiative once his initial objectives were seized. This afforded the U.S.-led coalition the time(nearly 5 months)that was needed to deploy by sea the heavy forces that would eventually lead the counter offensive to retake Kuwait. The operational mobility of heavy forces was further revealed during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, the deployment of Army forces to Bosnia during the winter of 1995-96. The deployment of are in forced brigade of only four armored and mechanized infantry battalions from southern Germany via rail and roads took nearly 2 months. 9 5

The Gulf War exposed several features of the Army's light-heavy force structure. First, the Light Infantry Divisions, a major Army initiative in "strategic power projection,"were noteworthy by their absence. Their very lightness to facilitate their transoceanic mobility lead to a table of organization and equipment(TOE)which provided no tactical or operational mobility and very modest firepower for such a "high intensity" theater. While the 82d Airborne Division did deploy,it quickly assumed the title of "speed bump" in the face of an enemy with huge numbers of armored vehicles. Ironically, the 9th Motorized Infantry Division, specifically designed for early deployment, had been disbanded the summer before Operation DESERT SHIELD.10 [2005: Balogney. Authors are incorrect. 3/73rd Armor Battalion deployed with 82d Airborne with M551 Sheridan light tanks, M113 Gavins and some borrowed USMC LAV-1 trucks. The wheeled 9th HTTD was easily destroyed in mere war games in the U.S. lacking a shoot-on-the-move armored gun system. All the 82d or any of the Army's light units need to participate in mobile warfare is upgraded M113 Gavin light tracks like used in the heavy divisions.]

If there is any doubt of the potential fate of foot-mobile infantry such as the 82d Airborne when confronted by a large enemy armored force in desert conditions, one has but to look at many battles that took place in the desert in World War II. [2005 EDITOR: authors have not done their homework. An Army light unit has enough wheeled trucks to move half of itself NOW. Army light units are more accurately seen as half-motorized than 100% foot mobile. Get a MTOE book and look.] The "bagging" of large numbers of foot-mobile infantry units by more mobile armored and motorized forces during the North African and Eastern Front campaigns comes to mind.11

It took roughly a month before the Army had its first division-sized heavy force ready for operations in Saudi Arabia. Fortunately, the enemy was totally passive during the strategic deployment of U.S. forces. Unquestionably all potential future U.S. opponents took note of the fate that befell the Iraqis due to ceding to the United States a lengthy, undisturbed deployment period.

