I would love to know what the Stryker VC could see. There's virtually no place where you can see in all directions and the RWS probably suffers from many of the same flaws as a Predator drone. It sees what it's looking directly at but has no wide view. I can't imagine how this would work out against the NVA. So far they haven't come up with anything that can match a Soldier's eyes and reaction to fast evolving unknown situations.

No reports about the RWS......was ANYBODY manning it? It certainly doesn't match a human gunner head-out with a GUNSHIELD with situational awareness and experience. The RWS is a pile of junk, more appropriate on Playstation 2 than on a personnel carrier.

A Bradley or M113 Gavin could take a RPG hit better, and have human gunners working powerful 25mm and .50 caliber heavy machine guns; not a slow rotating, cheesy robot machine gun with the VC/gunner looking through narrow optics. For all the money squandered on Stryker truck, the army could have had body armor, and GUNSHIELDS and extra RPG shielding on M113 Gavins, M2 Bradleys. And that no doubt is the reason that the Stryker was so easily ambushed and destroyed. Since the driver was focussed on driving the vehicle, only the VC was available to scan for the enemy. One set of eyes can't possibly keep a continuous 360-degree watch, and even if he saw both RPG gunners, one gun can't simultaneously engage multiple targets.

It seems common tactical sense that the situation begs -- no, screams -- for a rebirth of the ACAV. We don't know if it is feasible to install additional MGs on Stryker's thin steel hull. Even if it can be done, the hatch layout isn't nearly as well suited to turning the SUV into an ACAV, as is that of the M113 Gavin.

This Stryker ran by a roadside bomb:

The point of WAR is to get results on the ground, to have your will dominate. When the Iraqi guerrillas can incinerate a $3.3 million Stryker and embarrass us with just $30 of RPGs they are winning. If you don't understand this, you need to research what 4th Generation Warfare is all about.

For $400,000 we could upgrade M113 Gavin light tracks that wouldn't have got trapped into the bad, restrictive terrain in the first place and could have survived RPG hits without any damage. In other words, guerrillas lose, we win because we are not a flaming BBQ on the 6 o'clock news.

Has the Army's Generals been bought off by General Dynamics, importers of the Canadian-made Stryker trucks?

Weekend Edition
April 24 / 25, 2004

Stryking Out:
A General, GM and the Army's Latest Tank

By JEFFREY ST. CLAIR

On December 10, two Strykers, the Army's newest armored personnel carrier, were patrolling near Balad, Iraq, when the embankment beneath them collapsed and the vehicles plunged into a rain-swollen river. Three Soldiers died and another was severely injured. Three days later, another Stryker rolled over a roadside bomb south of Baghdad. The explosion left one Soldier injured and the vehicle in flames.

It was an inglorious combat debut for the Army's first new personnel carrier in thirty years. But it confirmed the worst fears of some of the Stryker's critics that the vehicle is unsafe and its crews untrained for using it in combat conditions. One former Pentagon analyst described the 8-wheeled vehicle as "riding in dune buggy armored in tinfoil."

The Stryker Interim Armored Vehicle is billed as the Pentagon's latest weapon in its new high-tech Army, a fast moving carrier designed for the urban battlefield and unconventional wars. This fall the Army deployed 300 Stryker vehicles and 3,500 Soldiers to Iraq's notorious Sunni Triangle, the Iowa-sized area in central Iraq where the most intense guerrilla fighting is taking place.

But new documents reveal that Pentagon weapons testers had expressed serious reservations about the whether the Strykers were ready for battle. The Pentagon's chief weapons tester, Tom Christie, warned in a classified letter to the Secretary of the Defense that the Stryker is especially vulnerable to rocket-propelled grenades and improvised explosive devices. These are, of course, precisely the kinds of threats faced by the Stryker brigades now in Iraq.

Advertised as rapid deployment vehicles, the Stryker brigades could in theory be rushed anywhere in the world within 96 hours by C-130 transport planes. But numerous internal studies have questioned whether the Stryker can be deployed by C-130s at all. Moreover, a newly released Government Accounting Office report scolded the Pentagon for a host of other problems with the carrier, which was meant to replace the much-maligned Bradley Fighting Vehicle. The GAO report points to serious problems with the Stryker's design and maintenance and discloses deficiencies in training for its use.

Even Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld wanted to delay funding of additional Stryker brigades until more testing and training could be completed. But congress, ever an anxious to spread the pork around to as many districts as possible, didn't heed the warning and approved the additional purchases.

The Stryker is a joint venture of two of the mightiest industrial corporations in America: General Dynamics and General Motors. These companies waged a fierce two-year long lobbying battle, stretching from Capitol Hill to the halls of the Pentagon, to win the $4 billion contract to build 2,131 Strykers, which was awarded in November 2000.

The first Strykers, which cost $3 million a piece, rolled off the assembly line in April 2002. Presiding over the ceremony at the Stryker rollout in Alabama was former Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki. The Stryker was a key component in Shinseki's plan to upgrade the Army, a scheme he outlined in a 1999 paper titled "Army Vision." In that report, Shinseki called for the development of an interim armored brigade featuring "all-wheel formation". This was a thinly veiled hint that the contract would be awarded to General Dynamics. The Stryker is a wheeled carrier, as opposed to the tank-like vehicles built by United Defense which run on tracks.

During Shinseki's speech in Alabama, he pointedly singled out for special thanks David K. Heebner. Heebner, a former Army Lt. General, had been one of Shinseki's top aides, serving as Assistant Vice Chief of Staff for the Army. As such, he played a key role in pushing for funding for Shinseki's projects, including the Stryker. In November 1999, General Dynamics issued a press release announcing that they had hired Heebner as an executive at the company. The announcement came a full month before Heebner's official retirement date of December 31, 1999. The timing of the announcement is curious for several reasons. Most glaringly, it's clear that the Army was leaning toward handing a multi-billion dollar contract to General Dynamics at the very time Heebner may have been in negotiations with the company for a high-paying executive position.

Federal conflict of interest laws prohibit government employees from being engaged "personally or substantially in a particular matter in which an organization they are negotiating with, or have an agreement with for future employment, has a financial interest." It's not clear if Heebner recused himself from the negotiations with General Dynamics over the Stryker contract. However, it's very clear that the Stryker deal, despite the reservations raised by Pentagon weapons testers and the GAO, proved to be very lucrative for both Heebner and General Dynamics. Off the strength of the Stryker deal, Heebner quickly rose to the rank of Senior Vice-President for Planning and Development for General Dynamics, the conduit between the nation's number two defense contractor and the Pentagon. By the end of last year, Heebner amassed more than 13,600 shares of General Dynamics stock valued at more than $1.2 million. "Based on the circumstances surrounding General Heebner's hiring and compensation, and internal Pentagon warnings about the Stryker's vulnerability, further investigation of the Stryker program is required," says Eric Miller, a senior defense investigator at the Project on Government Oversight.

This is the latest in a string of Pentagon scandals involving former Defense Department staffers who pushed for high-ticketed weapons programs, then cashed in by joining the very companies that were awarded with the contracts. Last year, POGO and CounterPunch exposed a sweetheart deal between Boeing and the Pentagon involving the leasing of 21 Boeing tankers to the Air Force. The chief broker of the deal was Darleen Druyun, who helped craft the scheme while working as deputy assistant secretary for Air Force acquisition and management , then lobbied congress to approve it as an executive at Boeing. Facing allegations of fraud and inside dealing, Boeing fired Druyun in December.

Jeffrey St. Clair is co-editor of CounterPunch

Keystone Stryker Cop Follies: OOPS! "we are stuck": broken axle!

www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg- mosul13mar13,1,2733323.story?coll=la-headlines- world&ctrack=1&cset=true)

In Mosul, Insurgents Have Become Road Warriors

U.S. troops find cars are mobile weapons caches as well as the means for drive-by shootings.

By Monte Morin, Times Staff Writer

MOSUL, Iraq - Army hatch gunner Brandon Jones may have missed the man who fired potshots at his head Saturday, but the sergeant managed to destroy a dangerous tool: the insurgent's car.

As U.S. and Iraqi forces have battled guerrillas for control of the northern city of Mosul in recent weeks, the insurgents have been putting their wheels to work.

Instead of packing their vehicles with explosives and detonating them in suicidal attacks, insurgents are more likely to fire on troops as they speed past their patrols and combat outposts.

Soldiers say the insurgents seem to favor Opels, because they have a reputation for being fast. Cars are also becoming insurgents' preferred hiding place for weapons.

"What's happening is, they realize we're finding the weapons they try to bury and hide in warehouses," said Lt. Col. Michael E. Kurilla, commander of the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment of the 25th Infantry Division, the Army unit responsible for Mosul's crowded west side.

"What they're doing now is hiding all of their weapons in cars," Kurilla said. "That way they can keep it moving around and out of sight."

Sometimes U.S. Soldiers pursue the drive-by shooters in 21-ton Stryker armored vehicles, jumping curbs and barreling down rutted dirt roads.

Such was the case Saturday, when Jones, 23, of Santa Rosa, and the rest of Bravo Company, 2nd Platoon, were fired at by suspected insurgents in at least two vehicles.

The day began quietly enough, with 1st Lt. David Webb, 23, of Hawaii, leading the men in a short prayer before they climbed into their armored vehicles.

Among other things, Webb asked for protection during their mission.

"Lord, if we do come into contact, make our weapons systems deadly," Webb said in his prayer.

The unit then set out to man a traffic checkpoint in northwest Mosul, an area of heavy insurgent activity.

After a few minutes of inspecting car trunks and questioning drivers, Webb received word that insurgents were firing rocket-propelled grenades and mortars at a nearby government building. They were escaping in two cars, white and blue, he was told.

Webb and the commander of another Stryker quickly spotted the vehicles speeding through the warren of narrow streets. They gunned their engines and the chase began.

As Webb's Stryker sought to overtake the suspected insurgents, the second Stryker closed in behind and prepared to fire its .50-caliber machine gun. But before that could happen, the second Stryker suddenly ground to a halt with a broken axle.

"We're stuck. We can't move," the commander radioed to Webb.

Meanwhile, Webb's armored vehicle had lost sight of the insurgents. As they scanned the area, Jones and the lieutenant heard the snapping of bullets nearby.

Suddenly the two insurgent cars came flying down an alley and almost slammed into the side of Webb's Stryker before screeching to a halt.

"Kill those guys!" Webb yelled from his perch at the front of the vehicle.

Standing in a rear hatchway, Jones swiveled to see the insurgents throwing open their doors and running.

For a moment, Jones said he looked into the face of one of the men and saw eyes wide with fear. Clean-shaven and appearing to be in his 30s, the insurgent clutched an AK-47 assault rifle in his right hand.

Jones pulled the trigger on his rifle, repeatedly.

"I dumped a whole magazine at him before we moved behind a wall and I couldn't see him anymore," he said.

Webb told the driver to shift into reverse, but by the time Jones had a clear view of the alley, the man was gone. Hoping the vehicles might still contain insurgents, Jones fired. One of them burst into flames.

The flames touched off a chain reaction, detonating rocket-propelled grenades and hundreds of rounds of ammunition in the trunk.

Soldiers in Jones' squad, who had exited their Stryker to pursue the suspects on foot, sought cover in a nearby home. A burning car door was thrown into the air and landed on a nearby roof.

After the turmoil subsided, Soldiers inspected the other car. They found a sniper rifle, a heavy machine gun, a handful of grenades, a rocket-propelled grenade launcher, walkie-talkies, batteries and boxes of bullets. They also recovered several cellphones, one of which began ringing as Soldiers examined it.

"Don't answer it. We don't want them to know we have it," one Soldier said.

The incident was the platoon's first close-up experience with insurgents.

"Usually you get shot at and never see who's doing it," Jones said. "Either that or we get hit by [homemade bombs] and stuff that you can't react to. This was different."

Even though they didn't find or kill the insurgents, Jones said he and his fellow Soldiers had made a point.

"We got a couple of their cars," Jones said. "Maybe that will keep them off the street for a while."

THE ARMY'S NEW CAR IS A "LEMON" STRYKER PROGRAM - A BOONDOGGLE SHINSEKI AND HEEBNER CRAWL IN BED WITH GENERAL DYNAMICS

By LONNIE T. SHOULTZ

In their fawning and congratulatory stories written in June 2003 when Army Chief of Staff Eric "Rick" Shinseki retired, most reporters referred to him as the "father of the Army Stryker Brigades." Few of the writers mentioned the "Black Beret" fiasco that destroyed morale during Shinseki's watch, since the little general preferred to be known for sheep herding the controversial weapons system, instead.

Shinseki needs to be careful of what he wishes. When the final chapter is written about the shady deals, accommodations, strong arming, bribery and other misdeeds that brought the Army "Stryker" armored car program to life, it will be one of the darkest chapters in the Army's history.

GUNG-HO FOR LIGHT VEHICLES

When the Senate confirmed Eric Shinseki as the first Asian-American chief of Staff of the Army in June 1999, Bill Clinton's "politically-correct" general had four years to leave his mark on the service. In a speech made on October 15 of that year, Shinseki stated. "In order to become more deployable and maintain lethality, the Army must field a prototype brigade-size force. The intent is to establish brigades in the next few months that will use off-the-shelf systems, as resources permit and as quickly as possible, to jumpstart development of concepts and doctrine, organizational design, and training."

It appears that Sinskeki began his task of "lightening" the Army will a willing spirit and a clean heart - then the money got to him.

But instead of buying "off-the-shelf" items for the Army's new Brigade Task Force, as he stated he would, in many speeches to friendly audiences and both Houses of Congress, Shinseki worked with others to design a new, extremely expensive, overweight and less survivable vehicle than the M113A3 tracked armored vehicle of which the Army already owned over 11,000 chassis.

The M113A3's could have been refurbished, had digital communications installed, and been field-tested for less than $400,000 each. The wheeled "Stryker" vehicle that Shinseki ultimately approved for purchase is a knockoff of the Swiss MOWAG design, manufactured mainly in Canada (a clear violation of the Berry Amendment that requires the Department of Defense to "Buy American"), costs the U.S. taxpayers $2.8 million dollars each, and is not as survivable as the tracked M113s already in the U.S. Army inventory. Here's how he went so wrong . . .

SHINSEKI AND HEEBNER - THE TWO CRONIES

In 1996, Shinseki and his fellow member of the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army's office, Maj. Gen. David K. Heebner, were both assigned to a RAND Corporation study group. More importantly, they were assigned to the RAND Arroyo Center, which is described as the United States Army's only federally-funded research and development center (FFRDC) for studies and analysis.

Some sources from this assignment state that Shinseki and Heebner co-authored a report. Since the center's publications are often classified, that claim cannot be independently verified. What is uncontested however, is that they had the same boss and place of work - The Army's Chief of Staff's Office - and they were assigned to the RAND Corporation at the same time. Interestingly, the Army's new Chief of Staff, Gen. Peter Schoomaker, was in the same study group, but since he worked at the Special Operations Command, he did not have the proximity that Heebner and Shinseki had in rank and interests.

As soon as the U.S. Senate confirmed Shinseki as the Army Chief of Staff in June 1999, he reunited with his RAND classmate, now-Lt. Gen. David K. Heebner. The only project at that time that drew any attention or publicity from Shinseki or Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera was the transformation of the Army to a "lighter force." They made countless speeches about the "transition force" that would bridge the gap between the present "heavy" Army and the future "lighter" Army. In their speeches and testimony to Congress, seeking Congressional approval to proceed with the development of the transition units, Shinseki and Caldera used the same speech on many occasions which centered around three factors that would be a guide to developing a new force.

FAILURE TO MEET SPECIFICATIONS

Those three factors found their way into the Army's solicitations for bids for the "Interim Combat Vehicle" (ICV). The Army solicitation stated: "The ICV shall have the capability of, (1) entering, being transportable in, and exiting a C-130 aircraft under its own power and (2) be capable to immediate combat operations (does not require a full basis load, but is desired). However, there was another ICV performance parameter that reflected an operational impact on C-130 transport, and that was the weight.

"The ICV combat capable deployment weight must not exceed 38,000 pounds gross vehicle weight to allow, requirement (3) C-130 transport of 1,000 nautical miles without requiring a USAF waiver for maximum aircraft weight on fixed runways. Two other complimentary performance requirements stated for the ICV were: "The combat-loaded ICV shall be capable of carrying an infantry squad (nine soldiers with individual equipment), outfitted for any season clothing (cold weather)," and "ICV shall provide space for each squad member, two sets of NBC protective clothing and food/water for 72 hours." In addition, the Army's requirement was for the vehicles specified "to arrive with three days of supply, and (the Brigade) will then get resupply "in theater."

The only occassions on which the Stryker has even been able to get into the air in C-130s, was when the Air Force could send them one of the newest, highest-powered "J" model C-130s. However, the C-130J comprises less than 10% of all 500 Air Force C-130s, and there is no money or plans to upgrade the rest of the transport plane fleet.

So, once again, the Army is trying to come in through the back door because it cannot come in the front.

CHANGING THE REQUIREMENTS IN MID-STREAM

In the months since the Army learned that General Dynamics could not lighten the "Stryker" and make it meet its contracted weight, instead of leaning on the contractor to perform up to standard in the contract, Army liaison personnel approached all Congressional points of contact and convinced them that they never "really, actually meant" flying the Stryker in Air Force C-130s was required. The Army under Shinseki told lawmakers on Capital Hill that the Stryker should really be flown into theater on USAF C-17s and then sent to forward air strips on C-130s. Obviously that reasoning falls under the weight of knowledge that if the Air Force could get these overweight cars off the ground and fly them for the contracted distance of 1,000 nautical miles on its C-130's, there would be no reason to ever load them onto a C-17.

There is a reason that Congress mandated the Strykers use C-130s. If a Stryker brigade is to be deployed anywhere in 96 hours, as promised by Shinseki, the Air force would have to use all of its 500 c-130s to transport the 308 Stryker variants in a brigade. The Air Force only has a little less than 120 C-17s. They cannot allot all of them to the Army's Strykers, so either the Stryker brigades are going to meet the weight requirement in the contract, or General Dynamics is going to have to take its toys and go home broke.

A SHINSEKI "BULLY-BOY" GETS REWARDED

The first solicitation for bids was made public at the National Industrial Defense Association sponsored conference in Ypsilanti, Mich. in December 1999. Several Army officers took personal leave and attended the conference while others were assigned by their commands to note any information that came from the conference. Two officers used their own money to rent one of the ten tables sold by the conference sponsors to people advocating different types of vehicles for the ICV.

One of Shinseki's "knuckle draggers," then-Col., now Brig. Gen. Donald F. Schenk, told the officers to "take down" the table they rented. The officers informed the colonel they had rented the table with their own funds and that no government money was involved. To that, Schenk announced that no tracked armor, air mechanized infantry or any other variation of combat vehicle would be allowed to compete for the bid. The "fix" was in, and the Interim Brigade Vehicle would definitely be a "wheeled vehicle."

