The original role envisaged for the Universal Carrier was for a fast, lightly armed vehicle to carry infantry across ground denied by small-arms fire and specifically, the Bren light machine gun and its team, hence the name Bren Gun Carrier. (NB: A broad parallel can be drawn between that concept and the tactics of the APC (M113Al) Troop which carried an Infantry Company. Each infantry section, comprising ten men [one section to a vehicle] possessed a light machine gun crew of three men and a GPMG M60, cal. 7.62 mm).

There was only one version of this vehicle named the "Bren Gun Carrier" but whatever the task, the entire family of vehicles was known by its users as Bren Carriers. In fact, numerous copies of the original Bren Carrier were produced and these were commonly known as the Universal Carrier

The hull of these vehicles comprised a simple steel box with a motor compartment situated in the centre. In front, sat a driver and alongside him, a gunner. A radiator was mounted in a bulkhead between them, and the noise generated by the fan effectively drowned out any conversation between these crew members (NB: vehicles of this type were not fitted with any form of internal communications).

Behind the two crew, were two rectangular compartments, one each side of the engine, these were used to carry a variety of stores and/or personnel.

Loads varied, and it was common to find the Carrier employed in a number of roles e.g. carrying ammunition, infantry support weapons such as medium mortars (81 mm), Medium Machine Guns (usually the .303 cal Vickers machine gun). They were also used for towing anti-tank guns and trailers.

Because it was fully tracked, it proved to be a reasonably good, cross-country vehicle and it was both agile and very fast, for its time. It was controlled by a small steering wheel and steering brakes.

Carriers were used extensively in every campaign during World War II. Such was their versatility, that many of those captured by the German Forces in France during the "Blitzkrieg" of 1940 were quickly put to use in patrolling and policing captured territory.

Australian Service History

Because of their general usefulness, Bren Gun Carriers were allocated to all types of Australian Army Units. Within the Armoured Corp, they were used by a number of units. For example, they were used in the Western Desert by 9th Cavalry and in Syria by the 6th Cavalry, as machine gun carriers.

Owing to the shortage of tanks, in the newly formed 1st Australian Armoured Division (1st July 1941), a great number of Carriers were pressed into service to provide tactical training for tank crews.

An example of its limitations in closed terrain are best summed-up in the following account: On 23rd November 1942, General Clowes at Milne Bay, New Guinea ordered a small number of Bren Gun Carriers to Cape Endaiadere as direct support to American troops operating in this area. It was made clear to the Americans that the Carriers were too lightly armoured and the crews too exposed for them to be used in isolation as tanks. In addition, they lacked any overhead protection from sniper fire, shell splinters and were extremely vulnerable to flank attacks. Thus they were forced to work with infantry support.

The aftermath of an attack at Cape Endaiadere on 5th December, resulted in vehicle crews being roughly handled and resulted in the abandonment of five vehicles. The supporting American infantry found they could not advance any further and the attack was called off. Sadly, it proved yet again, the futility of attempting to use inappropriate infantry carrier vehicles as gun assault tanks.

At the end of the War, the remaining Carriers were relegated to a training role and numbers of vehicles were allocated to Reserve (CMF) Forces to make up the balance of equipment needed by newly formed tank units. Bren Gun Carriers were quickly phased out of service as more appropriate vehicles became available.

German service history

Original Designation: Bren Gun Carrier / Universal Carrier
Original Role: light transporter
German Designation: Gepanzerter Machinengewehr Trager Bren 731(e) Conversions/Role/Use: combat/reconnaissance/policing/training

Note: Bren Gun Carriers were converted to various roles such as:

Brens with cannon could have acted as assault gun "Mini-STUGs" to blast through German opposition to reinforce LTC Frost holding the north end of Arnhem bridge, securing the victory instead of having the war prolonged by 8 more months resulting in the enslavement of millions to Soviet Communism and Germany divided by an "Iron Curtain" of East and West Germany. Not being properly mechanized has STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES.

www.d-daytanks.org.uk/stories/gliders.html

Personal D-Day Stories - Gliders

Crossing the coast of France, 1,500 feet up, and according to plan, it seemed too peaceful - rather like an exercise.

Casting off the air was crowded with other gliders, parachutes and discarded tow-ropes and we went down steeply on full flap, turning through 180 degrees. Without warning there came a tremendous jolting crash and the glider was partly stalled by colliding with another glider we hadn't seen, and we only had 600 feet to regain control.

Control was regained, just in time to round out but there was no time for anything else. We landed sideways, rushing through the tall French corn to a juddering halt.

My first pilot, Les, turned to me and said "time for a cup of char Tom!" we had two flasks strapped above our heads; one was still intact.

Staff-Sergeant Tom Pearce, Glider Pilot Regiment

Tank Museum photo No. 1424/B/6

Before D-Day we were all penned in near Tarrant Rushton. The gliders were herring-boned in formation along the runway which we believed to be the longest in Britain at that time. Our tow planes, souped-up Halifaxes, came later.

"Approaching Landing Zone, ready for cast off"..."Casting off!".

Then a gentle tug backwards, the nose dipped and turned and the wind whistled through the fuselage. The landing was a roaring, twisting, bumping skidding from high speed to a dead stop and we were all momentarily knocked out.

The side door opened and the pilot looked in "sorry for the rough landing boys" which woke me up. I unstrapped, dashed out of the door to let the undercarriage struts down only to find that it no longer existed and part of the wing was missing. The front was clear, vehicle engines running and all clear for exit except that the anchoring points were jammed. I took the escape hatchet from the wall, three or four good swipes, the [Bren] Carrier shot forward, the door opened and off they went.

Mr. A Darlington. 6th AARR.

Tank Museum photo No. 1617/C/6

We took off next day, June 6th in the late afternoon, wondering what we were going to find over there. Most of us landed safely and on leaving the glider I hitched up the three trailers to my tank.

These contained petrol in the wheels and ammo in the large box between the wheels. We had very little opposition, a few mortars a distance away, when suddenly the tank stopped. The driver did not know why.

I slid out of the turret to the ground and found parachutes wound round the final drive. It was hard work cutting them off and, on moving forward we came across the Squadron Leader in the same boat.

We moved out in the morning, passing quite a few of our knocked out anti-tank guns. We took up position near a crossroads, a few miles from Ranville. Down one road, leading off from the crossroads, were German infantry in positions on the roadside. Our troop was detailed to do something about this so Sgt Knowles in the leading tank, Troop Leader and then myself in rear went like hell, machine-guns roaring..

But alas the driver in the leading tank got knocked out somehow, blocking the road. It was very narrow, so the Troop Leader and I reversed out round a corner, back to the crossroads. On inspection we had a bit of paint missing and bullet holes in the tool boxes. Once again we had been lucky.

Corporal Sheffield. 6th AARR

www.d-daytanks.org.uk/regiments/6th-airborne.html

6th Airborne Armored Reconnaissance Regiment

In 1942 "C" Special Service Squadron of the Royal Armoured Corps, formed partly from men of the 10th Hussars, was attached to 1st Airborne Division, complete with its Tetrarch light tanks. Later it became known as 6th Airborne Reconnaissance Regiment in 6th Airborne Division and was based at Larkhill, on Salisbury Plain.

Tank Museum photo No. 4775/F/6

The expansion of airborne forces in Britain was due, to a great extent, to the success of German Paratroops during the invasion of Crete but, following the Allied landings in Sicily, in 1943 it was clear that troops would need immediate fire support when they landed, and it was believed that light tanks were the answer. The Airborne Division included Paratroops and infantry carried in gliders and it was by glider that the tanks would go to France.

Tank Museum photo No. 0032/G/3

On D-Day the plan was to drop Airborne troops on both flanks with the British on the extreme left, east of the Orne river. Once the troops were landed, and the area relatively secure the big gliders, carrying the Light Tanks and [Bren] Universal Carriers, crossed the Channel. In practice the tanks were not very successful. Many got themselves tangled up in discarded parachute lines when they left their gliders and those that did go into action were no match for powerful German anti-tank guns.