Since 1991 the Army has taken certain steps that have enhanced the strategic deployability of its traditional heavy forces. Prepositioning a float and ashore has led to the capability to deploy roughly a division-size heavy force in about a week's time. Anything more than a division, however, will have to rely on medium-speed shipping to move units from some combination of the U.S.and other overseas locations. That will take several weeks. In any 6 area outside the Gulf, Korea, or Western Europe, the lack of ashore prepositioning will also constrain the ability of the Army to rapidly deploy heavy forces. What is a "Medium" Aero-Motorized Force? Before we elaborate on some options for moving the Army away from the "barbell" model into more of a medium force, it is necessary to add some definition to what such a force might look like. Characteristics of a medium force follow. More rapidly deployable than a traditional heavy unit. While it is physically possible to deploy main battle tanks and tracked infantry combat vehicles on C-5 or C-17 aircraft, it is a very inefficient process. [2005 EDITOR: authors are screwing up again. M113 Gavins are LIGHT tracked infantry combat vehicles that can fly by C130s and 5 at a time by C-17s: this is very efficient.] Either aircraft mentioned above can lift only one main battle tank. To move even a single battalion-sized heavy armor unit will require virtually the entire C-5 fleet of 120 aircraft. A medium force would be able to deploy platoons of(4-12) armored fighting vehicles on a single C-5 or C-17, thereby allowing the deployment of a brigade-sized task force with the use of approximately 100 sorties of either wide-body airlifter. 12 Greater firepower, survivability and mobility. New technologies associated with the Revolution in Military Affairs(RMA)-over the hill targeting sensors coupled with stand-off firepower-can provide medium forces with enhanced combat power. A medium force built around light and medium weight armored fighting vehicles will provide infantry and cavalry units with a wide range of protected mobility. OperateUnderaHostileLong-Range"ArtilleryFan." FutureregionalopponentswillbeabletoputU.S. expeditionaryforcesunderlong-rangeballisticandcruise missilefireswithandwithouttheuseofNBC.Light armoredvehicles,especiallywheeled,willallowthe deploymentofcombinedarmsairandgroundforceswitha smallerintra-theaterlogisticsfootprintwiththeirlower 7 demandforPOLthanheavyarmoredforces.Theselighter forcescanrelymoreheavilyonthe"justintime"deliveryof bothlong-rangefiresandlogisticssupport.Thiswillbe especiallyimportantwherecombinedarmsunitshaveto rapidlydeployoverlongintra-theaterdistancessuchasthe Saudi peninsula, Eastern Europe, or the Balkans. Thecharacteristicslistedaboveargueforamedium weightforcethatcandeployquicklytoapotentialtrouble spotviatransoceanicrangeairlift,haveasubstantial amountofmobilityandfirepoweruponarrival,andbemore survivablethanafootmobile,dismountedunit.Suchaforce couldbetheinitialelementofaglobalmaneuverofland poweraspartofajointexpeditionaryforce.Insome circumstancessuchasanSSC,themediumweight aero-motorizedforcemaybesufficienttodealwiththe crisis.InothercircumstancestendingtowardaMTWclass conflict,theaero-motorizedforceswillbethetipofthe Army'sspear,tobefollowedbyheavierArmyarmoredand mechanizedforces.Thebasicpictureofwhatamedium aero-motorized force would look like is as follows: · Brigadesizedcombinedarmsforcesthatareeasily deployableonC-5/C-17typeaircraft.Somebrigades wouldbeoptimizedasmotorizedinfantrywhileother brigades would be organized as cavalry formations. · Groundcombatelementsthatarebuiltaround wheeledarmoredvehiclesthatprovidetransport,fire support,commandandcontrol,anddirect/indirect firecapabilities.Inthelastcase,artillerybrigades wouldbeequippedwithvariantsofthelightweight 155mhowitzerandthewheeledHighMobility Artillery Rocket (HIMAR) launchers. · Attackhelicoptersthatprovidespeedandlongreach to the force. · Highrelianceonindirectfireandair/missileactive defensesupportfromtheUSAFandUSNcombat 8 aircraft,USNmissilearmedwarships,andArmy ATACMs, MLRS and AD units. · Combatengineeringunitsoptimizedforairliftthat canprovideearlydeployerssomefieldexpedient protectedpositionsforkeyunitssuchasairdefense and USAF aircraft. · PalletLoadSystem(PLS)trucks,lifthelicopters, STOLcargoaircraft,andLogisticsOvertheShore (LOTS)toprovideforJustinTime(JIT)intra-theater logistics. · Command,Control,Communications,Computers, Intelligence,SurveillanceandReconnaissance (C 4 ISR)systemsthatarebuiltaroundtheArmyXXI initiatives,canreachbacktootheroutoftheater basesformanyoftheirneeds,andarecapableof operating with coalition forces. Armored Fighting Vehicle Options. Thereareavailableintheworldtodayawidevarietyof wheeledlightandmediumweightarmoredvehiclesinthe 5-25tonweightclass. 13 Therearetwoprincipaltactical disadvantagestothewheeledarmoredvehicles.First,in sometypesofveryadverseterraintheyhavecrosscountry mobilitythatisinferiortotrackedsystems,and,second, whiletheyofferadegreeofprotectionfarbetterthana dismountedsoldierhas,suchvehiclesarestillfarless protected then a main battle tank (MBT). StudiesbytheArmyCorpsofEngineersindicatethat theallterrainmobility"break-point"betweenwheeledand trackedarmoredvehiclesisaround20tons.Thatistosay, wheeledvehicleshavesimilarcross-countrymobility attributesastracklayingvehiclesbelowtheweightof approximately20tons.Evenheavierwheeledvehicleswill havesuperiormobilityonroadsurfaces.Further,there havebeensomeinterestinginnovationsinwheeledarmored 9 vehicledesigns,whichsuggestthatthebreakpointmay move upward. 14 Contemporarywheeledvehiclesrelyuponacombination ofadieselengineandacomplexhydro-mechanical transmission-suspensionsystem.Withinadecade,anext generationofdieselelectricpoweredvehiclesisplausible. Thistechnologyislikelytoflowfromthemassive investment(promptedbyglobalenvironmentalconcerns) thattheglobalautomotivecompanieswillmakeinhybrid vehicles-manyofwhichwillbeamixofinternal combustionengines,highdensityenergystorage/ generationsystems,andelectricdrivemotors.Ifsuccessful, hybridpropulsionmayprovidethenextgenerationof armoredvehicleswithlongercombatoperatingrangeswith important low observability features. 15 Ontheissueofprotection,lighterarmoredvehicleswill beinferiortosuperheavyfightingvehiclesoftheMBTclass withoutbreakthroughsineithermaterialtechnologyand/or activeprotection.Oneoftheclearweaknessesofthe9th MotorizedInfantryDivisionwasthefactthatallofits personnelandweaponcarriersweremodifiedunarmored HMMWVs.Thesevehiclescouldbe"sweptaway"byair burstingartilleryandmortarfireandprovedvery vulnerableincontestedurbanterrainfromSomaliirregular automaticweaponandrocketpropelledgrenade(RPG) fire. 16 Moreusefulistoexaminetheissueofpassive protection from the full spectrum of killing threats. Asnoted,wheeledarmoredpersonnelcarriers(APCs) willprovideameasureofprotectionagainstawiderangeof infantryandindirectfireanti-personnelweapons. Furthermore,thehullofwheeledarmoredvehiclescanbe designedtoberesistanttoanti-vehiclemines.Allofthese threatsarelikelytobeapartofanyfutureSSCoperations. NecessityanddoctrinewouldusetheAPCsonlyas"battle taxis"duringintensecombatoperations.Oneadvantageof thisinfantry/vehicleconfigurationisthatamotorized battalionwillhaveahigherdensityofuseableinfantrythan 10 acomparablemechanizedbattalion-alikelyadvantagein urbanandbrokenterraincombatsituations.Someunits mightbeorganizedaspurecavalrybrigades.Alldirectfire unitswouldbecomplimentedbyvehiclesarmedwitha varietyofstand-offweaponsincludingfiberopticguided missiles(FOGMs)andmortarsarmedwithguidedmunitions. Somepassiveprotectionagainsthigherperformance directfireweaponsispossibleespeciallywithfurther developmentofreactiveandactivearmorarrays.Passive protectionagainstlargecalibermissilesorkineticenergy weaponswilllikelyremainveryproblematic.Thiswill requirethatlightfightingvehiclesinconfrontationswith MBTswilleitherhavetoshootfirstwithahighperformance directfireweaponoroperatefromastand-offdistance.For example,aportionofthewheeledarmoredvehiclescouldbe armedwithindirectfireweaponssuchasFOGMsor mortarsequippedguidedmunitions.Thiswouldallowthe vehiclestoremainbehindcoverandengageheavierenemy armor,thusavoidingexposingthemselvestoadirectfire battlewheretheirinferiorarmorwouldbeadisadvantage. TargetingcouldbeprovidedbyUAVs,helicopters,other vehicles in hide positions, or dismounted elements. 17 Lightervehiclescanbedesignedtohavemuchlower thermal,electromagnetic,magnetic,andacoustic signaturesthanheavytrackedvehicles.Thereisaprospect thatthenextgenerationoflightarmoredvehiclescanuse hybridelectricpropulsionandceramictypearmortoreduce theirsignature,especiallytothermalimagingsensors.The issueoflowobservabilitywillloomlargeringroundwarfare withtheproliferationofawiderangeoftopattack munitions,whichcandestroytheheaviestMBT.Thelatter mayproveverydifficulttomake"stealthy"fromoverhead surveillance and top attack guided munitions. 18 Thedirectfirebattlewillnotbeabandoned.Thereisa widerangeofoptionsofpowerfuldirectfiresystemsthat couldbemountedonmediumweightwheeledarmored 11 vehiclesincludingmissiles,105mmor120mmlowrecoil cannons,andautomaticsmallcalibergunsavailabletoboth cavalryandmotorizedinfantrybrigades.Advancesintop attackmunitionswillallow105mmand120mmcannons highkillingpoweragainstupgradedversionsofcontemporary generation MBTs. 19 Aseriesofairdefense,commandandcontrol,and supportvehicleswouldbeneeded.Manyofthemodelsof wheeledarmoredvehiclesinproductionalreadyhave command and medical versions available. Finally,light-mediumarmoredvehiclescanbedesigned tobeinherentlyamphibious,provideoverpressure protectionfromNBCcontamination,andameasureof flash,blast,andelectromagneticpulseprotectionfrom nucleardetonations. 20 IfNBCweaponsareemployedin futureMTWsorSSCs,thentheprotectedmobilityof mediumweightforceswillbeofvitalnecessitytoallowthe Army to operate in a "dirty" combat environment.