Schenk took down the names of the dissident officers at the conference as well as that of their commanders, calling them to claim their subordinates were "disrupting" the conference. Most of the commanders involved must have already known Schenk was an idiot, because no officer who attended the conference got in trouble, even after their commanders received "intimidation calls" from Schenk.

However, in Shinseki's Army, no bad deed goes unpunished.

The "strong-arm tactics" of then-Col. Schenk at the Michigan conference earned him enough "brownie points" for him to make his first "star" and win him a new job as Program Manager, Future Combat Systems. Since no competing ideas were allowed at the conference, it appeared that Shinseki had succeeded in ramming wheeled vehicles right through the bid process.

AND NOW, THE "PAYOFF"

Just one month after Shinseki announced the need for billions of dollars for Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs), General Dynamics secured its role in the LAV "Stryker" program when it made a job offer to Shinseki's Deputy Chief of Staff, Gen. Heebner. General Dynamics announced November 19, 1999, six weeks before he was scheduled to retire, that Heebner would become a new "vice president" with the huge government contractor.

Since Heebner had only been promoted to three-star general in May 1997, retiring in January 2000 wouldn't allow him enough time to complete the required three years in his newest rank to draw a pension as a lieutenant general. By retiring before his higher rank was permanent, Heebner would end up drawing the retirement pay of only a major general. That would cost him tens of thousands of dollars to leave early and take the job at General Dynamics.

Heebner's contract with General Dynamics was obviously negotiated while he was still a general officer on active duty in the U.S, Army. The terms of that sweetheart contract between the general and the contractor are supposed to be in the public domain. However, all efforts by me to view or learn the terms of that contract have been ignored by both Heebner and General Dynamics.

A BIG PILE OF STOCK SWEETENS THE POT

On December 31, 2000 Heebner finally retired and joined the government contractor. In a little over 30 days, General Dynamics bought out General Motors, its only competitor for the wheeled Interim Brigade Vehicle. And just 60 days after Heebner went to work for General Dynamics - in violation of a law that prohibits him from lobbying his former place of employment for at least a year - General Dynamics made the brass hat a gift of 4,000 shares of its stock.

In the first week of March in each succeeding year, General Dynamics gave former Army Gen. David K. Heebner "gifts" of its company stock. He received the first 4,000 shares on March 1, 2000; another 1,650 shares on March 7, 2001; 1,600 shares on May 1, 2002 and 4,050 shares on March 5, 2003. In Heebner's stock summary on file at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), it shows he now owns 13,643 shares of General Dynamics stock and an additional 929 shares of stock known as "shares held indirectly." I certainly hope the U.S. Attorneys Office will ask the FBI to check on the ownership of those last 929 shares of stock.

IT'S NOT WHAT YOU KNOW, BUT WHO YOU KNOW

It's very interesting how General Dynamics has no compunction about hiring the friends of its new customer, Gen. Shinseki. In this era of corporate malfeasance, such as Enron and WorldCom, General Dynamics diligently recorded the details of every "bribe" paid to Gen. Heebner on inside trading stock reports at the SEC. Serving military officers are still livid at the disgraceful manner in which Heebner has treated his oath, his uniform and his country.

SHINSEKI "TAKES CARE OF" THE POLITICIANS

Probably the most widely-disliked aspect of the Stryker program among military affairs professionals is how Shinseki parceled out the six brigades of LAVs. The where and why is something of a mystery, but can be deduced. What is less clear is why the initial decision was made to create six brigades, since the Air Force can only deal with one at a time? After the initial entry by a Stryker Brigade, the follow-on forces and supplies will not necessarily be Stryker Brigades. It seems that the planning staff at the Pentagon could have been better stewards of our tax money by giving more thought to the mix of forces rather than creating six of the same unit, hoping to get one good one.

SEN. INOUYE GETS WHAT HE WANTS

In 1999, there were two American Army infantry brigades at Ft. Lewis, WA with no mission. The 3rg Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division, and the 1st Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division were identified in November 1999 as the units to become the first Stryker units. The Brigades stationed at Ft. Lewis had no stated mission other than "theater support for the Pacific Theater." That suited Shinseki and his cronies just fine. They needed a brigade to be a "show horse" for the Stryker program and one to quickly be a follow-on unit.

Sen. Daniel Inouye of Hawaii recently mentioned the 1st Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division when he promised to try and get them a second Stryker Brigade stationed in the Hawaiian Islands. That effort obviously was tied in with Gen. Shinseki's well-known desire to run for his mentor - Sen. Inouye's - seat from his native Hawaii in the 2004 elections. Having two Stryker Brigades in the Islands would provide great "photo opportunities" for slick Senate candidate Eric Shinseki.

The mention of Sen. Inouye above is a good point of departure to discuss how Shinseki determined which units would be turned into Stryker units. After he got his authority from Congress to (1) buy "off-the-shelf" vehicles to rapidly transform the Army into light units; (2) to keep them light enough to fly in Air Force C-130s with their crews, ammunition, fuel and needed consumables for 1,000 nautical miles without refueling and arrive ready to fight, and (3) the brigades had to be light enough to move the brigade combat teams anywhere in the world within 96 hours after liftoff, a division on the ground in 120 hours, and five divisions within 30 days, Shinseki needed money to even begin the bidding process.

WHY ALASKA AND PENNSYLVANIA? YOU'LL SEE

After the explanation of the location of the first two Stryker brigades, why would Shinseki place one of the quick reaction forces in the frozen tundra of Alaska where the weather is unpredictable for many months of the year? To answer that question, you must examine the structure of the U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee, and more importantly, its subcommittee for defense appropriations.

Sen. Daniel Inouye (D-HI) is the ranking member of both of these two powerful Senate committees. And Sen. Ted Stevens (R- AK) is the present chairman of both committees. If you need money in the military, all you need do is station the product of that money in the states of the appropriators. Inouye got at least one Stryker Brigade for Hawai's 25th Division and is discussing obtaining another one for the islands, while Sen. Stevens got a fast-response Stryker Brigade promised to the 172nd Infantry Brigade, located in that international hub of transportation - chilly Alaska.

The 172nd calls themselves the "The Snow Hawks" and on their web page, the text reads: "Authorized 3,809 soldiers, this is the largest infantry brigade and the only arctic infantry brigade in the U.S. Army." It is difficult to understand why Sen. Stevens would even allow Shinseki to discard America's only Artic-trained unit just to have a couple of garages built in his state on military installations.

Shinseki's predecessor, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Dennis J. Reimer, took away all of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment's M1A1 main battle tanks and M2 Bradleys and made them a lighter force by requiring them to take the field in nothing heavier than the Army's Humvees. That regiment, stationed at Ft. Polk, LA, is paying the price in Iraq today for such a stupid decision. The thin-skinned Humvees are called "RPG magnets" by the soldiers of the 2nd ACR in Iraq. Shinseki selected the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment for transitioning to a Stryker brigade when it returns from Iraq to get it out of the same vehicles that led to the bloody debacle for the Rangers in Mogadishu, Somalia. The Humvee is a light truck. Only Gen. Reimer ever saw it as a "battle vehicle."

That accounts for four of the six funded Stryker Brigades. If Sen. Inouye is correct and he is able to get another Stryker Brigade stationed in the Hawaiian Islands as a "prop" for Shinseki's expected run for his long-held Senate seat in 2004, there will be only one more front line, quick deployment Stryker Brigade to be assigned. Where will that unit go?

On March 21, 2001, Sen. Rick Santorum of Pennsylvania, Chairman of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee's Airland Subcomittee, signed a letter with his ranking member, Sen. Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut requiring the Army to stage a "competition" between the Stryker and its nearest competitor, the United Defense M113A3. Shinseki might not have been sure he could "control" the conduct of that competition, but he could control the interpretation of the results in the U.S. Senate. Shinseki allotted his last planned Stryker Brigade to Santorum's home state's National Guard.

AMERICAN DEFENSE JOBS LOST TO CANADA

The allocation of a fast reaction strike force to a part-time reserve unit has probably become the most discussed Stryker assignment of the six brigades. Even the "money guys" on the Appropriations Committee, Sens. Stevens and Inouye, could make the argument that the Strykers "had to be based somewhere," so why not their states? Santorum can make no such claim. Shinseki is placing one of his prized quick reaction brigades that must deploy in 96 hours in a National Guard unit that would be fortunate to even finds all of its members in 96 hours! They would never get their Stryker's off the ground in anything close to the required time.

However, Santorum has made no further objection to the Stryker program, although it sucked 1,500 high-paying jobs from the United Defense plant in his home state at York, PA. and allowed the General Dynamics plant up in London, Ontario, Canada to resume full production. Santorum, in effect and in fact, exchanged 1500 full-time union jobs in York for 3,700 part-time National Guard jobs that probably will have to be shared with several other states.

THE PHONY "WAR GAME" AND GEN. VAN RIPER

The competition mentioned above, as mandated between the Stryker Brigade and an aggressor force of M113s was set for an operation known as Millennium Challenge 2002. It was scheduled to be a three-week long, $235 million dollar exercise. The Army contracted with a retired marine corps lieutenant general named Paul Van Riper to command the Red "aggressor forces" that opposed the Blue defenders with a U.S. Army Stryker unit. According to an MSNBC report on the war game written by Brendan I. Koerner, the "game" turned into a fiasco. In the first place, the vaunted Strykers had to stop and change 13 of their big wheels and tires in the first four days of the exercise.

Then, according to Koerner, "controversy erupted when Red forces, commanded by Van Riper, engaged in some clever free play tricks that deviated from what the Blues were expecting. Van Riper used virtual motorcycle messengers to relay orders to his virtual field commanders, thereby negating the Blue Force's ability to eavesdrop. Mere days into the game, a squad of Red digital Soldiers had "sunk" several Blue ships in the "Persian Gulf" by carrying out suicide attacks with explosives-laden speedboats. "That's not in the script," countered the referees, who ordered the Blue fleet to be magically resurrected.

Gen. Van Riper told the Army Times that the sprawling three-week millenium challenge exercises were "almost entirely scripted to ensure a [U.S.] win." He protested by quitting his role as commander of the enemy forces, and warned that the Pentagon might wrongly conclude that its experimental tactics were working.

"SMOKE AND MIRRORS" AT ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT

Before we leave the subject of Congressional interference in war fighting, the congressman from Alabama's 3rd District that includes Anniston, went to the Army Depot there, where General Dynamics rents some space to do the final assembly of the Stryker. Rep. Mike Rogers arrived at the Depot full of "fire and fury" and with the press corps in tow. The congressman asked about some rumors he had heard about the Stryker, that only men under five feet five inches tall could get into one. It took me a week of pouring over fact sheets, briefings and other data to even find a reference to the "five feet, five inches" misunderstood quote.

In a Powerpoint presentation prepared by the contractor, General Dynamics, the statement is printed that "due to the amount of electronic gear" the Army wanted stuffed into the operating area of the Stryker, the driver and vehicle commander would have to be drawn from 1-5% of adult men to fit comfortably in the cab area of the vehicle. I don't know if that is the figure the congressman misinterpreted as only an army of dwarfs being able to ride in the vehicles, but it is the only reference I found to a size limitation for the Stryker. That crew size limitation will also cover the gunners and the main gun operators if that system is ever built by General Dynamics as it contracted to do. Other questions asked by Congressman Rogers were equally as stupid and were asked, of all people, of the contractor's General Dynamic's site manager!

I don't know if Congressman Rogers really expected the employee of the contractor to tell him that the vehicle should never have been built, but that's who he asked! Even if it is in his home district, Rogers should recognize his own limitations of having never served in our nation's military. He wouldn't know a squad from a squadron, but he wants to familiarize himself with the suitability of the Army's radically new and different transformation vehicle. He knows nothing about the old vehicles the Army is switching over form. How could he be competent to know the subtle difference between the two systems? He can't. People like him should be charged with practicing military affairs without a brain.

If I were reading this material as another, less informed, law-abiding American, I'd ask, "where were the cops when this theft occurred?" Calling for the "cops" is not that simple in military acquisition matters. One route of protest is to Congress. But both houses of Congress depend on the General Accounting Office (GAO) to be their investigators. Shortly after winning bids were announced, one of the losing bidders, United Defense, protested the nutty methodology used by the Army in determining which vehicle would be the "cheapest" to operate.

WHY THE GAO "ROLLED OVER" FOR SHINSEKI

The army has 40 years of documentation of "costs per hour" to operate the M113 family. The General Dynamics engineers had to guess at the cost per hour to operate the LAV III "Strykers." When the GAO rendered it's ruling, it determined that guessing was a perfectly acceptable way to fix costs. So the GAO allowed the "guesstimated" cost per hour of the Stryker - at $8.33 versus the documented $10.53 for the M113s - to stand. There were several other points of confluence that saw protests filed with the GAO and yet the General Accounting Office consistently ruled for whatever Shinseki wanted. Nobody I spoke with in the defense industry had ever seen the GAO "roll over" like that for one defense system, but they did for Shinski. It was almost as if the general had a spy at the GAO.

WEST POINT CLASSMATE - THE "INSIDE" CONNECTION

Some weeks back, I began an Internet background investigation on all the people I could identify from the documents released by the GAO. The official who signed or approved all GAO rulings in this and other matters is named Anthony H. Gamboa. He identified himself on the GAO rulings as "General Counsel, General Accounting Office." When I ran him on the Internet search engines, I found him listed with the University of Maryland Law Class of 1972 as Anthony Horace Gamboa. That page also listed his bachelor's degree from the United States Military Academy.

West Point classes communicate and stay in touch by classes, - not as the giant alumni association called the U.S. Army. By accessing an online Class of 1965 database at El Paso, TX, I found that Anthony H. Gamboa of the Maryland Law School "Class of 1972" was a four year classmate of Gen. Eric "Rick" Shinseki in the USMA Class of 1965!

One source I spoke with from a class behind theirs told me that he believed they were two of the four-man West Point Chess team, but I could find no yearbooks online. Simply having his classmate of four years running the legal affairs of the General Accounting Office allowed Gen. Shinseki to do anything he wanted because his fellow Academy "ring knocker" was in a position to make his desires have the force of law.

You can't help wondering how all of this would have changed if Gamboa had followed the canons of ethics of the legal profession and disclosed his close connection to one of the principles in the Stryker case. We'll never know, because Anthony Horace Gamboa kept it a secret that he and the most recent Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army spent four years together at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.

WHAT ABOUT ETHICS? DID SHINSEKI SELL US OUT?

It's nice to have friends, but I don't want mine turning their backs while I fleece the American taxpayers for an overwight, overpriced vehicle and put American workers out of their jobs to keep another flag officer buddy, Gen. Heebner, a vice president at General Dynamics, fat and happy at the taxpayers' expense.

Heebner doesn't have to collect unemployment checks in York, Pa. like the defense workers victimized by the Stryker. He's a millionaire with all his stocks. And the faulty Stryker vehicle is still off from its targeted weight of 38,000 pounds. The last figure I heard was 40,000 pounds, - if they left a few people at home

All this makes you wonder why the government even signs contracts with its suppliers if they're simply going to hire generals to run the program and violate the contract at will.

********************

www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2004/3/3/155315.shtml

Stryker: Army's Multimillion-Dollar 'Lemon,' or 'Excellent' Lemonade?

Jon E. Dougherty, NewsMax.com
Wednesday, March 3, 2004

See previous article, Controversy Surrounds Army's Stryker.

"The Army's new car is a lemon."

That's how former U.S. Treasury fraud investigator and Special Forces trooper Lonnie Shoultz describes the U.S. Army's newest armored vehicle, the Stryker. Worse, he says, it is becoming an expensive lemon.

Shoultz, a Vietnam combat veteran with the 101st Airborne Division and former Green Beret, as well as an experienced government fraud investigator, has long been vocal in his criticism of the Stryker, as well as the process the Army used to procure it.

He's not alone in his assessment. Other military analysts and experts have also come out against the implementation of the Stryker, though so far their criticism has fallen on deaf ears inside the Department of Defense; the U.S. Army wants more than 2,100 of the vehicles, in varying versions. "We've had concerns" about the Stryker, Eric Miller, senior defense investigator for the Project on Government Oversight, told NewsMax. Shoultz, who has a master's degree in history and is working toward his doctorate, believes the Army "defied the Congress of the United States by allowing a congressionally approved contract to go unmet by the contractor and not having the contractor, General Dynamics, stop work until it brought the Stryker into the parameters set out for it by Congress."

Big Dog

One of the most common complaints is the Stryker is too heavy to meet its original requirement of being able to be transported aboard C-130 aircraft ready to fight when it hits the ground. Because the Army has had to increase the amount of armor on the vehicle, to improve its survivability, it has surpassed the original weight limit.

"The entire purpose of these light brigades is to deploy in 96 hours to any trouble spot and follow-on with a brigade in four days," says Shoultz. "The only way to do that ... is to utilize the Air Force's 600 C-130s. If the Strykers will not fly 1,000 miles on a C-130, they are of no use to us."

Also, says Miller, a new "cage" the Army has fashioned to the Strykers, in an effort to better protect them against RPGs (rocket-propelled grenades) and other explosives, may work well but only add to the vehicle's transport weight. Also, he says, the vehicles may be less agile and, ultimately, better targets. "When you add all that weight, for example, a 5,000-pound cage, what does that do to the aerodynamics of it?"

And overall, he said he has some doubts about the vehicle's ability to perform. "We've got mixed emotions about this vehicle, as I'm sure a lot of people do," Miller said. "I understand the argument that it's better to have a Stryker than a Humvee, but the question we have is, does the Stryker do what it's supposed to?"

'Excellent'

The Army says the vehicle is performing well in Iraq, where they have been for weeks. Maj. Gary Tallman, a Pentagon spokesman, told NewsMax in January the Strykers deployed in the Iraqi theater so far had achieved a 90 percent operational readiness. "Overall performance you can characterize as excellent," Tallman said. Regarding damage, "it has shown its survivability - based on what it's encountered so far - has been high."

Strykers from the 3rd Brigade, Second Infantry Division based in Fort Lewis, Wash., were sent to Iraq in December. The were outfitted with an extra layer of armor and a steel cage intended to offer more protection against insurgents armed with RPGs, which added an additional 5,000 pounds to their overall weight. But damage and casualties have been light so far, Tallman said. He added at the time he was not aware of any RPG strikes on any Strykers. The Army also backs its new combat vehicle. The Pentagon says its first new armored vehicle in 20 years is a good replacement for the tracked M-113 armored personnel carrier, which was designed around the time of the Korean War. In announcing his decision in 1999 to procure the Stryker, then-Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki, who questioned the soldiers who had driven it, repaired it and maneuvered it through miles of pine forest at Fort Polk, in west-central Louisiana, expressed confidence it could survive on the battlefield.