[Editor: teach Paratroopers to collect their parachutes and bury them or stuff into their kit bags. Build BETTER LIGHT TANKS with guns/missiles superior to enemy tanks, gun positions, bunkers etc.]

Tank Museum photo No. 3019/C/6

The regiment fought in Cromwell tanks for the rest of the war, except for the period of the Rhine Crossing in March 1945 when it was equipped with [M22] American Locust light tanks, once again in the Airborne role. Its last operational posting was to Palestine before amalgamation with 3rd Queen's Own Hussars.

Three museums cater for these Airborne units:-

The Tank Museum, Bovington.
Museum of Army Flying, Middle Wallop.
Airborne Forces Museum, Aldershot

Task Force Smith: Korea, 1950

MacArthur's Japanese occupation army having a wonderful time chasing newly liberated Japanese women fell back onto the foot infantry default thinking they could fight WW2 Pacific-style if needed but forgot that looming to the west was the Asian continental land mass where tracked tanks rule the open terrains. You will see that these garrison cultural pressures to spend less money as troops goof off and adopt weak foot infantry battle techniques has manifested themselves again in the Shinseki era to do feel-good peacekeeping missions and perpetuates today with Schoomaker's "high-tech red-neck" gunslinger mentality. Its always easier to do less in the Army. The Korean War debacle that began with Task Force Smith entering battle after being flown in from Japan, at a rifle-and-rucksack default would be repeated again and again over the years.

TF Smith of the 24th Infantry Division flew by C-54s from Japan into South Korea and went by wheeled trucks to set up a blocking position for the inbound North Korean Army. When their T-34/85 medium tanks arrived, TF Smith's 2.36" Bazooka rocket launchers did nothing to stop them, and they were over-run. Had TF Smith been equipped with LIGHT TANKS AND APCs these could have been flown in by C-54s using the under belly SEL technique and then hit the enemy tanks in the flanks with 20mm to 40mm cannon fire as well as protect the infantry from shell bursts while providing cross-country mobility to withdraw in good order to another blocking position. The French were able to air deliver M24 Chaffee light tanks in pieces without the C-119s the USAF/Army had. And the 24th Infantry had M24 light tanks.

One account:

The battle began at 0816, 5 July. North Korean tanks initially broke through U.S. positions and continued to Suwon without slowing appreciably. With the exception of the artillery battery's direct fire on the tanks, the North Koreans suffered no losses. The old, understrength bazooka and 57-millimeter recoilless rifle shells just bounced off the Soviet-designed armor. After two heavy engagements, TF Smith began a withdrawal under pressure at 1400.

Unfortunately, the direct support artillery battery, "A" Battery, 52d Field Artillery, was defeated. The tanks cut the landlines to the forward observers, and all radios went dead. The tanks continued engaging the 105-millimeter guns in direct-fire duels. The 4.2-inch heavy mortar section ran out of ammunition. After the initial engagement there was no indirect fire support. Close air support (CAS) was nonexistent. Because of recent fratricide incidents, CAS was restricted from operating south of the Han River. This prohibition effectively hobbled U.S. ground maneuver elements and gave communist forces a distinct advantage.

Please take a few moments to read the detailed account below of TF Smith and examine the map showing where they were positioned to block the road and consider the terrain where it was go and no-go for tracked and wheeled vehicles.

www.korteng.com/Appleman/Chapter6.htm

Notice TF SMITH HAD WHEELED TRUCKS.

They were parked behind their defensive positions on the road to their rear.

We doubt if even Stryker TOW ATGMs fired from their rubber-tired mounts would have changed the outcome as the T34/85s would have point/shot/blasted them on the road. Ditto that for MGS even if that 105mm gun variant worked.

Once surrounded and routed the foot troops would be no better able to withdraw in Strykers along roads than they were in 1950 in unarmored trucks.

Also ponder that when TF Smith flew in by C-54s they COULD HAVE HAD light tracked APCs: here is a photo showing a M22 Locust light tank underslung a C-54 transport plane which had tricycle landing gear...

Maybe we shouldn't have been so quick to dismiss C-54s carrying light tanks, huh? Maybe the Army light infantry egomaniacs should have paid attention to the M24 light tanks they had and instead of chasing Japanese women noticed then the USAF got C-124s they could transport their light tanks in a pinch?

Imagine if after WW2 we didn't go back to sleep and neglect ground warfare as General Gavin fought hard to warn us not to do...M22 Locusts could have been fitted with 106mm recoilless rifles capable of killing T34/85s and flown in by C-54s, others Bren gun style open-topped troop carriers....the M24 light tankss could have been flown inside C-124s...maybe we could have stopped the T34/85 medium tanks? At the very least we could have withdrew in good order...under some armor protection with some tracked mobility to pull out our wounded...when foot infantry is wounded it cannot walk anymore...if swarmed by enemy infantry you cannot afford to try to break out barreling down roads in rubber-tired trucks...

Only TRACKED armored personnel carriers (APCs) that could have enabled them to move cross country in the face of intense enemy fire would have helped them conduct a mobile defense and carried the heavy firepower that could have been brought to bear from unexpected locations and move themselves, their wounded and their supplies. The whole point of the Army experience after Korea was NOT to move men around in helicopters so they could afterwards get shot up. The Korean experience forced the Army to get serious about tracked APCs beginning with the M75 at war's end, followed by the M59 and finally the greatest AFV of all time, ever the M113 at the behest of Gavin that was amphibious, air-transportable so infantry was not orphaned after airlanding and could move boldly even nuclear devastated battlefields. We progressed with gunshields to fight mounted with the ACAVs, and had firing ports figured out with a shoot-on-the-move autocannon with the AIFV when we went overboard with the 2-man turret Bradley to escort heavy M1 Abrams tanks. Infantry became second-class citizens and security guards for tanks (armored infantry) when we should have simply kept improving our M113 Gavins so ALL our infantry would have armored mobility even those that come by aircraft (Army's 4 divisions of light infantry) for 3D maneuver.

1954: M24 Chaffee light tanks: the French in Indo-China make air-mech History: but how did they air-mech 10 x M24 light tanks into Dien Bien Phu?

So here's the question----

How far did the French disassemble their M24 light tanks to save weight?

Could you detach the entire turret and add it later?

How much weight could you save removing all the guns?

There is evidence that a special unit did the reassembly of the M24s at Dien Bien Phu:

www.thehistorynet.com/vn/bl_foreign_legion/index3.html+m24+tanks+dien+ bien+phu&hl=en&ie=UTF-8

2nd Foreign Legion Tank Repair Company (2nd CREBLE): Organized on July 1, 1951 to replace an inactivated unit within the Colonial Infantry Regiment of Morocco, the 2nd CREBLE was based at Haiphong, where it performed depot maintenance and repaired tanks and amphibious vehicles. A mobile armored repair platoon was based at Hanoi. The majority of the unit's personnel were German by 1953. An element of the company was airlifted into Dien Bien Phu to assemble the ten M-24 tanks that had been flown in, dismantled in sections. The unit was inactivated in Saigon on December 31, 1955.

"Dismantled in sections"

what does this mean?

Would you want a heavy tank hull without tracks/roadwheels ie the means to drive itself off the C-119 airplane?

Want to see how a M24 light tank would look in pieces?

www.ferreamole.it/ images/m24/m24_01.htm

FACTS

1. The French amazingly flew in 10 disassembled 17-ton M24 Chaffee light tanks with short-barrel 75mm guns to the ill-chosen Dien Bien Phu location in 1953 with PISTON ENGINED AIRPLANES. We are researching the details; look on our Aircraft Photos web page for details under C-47, C-119 and Bristol 170 aircraft.

2. The squadron of 10 x M24 light tanks enabled the French to hold out for 55 days even though they did not command the high ground, leading counterattacks against superior numbers of enemy infantry while pummeled by artillery fire from surrounding hills.