The Aero Component.

The second major component of the force would be transport and attack helicopters. Today an entire battalion of AH-64 Apache attack helicopters,with appropriate support vehicles and a basic load of ammunition, can be transported on 10 C-5 or 21 C-17 aircraft. When RAH-66 Comanche is fielded, its smaller size and reduced support requirements will facilitate moving Comanche Scout/attack units long distances in USAF transports. With greater range(1200nms.)than the Apache, Comanches may be able to selfdeploy to many theaters and meet their ground support elements,thus reducing the burden on the airlift fleet. Beyond 2010,itis possible to foresee the exploitation of tilt-rotor technology derived from the development and deployment of the MV-22 assault transport and the BB-609 executive aircraft. Variants of both could be seen as 12 follow-ons to the UH-60 Blackhawk and the Apache Longbow. [2005 EDITOR: authors again are speculating on a failed tilt rotor design that 15 years of development still does not work. The V-22 is a failure and this was known even when this RAND report was written.]

Additional aerial logistic support could be provided the Army CH-47s and USAF C130Js. Given an adequate commitment of resources, a heavy lift Joint Transport Rotorcraft(JTR)or Advanced Theater Transport (ATT) might be developed by the post-2010 time-frame.

21

From the strategic deployment perspective, tilt-rotor technology could provide Army medium forces great benefit by facilitating the transoceanic deployment of airmobile assets without relying as heavily on USAF strategic airlift assets. On the other hand, the cost of developing and procuring any new theater airlift aircraft after 2010 will likely lead to a joint program operated primarily by the USAF.

Recent studies by the Army and the Joint Staff have clearly shown the power of the modern attack helicopter. 22

Indeed,the attack helicopter maybe the best anti-armor platform among the many tank-killing systems currently available to U.S. forces. A rapidly deploying U.S. force may have to react to an enemy advance along many axes that are widely separated. A dismounted infantry-heavy force has little ability to rapidly shift to new locations t ooppose different enemy thrusts. The mobility of the attack helicopter in conjunction with agile motorized infantry and cavalry units is ideal under such circumstances. [2005 EDITOR: what's "agile" about infantry in trucks restricted to roads/trails?]