"It's not a question of how much armor you can put on it," Shinseki said, adding Iraqi paramilitaries had destroyed two M1 tanks in the first Gulf War by firing at their more vulnerable rear. "The idea is to avoid taking a hit in the first place," he added, noting the Stryker's increased maneuverability. But Miller said his organization had been told maintenance had been soaring for the Strykers. "We're being told vehicles are going through a tire per day, for example," he said.

Pork-Barrel Project?

Besides worrying about its added weight, maneuverability and transportability, critics suggest cost is becoming another concern. A host of factors - inflation, unexpected production costs, and others - often occur with items bought by the government, especially by the Department of Defense. But costs for the Stryker vehicles have risen about 50 percent since the vehicles were first budgeted by the Defense Department. According to published reports, the Army first budgeted $4 billion to buy 2,131 Strykers, enough to outfit six new brigades. In rough terms, that translates into about $2 million a vehicle. Now, however, the Defense Department's latest figures show Strykers costing more than $3.3 million each. "The cost is getting way up there," Miller told NewsMax. "The acquisition cost is [getting] really high."

The author is a multiple Purple Heart veteran of an 18-month combat tour in Vietnam as a Paratrooper with the 101st Airborne Division and a Green Beret with the 5th Special Forces Group. When he returned home, he entered police work and rose thorough the ranks from uniformed patrol officer with the City of Birmingham to finally serve as a Special Agent with the U.S. Treasury Department. He holds a BS in Accounting and Finance, an MA in Military History, and has completed postgraduate academic work toward his doctorate at the University of Alabama and George Washington University in Washington, DC. He now resides in Foley, Alabama, on the Gulf Coast, and can be reached at: lshoultz@gulftel.com.

NEW ZEALAND STRYKER CLONES BREAK-DOWN (Don't have lying U.S. Army PAOs to cover things up like when American LAV-IIIs fail)

STORY:

www.nzherald.co.nz/storydisplay.cfm? storyID=3544740&thesection=news&thesubsection=

PIC:

Mark Burton says the problems are "minor glitches". Picture / Mark Mitchell

Breakdowns plague Army's new vehicles

21.01.2004
By KEVIN TAYLOR and SCOTT MacLEOD

Mechanical faults have struck the first six of the Army's expensive new armoured vehicles.

The faults include breakdowns in a turbo unit, a heater and an auxiliary power unit.

One vehicle was out of action from October 24 until mid-December after breaking an axle.

But Defence Minister Mark Burton yesterday defended the LAV III's reliability, saying the glitches were minor and to be expected with a new piece of equipment.

NZ First MP and former Army officer Ron Mark attacked the vehicle's reliability after Mr Burton revealed the faults in answer to his parliamentary questions.

The Government is buying 105 LAVs (light armoured vehicles) for $672 million to replace the Army's ageing M113 armoured personnel carriers.

The first batch arrived in August from the manufacturer, General Dynamics Land Systems Canada, and 15 were delivered by November, although only six were in service by mid-December.

The faulty vehicles had travelled between 277km and 2344km.

"I would not accept it on a Toyota Landcruiser," Mr Mark said.

"We should not accept it on an LAV III. Given their much-vaunted performance in the Canadian theatre, I'm surprised we are having any of these problems.

"The public were told these vehicles were tried and tested around the world and we were not buying a prototype."

But Mr Burton accused Mr Mark of a "beat-up", saying the faults occurred in the pre-acceptance phase for the vehicle and the manufacturer had accepted liability for all faults except the broken axle.

He said the LAV III was a "generational" leap for the Army, which was on a steep learning curve.

"The test of the reliability is the thousands of these vehicles that are in operational use."

Mr Burton said the chief of the Canadian Defence Force had told him the force was happy with the LAV's serviceability.

Critics of New Zealand's LAV purchase have complained about the cost and the fact that the vehicle is wheeled, unlike its tracked predecessor.

Mr Mark said the lack of serviceability showed there was a shortage of spares, tools, and mechanics.

Spares and tools were to have been delivered with the vehicles as part of the purchase.

Mr Burton said the shortage of parts and tools was temporary, and the time out of service did not reflect on the LAV III's reliability.

An American version of the LAV, the Stryker, has been criticised overseas for its lack of armoured protection but is being widely used in Iraq.

A Canadian Army project director, Major Jim Atkins, was quoted in a Canadian newspaper on Monday as saying concerns about the Stryker's ability to withstand rocket-propelled grenades had been partly addressed.

But its landmine armour had always been a concern, and new Strykers would probably need extra armour bolted on.

Many U.S. Soldiers in Iraq seemed to like the vehicles.

ABC news producer Mike Gudgell, who is in Iraq with a Stryker brigade, said the vehicle gave Soldiers confidence because it could move quickly.

Shiny, new and out of action

Mechanical faults that have struck the first six LAV IIIs:

* Heater unserviceable.

* Axle assembly damage, broken rear steering damper, coolant leak, fan damage (out of service Oct 23-Nov 19, Nov 22-Dec 16).

* Auxiliary power unit unserviceable.

* Transfer gear-case unserviceable (out of service from Oct 24).

* Third differential oil leak.

* Turbo unserviceable (out of service Nov 21-Dec 16).

EDITOR:

Typical journalist talking shit when he doesn't know jack!! There are a handful of the things over there and they've shipped them up to Mosul where they can't get into trouble!!

"widely used" my ass.

Sent from the Internet (Details)

http://www.tribnet.com/news/iraq/stryker/story/4655668p-4611175c.html

Bomb injures three Fort Lewis troops

MICHAEL GILBERT; The News Tribune MOSUL, Iraq -

Three Stryker brigade Soldiers were injured when insurgents detonated a roadside bomb as their convoy rolled down a highway Wednesday morning. One soldier was hit in the abdomen by shrapnel and was reported in satisfactory condition after surgery at an Army field hospital. His wounds were not considered life-threatening, but he will require further surgery after he's flown home to the United States, brigade officials said.The other two suffered minor injuries and were returned to duty after treatment. The Soldiers are from B Battery of the 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery Regiment.

The attack was the first in Mosul to injure Stryker brigade Soldiers since their move north from the Samarra area earlier this month.Another Soldier suffered superficial cuts Friday when his truck was hit by a roadside bomb on the way to Tall Afar, west of Mosul. The officer in the 1st Squadron, 14th Cavalry Regiment was cut on the face by flying gravel but was otherwise unharmed.

Wednesday's attack occurred just after 8 a.m. as a five-vehicle convoy drove along a major east-west thoroughfare on the west side of the Tigris River, officials said.The blast occurred a little more than a half-mile east of the Yarmook traffic circle, a major intersection, on a stretch of highway that runs between two cemeteries.Ordnance experts believe the bomb was fashioned with a pair of 155 mm artillery rounds hidden in an old vegetable container and detonated by remote control, said Maj. Yvette Hopkins, the brigade intelligence officer.The blast could be heard - and felt - three or so miles away at the brigade headquarters at the Mosul presidential palace compound.

Brigade commander Col. Mike Rounds said the explosion blew the rear axle off a Humvee with extra armor protection and damaged another Humvee, a standard gun truck.The vehicles had to be hauled away from the scene, Rounds said. He added he hadn't learned yet whether either could be repaired and returned to service.

Two of the wounded were riding in the vehicle with extra armor.Had it not been for the vehicle's additional armor, the soldiers' injuries might have been far worse, said the brigade surgeon, Maj. John Glorioso.The up-armored Humvees come with bullet-proof glass and additional armor installed at various points around the vehicle.One of the soldiers was hit between his nose and his eye by a large splinter of wood, narrowly missing his eyeball, the surgeon said.The other was hit by shrapnel in the back of his neck and buttocks. The metal in his neck was removed, but as for the other, Glorioso said, "there's not much you can do about that. It's deep muscle tissue. He'll just have to be careful around metal detectors."The injured soldiers were riding with troops from the 101st Airborne Division, who have been showing the Stryker soldiers around as they prepare to take over for the 101st in Mosul and the rest of northern Iraq.The blast occurred about 8:07 a.m. In just over an hour all three wounded had been taken by ground ambulance to a nearby 101st base and then flown by helicopter to the hospital at Mosul Airfield, officials said.Rounds directed his staff to review the incident to consider how the response might have been better or how it might have been avoided in the first place."You don't want these things to happen, but you want to learn from them," the commander said.

Combat engineers in Mosul conduct daily sweeps of areas where roadside bombs are likely to be planted, as they do all over Iraq where U.S. forces are operating.The bombs - "improvised explosive devices," or IEDs - remain one of the most persistent threats to coalition forces.

One other brigade soldier suffered a broken foot and ankle in an IED blast that set fire to a Stryker in Samarra on Dec. 13. The fire destroyed the vehicle. Another Stryker was hit by an IED a week later, also in Samarra, but was returned to service after repairs to the left front wheel. No soldiers were injured.

The 5,000-strong brigade from Fort Lewis is best known for taking more than 300 of the medium-weight, eight-wheeled Strykers into combat for the first time. But it also has hundreds of other vehicles with less protection and firepower, including Humvees and trucks.Rounds said he is trying to convince higher commanders to give the brigade more of the up-armored Humvees, particularly for the 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery Regiment. The battalion will mostly be working like an infantry unit, protecting the brigade's operating bases and convoy routes.Mosul is considered to be much more stable than other parts of Iraq but still sees attacks on coalition forces.On Monday, insurgents fired at least one rocket-propelled grenade at the palace camp. On Tuesday, three mortar rounds landed near the front gate.There were no injuries in either attack, which occurred just before sunrise.News Tribune staff writer Michael Gilbert is embedded with the Stryker brigade in Iraq. Reach him at mjgilbert41@yahoo.com. For regular reports on the brigade, sign up for an e-mail newsletter at www.tribnet.com/ registration. (Published 12:01AM, January 22nd, 2004)

Monday, December 15, 2003 - Page updated at 12:00 A.M.

STRYKER EASILY BLOWN UP

Blast destroys Stryker on Iraq road
By The Associated Press

TACOMA A $2 million Stryker reconnaissance vehicle was destroyed in Iraq on Saturday when it rolled over an explosive device planted in a road, officials of the Fort Lewis-based Stryker brigade said.

The driver suffered a broken right ankle and foot, and was flown to an Army hospital in Balad, a town north of Baghdad, according to The News Tribune of Tacoma, which has a reporter embedded with the recently deployed brigade. Three other crew members escaped unharmed.

The driver said fire engulfed the engine compartment as he crawled from his seat through the narrow passageway known as the "hellhole" and escaped the burning vehicle with the other crew members.

"I saw bright orange and tried to step on the gas," he said, "but then I saw the engine compartment was on fire ... and I got out as quick as possible."

He ran down the rear ramp with the rest of the crew and got into another Stryker. Other vehicles in the patrol fired on unspecified targets to counter the possibility of additional attacks, he said.

The explosion occurred around 1 p.m. Saturday as scouts from the 1st Squadron, 14th Cavalry Regiment were on patrol in a location that brigade officials did not disclose, for reasons of security.

It was the first of the Army's Strykers destroyed by hostile action.

The brigade arrived in Iraq more than a week ago. Last Monday, three Soldiers were killed and a fourth was injured when two Strykers plunged into an irrigation canal. The vehicles were submerged in about 8 feet of water and sustained extensive interior damage.

The Stryker vehicle destroyed in the explosion was recovered and trucked back to the operating base late Saturday.

Capt. Jerry New and Maj. David Athey, the squadron's executive officer, said troopers at the scene found a crater with wires leading away from it.

"We're 90 percent certain it was an IED," New said, referring to what the Army calls improvised explosive devices that have killed and wounded scores of U.S. Soldiers across Iraq. They are usually planted in or along a roadway and detonated by remote control.

A convoy on its way to the Stryker brigade's base camp in northern Iraq was struck by one such bomb Dec. 6. No one was injured, but the explosion peppered the windshield with rocks and debris.

OBSERVATIONS:

How many men are going to die and be maimed between now and 2005?

How many will die and be maimed when we find out these kits still do not protect men driving in trucks when they should be in tracks?

We can up-armor far superior M113 Gavin light tracked AFVs for $78,000 each compared to $250,000 per HMMWV truck 2 years from now. Funny how the Army can "rush" something to the troops when ego is on the line but somehow can't get something when eating crow is involved? When the LAVs failed the Aussies in East Timor they changed their minds and upgraded M113 Gavins instead. Too bad the U.S. Army wasn't as smart or Soldier and Mission-first principled.

Its always easy to blame the dead for their "operator errors". Never mind the 60 mph we'll-dodge-RPGs hubris that goes along with the Stryker mentality.

Army Official: `Operator Error' Caused Stryker Rollover

BY NATHAN HODGE

An Army official has blamed "operator error" for the rollover of two Stryker armored vehicles that claimed the lives of three soldiers Dec. 8. While results of an official investigation are still pending, critics are seizing on the incident as evidence that Stryker has fatal design flaws-in particular, that it is dangerously top-heavy. The Army and the vehicle's manufacturer dismiss those charges, saying that all manner of military vehicles-from tanks to Humvees-have suffered rollovers on Iraq's primitive roads. An Army official told Defense Week Friday that investigators from Fort Rucker, Ala., would probe the cause of the incident. But he said initial reports showed the vehicles rolled when a road embankment gave way. "The rollovers were all attributed to operator error," he said. "There is no center-of-gravity problem with the vehicle."

That explanation infuriates Stryker critics, who say the Army has a vested interest in validating the vehicle's performance. In an e-mail to Defense Week, Chuck Jarnot, a recently retired Army lieutenant colonel and an Afghanistan combat veteran, made an emotional plea for putting the Stryker program on hold. "I know you've heard all of this before, but I am very, very upset over this sad news," he wrote. "It's a death trap that must be cancelled immediately! If a V-22 [Osprey tiltrotor aircraft] killed Soldiers and rolled over like this, they would halt the program. I'm certain the Army will blame everyone and everything except the vehicle design when they investigate."

Details of the incident are still emerging. According to a U.S. Central Command press release, the two vehicles-from the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division Stryker Brigade Combat Team-were traveling in a convoy on an unimproved road nine kilometers northeast of Balad when they rolled over into an irrigation canal. Mike Gilbert, an embedded journalist from the Tacoma News Tribune who is traveling with the brigade, reported that "only the wheels of the flipped, 8-foot-tall vehicles could be seen above the waterline of the canal." It might have been much worse. While only three people died, Gilbert reported that a total of 19 soldiers were inside the two vehicles that flipped over. Most of the vehicles' top escape hatches were blocked, and in one case the rear ramp was padlocked-according to the Army official, to "prevent theft" during the convoy's movement. It is not clear how those who escaped were able to do so. Soldiers reportedly worked through the night to recover the vehicles and return them to the brigade's forward base.

Wheels vs. tracks

The Army has touted the eight-wheeled Stryker vehicle-based on the LAV III light armored vehicle made by General Dynamics-as a centerpiece of transition to a digitized, rapidly deployable force. But critics have charged that the new vehicles-which cost roughly $2 million apiece-are a poor improvement on vehicles like the tracked M-113 armored personnel carrier. What's more, they have said the Army's efforts to boost the survivability of the Stryker through the addition of ceramic plates (to protect against machine-gun fire) and slat armor (to detonate rocket-propelled grenades before they penetrate the vehicle's skin) have raised the vehicle's center of gravity. Prior to the deployment of the Stryker brigade, a report prepared by a defense analyst and author for Rep. Jim Saxton (R-N.J.) warned that the Stryker had "stability problems" and was "prone to overturn." According to that report, Strykers rolled over six times in exercises at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, Calif. "The Stryker is tall and heavy and carrying at least 50 percent more weight than its suspension and transmission were originally designed to bear," the report said. "The result of this is that the vehicle has a tendency to turn over when operating off-road." Victor O'Reilly, the report's author, told Defense Week the incident in Iraq raises questions about the Stryker's design. "I'm only saying when you've got a 12-foot-wide vehicle with a known stability problem, then it is suspicious, and it would worry one, ..." he said. "When a vehicle is modified as drastically as a Stryker has been, it should go back for testing. It's standard procedure." [The Defense Department certified Stryker as operationally effective in September. A General Accounting Office report released Friday concluded that the accelerated fielding of Stryker met congressional oversight requirements, but said the first Stryker brigade showed "insufficient training proficiency." Furthermore, the report said the Army had "deferred some critical issues that have implications for future brigades."] The Army official told Defense Week that, as far as the Stryker's program management office was concerned, "the vehicle does not have a problem with rollovers." In Iraq, he said, "we have unfortunately rolled every class of vehicle due to operator error, from Humvees to tanks."

GD defends Stryker

General Dynamics Vice President Kendell Pease was adamant that Stryker's design was not to blame for the mishap in Iraq. "This has nothing to do with the Stryker," he said. "This is a ... tragic accident that's happened to other vehicles in theater. It's a tragedy, but it certainly has nothing to do with anything operational with the Stryker." The Strykers, said Pease, were "on a road that was between canals; they've had a tank roll on that road, and they've had a number of Humvees roll on that road. And they were warned about taking that on there. It was at night, and the embankment gave way." Jarnot countered that the Army would tout the success of Stryker regardless of its performance. "It's already going to be a success," he said. "The Army's already written the after-action report before they even deployed it there. And that tremendous lack of objectivity is a major issue for me."

Lt. Col. David Tooker, an armor officer in the Army Reserve, agreed. "A lot of very senior people have invested their careers" in the Stryker, he said.

The Defense Department on Dec. 11 identified the three soldiers killed when their Stryker vehicles flipped into a canal. All three Soldiers were assigned to the 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Wash.

• Spec. Joseph Blickenstaff, 23, of Corvallis, Ore.
* Spec. Christopher Rivera Wesley, 26, of Portland, Ore.
* Staff Sgt. Steven Bridges, 33, of Tracy, Calif.

Army Rushing Vehicle Armor Kits To Iraq

BY NATHAN HODGE

In an effort to bolster troop protection, the Army is rushing to install armor kits on thousands of Humvees and trucks in Iraq, Defense Week has learned. An Army official said there was no fixed timeline for installing the upgrades, saying only the service wanted to deliver the kits "as soon as we can do it." Four suppliers have been tapped. The dollar value of the initiative is not yet known. Military vehicles and their occupants in Iraq are under daily fire from improvised explosive devices, grenades, mines, small-arms and more. The previously undisclosed program to protect the vehicles is a stopgap measure while the Army waits more than a year for additional copies of more heavily armored Humvees. In recent weeks, the Army has drawn fire over delays in sending up-armored Humvees to Iraq. As the war has morphed into a counter-insurgency campaign, vehicle convoys have come under regular attack; the most vulnerable vehicles are soft-skinned Humvees, trucks and heavy-equipment trailers. The Defense Department has made troop protection a high priority. In passing an emergency spending bill for fiscal 2004, legislators approved $239 million to pay for up-armored Humvees made by O'Gara-Hess & Eisenhardt, a subsidiary of Armor Holdings Inc. That's enough to buy more than 1,000 up-armored Humvees, which offer improved protection from small-arms fire, land mines and shrapnel.