3. The ONLY unit to fight its way OUT of Dien Bien Phu was the M24 light tank squadron. This is extremely significant.

Had the ENTIRE Dien Bien Phu force been air-mechanized with troop carrying M24s then in December after the satellite base camps fell, they could have BROKE OUT via TRACKED ARMORED MOBILITY and avoided decisive engagement that led to their strategic defeat.

Absurdly, TF Smith 3 years earlier had a "mini-Dien Bien Phu" when it failed to bring ANY tracked tanks to the fight even though we know now C-54s could have carried M22 Locust tanks underslung. Had the M22 been fitted with the 57mm anti-tank gun instead of the impotent 37mm gun it could have knocked out North Korean T34/85 medium tanks. We too, could have flown in disassembled M24 light tanks but didn't. You have to hand it to the French for having technotactical creativity to fly in M24 light tanks and tow F8 Bearcat fighters into Indo-China but their brass lacked skill in the operational art.

We don't believe in half-baked light infantry that just looks different from heavy forces as a fashion/ego statement. The reason why anyone should want "light" is to get a MOBILITY DIFFERENTIAL as Stan Crist puts it. That is the maximum mobility through and OVER (by aircraft) closed terrain to offer "3D maneuver" that compliments a main body 2D maneuver. the AMS Study Group has broken new ground in understanding warfare as shown in the PPT slides below:

www.geocities.com/transformationunderfire

The point is just as Captain (now LTC) Woodgerd ended his 1987 article in ARMOR magazine "French Armor at Dien Bien Phu"....if the French had more LIGHT tanks for its LIGHT infantry it would not have been defeated at Dien Bien Phu.

Absolutely true.

Despite being stupid and not occupying the high ground, they were indeed in OPEN TERRAIN in the often muddy, low ground. This means they needed 3D maneuver from light tanks not what they had which was only 1D maneuver---after aircraft delivery only a foot slog through closed terrain. They were pinned down and unable to move from Viet Minh artillery fire from the high ground, so they burrowed--dug in and became decisively engaged. However, if they had had light tanks that can carry infantry (APCs) en masse even as screwed up as their situation was, they could have rejected burrowing in and decisive engagement and simply drove their tracks and themselves out of the valley.

IF YOU CANNOT OUT-RUN THE ENEMY (MOBILITY DIFFERENTIAL) DO NOT GET SURROUNDED! (Custer at Little Big Horn, LZ X-Ray, Khe Sanh etc.)

What is a tank?

ANYTHING that is tracked and armored.

Did most WW1 tanks have turrets?

NO.

Did they carry infantry?

YES.

When we fully understand what a "tank" is in generic terms we can then fully understand their potential instead of the current fractured "us" and "them" Heavy vs Light, cligues and the illogical labels like "Main Battle Tank" they use to not understand generic battlefield FUNCTIONS.

Now fast forward to today.

If we fly in foot infantry into a Taiwan under CHICOM bombardment it will have to burrow into the ground and will be in a decisive engagement win or die situation. Wheeled Strykers will be immobilized by shredding their tires or simply unable to leave roads/trails--just like TF Smith. We also see the American light infantry narcissism no different from French infantry narcissism, both are egomaniacs without any humility to admit to laws of physics limitations and the moral courage to DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT: ie; get LIGHT TANKS ie; M113 Gavins.

If American light infantry were to get 10.5 ton M113 Gavin light tanks then it could indeed fly (3D maneuver) to any location in the world and never have to be decisively engaged if we put our best armor and weaponry on these platforms. We could wage a mobile defense over a large area and keep the initiative.

FURTHER READING:

members.lycos.co.uk/Indochine/ops/dbpwilde.html

Dien Bien Phu - A Fatal Gamble
By Wild Bill Wilder

Why did we have to wait 40 decades for 2 + 2 to be added together? Why wasn't this done in Vietnam to render fire support for Air Assault troops?

An M113A1 empty is 19,200 pounds (10 tons), the CH-54B can lift 12 tons, so track/engine removal is not required as the 25th LID caption implied. The M56 Scorpion was 8 tons.

When we get around to revising the 3rd edition of Air-Mech-Strike, we will have to raise the question of why wasn't this done? Our suspicion is that General Kinnard had a light infantry bias and was anti-armored vehicle resulting in the Army's helicopter 3D mobile units fighting the enemy at a disadvantage when not complimented by the 2D Armored Cavalry maneuveing in conjunction with them.

A Vietnam combat veteran writes:

Subj: [MASWG] Meet the CH-53E SkyCrane! (fwd)
Date: 9/7/2004 8:29:31 AM Eastern Daylight Time
From: XXXXXX@att.net

"Mike,

Even without the mods, the CH54 could lift a M113... I had to call one in when I had a track blown up in Oct 1968. You have to watch out for the downforce upon lift. Well in Excess of 150 MPH when you are lifting 12 tons. Blew most of the BN HQ shelters out of the FOB. Sorry, no pics of same. I can only imagine what downforce lifting 20 tons would generate!

Again, nice job on the models. I was busy this weekend with Frances, still not recovered from Charley, and waiting on Ivan.

XXXXX"

You mean, this?

EDITOR: the caption is incorrect; a M113A1 empty is 19,200 pounds (10 tons), the CH-54B can lift 12 tons, so track/engine removal is not required.

CAPTION:

www.i-kirk.info/tlnews/tln232-03.jpg

New Generation Skycrane Saves Damaged Carrier

Soldiers of the 25th Div's 2nd Bde scratched their heads in wonder recently as a armored personnel carrier (APC) from the 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf, went flying overhead.

The carrier had hit a Viet Cong mine the day before. Removing it from the swampy lowlands along the Oriental River would have meant dragging it 15 kms to the nearest road for pickup.

The only answer was to fly it out, but the APC weighs 13 tons. Battalion officers figured that it would take 13 HU-1D helicopters pulling at once to lift it out.

The answer came flying into the unit's forward base in the form of a giant "Skycrane" helicopter. The huge ship can easily lift a nine ton load.

To meet the weight restriction, the carrier's tracks were broken, and the vehicle literally driven off its metal treads. Then the engine was removed and all radio equipment was stripped off.

Two Soldiers battled the 120 mile an hour rotor wash and hooked the cargo straps to the Skycrane's hoist hook. Everyone stood back and watched as track number 33 flew off toward Cu Chi.

NEED A LIFT? - A "Skycrane" carries a damaged armored personnel carrier back to Cu Chi for repairs. (Photo by 1LT Karel)

www.25thida.com/TLN/tln3-06.htm

___________________________________

Page 6 TROPIC LIGHTNING NEWS February 5, 1968

____________________________________

Mech Displays Aerial Mobility

Story and Photos by SP4 Robert Rossow

3RD BDE - In a unique display of aerial mobility, the 2nd Bn (Mech), 22nd Inf, accomplished a vital piece of resupply work, airlifting two M-113 Armored Personnel Carriers (APC) by CH­54 "Flying Crane" from their Dau Tieng base camp to a forward base near the Cambodian border. The vehicles were dispatched to fill shortages caused by weeks of hard campaigning in the border regions.

CPT Theodore R. Sucher III, the battalion S-4, commented that airlifting APCs is rarely done, but that it is, nevertheless, not exceedingly difficult. "Weight is the main problem," said Sucher. "Slings and attachments strong enough to support the weight of an APC have to be procured. The track has to be stripped. After making reservations for the 'Crane,' final coordination between the pad crews and mechanics both in base camp and the field is made. The bird comes and goes, and it's all over. With our competent mechanics, the tracks will be combat ready a few hours after they are deposited in the field."

The two vehicles were unable to travel with the battalion when it moved out on Operation Yellowstone due to mechanical difficulties sustained in the previous operation. One required a new power pack, and the other repair of an idler arm which had broken away from the hub. When the repairs were completed, the only way to get the APCs to the field was by air. To prepare the APCs for airlift, four mechanics, directed by MSG John Pobodinski were assigned to disassemble the vehicles. Due to weight limits, it was necessary to totally strip them. First the mechanics removed the power packs, completely testing their performance before shipment on a test stand devised by the "Triple Deuces" maintenance section, then packaged them for airlifting. Then the basic load of ammunition was removed along with the basic issue items and personal belongings of the crew members. They then towed the two vehicles to the helicopter landing pad, where the tracks were removed to prevent damage to the suspension system during transit, and the carrying slings attached in preparation for flight.