A critical variable affecting rotary wing operations will be the density and sophistication of the battlespace air defense environment. An important synergistic role for the motorized ground units is to direct fires against local air defenses to facilitate air combat operations. 23

ManyofthepotentialcrisesthatamediumArmyforce couldbedeployedtoincludeopponentswhodonotpossess largenumbersofarmoredvehicles.Theopponentcouldbe infantryheavy,relyingondispersionindifficultterrain. Theattackhelicopterinsupportofdismountedmotorized infantryisprobablyabetterplatformthanmediumorhigh 13 altitudefixed-wingaircrafttoseekoutsuchdispersed forces. Attackhelicopterunitsconsumefuelatprodigiousrates. Ifadeploymentwasbeingconductedintoanareawhere therearenoprepositionedsuppliesawaitingtheU.S.force, thenumberofattackhelicopterunitswouldhavetobe carefullyconsideredandbasedonthenatureofthethreat, theamountofstrategictransportaircraftavailable,andthe logisticschallengesassociatedwiththatdeployment. Certainly,theconceptofjustintimePOLlogisticswillhave tobefullydevelopedincludingtheemploymentofSTOL aircraftsuchastheC-130Jasrefuelers.Underappropriate militarycircumstances,theuseofC-17sshouldnotbe excludedfromtheseandothercombatlogisticmissions.A future JTR or ATT could play this role as well.

The Exploitation of Sealift.

Althoughthefocusoftheargumentinfavorof aero-motorizedforcesistheircapacitytobeairlifted rapidly,theveryimportantroleofsealiftshouldnotbe ignoredinmanycontingencies.TheMilitarySealift Command'scurrentmodernizationandexpansionplanis ontheacquisitionofverylarge(50,000-ton)mediumspeed (25knots)roll-onroll-off(ro-ro)cargoships.Depending uponthespeedwithwhichafuturepoliticalmilitarycrisis develops,itmaybeappropriatetousesealifttodeploysome aero-motorizedunitsalongwithairlift.Wheeledfighting unitswillbeabletomorerapidlyembarkanddebarkfrom ro-roshipsthentheirheaviermechanizedandarmored counterparts.Further,themotorizedunitswillbeableto rapidlymoveoveroperationaldistances(morethan100 miles)withoutrelyinguponheavyequipmenttransporters orrailcars.By2010,theremaybearevolutioninlargecargo shipdesignthatwillallowro-roshipstocruiseat40knotsin adverseseaconditions.Ifrealized,afleetoffastsealift mightbeusedtodeploysubstantialaero-motorizedforcesto a wide range of plausible military contingencies. 24 14

Long-Range Fires and C4 ISR.

Tofurtherfacilitatetheuseofmediumforcesduringan anti-invasionor"haltphase"ofanMTW,theaeromotorizedunitswouldrelyheavilyuponindirectfires deliveredbyArmymissileunits,USAFandUSNaviation, andUSNmissilearmedwarships.Consistentwith philosophyoftheuseofaero-motorizedcombat,Armyunits willbeabletoexploitthelikelydeploymentofShort Take-offandVerticalLanding(STOVL)variantsofthe USAF'sJointStrikeFighter(JSF)inthepost-2010 time-frame.TosurviveinanMTWshadowedbythe NBC/missilethreat,USAFearlydeployerswillhaveto workcloselywithArmyaero-motorizedforcesandbe prepared to operate from dispersed field sites. 25 Thecommandandcontrolofsuchaforceshouldbebased oninformationsystemsflowingfromtheArmyXXI initiatives.Technologiesarealreadywelladvancedthat wouldpermitthemaximumuseof"reachback/information pull."Thusthesizeoftheheadquarterselementsactually deployedcouldbeminimized;datalinkstodistantsensors andinformationsystemswouldbesubstitutedinlargepart fordeployedcapabilities.Nevertheless,suchanaeromotorizedtaskforcewouldalmostcertainlyneedasuiteof tacticalUAVs,battlefieldradars,andothersystemsthat would contribute to situational awareness. Sinceaero-motorizedforceswouldbeoptimizedfor deploymentsintoareaswheretheUnitedStatesdoesnot haveapermanentpresence,apremiumcouldbeplacedon abilitytoworkwiththeforcesofimpromptu adhoc coalitions.Onecouldenvisionthattheheadquartersofsuch aunitwouldneedpersonnelproficientinvarious languages, for example. 26 Medium Forces as a Transition to the Army of 2020. Apowerfulargumentformovingtotheaero-motorized conceptdescribedaboveisthatitisanorganizationally 15 comprehensible,technologicallyfeasible,andfinancially plausibletransitionfromthecontemporaryArmydesignto anArmyof2020.Already,therehavebeenseveral large-scalestrategicwargamessponsoredbytheArmy AfterNext(AAN)programthatexploredtheimplicationsof veryhighperformanceair-groundunitswhichmightbe procuredanddeployedby2020.Thecurrentdesignconcept beingexploredbytheAANisbasedupon"air-mechanized" unitsthatassumetherapiddevelopmentandprocurement ofapost-2010generationoftechnologiesfarinadvanceof thoserequiredtocreatethemediumweightaero-motorized unitsdescribedinthisessay.Toseesomevariantofthe AANeraforceposturedeployedwithin25years,theArmy willhavetoseriouslyconsidertheintermediatetransition process.ThattransitionprocesspointstoanArmywhich decisivelymovesawayfromitscurrentultralight/ultra heavy force "barbell" posture by 2010. Ataminimum,theArmyof2010mightbeamixoflight, medium,andheavyunits.Theprospectisplausiblethat mostlightunitswillhavebeenconvertedtomediumunits. Moreradicalandcontroversialistheconversionofseveral heavy units to medium weight forces by 2010.