The problem, however, is that all of those vehicles-which are modified at the O'Gara-Hess facility in Fairfield, Ohio-will not reach the field until mid-2005. In recent congressional testimony, Les Brownlee, the acting secretary of the Army, said that, at current rates of production, the service did not expect to receive the full complement of up-armored Humvees until "summer of '05." That did not please legislators. Sen. John Warner (R-Va.), the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, told Army leaders that schedule was not acceptable. As an alternative, then, the service is exploring a number of options for improving the survivability of vehicles in theater while awaiting delivery of the up-armored Humvees. "We are making kits for regular Humvees, the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles [FMTVs, two-and-a-half-ton and five-ton trucks], and HEMTTS," the official said, using the acronym that refers to Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks (pronounced "hem-its"), which are 10-ton vehicles. The official said the Army had tapped several sources to deliver the armor kits. Thus far, there are four suppliers: O'Gara-Hess; Army Materiel Command's Army Research Laboratory in Adelphi, Md.; Simula Inc. of Phoenix, Ariz.; and Armor Works Inc., also of Phoenix. "There are more vendors undergoing bid right now," the official said. "But the other ones have been approved and they're already starting to ship." All told, the Army plans to up-armor an approximate total of 9,000 Humvees, 2,700 FMTVs and 1,100 HEMTTs, the official said.

Kits on order

Among other things, the armor kits include ballistic windshields and armored doors. For instance, O'Gara-Hess makes the HArD-Kit (HMMWV Armored Demountable Kit), which comes in a two- and four-door variant. The kit fully encloses the cab of the Humvee, and provides protection from blast fragments and 7.62mm ball ammunition (the factory-model up-armored Humvee, however, can take hits from armor-piercing rounds). "One of the positive aspects is that there are contracts already," the official said. "It's positive in the sense that we are moving forward tangibly in increasing force protection." To date, the Army has procured 1,500 ballistic windshields and 1,160 armor-plating kits. No figures were immediately available on how much the items cost, or what accounts the Army was funding them from.

OBSERVATIONS:

Chamorro killed in Iraq Army specialist's vehicle fired upon

By Iraqi forces, Theresa Merto Pacific Daily News Brian Forde/Pacific Daily News/bforde@guampdn.com

www.guampdn.com/news/stories/20031212/localnews/17109.html

Christopher Wesley, 25, right, who was killed Dec. 8 in Iraq, is pictured in this family photo with his mother, Rose Marie Wesley, 45, center, and his sister, Vanessa Marie Wesley Salas, 15.

Vanessa Wesley Salas, 15, is comforted by her aunt, Dawn Llamelo, last night after being informed of the death of her brother, Christopher Wesley, in Iraq. Army officials came to Mayor Joseph Wesley's house in Santa Rita and told family members of the casualty. Mayor Joseph Wesley is the uncle of Christopher Wesley.

ROSARY

Rosary for Christopher Jude Rivera Wesley is scheduled to be held at 7 p.m. today at Our Lady of Guadalupe Church in Santa Rita.

TO THE POINT

Army Spc. Christopher Jude Rivera Wesley was killed Monday in Iraq. The 25-year-old Wesley is the first confirmed Chamorro casualty of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Two candles flickered last night near a framed photo of Army Spc. Christopher Jude Rivera Wesley, who died in Iraq this week, marking the first confirmed Chamorro casualty of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

At 7:05 p.m. yesterday, three representatives from the Army arrived at the doorstep of Christopher Wesley's uncle's Santa Rita home to officially deliver the news.

The 25-year-old Army specialist died Dec. 8 in Iraq after the vehicle he was driving was attacked by Iraqis, said his uncle, Santa Rita Mayor Joseph Wesley, citing Army officials who had spoken to the family. Christopher Wesley is survived by Rose Marie Wesley, 45; his sister, Vanessa Marie Wesley Salas, 15, and his brother, Ricky Wesley Salas, 9.

"He loved the Army," Joseph Wesley said. "He joined to protect his family."

About a dozen family members, including the Soldier's mom, wept last night after they received the tragic news.

"He was fighting to keep America free," Christopher Wesley's mother told the Army officials.

Christopher Wesley was driving an Army Stryker fighting vehicle on Dec. 8 in Iraq with two other Soldiers as his passengers, his uncle said.

"They met up with (enemies) from the other side and all of a sudden they started firing," said Joseph Wesley, who received the information from military officials. "The vehicle he was driving got shot, and it flipped over."

The News Tribune, a Tacoma, Wash., newspaper, reported on Dec. 11 that three Soldiers, from Fort Lewis, Wash., were killed Monday evening when two Stryker vehicles plunged from a collapsed embankment. The article named the 3rd Brigade, but did not name the three victims pending family notification.

A memorial is planned for noon Friday in Iraq for the three Soldiers. The Army is conducting an internal investigation, according to the news report written by an embedded reporter.

The incident occurred as infantrymen were beginning nighttime patrols in an area northeast of the Iraqi town of Duluiyah.

The report also noted that the deaths were the first in the brigade since it left Fort Lewis last month.

Calls were made to the Pentagon last night, but questions were referred to the Army. Attempts to reach Army officials in Washington, D.C., were unsuccessful.

Christopher Wesley was born in San Francisco and was the oldest of three children. After graduating from high school, he joined the Army but got out several years later, his uncle said.

"He wanted to go in first and experience the military then he realized that he wanted to help his grandma," Joseph Wesley said. "He wanted to come back. So he brought his grandma back home."

Christopher Wesley returned to Guam with his grandmother, Dolores Crisostomo Wesley, and lived here for four years in the '90s.

"He came to Guam when he was old enough already," Joseph Wesley said. "He wanted to learn everything about Guam."

While on Guam, Christopher Wesley worked at Inn on the Bay in Agat for several months and, during his free time, he enjoyed farming and fishing. He also loved the local food, especially chicken kelaguen and empanada.

He even learned the language, and understood and spoke a little Chamorro, the mayor said.

"He enjoyed the culture, the fiesta food, and most of it is the respect of the people," Joseph Wesley said. "His mom taught him to be a very respectful individual. He was a model for his brother and sister."

Although he loved Guam, he knew the job market on island was declining and rejoined the Army about two years ago, his uncle said.

Christopher Wesley wanted to be a part of the infantry where he was assigned. He enjoyed working with tanks and heavy equipment.

"He loves a challenge," Joseph Wesley said.

Christopher Wesley was stationed in Fort Lewis when he was activated for deployment to Iraq last month.

"He called his mom in Portland, Ore., that he has been activated by the president of the United States and Fort Lewis has been accounted for," Joseph Wesley said. He spent two weeks in Portland with his mom before he went to Iraq.

That was the last time she saw him alive.

'Serving the country'

Joseph Wesley said the family had first heard the news earlier yesterday from a friend who was house-sitting at Rose Wesley's home in Oregon.

A military official had stopped by the Oregon residence to deliver the news, but Rose Wesley was not home. She is on Guam for the funeral of her mother -- Christopher Wesley's grandmother who had helped raise him.

The friend called the family yesterday morning, but they did not get official word from authorities until last night.

Joseph Wesley said he had to call officials on island to find out if the news of his nephew's death was true.

"It is sad," he said, of the way they received word of the death.

Although Christopher Wesley was unable to return to Guam for his grandmother's funeral, his family said they knew he was there in spirit. Family members spoke with Christopher Wesley after Thanksgiving, when he found out about his grandmother's death.

It was the last time they heard his voice.

"He wanted to come home," Joseph Wesley said. "But again, he said he is serving the country and protecting us."

OBSERVATIONS:

ARMY STRYKERS PADLOCKED SHUT: TOP-HEAVY AND NO WAY TO GET OUT

Friday, December 12, 2003 - Page updated at 12:45 A.M.

Survivor of deadly Stryker plunge 'got air in his lungs, started praying'

By Hal Bernton and Ray Rivera
Seattle Times staff reporters

Army Pvt. Bryan Hall knew one thing: His life was not supposed to end this way.

Not by drowning. Not trapped inside an Army Stryker truck, which had flipped - upside down - into a rain-swollen irrigation ditch in Iraq.

Water began to pour into the vehicle, one of two Strykers that tumbled into the canal Monday night, Hall told his mother in a solemn phone call the next day.

Scared, crawling through the submerged, darkened vehicle, Hall said, he found a small pocket of air. Struggling and gasping, he yanked off his Kevlar helmet so he could cock his head and keep gulping air.

Killed Strykers soldiers identified

Name: Staff Sgt. Steven H. Bridges
Age: 33
From: Tracy, Calif.

Name: Spc. Joseph M. Blickenstaff
Age: 23
From: Corvallis, Ore.

Name: Spc. Christopher J. Rivera Wesley
Age: 26
From: Portland, Ore.

Source: Department of Defense

"He told me that he got air in his lungs and started praying," said Winnie O'Connor. "He said, 'This is not why I was sent here.' "

Two Soldiers in one vehicle and one Soldier in the other Stryker did not make it out alive, according to Master Sgt. Robert Cargie, an Army spokesman in Tikrit. It was not immediately clear how many of the Fort Lewis-based soldiers were in the two overturned Strykers.

The Army's Safety Center at Fort Rucker, Ala., has sent a three-man team to investigate the accident. They will join a similar incident team at the scene. These are the first fatalities involving the Strykers, which the Army contracted for production in 2000.

The names of the dead have not been released by the Army, in what has been a difficult first week in Iraq for the 3rd Brigade 2nd Infantry Division. The unit is built around 300 of the eight-wheeled armored Strykers, the first new Army fighting vehicle in more than 20 years. The brigade's deployment in Iraq is its first foray into combat duty.

The accident occurred north of Baghdad near the town of Ad Duluiyah. As the combat patrol of 12 Strykers drove alongside the canal, its bank collapsed, pitching two of the vehicles into the shallow water, their wheels sticking above the surface, according to Army officials.

The phone call from O'Connor's son came at 5 a.m. Tuesday, waking her up at her home in Vine Grove, Ky. "Just know that I'm OK. I'm alive and OK. We had a terrible accident," his mother recounted him saying.

About the Stryker

Each Stryker vehicle can carry up to 11 Soldiers and is designed to operate at a top speed of more than 60 mph. The Fort Lewis brigade is built around 309 Strykers, which cost about $2 million each and are outfitted with computers to help scout the enemy and communicate among units.

They are intended to offer more protection than Humvees and trucks, yet be quicker - and easier to ship to battle - than tanks. Army officials are planning to spend at least $9 billion to outfit six brigades with Strykers, and see them as a possible steppingstone to the force of the future.

The Fort Lewis 3rd Brigade 2nd Infantry Division is the first Stryker brigade to be certified for combat.

Hall was saved by other Soldiers on the patrol. He could hear them outside the vehicle, trying desperately to use bolt cutters to free a rear hatch door. It was unclear how the door was secured or locked.

The door is one of about a half-dozen ways to exit a Stryker. But most of the hatches are on the top, so they likely were blocked when the vehicle flipped.

The first pair of bolt cutters broke, Hall told his mother, sending rescuers scrambling for a second pair. They then were able to open the rear hatch.

O'Connor said that even after the five-minute phone call, she was unclear about her son's condition. Nor did she know exactly where he called from.

Hall is the youngest of three children, and his family is steeped in the military. His grandfather was a Vietnam veteran, his stepfather, Michael, retired from the Army, and his mother works at the Fort Knox Army base.

Last year, Hall worked for United Parcel Service and was planning to go to college. But instead, in February, weeks before the war started, he enlisted, O'Connor said.

O'Connor said she was surprised to hear that her son was on a combat patrol. Last month, he called from Kuwait to say he had injured himself in a fall off a Stryker and didn't expect to be able to go on any missions for about six months.

But O'Connor said her son, a crack shot, said he was needed for this week's combat patrol. It occurred in the region north of Baghdad that in recent months has been the scene of numerous insurgent attacks.

"He said, 'I'm a sharpshooter ... They had to send me.' "

Hal Bernton: 206-464-2581 or hbernton@seattletimes.com
Ray Rivera: 206-423-4700 or rrivera@seattletimes.com

The Army Times contributed to this story.

OBSERVATIONS:

Wouldn't surprise me at all if the Army is covering up the fact that the Strykers rolled over as a result of trying to escape hostile fire. Maybe the Iraqi resistance figured out that the Strykers can be shot up in the wheel wells killing the driver and one other crew member resulting in a loss of control causing the vehicle to flip over. That would be really embarrasing. If that came out Congress would probably cancel the whole program and hundreds if not thousands of U.S. Soldier's lives would be saved as a result.

The Stryker is ill-conceived as an infantry carrying vehicle for modern combat by a chain-reaction of bad decisions that compound its fatal flaws

The Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) concept

Current Army transformation programs are not informed by the realities of modern combat or rigorous testing and experimentation. While it is gratifying to see interest in the concepts of rotational readiness and unit cohesion, the disastrous decision to keep American Soldiers and units in Iraq for 12 months at a time reinforces my broader reservations about Army transformation. Today, our ground force is apparently exhausted and incapable of securing the stretch of road from downtown Baghdad to Iraq's international airport. Thus, my greatest concern is that the current thrust of Army transformation may actually reduce the Army's fighting power and operational flexibility just as the international environment is placing greater demands on our ground forces.

The Army right now has 4 divisions that are light without any armored vehicles that walks on foot or in rubber-tired trucks and 6 divisions that are heavy that are 50% in light, medium and heavy tracked armored fighting vehicles and the other half rides in the same rubber tired trucks as their light brethren use. The truck is thought to be acceptable because we will deploy to allegedly "safe" rear areas with the enemy to our front and we can shuttle men and supplies to this linear map geocoordinates without the enemy attacking our trucks. The non-linear battlefield of Iraq has smashed these wishful assumptions. However, for many the non-existent linear battlefield is still how they see the world. During 1990's Operation Desert Shield the Army rapidly deployed its light 82^nd Airborne Division to stand in the way of a possible Iraqi tank invasion into Saudi Arabia but it only had a battalion of light tanks, with most of its Paratroopers on foot. During the 1999 Kosovo crisis the Army took a long time to deploy its medium and heavy tracks. So in 199, Army Chief Shinseki abruptly without any internal Army debate, analysis, testing and experimentation to decided to create Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) based on the RAND Aeromotorization report using armored trucks to carry 9-man infantry squads calling them "Interim Armored Vehicles" (IAVs).

There are 3 main ideas or goals undergirding the chosen wheeled IBCT/IAV concept:

a. The IAV must be able to fly by USAF C-130 aircraft to rapidly deploy anywhere in the world within 96 hours by being under 20 tons, to include flying 4-6 at a time in larger C-17s

b. IAV must drive on the ground at 10 mph faster than tracks with computers with situational awareness to avoid being hit at all by enemy weaponry

c. IAV must save the Army money by being available now without research & development tinkering and not tear up the countryside by rolling gently on air-filled rubber tires

Counter-Points

1. The fact is that the Army already owns 14, 500 M113 Gavin light armored tracks, with thousands in storage that at 10.5 tons are not only C-130 air-transportable they are certified for parachute airdrop. 5 can fly at a time to meet RAND's desired C-17 criteria. Therefore, the Army already owns "IAVs" that are combat-proven and available at zero purchase costs.

2. With a 50 mph top speed, fitted with band tracks, M113 Gavins can attain the exact same 60 mph road speeds as trucks and have plenty of room inside to carry command, control, communications, computers, intelligence surveillance reconnaissance gear (C4ISR).

3. By having far lighter ground pressure by its wide tracks, M113 Gavins even with steel tracks are far more cross country mobile and are gentler on civilian roads than armored trucks with 20-40 PSI ground pressures. Since the Army already owns enough Gavins to fully transform all its light divisions the Army would save billions of dollars by not having to purchase new vehicles, only upgrade vehicles it has in storage. M113 Gavins are proven inexpensive to operate with the exact 3.5 mpg fuel rate of armored trucks but without the break down and repair costs.

Clearly, both the RAND authors and Shinseki lumped M113 Gavin light tracks in with the pitfalls of medium and heavy tracks and the latter miscalculated and misapplied the former's concept.

Motorized Infantry and "Cherry Picking" when/where we fight is unsound and unrealistic

The Army's Stryker doctrinal manuals claim infantry will dismount early when its thought to be safe via computer network information-sharing so the Stryker vehicle will not have to be used by our troops to fight the enemy in close combat. Then later, these same manuals boast of how Strykers will protect their Soldiers somehow with its thin cocoon.

Perfect situational awareness, (SA) the key underlying assumption of the Army's Stryker brigades and future combat system is an illusion, or perhaps a delusion. Situational awareness promises that information about the enemy and his intentions will always be available when it is needed. It also assumes that everyone inside the battlespace will create and exploit information in exactly the same way.

As a result, situational awareness demands a greater level of technological capability than is attainable today or in the decades ahead. Most important, there is no evidence that plentiful networked information can replace killing power and inherent survivability, especially in close combat. Timely and useful information is critical, but it cannot substitute for firepower, mobility and armored protection.

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, despite unparalleled intelligence assets, most of the fighting on the ground was characterized by the participants as resulting from meeting engagements-battles in which American forces unexpectedly bumped into the enemy. The 3^rd Infantry Division's After Action Review states:

"No degree of IPB (Intelligence Preparation of the Batlefield) could compensate, alert, or prepare any U.S. force for the massive numbers of RPGs (Rocket Propelled Grenades) stored in houses, shacks, lockers, and cars. The only way to counter RPGs fired from covered and concealed positions was to absorb the hit, identify the source of the fire, and respond with massive overwhelming firepower."

No one should have been surprised. Land warfare is by its very nature chaotic. No technologies or systems exist to prevent such surprises in towns, cities or complex terrain populated by non-combatants and systems on today's drawing boards are unlikely to be effective for many, many years-if ever.

As experience in Iraq demonstrates, another flawed assumption is the belief that strategic speed (deployment) is worth sacrificing protection and firepower. What the Army does after it arrives in a theater of crisis or conflict is much more important than how fast it gets there. Formidable Army ground forces can be organized, equipped, trained, and postured through a joint rotational readiness system to deploy a powerful force in a matter of days and decisively influence events. Getting a light force to the same place a few hours or days sooner does not have the same effect. In fact, it may produce a speedy defeat rather than a decisive victory.