On the appointed hour, the 'Crane' settled down over the first APC like a giant predatory insect descending upon its quarry. A man from the pad crew battled the fierce downwash from the rotors as he struggled to fasten the carrying hook. When the slings were attached, the 'Crane' lifted slowly off the pad taking up the slack; then with a staggering lunge, track and helicopter were airborne. Some twenty minutes later the 'Crane' set the track down at the battalion's advanced support base miles away near the Cambodian border, and returned to repeat the performance.

The Triple Deuces field maintenance section has had a great deal of experience at major field maintenance, and has several times replaced power packs away from base camp; so, aside from the airlift factor, the reassembly of the vehicles was a routine job.

"TRIPLE DEUCES" MECHANICS REMOVE TRACKS FROM APC IN PREPARATION OF AIRLIFT.

SP4 WAYNE KRYSTER OF THE 2ND BN, 22ND INF, READIES THE APC FOR AIRLIFT.

THE GIANT CRANE HOVERS OVER THE APC AS MEN OF THE "TRIPLE DEUCES" FINISH LAST MINUTE PREPARATIONS OF THE VEHICLE FOR AIRLIFT.

SLOWLY THE GIANT CRANE MOVES OFF WITH THE APC TOWARD THE FORWARD BASE CAMP OF THE "TRIPLE DEUCES."

M56 Scorpion 90mm Assault Gun in action on the ground...

The U.S. developed two SPATs in the Airborne arena, the M56 "Scorpion" for the U.S. Army and the M50 "Ontos", used by the marines. It is the latter, and its Far East relative, the Japanese Type 60, these two vehicles are unique among armored SPATs and armor in general. The M56 "Scorpion" and the Russian ASU-57 shared similar traits. Both sported heavy caliber anti-tank guns, the "Scorpion" mounting the potent 90mm M54 gun, and both were small machines. But size and the need for a light weight punished the M56 crew, giving them no armor protection save the gun shield. As the 1960s neared its end, the M56 saw action in the jungles of Vietnam, serving with the 82nd and 173rd Airbornes, the only units to use the M56 in combat. As history was to show, the M56 was never able to engage enemy armor for the enemy armor was few and far between. Instead, the M56 provided vitally needed fire support for operations by U.S. troops. Even the M56 "Scorpion", in one case, had its 90mm gun removed and a pintle mounted M40A1 was put in its place. It should be noted that these modifications were not official U.S. military designs...merely ones troops in the field created to enhance their firepower.

www.library.vanderbilt.edu/central/brush/Ontos.htm

Peter Brush writes:

1967 saw the introduction of CH-53 [A] Sea Stallion heavy-lift helicopters for the marines in Vietnam. The first models had a six-ton external lift capability. This meant an Ontos could be transported by helicopter if it was broken down into components with the hull transported externally. It could then be reassembled and operated at destination, given it a transportability beyond its design considerations. M50s could also go where tanks feared to tread (or should have): in a 1966 operation, tanks got stuck in flooded rice paddies. Ontos, with less ground pressure, were able to drag timbers up to the tanks without bogging down.

The M50 "Ontos" (ontos meaning "Thing" in Greek) began its life in the early 1950s to meet a requirement for a light anti-tank armored vehicle to better equip anti-tank teams, then armed with only Jeeps to mount their anti-tank weapons. Designs were drawn up and prototypes built, the "Ontos" was the winner. Officially designated the T165, the "Ontos", designed and developed for the U.S. Army, was not to see service with them until late in the Vietnam war. The Army felt that its anti-tank teams were, rightly or wrongly, already well equipped with what they had. However, the U.S. marines were in the market for just such a vehicle. They were looking to replace their veteran and outdated Shermans but wanted a replacement which was light of weight to ease transportation issues and thus, by extension, enhance their mobility and deployment speed. To this end, they found it in the "Ontos". Beginning in 1955, the now designated M50 went into production with Allis-Chalmers and, by 1956, was issued into marine service with 45 x M50s in each divisional tank battalion. Between 240 to 297 vehicles were built by the time production ended at the close of 1957.

Rare video clips of infantry-carrying T56 version that was not put into production

The M50s hull was derived from the T55/T56 series of tracked APCs. The hull had a distinct pyramid shape to it, tapering at the top into a round cupola for the vehicle commander. Attached to the cupola were two sets of stalks. Upon these stalks were mounted a trio of M40A1C 106mm recoilless rifles (the "C" model had a slightly enhanced breech mechanism and a projectile indicator on the barrel). The sloping armor, which sloped upwards on all sides of the M50, supported a maximum armor thickness of 13mm.

The interior of the Ontos was rather cramped for its three-man crew. With a height of only 213cm, a width of 260cm, and a length of 383cm, the Ontos was a small machine indeed, tipping the scales at 8,641 kg in combat readiness. And due to the pyramid sloped hull, it only enhanced the smallness of the interior and fighting compartment. The engine, a gasoline inline V6 General Motors 302, provided 145 horsepower at 3,400 rpm with a power to weight ratio of 16.7 bhp/ton. This was enough to move the M50 at a maximum speed of 48 kph. The 47 gallon fuel tank offered a maximum range of 241 km. The M50A1, a later improved model (294 M50s were upgraded to the M50A1 standard in 1963), replaced the GM engine with a Chrysler water-cooled V8 HT-361-318 which developed 180 hp at 3,450 rpm. In all cases, the engine was mounted in the upper, right hand section of the hull. The exhaust was vented out a pipe which ran along the right side of the hull, just above the fender. To fuel, there was a fuel cap on the right side of the forward slope of the hull. The engine drove a set of front sprockets via an Allison XT-90-2 transmission, later upgraded in the M50A1 to the XT-90-5. Each track was supported by three bogie wheel assemblies, a rear idler wheel, and the front drive sprocket with an external brace mounting return plates as opposed to rollers. Ground pressure was .34kg/cm2. The M50 could climb a vertical obstacle no higher than 2ft. 6in. and could cross a trench no wider than 1.371 meters. Without any preparation, the M50 could ford water up to 2ft. deep and with the aid of a kit, could ford up to 5ft. of water. The driver was positioned in the front of the hull to the left of the engine. His station consisted of a brake pedal to his left, the accelerator pedal to his right. Centered in the middle were the two steering levers which the driver would direct the M50s motion with via a clutch brake steering system. Unlike other, larger armored vehicles of the time which had the steering levers more to the sides of the driver, the M50 had them right in the middle, almost like the control stick of an aircraft. Thus, the driver of the M50 had to pull the levers toward his chest to initiate steerage. To the driverīs right were to be found the instrument panel and also the gear shift which supported three forward and one reverse gear. There was storage space for a spare M13 driver periscope and also a section of the forward hull to mount a water canteen. The driver was provided with a hatch in the front glacis. The commander and the gunner shared the fighting compartment space in the back of the M50. Mounted centrally in the fighting compartment was the post which supported both the gunnerīs seat and above that, the commanderīs seat. On the backside of this post was to be found boresighting instructions and storage for binoculars which the commander would use. The gunner used the M20A3C periscope, in the M50A1 model, to lay his weapons and the rifles could be fired from within the M50. To the right of the central seat post was to be found a fire extinguisher and, on the floor, tubes to hold 4 rounds of 106mm ammunition for the rifles. Just forward of the gunnerīs position was a metal cage in which ammunition for both the spotting rifles and the M1919A4 .30 caliber (7.62mm x 82mm) medium machine gun mounted on the cupola were stored. All told, 80 rounds of spotting rifle ammunition and 1,000 rounds for the .30 caliber were carried onboard. Beneath the floor of the fighting compartment were 8 storage tubes for ammunition for the recoilless rifles and these could be accessed from outside the vehicle via a panel just under the main rear door at the back of the hull. Mentioning the main rear door, the entire back of the M50 was a set of double hatches to allow entrance and exit from the vehicle and could be locked from the inside. Radio communication came from a AN/PRC-10 radio set which was housed on the left sponson. The commanderīs cupola featured the sighting periscope and, on the outside of the cupola, the frame to mount the .30 cal. machinegun, the frame allowing high angle elevation and depression as well as good side to side traverse.