Choices Available to the Army.

ThisessayhastriedtomakethecasethattheArmy, currentlyofa"barbell"configuration,shouldchangeatleast aportionofitsstructureintoalighter,yetstillpotent, mediumforceby2005withextantornearlydeveloped combatvehiclesandsystems.Theessentialelementsofa mediumforceweredescribedashavingstrategic/ operationalmobilitysuperiortotraditionalheavyforces andbetterfirepower,operational/tacticalmobility,and survivability than present light forces. Severalquestionsmustbeanswered.Firstistheissueof whetherthisisacorrectcourseofactionfortheArmy.The organizationhasbeensuccessfulforthepast50yearsin roughlyitspresentbarbellconfiguration.Anychangeofthis 16 typewouldrequiresomeexistingforces,eitherheavyor light, to be reconfigured. Thesecondmajorquestionconcernsthespeedandscale ofconvertingheavyand/orlightdivisionsintomedium weightunits.InthoseareasoftheworldwheretheArmy hassomecombinationofin-placeheavyunitsand/or prepositionedequipmentavailable,atraditionalheavyunit willplayanimportant,ifnotcentral,roleforthenear future.Lookingoutadecade,evenprepositioningconcepts maybecomeincreasinglyquestionableoncefuture opponentshavepotentlong-rangemissilecapabilities. Prepositionedequipment-ashoreandafloat-couldbe menacedbyaccuratemissileandaircraftstrikeseven withouttheuseofNBCwarheads.Additionally,insome partsoftheworld,suchasheavilyforested,mountainous, andsomeurbanareas,speciallytrained(Rangertype)light unitsthatarecenteredondismountedinfantryarestillvery appropriate. BelowisanoutlineofhowtheArmyshiftto medium-weight forces might occur over the next 20 years.

Organizational Options

MediumForces HeavyForcesLightForces 82ndABN OneLightDiv TwoArmoredDivs FourMechDivs 101stAirAssault One"medium"Div (ACR) MediumForces HeavyForcesLightForces 82ndABN OneLightDiv TwoArmoredDivs ThreeMechDivs Three"medium"Divs (OneLightDiv) (OneLightDiv)(OneHeavyDiv andACR) 82ndAirborne Seven-Eight MediumDivisions MediumForces HeavyForcesLightForces One-twoHeavyDivs (Moststructure movestomiddle) (Moststructure movestomiddle) "Limited"Optioncirca2001 Onelightdivisionand 3rdACRconverttomedium structureandjointhe101st whichretainsitspresentairassault configuration. "Balanced"Optioncirca2008. Onelightandoneheavy divsion,plustheACR,convert tomediumstructure.101st alsoreconfiguredwithadditional wheeledarmoredvehicles. "AANType"Optioncirca2020. One-twoheavydivisions andthe82ndABNareretained intheirpresentstructure.All otherdivisionsandtheACRmove tomediumforceconfiguration. 17 Thirdisthecostoftheseinitiatives.Thetypeofmedium forcediscussedinthisessaywillrequirerecapitalizationof aportionoftheArmydivision/brigadestructure. 27 While theArmyalreadyhasthebestfleetofattackhelicoptersin theworld,ithasvirtuallynowheeledarmoredvehicles. Severalthousandvehicleswouldhavetobeprocuredfrom U.S.and/oroverseassources.Additionalindirectfire weaponswouldhavetobebought,forexample,addinga vehiclewithanFOGM-typecapability.Thesearedifficult timesfortheArmybudget,andwithoutadditionalfunding duringthenext10years,someotherlessappropriate systemssuchastheheavy Crusader self-propelled gun/howitzerwouldhavetoberadicallyscaledbackifnot eliminatedinordertoinitiateawheeledarmoredvehicle program.AnyoptiontomovetheArmyinthedirectionof becomingamoremiddleweightforce,whetheralongthe linesdescribedinthisarticleortowardamoreradicalAAN typeforcemusttakeintoaccountaffordabilityandrealistic budget assumptions. WhethertheArmywillmovetoanearlypuremedium weight-typeforceby2020remainsuncertain.Severalkey technologicalandoperationalquestionswillhavetobe answered.Thefateoftheultraheavyunitswhichrelyupon land"dreadnought"(50+tons)armoredfightingvehicles willcriticallydependuponwhethertheinvestmentinthe nextgenerationofcombatvehicleandweaponstechnology willleadtoanArmyconsistingofprimarilymediumweight aero-motorizedforces.Severalmajoradvancesifnot breakthroughswillhavetobemadeinactive/passive protectionandpropulsionefficienciesby2010toallow mediumweightgroundforcestofightinallcombat environments.Secondisthequestionabouttherisksand benefitsoflowaltitudecombatandmaneuveraviation.Low altitudeaerialfightingvehiclescanbeneutralizedby dispersedandeffectivebattlefieldairdefenses.Akey questioniswhethertheUnitedStateswillbeabletodevise effectivesuppressionofenemyairdefense(SEAD) capabilitiestofacilitatelowaltitudeaircombatoperations 18 withoutheavyattrition.Thirdisthequestionastowhether reconnaissancestrikecombinationswilldominatethe battlefieldevendowntothecloseengagementregime. Fourth,thereremainsthequestionaboutthesize, configurationandroleoffutureinfantryforcesandhow theyinteractwiththenextgenerationofcombatvehicles (withandwithouthumanoperators)andlong-rangefire systems.