Large quantities of light infantry with nothing more than the weapons they can carry after they dismount to attack from either up-armored HMMWVs or Strykers will sustain heavy losses. Light infantry is not designed to lead penetration attacks into urban areas or against any prepared enemy defense and should never be used in that role. For light Infantry to succeed, it must be integrated with real tracked mobility, devastating firepower, and armored protection so that it does not become a road-bound paramilitary police force subject to blockade and ambush. If we stay on the current intellectual path, we risk fielding Army units that will end up like the tracked vehicle-less 1^st Cavalry Division in the Ia Drang valley, calling for air strikes on its own position to avoid annihilation. The 3^rd ID AAR comments:

"Tanks and Bradleys repeatedly sustained hits from RPG's and ground directed anti-aircraft fire that dismounted infantrymen, HMMWVs and other light skinned vehicles could not sustain. Bradleys successfully protected the infantrymen inside while at the same time delivering a massive volume of fire against dismounted enemy, trucks, tanks, and armored vehicles. The firepower and shock generated by tanks and Bradleys could never have been matched by dismounted infantry. Without the use of these systems initially, the enemy would have caused many more casualties."

The greatest irony is that our current inventory of tanks and armored fighting vehicles actually arrive as quickly as the so-called light force. In the future, Army forces arriving from the air or the sea must include heavy and/or light, medium weight armor - M1 Abrams, M2 Bradleys, M113 Gavins and platforms similar to the M8 Buford Armored Gun System and Tracer equipped with hybrid-electric engines and band track, respectively. These platforms and systems are capable of augmenting light infantry and punching through enemy forces with devastating effect. Ultimately, airpower, armor, stand-off attack in the form of UCAVS, mortars and artillery, special operations forces, engineers and infantry all must cooperate in contemporary combat. But armored forces are central to dominating the enemy on the non-linear contested ground with impunity.

The current Stryker brigade combat team lacks the joint C4ISR, firepower, protection, mobility and organic logistical support to be a full-dimensional warfighting organization and its operational utility will continue to be limited to peace support or paramilitary police operations. A glance at the Stryker brigade in Northern Iraq provides ample evidence for this statement. The Army's senior leadership wisely decided to keep the Stryker brigade remote from the scene of the action in Central Iraq where the lethal quality of close combat might inflict serious casualties on it. Frankly, in peace support operations, the block III LAV with its stabilized 25mm chain gun with stand-off engagement capability, though lighter and never designed for close combat, is more lethal and less expensive than the Stryker carrier which has just an impotent, must stop-to-shoot, unstabilized .50 caliber machine gun with 200 rounds.

According to its published doctrine, the Stryker brigade is designed to move light infantry quickly on primary or secondary roads to a point where the infantry will dismount and conduct combat operations on foot with unstabilized machine guns and, eventually, 105mm guns on Strykers in support, presuming the mobile gun system can be made to work.

This approach is familiar to anyone who has read tactical manuals for mechanized infantry in the 1960s training in the pinelands of Fort Benning, Georgia. In anything but an environment where the enemy's anti-armor, artillery and mining capabilities are slim to nonexistent, these tactics are a prescription for mass slaughter. The lethality of small arms, RPGs and roadside bombs is simply too great.

Lastly, the claim that this formation can deploy into action anywhere in the world on C-130s in 96 hours is not supported by empirical evidence. Given the size, weight and volume of wheeled armored vehicles, the Stryker brigade is not suitable for strategic air lift and will deploy as a unit via sealift as seen quite recently when the Stryker brigade currently serving in Iraq arrived via ship in Kuwait City harbor.

The unsoundness of the wheeled IAV dubbed "Stryker"

Despite the M113 Gavin based IAV tracks beating the wheeled LAV-III wheeled trucks in both the platform performance demonstration and the later Congressionally-mandated comparison evaluations, the Army chooses to spend billions of dollars and precious time needed to get ready for actual war on handfuls of rubber-tired trucks. 4 years of this tinkering with a handful of brigades with very expensive LAV-III thinly armored trucks called "Strykers" results in the Army right now being unprepared for non-linear combats in Afghanistan/Iraq where the enemy can attack at any time in any direction, blowing our men up in their trucks with roadside bombs, rocket propelled grenades, molotov cocktail (lit bottles of fuel) and massed small arms fire. The 60, 70 and even 80 mph speeding on predictable paved roads in the Army's trucks has not prevented the enemy from command detonating land mines instantly by remote cell phones and garage door openers to inflict the majority of the over 900 dead and 4,000 serious wounds our troops have suffered in Iraq.

The Combat History of Armored cars & Trucks is dismal

The Russians were defeated in Afghanistan due in large part by the lack of mobility of their BTR 8x8 armored trucks very much like the Stryker 8x8 truck. Details:

www.combatreform.org/lavdanger.htm

The French defeat in the first Indo-China war was hastened by their use of wheeled armored cars and trucks that could not deviate from roads flanked with concealing vegetation rife for enemy ambushes.

The 3 Enduring Vehicle Physical Design Factors that Never change

ALL armored vehicles have a pyramid of design attributes they must balance; mobility, protection and firepower. All 3 of these factors interact and effect the other. You add heavy weaponry this costs you in weight and this reduces mobility. Having ammunition stored that can be set off if the enemy hits it adversely effects protection.

/\

Mobility

/ \

/ \

/ \

Protection------------------Firepower

Protection

The desire to fully armor enclose a 9-man infantry squad is NOT new. From the beginning of applying internal combustion engines to armored ground vehicles we have wanted to carry infantry safely inside. However, steel metal is very heavy. To get the needed volume for 9 plus men either your steel is very thin as in WWI tanks or you sacrifice protection with an open top as WWII half-tracks had. The steel we use today has the same limitation as we had back then. To stop a non-armor piercing, .30 caliber (7.62mm diameter) "ball" bullet you need 1/2 inch thick hard steel. To protect against explosions you need softer steel to absorb the blast and larger fragment shrapnel so a compromise is made in the smelter's pot. However, try as we did after WWII, we could not fully enclose a 9-man infantry squad with adequate steel in an armored vehicle under 15 tons, we could do it at greater weight with the resultant poor mobility that the vehicle could not go where the infantry can walk. Infantry was still exposed. This reality for the most part still exists today. A turreted light tank that does not have to carry infantry is far more compact and has always been possible out of steel.

The solution for fully armor protecting a 9-man infantry squad is armored aluminum that is both hard and soft to stop both armor piercing bullets and explosion effects that is 3 times thicker than steel but at much less weight. The M113 Gavin is made out of 1.5 inch thick aluminum alloy armor and the LAV-III/Stryker is made out of thin 1/2 steel. The hull of an armored vehicle has to do two things:

1. Hold together the entire propulsion system
2. Armor protect

Another reality is that all Army vehicles with solid armored hulls require drivers and "steerers" (commanders) working with heads and torso out to see properly. Vehicles with window glass can have troops operate from inside, but windows are restrictive in peripheral vision, get dirty and are vulnerable spots that cannot stop RPGs and heavy machine gun bullets even if made of "bullet proof" glass. As these Soldiers fight "unbuttoned" they need protection in front of their guns (gunshields) and themselves (shields). The Stryker does not come with shields for its Driver and Squad Leader though I have seen the HMMWV shield attached to the Gunner's remote weapon system. While shields can be applied to Strykers this yet again more weight on the very top of an already top heavy and large target for the enemy. The M113 Gavin already has combat proven moving ACAV steel gunshields for the Track commander and rear compartment troops, the Israeli's Kasman fixed shields have vision ports of ballistic glass and the vehicle's maker offers clear shielding kits. These shields when fitted to the M113 Gavin neither make it top-heavy or weighs them down because extra reserve power to move this added weight exists and the vehicle is very compact with a low center of gravity.

Mobility

Strategic, Operational: Air Transportability

Airland: Strykers cannot fly by C-130s, can fly no faster by C-17 than existing Army Light and Medium Armored Vehicles

The first Army miscalculation was not reading the RAND Aeromotorization report carefully enough; it called for 14 ton LAV-1s like the USMC uses. Instead, the Army Chief chose the much heavier LAV-III which at 17 tons "vanilla" ie: thin steel box on 8 rubber tires and engine is already too heavy for C-130 Hercules airland where there is no fuel facilities. The C-130 needs fuel in its wings not only for structural strength (re the firefighting plane whose wings snapped off) but to fly itself back to where it came from. MTMC's Joe Cassidy wrote an unchallenged report that explains that the C-130's payload limit for airlanding into unimproved runways is 16 tons. The 19-21 ton LAV-III/Stryker is already too heavy before putting C4ISR electronics, remote weapon system and troop gear on. Thus, to simply fit and not be too heavy to take off in a common USAF C-130H, each Stryker 9-man squad has to strip their vehicle of most gear and fly in another C-130, while only a driver and possibly the vehicle commander flies with the truck. Even after all of this, the C-130H can only fly a stripped down Stryker for 200 miles-unless we are fighting the enemy in Topeka, Kansas from Wichita, Kansas C-130s are not going to globally deploy Strykers anywhere. The Stryker with 5,000 pound bird cage will not even fit into a C-130, so it will land unprotected from RPGs. The Army demurs by saying Strykers will not airland into areas threatened by enemies, this excuse has been vetoed constantly by the enemy for over the last year in Iraq. Today's 10 division Army cannot guarantee any of its ground is free of enemy attacks on the non-linear battlefield. This is not WWII where we had 100 divisions to fully clear out large swaths of the earth of all enemy belligerents. That the Stryker cannot fly combat ready, with its own 9-man infantry squad fully armed and ready to fight but has to be pieced together from two C-130s that can only go 200 miles tops disqualifies it as a C-130 air transportable vehicle for an U.S. Army that needs to cross thousand mile plus oceans. Stryker fails the first reason the Army stated it needed IBCTs for which is to rapidly air-deploy.

Another problem is that even the stripped down Stryker by being a space and weight inefficient wheeled truck blocks any safety aisle for the crew and any Army personnel on board from reaching the two side Paratroop doors and rear ramp to escape if the plane crashes and catches fire. The only way to reach the rear exits is by carefully climbing one man at a time over the top of the hight Stryker and squeezing between the remote weapon system. With an aircraft that can burn up and explode in seconds this is not acceptable. Flying the Stryker in a C-130 is unsafe from human escape needs as well as overtaxing 30+ year old airplane's payload capabilities.

In sharp contrast, M113 Gavins by their more compact size and lighter weight can be transported long distances over 1,000 miles by C-130s to global hot spots fully combat loaded with their 9-man infantry squad on board, ready-to-fight. In fact, compact RPG resistant spaced armor can be fitted to the M113 Gavin and a safety aisle can still exist for troop safety. The Gavin is also far lower than the Stryker so troops can also easily climb over the top if wider reactive armor tiles are fitted. The point is the Gavin comes out of the Hercules ready to fight with full protection and it can do this without endangering the aircrew and troops on board the plane.

Because the Stryker is so wide, it cannot be loaded side-by-side even in the very wide C-17 Globemaster III jet. Since it has to be loaded sing file, and it being a very long 253 inch vehicle, only 2-3 Strykers can fit in a C-17; failing the RAND criteria that at least 4-6 vehicles fit for maximum transport efficiency. I say 2-3 because the third Stryker rests half on the aircraft floor and half on the raised ramp, an awkward and fundamentally unsound position in a cargo aircraft, but the C-17 is very robust. If I were a loadmaster, I wouldn't do it, no C-17 has ever crashed since service in 1993 and I wouldn't want to be the first by overtaxing the ramp hinge. With a maximum airland load capacity of 80 tons, the C-17 can airland 2 new M2A3 or 3 M2A0 old Bradley medium infantry fighting vehicles. Since the C-130 can't air-deliver Strykers, why would any combat commander choose a pair of thin-skinned Strykers with an unstabilized mere .50 caliber heavy machine gun that cannot go cross country, cannot shoot on-the-move, easily mobility killed by attacking its rubber tires when he could have the same number of Bradleys? Bradleys can shoot-on-the-move with 25mm, TOW ATGM and 7.62mm medium machine gun weaponry, go off-road, are protected against 30mm autocannon, ATGMs and RPGs while carrying their infantry. Another option would be 5 M113A3 Gavins which not only are more cross-country mobile than Bradleys, are light enough to have Bradley and other type 20-40mm autocannon turrets fitted while still retaining C-130 transportability because we have more vehicle power and payload parameters to work within.

Airdrop: Strykers cannot land by cargo parachutes

Before dismissing the need to airland ready-to-fight as just a "nice-to-have" consider that the Army recently chose to spend $500,000 to try to make the mobile gun system Stryker (Stryker-MGS) parachute airdrop for the 82^nd Airborne Division who actually requested M8 Buford Armored Gun System light tanks that are already Army certified for paradrop. The vanilla Stryker-Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV) cannot airland from a C-130 with just troops with rifles and machine guns yet the Army is trying to slap a 105mm gun and ammunition on top of the already oversized and overweight Stryker and parachute airdrop it. After a parachute drop, any vehicle must be combat ready not pieced together hours later. MTMC's Joe Cassidy has also written a report on Stryker-MGS parachute airdrop and has concluded that at 22 tons its already disqualified from the 21 ton parachute system the Army uses. The 42,000 pound low velocity airdrop (LVAD) system is the maximum load a C-130 can drop since it doesn't have to airland which has a 16 ton limit. So he then turns to the larger C-17 jet transport; the problem is that a larger LVAD system is needed; the 60,000 pound system is not certified and ready. Even if it were available, there is only 118 inches of rear ramp airdrop clearance on the C-17 and the Stryker-MGS stands at 106 inches high even after they redesigned the hull to lower it. The Stryker-MGS will have to sit on top of a type V airdrop platform on top of honeycomb shock-absorbing cardboard stacks attached to extraction and descent parachutes and clear the C-17's rear ramp safely. If all air is removed from its 8 tires it will belly rest on the stacks and take the entire impact G forces into its hull and sensitive C4ISR electronics. Even if it can fit through the C-17 rear ramp with the uncertified 60K LVAD system, it like all other wheeled trucks needs a Heavy Drop De-rigging System (HDDS) which is nylon straps attached to front tires to pull itself OFF the honey comb stacks on the drop zone. HDDS requires inflated tires to grip and yank the bellied vehicle from the stacks. Whether HDDS can work while Paratroopers somehow generate compressed air under fire on an open danger area drop zone to fill up 8 rubber tires is doubtful and an unwise predicament to put our men in. Particularly since M113 Gavin infantry carriers and M8 Buford light tanks are readily available that can paradrop from existing 42K LVAD systems to include C-130 delivery without any problems.

When questioned by Congresswoman Loretta Sanchez about the viability of "air-mechanized" operations, Army Chief General Peter Schoomaker lied about the recent Airborne operation into Northern Iraq and tried to deceive Congress about the Stryker as being the only way to give light infantry armored mobility. First, he said we flew in "Tanks and Brads" (Bradleys) to reinforce the 173^rd Airborne Brigade's Paratroopers who had seized a runway/airfield. This is not true; the majority of the force from the 1^st Infantry Division was two infantry companies in M113A3 Gavin light tracked AFVs, Then to further the deception he quipped that "had we had Strykers available we could have given the infantry better mobility". We had M113A3 Gavins giving the 1^st ID's infantry armored mobility, these same vehicles could have and should have been supplied rto the 173^rd's Paratroopers; they were and still are available. Trying to deceive Congress into thinking only Strykers are C-17 airland capable to render armored mobility for our infantry is not only immoral in light of the way or troops are suffering in combat now on foot and in HMMWV trucks, it's a felony. General Schoomaker should be rebuked and called on the carpet for his lies on this issue, and made to not only apologize but start fully employing available M113 Gavins by our Airborne and Air Assault forces.

Air Asault: Strykers cannot fly by helicopters

At 19-22 tons Stryker trucks are not even sling-load transportable by USMC CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters let alone the Army's 12 ton payload limited CH-47D/F Chinooks. In stark contrast, the 10.5 ton M113A3 Gavin can be air assaulted by Army CH-47D/F helicopters if the Army chose to transform its foot-mobile 101^st Airborne (Air Assault Division).

Tactical Ground Mobility

Strykers cannot go cross-country

Planet Earth is essentially unchanged from the time that Winston Churchill led the development of the tracked tank in 1916. Wheeled armored cars and trucks could not then and still cannot today traverse trenches, mud and soft soil conditions due to their high ground pressures of their rubber tires sinking into the ground and then slipping and/or becoming mired. Strykers in Iraq are constantly getting stuck when they try to venture off pavement so any claims by wheeled vehicle manufacturers that some sort of new wheeled technology has made the armored truck cross country mobile are false. Bigger, fatter tires with run flat inserts and central tire inflation systems (CTIS) have failed to make armored trucks cross country mobile. Stryker Soldiers drive in constant fear that if they venture off road they will be stuck; in contrast light tracked AFV crews can boldly venture off road with confidence that they will not be stuck; the latter is functional cross country mobility. If you cannot drive off road with confidence and decide to take paths cross country to perform missions then you are not cross country mobile. 19-22 ton Strykers are not cross country mobile because their weight smothers any possible tire floatation over soft ground. Its wrong to equate 4 wheel civilian truck enthusiasts in unarmored sport utility vehicles weighing less than 3 tons being able to go off road because they float via high engine torque (HMMWV) or fast RPM (Dune Buggies) with a 19-22 ton heavy Stryker truck with much higher ground pressures. Even wheeled SUVs will get stuck when their tires can no longer grip the ground due to mud and/or slope, obstacles that track-laying vehicles can rumble over.

When you poorly design a vehicle like the M114 and Stryker, you negate any positives, in this case having the hull overhang in front of the tracks and wheels causes it to snag on uneven ground ahead.

M114 track stuck in Vietnam

Stryker truck stuck...and struggling to negotiate small ruts

www.geocities.com/armysappersforward/amphigavins.htm

Blind Strykers eaily swarmed by angry mobs

The Stryker is a fatally blind vehicle that simply can't allow potential enemies to even get close: this also means that Soldiers can't let civilians get close to effect liaison safely from within the vehicle as is routinely done from M113s which also have gunshields available. Stryker Soldiers will have to always get out of their vehicle to communicate with civilians, and if they turn into an angry mob will be overwhelmed physically as 4 marines were recently during a foot patrol in Fallujah. If civilian mobs swarm around Strykers, their Soldiers cannot fight out from the top troop hatches to keep grenades and bottles filled with oil and gasoline from being tossed into their bird cages and at their rubber tires, immobilizing the vehicle and setting it on fire. You don't want to be in any vehicle full of ammunition, fuel and high explosives that has caught on fire.