The main weapons, as mentioned, were mounted in triplets, three per side of the M50. Though each gun tube was rigged to mount a spotting rifle, only the top pair of each set of three supported the rifle. The cupola, to which the stalks which held the sets of rifles were attached, was manually traversed with an 80 degree range of traverse total. Elevation was also manual, through a maximum of 20 degrees to a minimum of -10 degrees. Once the target was successfully hit by the spotting rifle, the commander or gunner could fire one or more of the rifles, up to firing all six at one time. All told, the M50 carried 18 rounds of ammunition, one in each gun tube, four inside the fighting compartment, and eight under the fighting compartment floor. If needed, two of the M40A1s could be dismounted from the M50 and used as ground support weapons, much like the infantry version.

It is here that we will discuss the major, and the most detrimental, disadvantages of the recoilless rifle, for, unlike the Type 60, the M50 did see battle and these disadvantages came to the fore. The first is backblast. As we have noted, an equal force is needed projecting backwards to negate the force going forwards. In so doing, it creates a huge blast signature directly behind the gun which is detrimental to anyone caught in it as well as, more significantly for a tank hunting vehicle, it betrays its location, rendering any carefully constructed camouflage ambush position useless, lost in a cloud of smoke, dust, flash, and debris after firing. For the M50, which could fire its six M40s at once, aside from being rather spectacular to witness, the resulting signature spelled disaster since now it had exposed its position to the enemy to counterattack. Another serious drawback was that, because of this very blast signature, the recoilless rifles had to be mounted totally on the outside of the vehicle. This resulted in the gunner having to dismount the vehicle, leaving the protection of the M50s armor, to reload his weapons and it doesnīt take much to understand that in battle, this poses a tremendous risk to the gunner whom is now vulnerable to artillery, small arms fire, and the sniper.

The M50 was first blooded in battle in 1965 with the 6th marines in the Dominican Republic. Here, the M50 was pitted against two types of light tanks crewed by Dominican rebels. The first were old, vintage Swedish Landsverk L-60 light tanks and the second, French AMX-13 light tanks. The L-60s, built at the outbreak of World War II, and the AMX-13 whose design was begun prior to the German invasion yet didnīt begin production until 1952 were to be proven beatable by marine gunners. In the scattered and sporadic actions, these two tanks fell victim to the M50, the 40mm armor of the AMX-13 and the lighter armor of the L-60 not proof against the penetrating power of the M40s HEAT rounds. But the M50 is more well remembered when it participated in the Vietnam War and where it was deployed in more numbers. The M50 was deployed with the 1st and 3d Anti-Tank battalions of the 1st marine division and by the end of 1965, a total of 65 M50s were in-country. Pretty soon, the M50s were modified by their crews to suit the conditions. When on the move, the lower rifle on each of the two stations was provided with a travel lock and the breeches were usually covered in tarp to protect them from the elements and grime. In the tradition of tankers in World War II, some crews draped spare tracking across the front and sometimes the sides of the M50 to provide just a bit more metal between the incoming round and them and other crews added in sandbags as well. To help the little machine carry more stowage, some "Ontos" has raised slats affixed to the sides of the track fenders to allow for a resting spot for items lashed to the hull. Jerry cans of fuel and water were often to be found strapped to the sides of the M50 and both a shovel and an axe were standard equipment. In one case, to provide night illumination, the .30 cal. machinegun was replaced with a large spotlight in a locally adapted mount. The first major action of marine armor was Operation Starlight in August of 1965, an attempt to spoil the suspected attack by the 1st. V.C. Regiment on the U.S. military base at Chu Lai. Starlight proved that armor could work in the muddy paddies and jungle...but at the same time it also showed that armor could not be without infantry. Starlight also shaped the way marine armor was to be employed and this was that M50 battalions ( and also M48 tank battalions ) were to be broken down and attached to infantry units to provide needed support. When in base camp or in a firebase, the M50 was given a defensive position to defend in case the base found itself under attack, providing additional firepower to the basesī own weaponry. In fact, the M50 was to become a lethal defensive vehicle when it used its recoilless rifles, firing anti-personnel "beehive" rounds which could decimate infantry in seconds. In 1968, during the siege of Khe Sanh, the two M50 platoons from the 3rd Anti-Tank Battalion were involved in mobile defense against NVA forces attempting to overrun the base there.

During the Tet Offensive, the M50 again played a critical role in the street fighting and adverse weather which grounded air assets and severely hampered artillery support. M50s of the 1st and 3d participated in such operations as Iowa, Mobile, and Deckhouse VI. Though the M50 performed well, the shortcomings mentioned earlier, its vulnerability to anti-armor mines and RPG rounds due to its very thin armor and the lack of protection given to the commander when he saw the need to use the .30 cal. machinegun eventually saw the M50 retired from service, its role replaced by the more conventional tank. By 1970, there were no more M50s in marine service.

GENERAL INFORMATION

Designations Type 60

Manufacturer(s) Komatsu

Status Production complete.

Production Period 1960-1977
Production Quantity 252

Crew 3-4
Length, overall 4.3m
Length, hull 4.3m
Width, overall 2.2m = 87.12 inches = fit inside CH-47 helicopter, C-1 jet STOL transport
Height, overall 1.6m
Combat Weight 8000kg = 8.8 tons = light enough for CH-47 to heli-lift
Unloaded Weight 7600kg

MOBILITY

Max. speed 55km/Hr
Engine liquid cooled 4 cycle diesel engine 150hp
Radio, external n/a
Communication, crew n/a

FIREPOWER

Main Armament 2 x 106mm recoilless rifle
Ammunition Carried 8x106mm
Gun Traverse 30 (left, right) (1)
Elevation/Depression +15/-20 (1)
Traverse Rate manual
Elevation Rate manual
Gun Stabilization none
Rangefinder 12.7mm MG
Night Vision no
Auto-Loader no
Secondary Armament none

Meanwhile, at the same time the M50 was undergoing development, so too was a vehicle which shared quite a bit in common with it.

This was the Japanese Type 60. The Type 60s design began in 1954 by two companies, Komatsu Seisakujyo and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. Both these companies put forth a design, called the SS1 and SS2 respectively. In so doing, history was made as these were the first Japanese armored vehicles to be completed following World War II. However, the results were not very good and trails showed that both vehicles had unacceptable flaws and thus were deemed unsatisfactory. Both companies returned to the drawing board and revised their entries. Again, a vehicle was put up for contention by both companies and, after trails, the Komatsu design, the SS4, was accepted and standardized as the Type 60. By 1960, production was underway at Komatsu and entered service with the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force that same year. By 1979, production was completed, with 223 vehicles delivered to the JGSDF, the vehicle still in Japanese service.

The Type 60 is a much smaller vehicle in comparison to the M50, which, in many ways is related to the smaller nature of the Japanese crewmen. Its height is 1.59 meters, width is 2.23 meters, a length of 4.3 meters, and a combat weight of 7,000 kg. This means that the Type 60 could indeed roll-on/off from inside a CH-47! Also airland and airdrop capable from their C-1 jet transport.