Conclusion.

AdecisiontotransformaportionoftheArmyinto aero-motorizeddivisionsandbrigadesappearscompelling. Thegeo-strategicenvironmentwilllikelycallfortherapid deploymentofhighperformancecombinedarmsforcesover trans-oceanicdistances.EveninEurope,NATOexpansion easttoPoland,Hungary,andCzechRepublichighlightsthe needforoperationallyagilegroundforcessinceclassic prepositioningoptionsmaybeprecludedforgeo-strategic and cost reasons. Inmanysmall-scalecontingencies,aero-motorizedunits appearmoreversatilethanpurelightinfantryunits, especiallyifthereisanyexpectationofintenselocalcombat. Additionally,therewillbetheneedtohavetheater forcesthathavehighfirepower,operationalagility,anda lowlogistics"footprint."Thisprovidesthemthecapacityto operateeffectivelyinamilitaryenvironmentunderthe "artilleryfan"oflong-rangeballisticandcruisemissilesand possibly"dirtied"bytheuseofNBCweapons.Finally,a movetowardthemediumweightaero-motorizedconcept wouldputtheArmyfirmlyonthepathtowardamore strategicallyandoperationallyagileforceof2020without calling for either technological or budgetary magic.

ENDNOTES

1.Thepossibleexceptiontothis"10-year"ruleistheprospectthat thePRCwillacquireasubstantialairandnavalcapabilitytomenace Taiwanbycirca2005.TobecredibletheChinesewouldhaveto 19 efficientlyexploitawiderangeofcontemporaryairandnavalweapons, largelyacquiredfromtheRussianFederation.TheChinese military-notnotedforhightechnologyinnovation-wouldhaveto selectivelymasterelementsofthecontemporary"revolutioninmilitary affairs."EvenifaChinese"regionalstrategicthreat"rapidlymatured by2005,itislikelythatthegeo-strategicfocusofpossiblefuture confrontationswiththeUnitedStateswillhaveprimarilyaerospace andnavalfeatureswithU.S.groundforcesplayingasecondarysupportingrole.ThenuclearcapabilityofChinashouldnotbeforgotten.

2.U.S.forcesinKoreafacetheimmediateprospectthatasecond KoreanWarwouldinvolvethesubstantialifnotmassiveuseofchemical andbiologicalweaponsbytheNorthKoreans.During1997,amajor shiftinattitudetowardtheDPRK'sCWandBWcapabilityoccurred bothwithintheregionandtheU.S.JointStaff.Bythewinterof1998, therewaswideconcernabouttheneedtoenhanceboththeU.S.and SouthKoreans'jointcapacitytooperateinatheater"dirtied"bywide scale CW and BW use.

3.InanimportantshiftemphasisfromtheBottom-UpReview (BUR),thestrategicanalysiscontainedintheQuadrennialDefense Review(QDR)acknowledgedthatCWandBWusewas likely infuture MajorTheaterWars(MTWs).Thisshiftinstrategywasstrongly endorsed by the National Defense Panel.

4.Seethe StrategicAssessment1997,FlashpointsandForce Structure,WashingtonDC:InstituteforNationalStrategicStudies, National Defense University.

5.Withhindsight,the"Pentomic"conceptoffiveinfantrybattle groupswithoutorganicarmoredmobilityandprotectionmadelittle operationalsenseinthecontextofabattlefoughtprimarilywith nuclearweapons.SeeA.J.Bacevich, ThePentomicEra ,Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1986.

6.Bytheearly1960s,theInfantryBranchhadadoptedtheconcept ofmechanizedwarfareifonlytoprovideitsforceswithprotected mobilityinaEuropeanTheaternuclearwar.Withthe1960sheavy divisionconcept,thedistinctionbetweenanarmoredandmechanized divisionbecametrivial.Bothhadamixofarmoredandmechanized battalionsinthreebrigades.Itwasduringthistimetheconceptofthe armoredself-propelledgun-howitzerfullymaturedaskeysupporting arm to the armored and mechanized brigades with a heavy division.