Strykers cannot rumble over urban obstacles

The Stryker cannot be assumed capable of driving itself out of trouble, either. To turn a Stryker it must travel forward over its wheels and "Y" turn back and forth if there isn't the required hundred feet or so. In tight urban streets under enemy fire, we cannot afford our Soldiers to be playing "Austin Powers" trying to inch forward and back to get out of the enemy's kill zone. If the enemy has around the corner set up barricaded cars the Strykers cannot drive over them to get out like M113 or any other of the Army's tracked vehicles can. If the Stryker tries to drive over a barricaded car its belly will stick on the car body and its tires will spin futilely in the air, the Stryker will be stuck and a sitting duck target. Its 8 run-flats inside each 8 air-filled rubber tire will increase the flames as the rubber tires burn furiously, sending toxic smoke into the hull and igniting nylon troop gear and ammunition stowed all around and inside the vehicle. The Stryker's HALON fire extinguisher system will fire, killing the engine from operating again until fully cleaned and robbing the troops inside of all of the oxygen they need to breath. Faced with asphyxiating or burning-to-death, the troops will drop the rear ramp and get the heck out of the Stryker. The problem is that an enemy Soldier with an AK-47 assault rifle could be waiting for the ramp to drop open and empty a 30-round magazine of 7.62mm bullets into these American bodies just like how we saw D-Day recreated in the movie "Saving Private Ryan" when landing craft ramps went down in front of enemy machine gun fires.

The Army's "solution" is to not have Soldiers ride in Strykers!!!

How long will be able to define an "edge" of the battlefield when there are no lines of safety/danger is unclear? What is the point of a $3.3 million each truck that is too dangerous to ride in? The troops are having to march almost as far as if they had no vehicles at all.

The physical blindness of the Stryker cannot be excused away by just saying it lacked "testing" when those test results would simply be forged and altered to give the senior Army leaders--some of whom now work for GDLS---the results they wanted to see. What is going to happen unless Congress cancels any further Stryker purchases is the enemy is going to "blind side" a bunch of American young men thinking they are still somehow safe in the Stryker because they haven't reached their distant dismount point yet and are in some kind of fantasy "rear area" marked as such on a computer screen. There are no safe, rear areas on the non-linear battlefield. Enemy attacks can come from any direction at any time

Strykers simply cannot bring their understrength squad of Soldiers to necessary close dismount points out of fear of getting stuck or being ambushed--or worse, both---which forces them to dismount and walk long distances from their objectives negating any rest they received riding in a vehicle touted for its reduced vibration/noise. What's less of a hum-in-your-head if you now have to march 5-10 miles with 100 pounds of gear on your back because your vehicle is too fragile and has to stay out of danger at all costs? What happens if the enemy all around on the non-linear battlefield, refuses to cooperate and attacks your blind and mobility handicapped Stryker without any troops around to protect it like the Stryker that was torched by RPGs shot into its rear fuel tanks in Mosul? Remember they had to dismount and early short of the objective to try to keep the Stryker out of trouble? The Driver and Gunner jumped from the Stryker as it burned up and the Army then brags that the vehicle somehow "protected them" but fails to admit that the Stryker's inability to go where the infantry dismounts go put the isolated crew in the life-or-death predicament in the first place!

Firepower

Firepower is an "icing" that is applied to the vehicle's hull and propulsion "cake". If the vehicle can handle the weight, recoil and size of the weaponry, its firepower can be greater than what a man can generally hand carry. The Stryker uses a slow-turning Remote Weapon System (RWS) that has the gunner down in the hull looking through unstabilized day and night optics. The RWS shoots either a .50 caliber or 40mm heavy machine gun, the former with a box of 200 rounds that can be shot up in less than 1 minute of firing. The entire vehicle has to stop for the gun to shoot accurately, making it an easy target for enemies with vehicles with stabilized weaponry and foot Soldiers with RPGs, hand grenades, satchel charges ala Saving Private Ryan. To reload the Gunner has to open his hatch and expose himself to open up the machine gun, lay down the belt in the can or replace the can entirely, then lay the belt edge down into the open feedtray, close the feed tray, recock the weapon twice and then duck back down into the hull.

The "vanilla" M113 Gavin has the ability to mount .50 caliber and 40mm heavy machine guns behind gunshields fired by the track commander who is not limited by optics. The troops in back can stand and face outward behind gunshields rendering their automatics rifles and light, medium machine gun firepower in all 360 degrees of directions. This is what is needed to protect the vehicle from close-range attacks and prevail on the NLB. We wouldn't have to settle for an impotent RWS with the Gavin since it has extra power and weight capacity; optimally a 1 man power operated, stabilized 20-40mm autocannon turret like used on the USMC AAV-7 would render Bradley level fire-on-the-move firepower while still enabling the troops in back to see out and contribute to the fight.

Situational Awareness

Too many equate "situational awareness" (SA) with a new electronic mental gadget. The first and most direct SA is the physical kind by operating your vehicle with your head out and eyes open behind gunshields.

Stryker is physically blind

Most Soldiers in Strykers ride buttoned up and NOT situationally aware: blind spots everywhere for those with their heads out.

The following explains the internal seating arrangement and functions of the baseline Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV).

The Driver sits at the left front, the diesel engine is to his right. He can raise his seat to drive with his head out from an open hatch but CANNOT SEE TO HIS REAR because the hull behind him blocks his view.

Squad Leader (SL) sits behind the Driver: he CANNOT SEE TO RIGHT OF THE VEHICLE because he is blocked by the Remote Weapon System (RWS)

The Gunner to the right of SL, sits under the RWS: he CANNOT SEE OUTSIDE OF VEHICLE at all, only through his optics.

The Platoon Sergeant or Platoon Leader (PL) sits behind the Gunner looking at the FBCB2 computer screen and CANNOT SEE OUTSIDE OF VEHICLE at all.

The remaining 4 (not 5) Dismount Soldiers cannot stand on seats to reach the two small top troop hatches which are for emergency use only escapes: they CANNOT SEE OUTSIDE OF VEHICLE at all. There are no gunshields to protect them if they could stand up through the two small hatches.

6 out of the actual maximum 8 Soldiers that can ride in a Stryker cannot even see outside their own vehicle! One can only see to his front and left. The Driver cannot see to his rear. The only person in a Stryker who can see somewhat in 3 directions is the DRIVER! The Squad Leader can't see through the remote weapon system on his right, a fatal blind spot for the enemy to attack with RPGs and/or molotov cocktails. He must spend most of his time directing the driver where to go and has no mounted weapon and gunshield to engage enemies even if he can see them. He must duck down into his hatch if the slow-turning remote weapon system machine gun is to fire to its left. The Gunner down in the hull, looks through an unstabilized optic so as the Stryker moves, all he sees is a blur; to fire, the vehicle must stop and be a sitting duck to the enemy. The PL or platoon sergeant (PSG) behind the Gunner can't see what's going on for real outside the vehicle like you can from the top troop hatch of a M113. He is staring at a computer screen and typing email messages, detached from physical reality around him. His real-world situational awareness is nil.

The Stryker is fatally blind and unsafe for combat; it cannot carry a fully-equipped 9-man infantry squad and should be immediately cancelled by Congress for failing to meet stated Army requirements.

The 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) and Special Forces Soldiers say M113 Gavins with infantry facing out from top troop hatches behind gun shields are best for non-linear, urban combats. At just 73 inches high, the Gavin can be used to converse with civilians from the vehicle while being safe from most close-in attacks. Details:

www.geocities.com/paratroop2000/armoredhmmwvsstrykersfail.htm

Here is a picture of M113A3 Gavins on patrol in Iraq, demonstrating their excellent situational awareness from the top hatches though they lack the gunshields and extra armor they are supposed to have:

www.combatreform.org/m113a3Gavinsonpatrolinbaghdad.jpg

The 3rd ID lessons learned from the Iraq nation-state conflict, from Chapter 7 at:

www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2004/onpoint

"As the Army fields Stryker Brigades and continues transformation, the OIF experience will influence combat development. Tanks and Bradleys performed brilliantly in OIF, but they did not meet all of the operational requirements. Despite their advantages in armor, tanks and Bradleys evinced a number of disadvantages --they could not elevate their weapons far enough to fire at the upper floors of buildings from close range. But as 3rd ID discovered, the lowly M113, full of engineers armed to the teeth, could engage the second and third stories."

An Army Special Forces Soldier in Iraq NOW during the sub-national conflict writes:

"You betcha. Brads are great for rolling around like a turtle and knowing nothing can touch you, but the problem with the insurgents here is that every time they take a shot at you and no one shoots back, they get bolder.

Now, take my boys in 91st engineers. We roll around with a gun in the tub, the back top open and guys hanging out with ARs and optics.

Go ahead, step out from behind that building against riflemen who are

excellent snap shooters.....and can engage 360 degrees and up and down almost 180 degrees.....pretty much wherever they can point the rifle.

In a M113, this is almost everywhere.

Just my firsthand experience day after day in Gazalea and Abu Graib.

XXXX"

Stryker is mentally blind about the enemy

There is no manned observation and attack fixed wing aircraft or enough UAVs flying over Iraq to create a tactical internet for the Stryker's FBCB2 screens to have meaningful information on the enemy. The entire digital battlefield where enemy targets are turned into computer icons could only possibly exist in all out nation-state war against inept opponents operating in the open without masking terrain (Desert Storm). Without someone "cooking" a tactical internet "lunch" the Stryker's computer screens are just empty of enemy data.

Safety

Strykers are top-heavy and prone to fatal roll-over accidents

The 19-21 ton Stryker is already a top-heavy vehicle that is prone to roll-over by its very nature of being a heavy metal box slapped on top of 8 wheels and suspensions. Tracked vehicles are more compact and though its counter-intuitive, are 28% more weight/space efficient than wheeled armored vehicles because their hulls can be smaller to deliver a given volume of space. Though the M113 is smaller externally than a Stryker so its a harder to hit by enemy fires, it can actually easily carry a fully-equipped 9-man infantry squad because its got better available volume. Its compactness results in low center-of-gravity stability so its not top-heavy even when carrying lots of gear. Yet when all of the troop gear goes either inside or strapped to the outside of the Stryker, since its a 1/2 inch thin metal box SITTING HIGH ON TOP OF the 8 wheeled suspension and drive train every item carried is above the centerline of gravity making the vehicle dangerously top-heavy. When it was pointed out by DoD's Testing Director Tom Christie that the thin metal hull and 8 rubber tires will not protect against rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) the Army rushed to have a 5,000 pound "bird cages" bolted to the outside of every Stryker in Iraq to pre-detonate RPGs but at the cost of making the Strykers even more top-heavy and prone to roll-overs. In the first days of operations in Iraq, two Strykers rolled over killing 3 Soldiers. Afterwards in typical Army fashion of denying problems exist and solving them by admitting that the Stryker is a mistake, vehicle speeds were reduced and crews ordered not to leave paved roads.

But don't take my word for it, someone in Congress needs to subpoena or Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA) request from the Army Safety Center at Fort Rucker, Alabama to release all of the actual roll-overs and accidents the Strykers have had from Fort Lewis, to NTC and now Iraq. The Stryker holds the record for the most roll-overs ever by any unit at NTC and we just had another two Soldiers killed in Iraq when it merely swerved to avoid a civilian car. Its too bad Ralph Nader was not a military safety advocate to tackled this unsafe-at-any-speed "Corvair" in Army green.

Reliability & Costs

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Mobility

/ \

/ \

/ \

Protection------------------Firepower

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Reliability & Costs

The foundation for any vehicle to operate is its reliability against the forces of the earth itself which don't want it to run at all and the human societal costs to keep it running. If your vehicle design pyramid is weak, heavy and inefficient its going to constantly collapse and have to be propped up by maintenance and constant repairs driving up costs. A wheeled armored truck pressing down heavily upon fragile drivetrains, suspension and steering is prone to break-down; a tracked armored vehicle is actually simpler. Details:

www.geocities.com/wheelsvstracks

The Stryker is a constantly collapsing pyramid. Its bad enough that the army had the "sticker price shock" of $3.3 million each it now has spiraling maintenance costs to try to keep unreliable Stryker vehicles operating because they are fundamentally ill conceived by design (mobility, protection, firepower, situational awareness). To purchase Strykers, the Army had to neglect the majority of the rest of its Soldiers/units, to maintain and operate them this neglect robs the rest of the Army of needed armor, vehicle upgrades. The Stryker choice of a new purchase, wheeled armored truck was never feasible as a fix to transform the entire Army. To squander the majority of the Army's funds on a handful of increasingly costly truck brigades when there are over 33 brigades to reform for actual, on-going non-linear combats is fiscally irresponsible and morally bankrupt.

The are just 300 Strykers in quiet northern Iraq. There are over 1,700 M113 Gavins in combat all over Iraq now, and receiving no Army modernization funds. The majority of our 130,000 troops in Iraq have to ride in 12,000 unarmored HMMWV trucks. An official Army internal document reveals that the 300 wheeled Strykers in Iraq are already in need of $111 million in repairs. Each day, 4-5 rubber tires have to be changed at $1,000 each. Other unofficial reports state General Dynamics Land Systems contractor support costs are $750 million a year just to try to keep the Strykers running on paved roads. We do not know the actual TOTAL operations and support costs for Strykers in Army service because the Army hasn't revealed these cost figures because they would show a flawed vehicle that is fragile, break-down prone and would lead to Congress canceling the program. Some enterprising Congressional staffer or news reporter should make TACOM release the true maintenance costs of the Stryker so the American tax payer knows how BILLIONS are going towards handfuls of failed Canadian-made trucks when made-in-America M113s that total 1,300 in Iraq combat now require no such constant repairs/pampering and don't receive a dime from the Army to have the RPG and roadside bomb applique' armor they are supposed to have be fitted. Most don't even have the required ACAV gunshields though they have been available for years. There are enough M113s in storage to get most of the 100,000 troops in Iraq out of vulnerable HMMWV trucks, and if we stopped wasting money on Strykers make them RPG and roadside bomb resistant building upon the greater protected mobility of their firebomb resistant steel tracks and metal roadwheels.

What is the real cost of Stryker? If you look in the Jun 28th issue of Defense News, page 3, it states that the Army gave GD an order to complete the 4th brigade (the decision that wrecks

The 2ACR forever) to buy 106 vehicles for $163M. This order is in addition to the March 2004 contract for 212 vehicles at $282M; resulting in a total of 328 vehicles for $445M. Yet, this accounts for less than half of the over $950M appropriated for Stryker Procurement in the 2004 budget. Where does the other $500M go? Also, how much R&D is being spent on Stryker and how much O&M is going into GD's coffers? The Army keeps saying that the Stryker only costs $1.5M per copy; yet the Stryker program is costing them well Over $3M per vehicle; and it could be closer to $5M per vehicle fully loaded. It would be very interesting to demand that the Army disclose what it is actually spending on Stryker -- could be $1.5 to 2B per year."

SUMMARY/CONCLUSION

1. The Stryker is unsound in all categories of analysis and should be cancelled for further purchases by the U.S. Army. Recommend that Congress curtail the acquisition of more Strykers and shift funds into the acquisition of more promising technologies and platforms with close combat capability in urban or complex terrain. Congress should also demand that the Army provide a plan for pooling existing Strykers in support of Army units rotating through peace support missions on the British Army model. A cost-effective alternative to permanently equipping light infantry with Strykers would involve the purchase of a limited number of wheeled armored vehicles for use by Army units rotating through routine peace support missions. The British Army uses this approach in Ulster and Cyprus with considerable success.

2. It is important however, that the Army have 3D maneuver forces that can rapidly air-deploy and then fan out with armored mobility on the ground to block and capture enemies fleeing our heavier 2D maneuver forces coming overland. Had we been properly organized for 3D air-mechanized maneuver in 2001 we might have gotten terrorist leader Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan before he fled, and Saddam and his subordinates in Iraq before they went into hiding to start the on-going, bloody guerrilla war. The place to create these formations is in the army's Light, Airborne and Air Assault units be transforming them with available light tracked armored fighting vehicles.

Monies that would have been wasted on Strykers should immediately be spent on upgrading thousand of M113 Gavins to MTVL standards to fully transform the Army's Light Divisions beginning with their infantry battalion's Delta Weapons Companies who drive in vulnerable unarmored HMMWV trucks so A, B and C companies can have armored mobility as needed. M8 Buford Armored Gun System and Tracer scout vehicles should also be purchased to Brigade RSTA Cavalry troops to work in conjunction with the infantry battalions. These light tracked AFVs are parachute airdroppable and the Gavins are CH-47D/F air assault mobile.

M113A4 Gavin MTVL

The "MTVL" standard M113 Gavin can far exceed the costly and impotent RWS and C4ISR "icings" applied to the physical unsound Stryker trucks. Most importantly, MTVLs can be created from the Army's 14, 655 M113 Gavins quickly and a very affordable price to actually fix the physical weaknesses of the U.S. Army which has 4 light divisions with no armored vehicles whatsoever and the unlucky half of our heavy divisions that ride around in unarmored trucks.

Protection

Multiple layers of armor protection are possible on up-engined MTVLs up to 7,000 pounds worth depending on what engine powerpack is chosen; 275 hp, 400 hp or 500 hp diesel-electric. Multiple and differing armor layers are required to defeat RPGs by reactive forces and spacing, defeat roadside bombs and land mines by blast absorption and shrapnel defeat, and counter kinetic energy bullets/shells by a hard strike face away from the hull to break up the projectile for the following layers to "catch" the fragments. Wheeled Strykers and so-called "up-armored HMMWVs" are already maxed out by weight and suspension load cannot have adequate armor layers fitted as the world's most combat experienced force, the Israeli Defense Force recently concluded when they rejected purchasing Strykers from the U.S.

The 1996 RAND report commissioned by Congress concludes that a M113 Gavin can receive 60% coverage by reactive armor compared to the just 35% coverage that can be applied to a Bradley with more complex hull and turret shapes.

Mobility

The baseline M113 Gavin has a low 8.63 PSI ground pressure the lowest of any Army vehicle in service except for unarmored M973 over-snow vehicles. All are amphibious in lakes/rivers without preparation. M113 Gavins are currently the only U.S. Army vehicles that can swim. Had the enemy in Iraq wisely blown up bridges over key junction points over marshes and rivers, the advance into Baghdad could have been stopped and even defeated by our Army and marines burdened with thousands of vehicles that cannot swim and need bridges. As it was, many wheeled vehicles were mired in the mud and were abandoned to enemy vandals to destroy for negative media attention and/or recovery and use by them. An Army on wheels simply cannot recovery itself if it get stuck; if our Army was tracked every vehicle could regardless of circumstance recover another vehicle though by being tracked this event shrinks from being the common occurrence that happens with wheels.

Mobility to go along an undetected path and route is a PHYSICAL requirement that cannot be attained by wishful cherry picking mentally on a paper or digital map. Its more important to have the PHYSICAL capability to actually take an unexpected route than an expensive computer to realize you need to take that path if the latter results in your being in a wheeled vehicle that can't do it.

Firepower

Troops report from Iraq that the M113 is the only mount that enables them to fire and hit elevated urban targets. The open rear troop hatch with gunshields combination is widely used by the Israelis to prevail in urban combat for 360 degree all around firepower.