The chassis shares a likeness to the Mitsubishi Type SU 60 APC, in fact, were it not for the different arrangement of the bogie torsion-bar suspension, one would say the Type 60 was a variant of the SU 60. The hull is of welded construction, supporting an estimated maximum thickness of between 12mm-15mm of steel armor protection. The engine, a Komatsu Model 6T 120-2 diesel, is a V6 and air cooled, developing 120hp at 2,400rpm. Late production models of the Type 60 featured an uprated engine developing 150hp. Power to weight ratio is 18hp/ton with the 150hp rated engine. The Komatsu powerplant gives the Type 60 a maximum road speed of 45kph, the later models getting up to 55kph. Maximum road range is 130km out of a 77 liter fuel tank. While the speed is similar to the M50, the Type 60s road range is less than half the M50. The engine, unlike the M50, is mounted in the rear of the Type 60 and it drives a front drive sprocket, the track supported by five road wheels, an idler, and three return rollers with a ground pressure of .67kg/cm2. Should it be needed, the normal tracks can be replaced with wider snow tracks for such conditions. The Type 60 can climb a .55 meter vertical obstacle, cross a 1.8m wide trench, and ford up to a meter. The driver sits in the front of the vehicle to the left and he is provided with a hatch and two vision blocks. The armament, consisting of two 106mm recoilless rifles manufactured by the Japan Steel Works, is mounted along the right half of the vehicle. Behind the driver is the fighting compartment, where the commander and gunner reside. The gunner has a hatch located behind the commander, the commander having a small, raised turret topped off with a hatch which contains a trio of vision ports along with a periscope and optical sight. The vehicle offers no form of NBC protection and some models have been fitted with infrared night vision equipment.

The recoilless rifles, of which there are only two as compared to the M50s six, are, when in traveling condition, laid straight and kept secure by a travel lock on the front of the hull. In battle, the rifles can be deployed in the "low" position, allowing them an elevation of only -5 degrees up to 10 degrees with a traverse of 10 degrees left or right, 20 degrees in total traverse. In the "high" position, the rifles are raised upwards via powered controls in the roof of the tank and from this vantage, they can be elevated down to -20 degrees or up to 15 degrees with a total traverse rate of 60 degrees. Like the M50, the rifles are brought to bear on the target via a spotting rifle secured to the outer recoilless rifle and the procedure to target and fire is much the same. The commander is provided with a rangefinder. The Type 60 can hold between 8 to 10 rounds of 106mm ammunition total, a rather small sum indeed. Ammunition types arenīt usually mixed and so if the mission is anti-armor, HEAT rounds are carried while for infantry support missions, the load will be HE rounds. Like the M50, the recoilless rifles are kept completely outside the vehicle, requiring the gunner to expose himself to reload the weapons. On each side of the hull, housed behind the armor and facing rearwards, is a panel. Behind the panel are storage for 4 rounds of ammunition. So, with a round in each rifle and a full load of 4 rounds in each storage holds, the total ammunition carried is 10. The Type 60 carries no form of secondary armament outside of any small arms the crew may have.

The Type 60, unlike the M50 "Ontos", still sees service to this day. Both vehicles shared a similar mission, that of hunting armor in as small a package as possible, to present a minimal target and rely on speed to keep it alive and both mounted, for its day, the powerful 106mm recoilless rifle. Both had similar dimensions and almost equal performance. Both, however, shared the same drawbacks...little armor, few rounds onboard to sustain protracted battle, high risk for gunner and commander in having to reload their weapons without the benefit of what armor the vehicle offered, and the telltale backblast signature upon firing their guns. Of the two, the M50 was the only one to see combat action and, aside from the high toll in crew casualties, proved its worth in the anti-tank role but more notably in the fire support role.

MULE ATV with 106mm RR

Jeeps with 106mm RRs
Toyota Land Cruiser with 106mm RR

ARVN M41s fly by USAF C-133s to stop a mutinee in South Vietnam

---

1970s...

---

M113A1 Gavin APCs

NEW COMBAT ACTION VIDEO!

www.combatreform.org/airgroundcavalryincombat.wmv

The light infantry combat vehicle that can go anywhere a lightfighter can walk--to include breaking brush in closed terrain after 3D aircraft insertions is still the TRACKED M113 Gavin, the "Green Dragon" feared by the VC/NVA and enemies today that can spit out firepower in all directions behind gunshields...you can't do this in a Stryker or any other wheeled truck. We also have the armor to go on the outside of Gavins to make them RPG and landmine resistant as well as stabilized, shoot-on-the-move autocannons to smother all enemies with explosive shell fire. Band tracks and hybrid-electric drive can make extended hull MTVL, regular size or reduced size "Mini-Gavins" that fit into CH-47 Chinook helicopters stealthy and go 60 mph on smooth terrain...

M113 Gavin being extracted from a C-130 Hercules

M113 Gavin under multiple parachutes during airdrop
M113 Gavins and Wiesels from a C-130

The M113A3 is simple-to-operate with a steering wheel and can be operated effectively with little additional training by any U.S. Army infantry squad. The M113A3 swims without preparation, is light on roads and doesn't need a transporter to move around; is in use by over 66 allied countries, spare parts are cheap and available, can be lifted by heavy lift CH-47D/F Chinook helicopters by sling-load to any place we want on the battlefield.

M113 sling-loaded by a Chinook
Gavin heavylifted by a CH-47D/F
With "band tracks" is even lighter on roads than rubber SUV tired wheeled armored cars, while still able to go cross-country that would be no-go terrain for LAVs.

CH-47F Sling-loading a Gavin Fighting Vehicle
Gavin with 106mm RR
120mm turret for Gavin
30mm and Javelin turret on Gavin,/a>
Gavinwith M551 turret
Gavin Driver's panel
Engineer Gavin with gunshield
Fleet of Gavins!
Gavin with 1 man 25mm/7.62mm turret
Another view of Gavin 25mm ITVL
Gavin ACAV
Gavin infantry situationally-aware!
M113 in combat in Panama!
M113 infantry lead the way in Panama invasion

IDF Airborne C-130 airland: Victor at Entebbe

AFTER VIETNAM

What happened to Air Assault tactics, then?

Even though the TRI-Cap armor/helicopter experiment worked very well in tests, the conservative Army leadership went back to emulating WWII, perhaps they were excited about George C. Scott in the movie, "Patton"?

We know most of the readers would parachute out of a plane to gain 3D positional advantage if asked to do so. The following remarks are directed at those who are not even willing to sit on a bench seat in a helicopter or STOL fixed-wing plane to get a 3D advantage by low-personal risk airlanding, either. Our thesis is that American mounted and firepower-centric warfare is also a form of "posturing" going through the motions of fighting but not really fighting except when in the coverless desert where we can kill the enemy from the safety of our armored cacoons. Perhaps by going to too-heavy AFVs like the M1/M2 we have created a built-in automatic excuse so Armor branch will never have to fight in jungles or against thinking, adaptive enemies again, you certainly don't see any AFVs in the 25th LID anymore. General Don Starry and company certainly knew light tanks/AFVs were fantastic in Vietnam---perhaps they thought by going to heavy AFVs they could insure they wouldn't have to fight where infantry dismounted action would run the show? We'd love to interview these Army leaders that made these decisions and find out. Did they really think a 33-ton medium-weight BFV is going to be as terrain agile as a light tracked M113 Gavin rumbling over the rice paddies in Vietnam? If they do, they are truly idiots, but we doubt that.

Personally, we think the Army--particularly Armor branch deliberately made itself too heavy so it wouldn't have to fight a Vietnam again. Just like the marines deliberately land-lock themselves and ship-deploy just token evac forces, all the while by spending as much tax-payer money as possible. If the shoe fits, wear it. Now we have another "Vietnam" called Iraq and the lightfighter narcissists on foot are getting creamed and the tread heads have the answers, they just need to get on with it and add the extra armor layers and gunshields needed to win non-linear battles.

The failure of aviation/infantry/artillery to defeat the VC/NVA in Vietnam without taking too many casualties---resulted in leaders in the Army to resort to 2D heavy, armored cacoon mounted warfare oriented towards European confrontation against the Soviets. Instead of FIXING Airborne/Air Assault 3D maneuver units by giving them numerous air-deliverable light AFVs which would solve their vulnerability/firepower/ground mobility problems these heavyists who I suspect are "legs" (meaning unwilling to take personal risks by flying in aircraft=cowards) that are anti-3D maneuver because they think they can make up for this lack of 3D maneuver-gained-positional-advantage by extremely heavy armor protection/firepower that limits them to just 2D maneuver routes. A 2D force so heavy it cannot rapidly deploy strategically to be relevent in a world that moves by the speed of the AIR in a force that sits in the motor pool and watches the fight on CNN.