7.TheLightInfantryDivision'stableoforganizationand equipment(TO&E)wassizedsothattheentiredivisioncouldbe 20 airliftedby500C-141sorties.Thisresultedinaverylightdivision structurewilllittleorganicmobilityandmodestanti-tankandartillery assets.

8.See Major P.H. Herbert, "Deciding What Has to Be Done: General W.E.DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM-100-5," 1988; and Major R.A. Doughty, "The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76," Command and Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1979.

9.Both Operations DESERT STORM and Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR revealed the very large intra-theater logistic support needed to provision and move heavy armored and mechanized forces.

The now famous" left hook" of the 100-hour DESERT STORM ground campaign required a massive shift of supplies to pre-dumped sites through the use of thousands of heavy cargo trucks and heavy equipment transporters(HETs).Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR required the extensive use of rail and road support to move one reinforced heavy Army brigade out of southern Germany to Bosnia over a 90-day period. Aero-motorized units would have had far better operational agility in a similar circumstance, especially in a military environment with a substantial road net.

10. One brigade of the 9th Motorized was operational during the fall of 1990 during Operation DESERT SHIELD. It was not deployed! The 82d was deployed without organic trucks. [2005 EDITOR: how would 9th with Humvee trucks deploy any faster from Washington state than the 82d on the east coast with Humvee trucks? Sounds to me like Shinseki, your patron that commissioned this BS RAND study has a 9th HTTB "ax" to grind. His pet wheeled unit didn't get the glory so now he is out to rewrite the facts of history?] Unlike the HMMWV equipped 9th ID, the 82d would have been either over run and/or bypassed if the Iraqi Army had moved south during the first six weeks of the U.S. build-up. It is noteworthy that trucks were provided the 82d when it participated with the 6th French Motorized Division as the furthest element of the left hook into Iraq during the 100-hour ground war. [2005 EDITOR: again, authors don't have their facts straight. 82d Airborne deployed a 56 x M551 Sheridan light tank battalion at same time as foot Paratroopers arrived.]

11. The Italian, British, and American Armies had several disastrous experiences during the North African campaign where foot mobile infantry units were either overwhelmed or bypassed by opposing armored and motorized units. Much of the German infantry and their allied forces suffered similar military disasters along the Eastern Front especially after the battle of Stalingrad in 1943. The marines discovered this reality during a number of NATO exercises in the 1980s when their then foot-mobile infantry regiments were overrun or bypassed by West German armored and mechanized units. This "lesson" prompted the marines to use their amphibious assault vehicles as armored personnel carriers during the marine offensive into Kuwait during Operation DESERT STORM.21 [2005 EDITOR: why is ok here for tracks but not ok in the text earlier?]

12. See various RAND studies by John Lund and others for analyses of the role of wide-body aircraft to carry light armored fighting vehicles. For an earlier discussion of these issues see Peter A. Wilson, "U.S. Reinforcement Options" in European Security Policy After The Revolution of 1989, Jeffrey Simon,ed., Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1991.

13. See Jane's Armor and Artillery, 1997, for a description of the wide range of extant light and medium weight wheeled armored fighting vehicles and new developments. Also see R.M. Ogorkiewicz, "Armored Reconnaissance Vehicles: Finding the Right Capability Mix," International Defense Review Special Report, May 1995.

14. See Dennis W.Moore, The Influence of Soil Surface Conditions On The Traction of Wheeled and Tracked Military Vehicles, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Report GL-89-6, 1989. During the 1980s, major advances in off-road wheel technology occurred with the deployment of radial/run flat tires and central tire inflation systems. [2005 EDITOR: total BS. None of these studies say wheeled trucks provide adequate off road mobility. Run flats have a hard insert that prevents much tire deflation and CTIS is fragile. Even with flat tires a wheeled truck is not even close to spreading its weight like wide tracks do. This is intellectual dishonesty on part of the authors]

15.SeeVictorWouk,"HybridElectricVehicles"andHaroldA. RosenandDeborahR.Castleman,"FlywheelsinHybridVehicles"in ScientificAmerican ,October1997,foradiscussionofinnovationsin landvehiclepropulsionsystems.Fuelcelltechnologyappearstobeon thevergeofmajoradvance,whichshouldfurtherfacilitatethemass deploymentoflowemissions/highfuelefficienthybridpowerplant combinationsforautomobilesandutilityvehiclesby2010.Variantsof thesehybridsarelikelytopresentthenextgenerationofarmored fightingvehicledesignerswithsomeeconomicallyandtechnologically attractivepropulsionoptions.SeeJoeFeese,"RaceonforCleanCars," ABCNEW.com,October24,1997.Inthefuture,itispossibletoimagine thateachwheelofafightingvehiclewillbepoweredbyanelectric motor.Thiswillallowdynamicbraking(usingthemotorasagenerator) whichwillincreaseoverallfuelefficiency.Ifdamagedincombat,these poweredwheelsmightbejettisonedtoinsuresurvivalmobilityforthe battle-damaged vehicle.