The Track Commander of "vanilla" M113s has a 360 rotating mount for .50 caliber and 40mm grenade heavy machine guns with his head out behind a gun and side shields that is effective on the move unlike the Stryker though not stabilized. Small stabilized 20mm-40mm autocannon turrets could be purchased for thousands of M113s using monies saved from cancelled Stryker purchases as many NATO nations have done to provide dominant firepower while still retaining the infantry in back's 360 degree vigilance out the top troop hatch. These turrets can also have strap-on anti-tank guided missiles or unguided rockets to destroy enemy armored vehicles and buildings/bunkers if required. These firepower additions applied to the basic 10.5 ton M113 vehicle do not disqualify it for C-130 air transport (17 tons is STOL landing limit) as they would if attempted on the Stryker starting at 17 tons.

Situational Awareness

The basic physical M113 design has EVERYONE; driver, track commander and troops able to see in all direction. This 360 degree coverage helps to keep any enemies from getting into a position to threaten the vehicle. When buttoned up, the only people who are blind are the dismount Soldiers in the back, but this can be compensated like the Israelis are doing using TV cameras at a fraction of the cost of the inward-focused computer network the Stryker has. Gunshields exist for troops in M113 Gavins to fight effectively from their mounts while above shoulder level to avoid grenades and firebombs. However, they are still able to converse with civilians from their vehicles for HUMINT.

Safety

The M113 at 78 inches high and 98 inches wide on wide tracks is not top-heavy and prone to roll over as the Stryker is. It has the safest operation record of any of the Army's armored vehicles and most of the Army's unarmored vehicles. There are multiple exits to escape even if the vehicle turns over: 3 top hatches, a rear ramp and a door in the rear ramp. If the vehicle tumble into the water it floats if its hatches are closed and doesn't sink like the Strykers did when 3 Soldiers drowned in Iraq.

Reliability & Cost

The vanilla M113A3 Gavin has a 3.5 miles per gallon fuel cost and averages to be $1.53 per mile according to UDLP. M113s are known for reliability and low operating costs all around the world, such that with over 23 countries using them, Army forces deployed overseas could tap into host nation logistics to support our vehicles. The M113 was chosen to replace the M551 Sheridan tank as the OPFOR replica vehicle at the national Training Center at Fort Irwin, California due to its decreased operating costs, reliability and reduced environmental foot print. The M113A4 MTVL hybrid-electric variant at 7.0 mpg would most likely be 50% of current costs to even operate.

3. The entire Army must reorganize and requip for non-linear warfare; the minimum transportation standard must be a light tracked AFV not a wheeled truck.

XM1108 Gavin Tracked Support Vehicle

That Army resupply vehicles are road-bound and cannot aggressively move off road has created a debacle in Iraq where Americans are dying each day by roadside bombs. More Americans have been killed and wounded by roadside bombs than any other cause in Iraq. This is largely preventable if we had tracked armored resupply vehicles.

The handicap of only having wheeled vehicles for resupply defeated the Germans in the Russian mud and winter snows in WWII concludes military historian B.H. Liddell-Hart. The inability to be resupplied away from roads led to the French not holding the high ground in the first Indo-China war at Dien Bien Phu.

In the USAF Air Chronicles article, "Stalingrad to Khe Sanh: Factors in the Successful Use of Tactical" Dr. David K. Vaughan, Air Force Institute of Technology Major James H. Donoho of the Air Combat Command write:

www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/vaughan.html

EXCERPT:

The good news is that the M113 Gavin family of vehicles can be modified into XM1108 MTVL type armored cargo carrying vehicles for off-road, protected resupply. The XM1108s can pick up and drop off palletized loading system (PLS) flat racks full of supplies without Soldiers even having to leave their armored cabs.

Protection

XM1108s have the baseline 7.62mm AP bullet protection of a M113 Gavin but since there is only a small cab to armor, could be fitted with multiple armor layers to defeat RPGs at lesser weight penalty than a full bodied vehicle so engine power can still be used to deliver supply payloads.

Mobility

With H/E drive and band tracks, supply XM1108s can travel at 60 mph speeds like civilian cars on paved highways yet can operate off roads that automobiles--and gunmen in them with RPGs cannot.

Firepower

Every vehicle must be able to fight back while on the move. To mount a machine gun in a ready-to-fire mode, a hard mounting is required with a gunshield for the gunner. The XM1108 roof is a hard cab that can fit a swiveling machine gun mount and gunshield so a gunner can be vigilant and fire at suspected enemies to spoil and failing that counter enemy ambushers.

Situational Awareness

With a crew of no more than 3 men, one driving, one gunning and the other navigating, the XM1108 would have adequate situational awareness to defend itself from enemy attack since it does not have blind spots like the Stryker has.

Safety

The XM1108 would benefit from the same low CG design of the basic M113.

Reliability & Cost

By using the same reliable and efficient components as the 14, 655 vehicle M113 Gavin family, the XM1108 would be easy to maintain and operate.

Mr. Jose Caldas, a relative of Captain Ernesto Blanco of the 82nd Airborne Division who was killed in Iraq by a roadside bomb while in a HMMWV truck sums it up best:

"Pretty amazing isn't it?

Ernie was killed in a Humvee by an IED.

M113s are available and are being used in Iraq.

They can be upgraded inexpensively.

They can do everything a Humvee or a tactical truck can do, safer.

The Anniston Depot and UDLP (United Defense) have active programs supporting the M113.

Congress has funded and is funding M113 related programs.

I am going to pose this questions to my elected representatives, the DOD and Army leadership:

Why hasn't the Army completely replaced Humvees and Tactical Trucks with M113s for use in Iraq?

Civilian leadership runs the U.S. military and America's Army belongs to the American people and its Soldiers not a small clique of general officers who want post-retirement employment with GDLS. Someone should also investigate and "follow the money" trail of GDLS and its subcontractors and see which politicians are getting re-election campaign donations, a linkage should become apparent of who supports the Stryker deathtraps despite all of the facts of its performance failings and fatal vulnerabilities .

REFERENCES

_____________________________________________________________________________

Concept

1. www.house.gov/hasc/openingstatementsandpressreleases/108thcongress/04-07-15Macgregor.pdf

Statement of Colonel Douglas Macgregor, PhD, USA (ret.)

Testifying before the House Armed Services Committee on July 15, 2004 in 2118 of the Rayburn House Office Building.

2. www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=10902082

51924

Stryker APC deal tabled for two years

By ARIEH O'SULLIVAN

Citing financial pressure, the IDF has decided to put a hold on a decision to procure the controversial 8x8 Stryker light armored vehicle from the United States.

According to military sources the decision was made earlier this month in a review of expected expenditures in the multi-year procurement plan. The decision was to delay the matter for two years, but military sources said that the idea of purchasing the Stryker was effectively "buried for good." The decision is also a blow for the battered image of the Stryker since America was hoping to enhance its status with its inclusion in the IDF arsenal.

The Ground Forces Services had been pushing for a "critical mass" of Strykers to equip at least two brigades. This would involve hundreds of vehicles at a cost of $1.5 million each. But they would have likely undergone reinforcement to make them more protected, boosting their cost by up to $500,000.

OC Ground Forces Services Maj.-Gen. Yiftah Ron-Tal has been a strong proponent of the Stryker to replace the aged M-113 "Gavin" APCs. The Stryker was designed as the vehicle tailor-made for urban conflict, but it has garnered mixed reviews in action with US troops in Iraq.

Some of the criticism has been that the Stryker has many blind spots and was not as maneuverable as tracked armored personnel carriers. The 19-ton vehicles are also said to be top heavy and prone to rollovers. After it was designed the American Army realized it wouldn't withstand RPGs so the US rushed through additional means to pre-detonate the RPGs, which made them even more top heavy.

It also needed to upgrade its protection against roadside bombs with Applique' armor developed by an Israeli-based company.

"It's a piece of junk," said one former senior IDF field commander intimately involved with the Stryker. "I don't know why Ron-tal was pushing so hard for it." There was also criticism that the IDF was never really serious about purchasing the Stryker from the beginning and it was all part of a disinformation campaign, possibly to enhance Israel's indigenous APC production.

The IDF did not even seek out any possibility of upgrading Stryker armor from manufacturers in Israel.

"Nothing. They never even contacted us," said Dr. Michael Cohen, director of Mofet Etzion Ltd. His company, based in Kfar Etzion, has been supplying General Dynamics Land Systems based in Canada with applique armor for its US Army Strykers in Iraq.

Proponents of the 19-ton Stryker say it would have been more mobile and more responsive than heavier tanks and treaded vehicles in the digitalized, urban battlefields of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The ground forces wanted to use them to replace the Vietnam-era M113 APCs, such as the ones destroyed in the Gaza Strip last May killing 11 Soldiers.

Now that the Stryker is pass , it paves the way for accelerating the alternatives to the American APC.

According to a senior defense official, the state-owned plant which produces the Merkava tank and other upgraded APCs has put together a prototype of a heavy armored vehicle that rivals the Stryker. It is called the "Namer" or Leopard, and is built on the chassis of the Merkava I tank. It too would cost between $1 million and $2m. each. The drawback was that US military grant money could not be used to pay for these since the bulk of the annual $2.2 billion in grants must be spent in the United States.

3. Wheeled Strykers were beaten by tracked M113A3s at the Fort Lewis Comparison Evaluation (CE) tests, yet Army lied in its report to Congress and continue to buy inferior Strykers when far better tracked vehicles could be upgraded at 1/2 the cost and time

The Soldiers who actually did the CE tests at Fort Lewis if placed under oath would testify that the M113 platoon beat the Stryker platoon in ALL categories of performance. Yet the Army official report called the tests a "draw". Because Strykers are overweight, top-heavy and roll on narrow air-filled rubber tires crews drive them with a constant fear of getting stuck or rolling-over. Since Strykers have to be driven gingerly at all times they cannot maintain proper vehicle battle formations to avoid bunching up and colliding with each other or being caught in the blast of one enemy shell or roadside bomb impact. On the other hand, the tracked M113A3s with a low 8.63 PSI ground pressure and little fear of getting stuck were able to maneuver boldly across all terrain types and get to their mission objectives long before their Stryker counterparts could. When M113s at the earlier platform performance demonstration swam across a lake at Fort Knox, Strykers without the needed props and rudders stood idle unable to propel themselves in the water. This means Soldiers in Strykers must avoid small bodies of water and lakes like a plague because they can't swim. In order to cross, enemy held bridges must be taken which WWII taught us can be a bloody mess. If the enemy blows up the bridges, Strykers are stuck unable to get to Soldiers where they need to go. WWII veterans with non-swimming vehicles learned from their mistakes and made sure when General Gavins drew up the requirements for an Airborne Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle Family of light tracked armored vehicles that they would be amphibious; resulting in the amazing M113, arguably the greatest armored vehicle of all time, ever. However, having the humility to listen to her Soldiers and doing what's best--even if its less costly---is not an Army bureaucratic virtue.

3. www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/20030912.asp

Unclassified After Action Report From Iraq
September 12, 2003

Recommendation: Conventional ground commanders, the backbone of the army, cannot expect to receive any timely information from special operations forces during combat operations such as those experienced by this unit during "OIF". Additionally, the United States Army should review its current doctrine or lack of doctrine reference the integration of SOF and armor and mechanized infantry forces.

Protection

1. The Death Wagons of Iraq

By David H. Hackworth

In Iraq, a Humvee - the modern military's jeep - is involved in an enemy action or a serious fender bender or rollover almost daily. Lt. Gen. Thomas F. Metz's command has experienced 13 Humvee rollovers, resulting in 17 of his Soldiers dying. "Nine of the deaths occurred in the last 90

days," he says.

Gen. Metz says that most rollovers occur when "the driver has lost control of the vehicle." In a letter to his unit, he summed up other causes, such as "aggressive driving, lack of situational awareness, rough terrain, poor/limited visibility, adverse traffic conditions, improvised configurations and failure to wear seat belts."

Amen on the aggressive driving. If bad guys are firing rockets and automatic weapons and blowing off mines left, right and center, no one in his or her right mind would drive on the most dangerous roads in the world the way we oh-so-carefully drive by a parked police car on the

freeway. As longtime guerrilla-war veteran Lt. Col. Ben Willis (retired) puts it, "The MO would be to put the pedal to the metal."

The problem is that the soft-skinned Humvee was conceived as a light utility truck - not a close combat vehicle. "The Humvee is horribly thin-skinned and underpowered," says Army veteran Scott Schreiber, who drove one for six years. "It should be used in roles that don't call for

armor. If the role calls for armor, it's simple: use armor."

At the end of World War II, I was in a recon company in Italy. We started with armored cars - M-8s - but as Terrible Tito's terrorists started using roadside mines and staging ambushes similar to the mean stuff going down in Iraq, our leaders quickly got rid of those thin-skinned suckers and put us in light tanks - M-24s. Within a year, as the guerrilla war with Yugoslavia heated up, we were given Sherman tanks - M-4s - with their even-thicker armor protection. And when a

blown mine or ambush slapped shrapnel or slugs against the sides of our 36-ton tanks, we sat safely inside those steel walls, with our weapons turned full-bore on the enemy. Our armor protection gave us the critical edge our troopers should have today.

But here we are in Iraq after 15 bloody months still welding steel plate onto Humvees. Sure, our Soldiers gain a tad more protection, but it also turns the vehicles into rollover queens because it shifts their center of gravity.

Meanwhile, we have the Pentagon spending billions of dollars on irrelevant gold-plated fighter aircraft and on the lightly armored Stryker - a vehicle that is not battle-tried and that the Army has placed in relatively safe northern Iraq. Not to mention the thousands of

potentially lifesaving armored personnel carriers - M-113s - left over from the Cold War gathering dust in depots.

What's further wrong with this picture is that Iraq has excellent steelworkers and first-class machine shops that could be put to good use upgrading captured Iraqi equipment into armored vehicles capable of protecting our warriors while also securing our long, exposed supply

lines.

Our modern generals might give a lot of lip service to protecting the force, but any way you cut it, what's going on in Iraq is criminal. Clearly there's a disconnect. The brass need to spend less time in their luxurious lakefront palaces and get down on the ground with the troops.

Maybe then they'll develop a greater sense of urgency about what's really needed on those killer roads the same way the 88th Division commanding general, Maj. Gen. Bryant E. Moore, did with us back in Italy and then again in Korea - where he was eventually killed as a corps

commander leading from the front.

And maybe our lawmakers should stop by Walter Reed hospital and get some firsthand skinny from the terribly wounded being treated there about what a death wagon the Humvee has become from the way it's presently being used.

"How many Soldiers and marines need to be maimed or killed by roadside bombs before Congress will get off their tails?" Mary Martino rightfully asks. "My son is serving his country with honor and pride in Iraq ...and has the right to expect that his country will do whatever it takes

to protect him in his duties."

--Eilhys England contributed to this column.

Col. David H. Hackworth (USA Ret.) is SFTT.org co-founder and Senior Military Columnist for DefenseWatch magazine. For information on his many books, go to his home page at Hackworth.com, where you can sign in for his free weekly Defending America. Send mail to P.O. Box 11179, Greenwich, CT 06831. His newest book is "Steel My Soldiers' Hearts." C

2004 David H. Hackworth. Please send Feedback responses to dwfeedback@yahoo.com.

2. SOF magazine, July 2004

TRACKS IN IRAQ

fax: (360) 737-0743

info@armorsystemsint.com

www.armorsystemsint.com

STEP A: 1300 sets of peel n' stick Aztik armor for M113 Gavins in Iraq now. Troop welders should add racks on the sides to hold the Aztik panels against the M113 hull, and add troop stow gear to pre-detonate any RPGs.

Start building 1300 ACAV gunshield sets.

STEP B: Ship ALL the M113 Gavin tracks the troops in Iraq left behind to get as many of them out of HMMWV SUV trucks as possible. We need peel 'n' stick for as many as are shipped. Troop welders should add racks on the sides to hold the Aztik panels against the M113 hull, and add troop stow gear to pre-detonate any RPGs. Build same number of ACAV gunshield sets.

STEP C: Upgrade 800 M113A2s into M113A4 Gavin hybrid-electric drives with C4ISR, peel 'n stick armor, gunshields, RPG applique' armor etc. and buy 400 M973A2 Ridgways for the 101st Air Assault Division with armor modifications to combat-ready the entire U.S. Army's light infantry divisions, which are now without any armored vehicles.

United Defense Limited Products, makers of the M113 Gavin, M2 Bradley, AAV-7s, M109 Paladins, reports that M113s have provisions to fit underbelly armor which extends back the first 1/3 of the vehicle.

SIDEBAR 2: LIGHT TRACKED VEHICLES ARE SUITABLE FOR NON-LINEAR COMBAT AREAS; WHEELED TRUCKS ARE NOT

Slapping two tons of armor onto what was originally a three-ton wheeled vehicle loads too much pressure onto too narrow wheels, suspensions and drive trains. In civilian life, an armored car has to be rebuilt several times because their armored boxes over-tax their drivetrains. The commanding general of Army Materiel Command, General Paul Kern has said the service takes an estimated eight hours to reset a HMMWV; some experts say that figure can skyrocket to 62 hours when the engine is pulled, whereas swapping the engine on an M1A1 Abrams tank requires only about 30 minutes.

When even thin armor is added to HMMWVs for minimal protection against roadside bombs, the weight places an additional strain on engines. During the 2004 Winter Symposium sponsored by the Association of the U.S. Army, Kern said. "I've got 800 of them right now, sitting around...trying to get back to the United States with a retrograde problem...the challenge I see is making decisions quickly enough and getting on with a new development, because the vehicles are wearing out pretty fast."

Army spokesmen told us that the M113 Gavin's light ground pressure tracks are somehow "too hard" on pavement and cannot go the daily distances required, when more than 1,300 M113s have been driving all over Iraqi roads and countryside for over a year without ill effects. Why not expand on this success and have all our troops ride in better-protected M113 Gavins? The M113 is seven times lighter than a 70-ton M1 Abrams heavy tank, three times lighter than a M2 Bradley fighting vehicle, and half the weight of a 22-ton Stryker armored car, while being better protected than the latter. The M113 weighs the same as an Army 5-ton cargo capacity truck but spreads its weight over long and wide tracks instead of narrow tires. The answer is to stop throwing armor on expensive, fragile HMMWV trucks and solve the troop protection problem by immediately shipping to Iraq some of the thousands of better protected, thick-skinned 11-ton M113 Gavin light tracked armored fighting vehicles the Army has ready today in storage, and the 235+ Gavins the National Guard's 30th and 81st Brigades left behind when they went to Iraq.