Heavyists want low/no risk warfare and think that those positions ahead that threaten them can be controlled by "deep fires" and thus they don't have to take any risks by flying forces ahead to control this ground. This is the "deep strike" mentality prevalent in the Army today because it thinks war is just killing and killing is firepower. These folks do not understand to control ground you need forces on the ground; and this means not relying on distant fires to do this. Controlling ground locally with close fires/patrolling is sound, trying to control ground miles and miles away with just the eyes of a robot plane or vehicle is madness. By being heavily mounted, they think they are so impervious to fires they can just stampede ahead without ill effect. Don't they see the repeated failures at NTC every time this is tried? Tracks are not Chobham armored--once BlueFor stampedes into a minefield kill zone its over. Heavyists are living on technotactical borrowed time as top-attack missiles are coming that will pierce their vehicle roofs that don't have 4 feet of Chobham/DU armor. A smart enemy will not let their fuel trucks travel down roads to refuel these heavy gas-guzzlers.

We know this is cruel, but we think it boils down to personal cowardice. (we call them as we see them)

3D maneuver requires movement inside aircraft and the 2D heavyists are afraid of flying. Yes, some aircraft will crash in peacetime and some of us are going to die. But the more numerous lives we will have saved in war will make it worth it. Don't believe me? Order everyone at Fort Knox to go to jump school or they will be discharged and see what happens. Am I saying they are lesser Soldiers? Yes, I am. If you are not willing to do WHATEVER IT TAKES to win a war, to include risks in peacetime to have a 3D maneuver capability, you are a coward and a phony. If Generals want to shoot shells at map coordinates and assume they are under our "control" are posturing cowards, too. When our 2D forces come by these terrain areas and the enemy is there, the junior officers/enlistedmen will pay for it with their lives. The only guy who is really got the pressure on in mounted warfare is the Driver; everyone else can relax and enjoy the ride. Its the worse kind of Fort Knox BS mentality possible, a lot of General Shinseki's transformation opposition sadly emanates from Armor types who are scared to fly in aircraft when it should be opposition to being in a road bound armored car in order to be light enough to fly in USAF aircraft when you can have a better, x-country capable tracked AFV that is so efficient with its weight that its Army helicopter transportable, too. Be against road-bound wheels not 3D deployability and battlefield maneuver.

To meet this need, the Soviets chose a turretless design which began with the ASU-57 of the mid-1950s. This tiny little SPAT, weighing no more than 7,387 lbs. in combat readiness and with a maximum height of only 3 feet 10 inches had all the qualities of a small and relatively fast SPAT which was air-droppable. But, due to its size and the aluminum materials used to give it its light weight, its armor was a mere 6mm maximum. Indeed this is a graphic illustration of the price to pay for such a vehicle. However, its gun, a modification of the 57mm ZIS-2 anti-tank gun, was more than adequate to combat most of the vehicles it may have faced for its time, short of main battle tanks. But, the little ASU-57 had many shortcomings, notably its feeble armor, lack of any NBC and overhead crew protection, and, as time passed, the 57mm gun was unable to deal with the current crop of threats. To this end, the Soviets deployed the ASU-85. Using components of the Soviet PT-76 amphibious light tank, the ASU-85 was a fully enclosed vehicle with the heavy 85mm anti-tank gun mounted in the front glacis plate. Maximum armor was 40mm with NBC protection for the crew. Like the ASU-57, it was still air-droppable but a bigger vehicle like the ASU-85 meant more assets had to be used to transport an equal number of ASU-85s compared to its smaller predecessor.

ASU-57s by MI-6 Hook helicopters
ASU-57s and infantry on the march!
Map of world's first Air-Mech helicopter assault in Somalia in 1977

ASU-85 Assault Gun
ASU-85 on field maneuvers

8-12 ton BMD: the world's standard in a light Air-Mech AFV

BMDs and Paratrooper infantry in the assault

Russian VDV Airborne History & Today, Part 1

www.youtube.com/watch?v=c480PS9xEEs

Russian VDV Airborne History & Today, Part 2

www.youtube.com/watch?v=QF8ItLzcTOc

Meet the BMD-1

www.youtube.com/watch?v=B8tHiZ03U6c

www.youtube.com/watch?v=_hrvgYEI90c

www.youtube.com/watch?v=IUF4GVszsCQ

BMD-1
BMD-2

www.youtube.com/watch?v=97BKseuQl1c

BMD-3

www.youtube.com/watch?v=xAZPWMgU0qc

BMD with tracks retracted and rigged for airdrop
BMD with 120mm turreted gun-mortar (2S9)
BMD airdrop sequence from AN-12 turboprop aircraft
IL-76 loading a BMD
Retro-rockets fire to slow a BMD under canopy for landing
BMD after the paradrop, crew de-rigging for ground maneuvers

BMD-4: 100mm/30mm/7.62mm firepower out to 7, 000 meters, Airborne/Amphibious Maneuver

www.youtube.com/watch?v=zxwkZqijfas

Foot-slogging, truck-hopping American Paratroopers and marines are not even close to being as capable. We suck, and we better get off our asses and start gaining capabilities instead of wailing about WW2 generation casualties otherwise we are going to join them in the grave, tombstones marked: LOSERS.

For BMD-3/4 pics:

www.geocities.com/armorhistory

---

1980s...

---

"M113 1/2": the "Lynx" scout vehicle

Small Size = Excellent Mobility and Ability to Hide when Scouting!

The 4-roadwheel, "Mini-Gavin" Lynx out-performs the XM800 Scout tank, however in the aftermath of the failed M114 (hull overhang in front got it stuck in rice paddies in Vietnam) the U.S. Army without a CAVALRY BRANCH chose to make the bloated Bradley infantry fighting vehicle into an oversized scout vehicle. U.S. cavalry forces could slam into the enemy, but not stealthfully move ahead or swim across rivers/lakes in Bradleys/Humvee trucks.

However, NATO countries Canada and the Netherlands realized the value of small, light recon tracks and bought the Lynx and used it successfully for over 20 years! What's amazing is that none of them figured out that a Lynx could fit into a CH-47 Chinook helicopter or two at-a-time in a C-130 for 3D maneuvers, but they did aggressively swim them and mounted powerful 20mm autocannons to give them a nasty sting if anyone tried to stop them scouting.

Excellent Lynx photos from web site: bendijkstra.nl/M113%20C&V.html

Humvee trucks and 106mm Recoilless Rifles

Taiwanese 106mm HMMWVs
Art drawing of 106mm RR on HMMWV firing

8-ton Scorpion/Scimitar family: victors in the Falklands wars and Kosovo
U.S. CH-53D helicopter flies Scorpion light tank
RAF Chinook hovers to pick-up Scorpion light tank
British Airborne Air-Mechs into Kosovo

M551 Sheridan 17-ton light tanks
World's first combat parachute Air-Mech Assault: Panama M551 Sheridan 152mm gun light tanks

www.youtube.com/watch?v=50cpPAVoxJQ

www.youtube.com/watch?v=kEgBoROaD2g

Sheridan sling-load under a CH-54 SkyCrane helicopter

Before envy struck, the U.S. Army Airborne parachute low-velocity airdropped (LVAD) M551 Sheridan Light Tanks and M113 Gavin Armored Personnel Carriers in the 3^rd Battalion, 73^rd Armored Regiment as a part of the 82^nd Airborne Division in the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. This video shows that the rear ramp of a C-5, C-17 or C-130 can be opened for light tanks to slide out, followed by the ramp closing and the Paratroopers to operate them to jump out both side jump doors. On C-130s, Paras can follow their M113 Gavins on Type V airdrop platforms immediately by a ramp jump currently not allowed on C-5Bs/C-17s with static-line parachutes. The U.S. Army despite inventing M113/M551 airdroppable light tanks in the 1950s thanks to Generals James Gavin and Hal Moore; had to play catch-up with the Russians who aggressively perfected air-mech in their force structure with a BMD assigned to every rifle squad while American Paras foot-slog after "seize & hold" defensive WW2 re-enactments.