16.Proponentsandparticipantsofthe9thMotorizedDivision experimentfreelyacknowledgedthevulnerabilityoftheforceto artilleryfirewhilebeingequippedonlywithsoftskinnedvehicles,the HMMWV.AttemptsbytheArmytodevelopanddeployanair transportableArmoredGunSystem(AGS)havefailedtwice-oncewith theMarinesduringthe1980sandmostrecentlywiththe1997 cancellation of the XM-8.

17.ForamoredetailedanalysisofRapidForceProtection TechnologiesseeR.Steeb,J.Matsumura, etal., ExploringNew 22 TechnologyConceptsforLightForces, DB-168-A/OSD,RAND1997;and R.Steeb,J.Matsumura, etal., RapidForceProjectionTechnologies: QuickLookAnalysisofAdvancedLightIndirectFireSystems , DB-169-A/OSD,RAND1997.Unliketheaero-motorizedconcept,this RANDconceptcallsforthedeploymentofveryfewcombattroopsand primarilyreliesonairdeployedweapon"pods"whichhavenotactical mobility.

18.Radicallyloweringthesignatureofthenextgenerationof armoredfightingvehiclestodetectionbyoverheadsurveillanceandtop attacksystemswilllikelybeamajordesignrequirement.70-tonclass MBTsmaybecomejust"toobigandtoohot"tohidefromtopattack threats.SeeGeorgeSeffers,"DoDWantsStealthyHybridElectric Vehicles," Defense News, December 1-7, 1997, p. 4.

19. See R. Steeb, J. Matsumura.

20.AstheUnitedStatesreliesuponsilicon-basedweapons,sensors, computers,andcommunicationstoaffectarevolutioninmilitary affairs,technologicallycompetentmilitaryopponentsmayrelymore heavilyuponweaponswhichgeneratehigh-poweredelectromagnetic effects.Theseincludebothnuclearandnon-nucleardriven electromagneticpulse(EMP)andhigh-poweredmicrowave(HPM) weapons.FutureArmywheeledfightingvehiclesshouldbedesignedto minimizetheseweaponseffectsespeciallyifthenextgenerationof fightingvehiclesreliesuponhybridelectricpropulsionsystems.SeeF. GassmanandEMCBaden,"HighPowerMicrowave:TheSilentThreat" in Armada International, August/September 1997, p. 70.

21.See"JTRtobe'Chinook'forUSArmyof2025"in Jane'sDefense Weekly, September10,1997.Aninterestingalternativetovarious tilt-rotorandlargehelicopterJTRconceptsistheBoeingSuperSTOL (SSTOL)conceptfortheAdvancedTheaterTransport(ATT)which wouldreplacetheC-130family.SeeBillSweetman,"Arising imperative:moredemandsonairlift"in Jane'sInternationalDefense Review , 2/98, pp. 28-29. 22.RecentcomputerdrivenwargamessuchaTACWARusedduring theQDRhighlightedthekillingpowerofhelicoptergunshipsduringthe Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study (DAWMS).

23.Thethreatofmanportablesurfacetoairmissilestolowaltitude fixedandrotarywingaircraftisveryseriousandwilllikelycontinueto mature.AmajorobjectiveoftheRAH-66 Comanche gunshipisto producealowobservablecombathelicopter.Amajorjointactivityofall fourserviceswillbetoconductsuppressionofenemyairdefenses 23 (SEAD)operations.Well-armedmotorizedunitscanplayanimportant roleinthisregard.Inthosecircumstanceswherethereisasevereair defensethreat,motorizedunitswillhavetorelymoreheavilyupon long-rangestand-offmissilefiresupportfromplatformsoperating outside of the effective envelope of the local air defenses.

24.Foradescriptionofthenextgeneration40-knotcargoship,see DavidL.Giles,"FasterShipsfortheFuture," ScientificAmerican, October 1997. 25.CurrentUSAFplansfortheAirExpeditionaryForce(AEF) whichcallsfortherapiddeploymentofshort-rangeF-16class fighter-bomberstobare(unprotected)basesmaybeviewedasabit operationallynaïve.Futurelong-rangemissilethreatswilllikely requirethatUSAFunitsequippedwiththeSTOVLversionoftheJSF willoperateoutofdispersedandhiddensites.BoththeRoyalAirForce whileoperatingtheGR-5/7 Harriers andtheUSAFwhileoperatingthe Gryphon GroundLaunchedCruiseMissilediscoveredthatdispersed logisticstosupportairunitsinthefieldwasamajorchore.Eventhe USMCtendstooperateits Harrier fleetfromafixedairfieldorfroma large amphibious ship to minimize the logistics burden.

26. See R. Steeb, J. Matsumura .

27.Implicitintheproposalsmadeinthisarticleisthequestionas to whether the Army should move to an all brigade structure, which eliminates the division as an echelon. The authors are somewhat agnostic and do not believe the argument in favor of the Army moving to medium-weight combat formations stands on the outcome of this debate. For a call to change the Army to a brigade structure with forces having features described in this article, see Douglas A.Macgregor, Breaking the Phalanix: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997. 24

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.
Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
Director Colonel Larry M. Wortzel
Director of Research Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.
Authors John Gordon IV Peter A. Wilson
Director of Publications and Production