As General Kern alludes, tracked AFVs are mechanically simpler than wheeled trucks, spreading their weight over a larger area, to go easier on their running gear; a single light tracked AFV like the M113A3 Gavin with 275 hp engine can carry an entire 9-man

rifle squad with underbelly armor, gunshields, extra RPG-resistant armor at a 3.5 mpg fuel cost with far better armor protection than vulnerable HMMWVs with two windshields, eight windows, eight doors rolling on eight air-filled rubber tires that easily burn.

The M113 Gavins roll on metal roadwheels with steel tracks with rubber pads or band tracks--so they are easy on Iraqi pavement--you can have 50+ mph road speeds and vibrationless stealth for raids. The latest T150 track lasts for 10,000 miles--a lot longer than rubber tires that bust daily. M113 Gavins are the most successful vehicles in Iraq, for those units lucky enough to have them. It's time every Army unit uses them, as the U.N. does when they go to a dangerous area.

The Israelis use up-armored M113s to convoy their troops from bases to foot-patrol areas and back--they don't lose a man a day in combat as we do in Iraq. While their troops talk to locals on foot, other Soldiers in M113s follow in the background ready to help or talk to locals from behind gunshields.

About the authors

Michael L. Sparks leads a non-profit think-tank, the 1st Tactical Studies Group (Airborne), originally based at Fort Bragg NC. A 23-year veteran, prior service marine NCO and officer, he is co-author of the book "Air-Mech-Strike: Asymmetric Maneuver Warfare for the 21st Century" www.geocities.com/air_mech_strike

Roy S. Ardillo II has a Bachelor of Science degree in accounting and a Master of Business Administration from Southeastern Louisiana University, and is a Health Care Services Division analyst. In the United States Army, he was a military intelligence analyst from 1971 to 1981, including combat service in Vietnam.

Mobility

1. Defense Today

June 28, 2004

Pg. 1

Stryker Gun May Be Too Bulky For Airdrop: Report

By Nathan Hodge

An internal Army report casts doubt on whether the Stryker Mobile Gun System

(MGS) can be air-dropped from Air Force cargo planes, possibly an important requirement.

According to a draft report prepared by the Army's Transportation Engineering Agency of Newport News, Va., the MGS is too tall to be airdropped from a C-130 Hercules, a four-engined turboprop plane. What's more, the report said the gun system may be too heavy to be dropped from a larger, more powerful airlifter, the C-17 Globemaster III.

"The C-17 low-velocity airdrop weight limits are the same as for the C-130 and are based upon the current 42,000-pound airdrop system" that enables heavy equipment to roll off the ramp of an airlifter and sail to the ground by parachute, the report says. "The maximum gross rigged weight of an item to be airdropped is 42,000 pounds. The maximum item weight, which depends on the rigging requirements, is about 36,000 pounds."

In other words, the 44,000-pound gun system may be large and too heavy to be used on the existing airdrop system.

If MGS is not certified as air-droppable, it means the gun system might not meet a key requirement for the 82nd Airborne Division, which wants a lightweight armored gun to provide fire support in airfield seizure and other operations. The Army recently awarded a contract to General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS), which makes the MGS, to experiment with the parachute airdrop of the vehicle, and has tentatively scheduled a static drop test for the end of this month. Another armored gun already is airdrop certified: the M8 Armored Gun System made by United Defense, L.P. Four M8s are currently in storage.

However, the Army report does not rule out airdrop testing of the MGS. The report notes that prototype 60,000-pound airdrop hardware is available that could handle the heavier load. The Army developed and tested the 60,000-pound airdrop system, which can be dropped from a C-17 or a C-5 Galaxy, but it was never purchased.

"The components that make up the 60,000-pound airdrop hardware may exist from the original testing, but not as a fielded set," the report says. "If these components exist, the MGS could possibly be airdrop tested."

No immediate comment on the report was available from the Transportation Engineering agency; likewise, calls to a representative of the Natick Soldier Center, Natick, Mass., the agency responsible for evaluating the MGS for airdrop procedures, were not returned.

Peter Keating, a GDLS spokesman, said the MGS airdrop was a very ambitious project.

"They have the pallet to do it, but they just never had a vehicle that came in at this weight to need to try it," he said. "I don't know of any issues, but we'll know more after the static drop at the end of the month."

On June 30, the Army is planning to do a static drop at Fort Polk, La., meaning they will rig up an entire MGS, haul it up on a crane and drop it from several feet up.

In July, Keating said, the Army will airdrop a "surrogate vehicle": a tracked M113 Engineering Squad Vehicle with additional weight added to mimic the MGS.

The MGS, a variant of the Stryker wheeled armored vehicle, carries a 105-mm cannon. It is slated for a production decision later this year.

Firepower

Safety

www.komotv.com/stories/32178.htm

Two Stryker Brigade Soldiers Killed In Iraq

July 14, 2004

By <mailto:WebTeam@komo4news.com>KOMO Staff

MOSUL, IRAQ - Two Stryker Brigade Soldiers were killed and two others were injured when their vehicle rolled over in Iraq Wednesday morning.

The U.S. military says the Soldiers swerved to miss an oncoming civilian truck near Tall Afar around 11 a.m. and their vehicle went off the road and rolled down an embankment.

The injured Soldiers were taken to a military medical facility for treatment. The names of the Soldiers who were killed have not been released.

Situational Awareness

1. 1st Cav M113A3 Gavins on patrol in Iraq good/bad things evident

M113A3 Gavins on patrol in Iraq: infantry facing out but no gunshields/applique

This is further proof that the M113 Gavin is best platform for urban patrolling because infantry can face outward with weapons for 360 degree awareness and instant firepower. However, troops should be stowing gear/sand bags outside to pre-detonate RPGs since Army refuses to supply them extra armor. They should stack sandbags on top since Army won't supply them with gunshields.

Yahoo! News - World Photos - AP

http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?

tmpl=story&u=/040722/481/mac10407220854

PIC:

http://us.news2.yimg.com/us.yimg.com/p/ap/20040722/capt.mac10407220854

.iraq_baghdad_clashes_mac104.jpg

U.S. Army Soldiers patrol near Haifa Street in downtown Baghdad, Iraq (news - web sites), Thursday, July 22, 2004. One Iraqi Police officer and another Iraqi suffered gunshot wounds in an overnight clash in the area, which was also the scene of another gun battle earlier this

month. (AP Photo/Jim MacMillan)

Reliability & Cost

1. National Defense Magazine: August 2004

No Quick Fixes on the Horizon For Army Logistics Operations

by Sandra I. Erwin

The Army intends to field quick-reaction brigades that can respond to contingencies and help facilitate the deployment of a larger force. The goal is to avoid the lengthy buildups that preceded the most recent conflicts in the Persian Gulf.

The plan, however, may be overly ambitious, given the heavy logistics tail that must follow combat units. The Army already has begun to reorganize divisions into smaller but more agile "units of action," but there are no signs that the service will be able to make these units less dependent on massive logistics support.

That reality is not likely to change, said Lt. Gen. Claude V. Christianson, Army deputy chief of staff for logistics.

"Some laws of physics you can't violate," he told reporters. When a brigade shows up with 1,200 pieces of equipment, it still takes a certain amount of effort to unload and prepare for combat, he noted.

But Christianson still believes the Army can take a leading role in "opening the theater" for a follow-on joint force. It would do so by dispatching brigade-size units specially equipped and trained for that job. "They have to be able to run airports and seaports, receive forces off planes and off ships, marry them up with their equipment and deliver them into a tactical assembly area so the commander can get ready to do the operation," he explained.

Both military and industry logistics experts, for years, have tried to fathom ways to reduce the Army's support tail. Under the future combat systems program, for example, efforts have focused on fuel-efficient vehicles, techniques to make drinking water out of exhaust fumes, and other

ambitious technologies. But no silver bullet yet exists to shrink the logistics tail.

"Those technological breakthroughs are not on the horizon for anybody," Christianson said. "We can't just hope we'll get a 50 percent reduction in fuel and ammo requirements, because that's not going to happen in the future."

At best, he added, "you can work on the margins to drop down consumption," but the only way to achieve substantial results is to empower logisticians with better information about the supply and demand on the battlefield. "If you can see what the need is and you have a throughput that is rapid and precise, you don't have to carry as much stuff," said Christianson. "The only way we can gain leverage on logistics is to have absolutely 100 percent real-time visibility requirements everywhere and have a distribution system that is so good, that once you see the requirements, you can deliver precisely."

Even if the Army managed to achieve this ideal distribution system, it would still need to convince the Soldiers that it works as advertised. As a career logistician with 33 years of service, Christianson is aware that most Soldiers have little confidence in the Army's logistics system. "The reason is that they don't know if anyone is coming," he said. "They don't know that

the requisition they sent got there. They have no connectivity. . We've got to have 100 percent connectivity all the way back to the strategic base."

The Army has moved one step in that direction with the deployment of satellite communications terminals throughout the U.S. Central Command area of operations. The service spent millions of dollars on "very small aperture satellite terminals," which are helping ease the stress on Army logisticians in the field by keeping them connected up the chain of command. These expensive systems in the past were considered unaffordable luxuries for support units.

Army planners, meanwhile, remain skeptical about the prospects of lightening the logistics burdens in combat units. A cautionary tale is the deployment of the Army's new Stryker brigade, composed of about 300 eight-wheel light armored vehicles. Although the Stryker is considered a success story from a war-fighting perspective, many observers were surprised by the large logistics footprint that it required to sustain operations in Iraq. The Army put "enormous resources" into the logistics support of Stryker to make sure it was a success, noted a logistician during a private meeting with military and industry officials. The Stryker brigade has a dedicated logistics operations center in Europe and deploys with a large contingent of contractors from General Dynamics Land Systems.

"What happens when these resources go away?" the logistician asked. He appeared skeptical that the Army would be able to afford that kind of support across the service for any extended period.

These issues are fueling debate within the future combat systems program as to whether FCS can conceivably break any new ground in logistics. Of most concern is the inability of the support units to keep up with the speedy pace of combat operations, as was the case in the Iraqi conflict. "The tempo is dramatically different than at any time in history," said an industry expert. The current logistics structure is based on "tactical pauses every day," which may not be realistic.

Even if FCS vehicles are equipped with hybrid-electric engines, that only will reduce fuel consumption by a small amount, he said. The exhaust-to-water technology is too cumbersome and consumes too much fuel. Food packaging is another sticking point. The desire to simplify logistics in some cases runs counter to an Army culture that wants to create, despite the circumstances, a comfortable environment for the Soldier. Even something as mundane as providing hot meals can add tremendous pressure to the logistics operations, the expert noted. "We haven't yet figured out how to deal with that."

2. www.fa-57.army.mil/refs/transf-rpts/16-22Jan04.htm

FT. LEWIS & I CORPS (DAN KEIRSEY 253-966-0295 email:

keirseyd@lewis.army.mil)

SBCT PCC - All preparations are complete for the first ever "Stryker BDE" Pre Command Course which will be conducted at Lewis next week (26-30 Jan). Fifteen attendees who are slated to command current/future SBCT Brigade and Battalions and three future SBCT CSM's will go through the one week course. The schedule is a busy one and includes a live VTC with the 3rd SBCT currently in Iraq.

SBCT #1 - The first Stryker Brigade continues to consolidate their new positions with the 101st ABN DIV vicinity Mosul. The 5000 Soldier Brigade will replace the 25,000 members of the 101st and assume their entire area of operations in the next few weeks. C2 of the Brigade and the AO with other associated elements will be provided by a HQ drawn from the I Corps staff of about 100 which has been named TF Olympia.

In advanced planning for their ultimate return to Lewis, PM BCT has already estimated a 111 million dollar bill for refurbishing the Strykers. And with an expected avalanche of ETS (739 known losses) and PCS moves it is expected that the entire brigade will have to undergo a new NET. For planning purposes Jan-Jun of CY 05 have been designated as the RESET window for SBCT #1.

SBCT #2 - Elements of the Brigade have been training in Leschi Town (new CACTF) and preparing for LANCER SUMMIT, the final collective training event prior to their scheduled JRTC rotation in March. Lancer Summit will be a mix of live collective events and a CPX lasting from 25 Jan to 6 Feb. PEO STRI will support the exercise with lower fixed tactical Internet, TADSS and with camera operators and AAR analysts to cover training in the CACTF. On 17 Feb they begin rail deployment to JRTC for their final training event prior to reaching readiness for immediate deployment.

The schedule for JRTC is: LFX (7-18 Mar); STX (13-16 Mar); Stryker Plt deploys to Korea (16-18 Mar); Maneuver Box (20-28 Mar); Cleanup/Regeneration (30-31 Mar); Redeploy (31 Mar-8 Apr); Stryker Plt deploys from Korea (31 Mar-2 Apr) Note that during the JRTC rotation a platoon will deploy to Korea in conjunction with the yearly RSOI exercise as a demonstration. PEO STRI, JRTC and the Lewis TSC have been proactive in preparing for the JRTC MRE and no problems are anticipated in providing quality support. The Brigade and Corps have been pressing to have the Brigade deployed sooner rather than later. If the Brigade does not deploy by September, PCS losses will force the Brigade into an extensive retraining program which would have to include another CTC like event and massive re-NET of much of the unit.

MILES XXI for Stryker w/Slat armor - It now appears that although Lewis is slated to receive 27 sets of SLAT armor this month for training, only four Strykers will be configured prior to the JRTC

exercise. None of the SLAT has been applied yet. We still have a due out to work locally to see if we can reconfigure the current MILES XXI to mount over the SLAT armor prior to the JRTC and rail loadout for the unit. It appears doable and feasible buy we need an actual vehicle to validate the installation. The Brigade has assured me they will contact me as soon as they have a set installed.

MOUT/CACTF (Leschi Town) - Local units began actively training in a portion of the Leschi Town CACTF this month. Thirteen of the 52 buildings are open for training while construction continues on the remaining portions of the 800 X 300 meter complex. However the first thirteen buildings comprise the urban core of the "town" with numerous multi story buildings (including a five story). PEO STRI instrumentation of Leschi Town will not take place until the complex is complete sometime this summer. In the interim PEO STRI is providing camera operators (comprised of the personnel who willultimately maintain both Leschi town and the AAR facility) and completing the AAR facility instrumentation to insure that SBCT #2 training receives quality support. Additionally, PM DT will provide assistance with video editors.

EST 2000 Convoy Trainer - Training demand continues high for the initial vehicle. We are working some funding issues at Lewis, but the Corps CG has indicated that dollars will be made available for a direct purchase (through PEO STRI) of additional components to bring the trainer to our objective design. The Director of the Corps Warfighting Center is confident that he will have access to the funds soon. PM GCTT is standing by to assist as soon as we at Team Lewis quantify our "shopping list."

3. This press release says that 312 Strykers will have covered 9,000 miles in their first year in country. Thats a whopping 28.85 miles per combat vehicle. That confirms the stories we have that the Strykers are impounded inside of one of Saddam Husseins palace grounds. You don't rack up many miles when you are hidden behind a walled-compound but you don't have combat fatalities either. That would turn off the money spigot for the rest of the program. This is not transparency. We're being shucked and jived.

How much real deterrence from terrorism is provided by 312 Strykers at $3.3 million each hiding behind walls running 28.85 miles each in a year? This is bogus!

Lonnie Shoultz

Aerospace Daily & Defense Report

May 27, 2004

Official: First Stryker Vehicles Exceeding DOD Expectations

Stryker vehicles used by the Army's first Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) are exceeding Department of Defense expectations, an Army official said May 26.

The first SBCT, the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, was deployed to Iraq in October (DAILY, Oct. 13, 2003).

The Strykers have a 95 percent operational readiness rate and on average, 97 percent of their parts are available when needed, said Lt. Col. Bryan McVeigh (USA), product manager for Interim Armored Vehicle - Combat Support.

96-day turnaround

McVeigh spoke at the Institute for Defense and Government Advancement's Tactical Ground Vehicles conference in Arlington, Va.

There is a 96-day turnaround time for replacement parts and it takes only 16-20 days for parts to be shipped from the United States to the SBCT unit in theater, he said.

The first SBCT is operating within a 56,000 square-kilometer (34,796 square-mile) area and will have covered 9,000 miles by the end of their first year in theater.

The SBCT has been replacing four to five wheels a day on average and has increased battery capacity by using 20 sets of deep-cycle batteries, which cost more, but last three times as long. This allows the vehicles to conduct five-to seven-hour silent watches without starting the engines, he said.

Suvivability

The Stryker's survivability rate has been high, even though the interim slat armor solution was designed for only a 50 percent rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) protection rate, he said. The first SBCT has had no fatalities from RPGs and only one fatality, from a grenade. Two vehicles have been lost, to secondary fires, he said.

With 56 General Dynamics Land Systems contractors and 48 Soldiers working in theater, 24-28 vehicles have had slat armor kits installed per day, or 310 sets installed in 16 days, McVeigh said. "Over 80 Soldiers are alive today because of vehicles with slat armor," he said.

Meanwhile, the Army will make a production decision on add-on reactive armor for the Strykers this October. If the service decides to proceed with reactive armor, the reinforced vehicles will come off the production line by spring, 2005, he said.

The Army also is considering an active protective system for the Strykers that would defeat incoming enemy projectiles, "to see if it can be done, since there are lots of Soldiers outside the vehicle," he said.

The Army plans to field six SBCTs over five years, for a total of 2,100 Strykers. The second SBCT, the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, is in training at Fort Lewis, Wash., said an Army spokesperson.

--Lisa Troshinsky

4. Army Transcript: Beat-up Strykers will remain in Iraq

www.fa-57.army.mil/refs/transf-rpts/27feb-4mar.htm

FT. LEWIS & I CORPS (DAN KEIRSEY 253-966-0295 email: keirseyd@lewis.army.mil)

GENERAL - Things have definitely slowed down this week as the second SBCT moves out to JRTC. Many of the Corps staff not in Iraq on TF Olympia are putting the final touches on this years COBRA GOLD exercise with the Thai Army in Hawaii.

The 81st eSB is winding up their NTC final train up. They have a final formal farewell at NTC on the 13th of March and then deploy directly to OIF. The 116th Cavalry BDE from Idaho and Oregon is on alert for mobilization and is expected to train at Lewis when mobilized.

SBCT #1 - Continues to operate in the former 101st ABN DIV AO vicinity of Mosul.

SBCT #2 - Lewis has still not seen the official OPORD/DEPORD but the decision has been made that SBCT #2 will replace SBCT #1 in Iraq. The general plan is for SBCT #2 to do a relief in place and fall in on SBCT #1's equipment. This will minimize the movement of equipment but will present some interesting challenges in reconfiguring the digital databases. Much remains to be sorted out in identifying just how this will all fall out before the actual deployment. Due to the anticipated timeline (Oct/Nov) the Brigade faces a major training challenge after they return from JRTC and the summer personnel rotation begins. A number of currently unresourced new NETs and a high volume of initial/collective training on the digital systems is anticipated.

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