www.geocities.com/armorhistory

Finally, in 1989, the U.S. Army Airborne stunned the world by airdropping M551 Sheridans into combat in Panama in 1989 while other Sheridans and Gavins on the scene by airland lead the way to a quick collapse and capture of dictator Manuel Noriega and his regime.

www.combatreform.org/lighttanks.htm

After another pair of victories in Haiti (1994) and Desert Storm (1990-91) where light tanks saved the day, the heavy tankers running HQDA in 1996-97 lied to the light Army Airborne with a "bait & switch"--retire your Sheridans and we will buy M8 Buford Armored Gun Systems (aka light tanks) to replace them. The Sheridans were placed on railroads cars to go to the National Training Center as training aids--and then HQDA cancelled the AGS buy. Thus, because of egomania, incompetence and envy, 3/73^rd Armor was disbanded when thousands of M113 Gavins are available to re-equip them to be Assault Transportation for Light Infantry as Gavin always intended them to provide. HQDA racketeers refused of course, so in 2001 when Osama Bin Laden was escaping into Pakistan, General Meigs in Germany offered to fly-in his M113 Gavin Immediate Ready Force to give our troops ground maneuver capabilities, Clintonista wheeled peacekeeper racketeer, General Shinseki said "no! I don't want anyone seeing M113s rolling off C-130s"--it'd reveal his too-heavy-to-fly-by-C-130, LAV-III "Stryker" truck purchases were un-necessary and dismal failures. When the Airborne asked to drop Paras en masse to block OBL's escape routes backed with 4 of the Buford AGS light tanks the Army already owned, SecDef Rumsfeld and HQDA said "no!" to that, too. They don't want to get CIA-man OBL and defend America; they need him as a "boogie man" to boost defense budgets to buy junk trucks so our men can get killed on roads by land mines to keep the American public in a rage at "ragheads" when the truth is that walling off the rival sects in Iraq and having a low-key American advisorary and M113 Gavin tracked Quick Reaction Force presence in Iraq/Afghanistan would reduce justified outrage at our obnoxious presence and smother the civil war in the former and stop air strikes killing civilians in the latter. Bad for war profiteers like Stryker truck-maker GDLS, but good for the Iraqi and American people and their Army.

M113A3 Gavin AFVs

www.youtube.com/watch?v=BcSwXW49J_I

M113A3 rolling from C-17 Globemaster III
C-130 heavy drop
M113A3 Gavin under CH-47 Chinook using SEL concept

Australian M113A1s Air-Mech from C-130s into Dili to save the day in East Timor!

Notice the Australians actually know their M113 Gavins weigh 9.7 tons (see Loadmaster marking on front) band the dumb Americans think they weigh 13 tons and proceed to un-necessarily remove tracks and engine to fly by CH-54 SkyCrane.

East Timor montage
C-130s approach the airport
C-130 flaring to land at Dili airport
Aussie Digger Paratroopers run off C-130 rear ramp
M113A1: victor at East Timor
M113A1 as the mobile command post
Close-up of twin MG turret
M113A3 with applique armor
IDF M113 with "classical" configuration/reactive armor
Modern M113A3
M113A3 with MOUT vertical assault capsule arm

M8 Buford Armored Gun System: 105mm shoot-on-the-move ready for production
M8 rolling over a wall

BMD-3s: all troops can be air-dropped INSIDE
BMD-3 firing in action

www.youtube.com/watch?v=xAZPWMgU0qc

BMD-4

www.youtube.com/watch?v=zxwkZqijfas

Even a full-sized BMP-3/4 can be Air-Meched by paradrop or MI-26 HALO helicopter

www.youtube.com/watch?v=O8OOwdwZhNI

www.youtube.com/watch?v=piwS3Vbdvvc&

---

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS

The lessons of World War 2 armored vehicle design are that tanks need to be LIGHT and TURRETLESS.

The late armored vehicle combat veteran with General Percy Hobart's "Funnies" combat engineering tanks of the 79^th Armoured Division, Major Kenneth Macksey wrote extensively after the war and came to the conclusion in his masterpiece, Tank versus Tank that in order to be as thickly armored as possible while still being light enough to have low ground pressure to go anywhere cross-country the future tank must not squander weight/space with a turret that also adds fatal height which makes the enemy detect you. Actual combat shows the most effective German tank of WW2 was NOT the vaunted turreted heavy Tigers, medium Panthers or even the light Mark IVs, but the turretless Sturmgeschutze or "STUGs", which killed a horrific 30, 000 Allied tanks in WW2.

STUGs were in production all throughout WW2 and were so effective because without a turret they were hard to see and had thick armor on their front so even if you did see them and returned fire, it was too late because the STUG was facing you with its thick frontal armor which even if you hit it didn't damage it and the Germans were blasting you to bits at the vulnerable turret/hull junction.

Today's Army vehicles violate these WW2 truths; the M1 Abrams is 70 tons overall but 30 tons of it is its huge turret, the 36-ton Bradley has a 4 ton turret begging to be shot off, and the Stryker and MRAP trucks while not having turrets squander away armor potential by being wheeled and 28% less space/weight efficient than a more compact tracked tank and are road/trail/street bound and subject to constant land mine and ambush attacks due to the high ground pressure of their vulnerable air-filled rubber tires.

There is only one vehicle in the U.S. inventory that embodies the truths of WW2 combat experience and is the most space/weight efficient to achieve STUG-like effects: the light, tracked M113 Gavin.

By not squandering its engine power moving turrets or an oversized hull box to fit over wheels, the M113 Gavin can be very thickly protected if we add armor to its baseline aluminum alloy hull that is medium caliber bullet and near-miss blast-proof. Now a let's examine the whole aluminum alloy armor thing.

The whole future combat system (FCS) selling point that if we built tanks from scratch that they could be built of composites aka a "plastic tank" and exceed the protection levels of aluminum alloy was considered by the South Koreans for their NIFV and rejected because its not proven if an entirely plastic hull can withstand daily wear & tear in the field and not catastrophically crack and moreover, all one gains is twice the kinetic energy bullet protection meaning heavy machine gun bullets instead of medium ones at the hull when to defend against high explosive blast and missile attacks applique' armor not a part of the basic hull holding the automotive parts together is needed and when these are added they automatically defeat heavy machine gun bullets. The hull is only to hold the automotives unless you want to lock yourself into the armor technology of the moment that you make a hull that is also to be the protective layering, too. Thick steel tanks lacking any excess engine power are all over the world in a state of obsolescence to the increasing landmine and ATGM threats because they have little wiggle room in their designs to get the necessary new armor types to counter these threats. Once all of these factors were weighed in, the South Koreans opted for an aluminum alloy hull for their NIFV with a plastic roof to experiment with this material type operationally. The BAE FCS NLOS-C demonstrator is likewise made of aluminum alloy and steel, its an AGS chassis. Thus, the whole point of starting off with a clean-sheet FCS is not functionally necessary for a LIGHT tank when we already have an excellent light tank chassis in the M113 Gavin which to modify into a series of high technology variants to exploit the STUG effect to fire support for our tankless light infantry as well as to move them by air and with maximum cross-country mobility through even closed terrains often thought only men on foot can traverse.

Our Future Armored Vehicle (FAV) Seminar that showed a glimpse into Air-Mech-Strike future!

Legendary combat tanker, Ralph Zumbro writes:

"Mike;
That little beast has the same 90mm that we had in the M48 series and burns the same selection of ammo which is made by the Spanish, Belgians, French, and the Pakis. It also has the full length rubber tracks in five foot sections. The roadwheels, however, are air filled tires......Take some work but you could make a nice Hetzer type assault gun outa that sucker."

Ralph