VINTAGE AIR SUPPORT

SHOULD IT/CAN IT BE REVIVED?

Chuck Myers
29 August 2001 [UPDATED 11 December 2002]

Part I: What have we lost and how did we lose it?

"Air support puts new zest and determination in our line in a way no amount of artillery fire before our eyes can do. The men see our pilots; they watch them come in low and take terrible chances. It makes them want to go forward again. The effect is as if they were drawn by a magnet."

A Battalion Commander of the 1st Marine Division, made this descriptive statement following their withdrawal from the Chosin Reservoir (quoted in the Marine Corps Gazette page 79, November 2000). At the time of his observation, Army and Marine forces were under extremely heavy pressure from 250,000 Chinese troops who had intervened against General MacArthur’s U.N. forces which, in November 1950, had been on the brink of victory in North Korea. The battalion commander’s description of air support reminds one of the old WWII movie "Flying Leathernecks" where John Wayne and his Marine F-4U Corsair pilots attack Japanese infantry and armor at eyeball level while our GI’s cheer them on.

Such flying was not uncommon by pilots of both allied and enemy air forces during WWII, Korea and some stages of the war against North Vietnam. Unfortunately for our infantry, it has gone out of style for a number of reasons. The popular excuse is that the air defense threat has become so ferocious as to preclude flying above enemy ground forces at altitudes below 10,000 feet. In Korea and Europe, the sky is overcast at two to three thousand feet over forty percent of the time. Knowing that the visible presence of tactical aircraft will be curtailed by an overcast sky above the battlefield is good news to enemy commanders who can be expected to exploit this factor to their advantage. Also, the possibility for overcast skies may constrain plans for offensive action by our ground commanders, knowing that they can not count on a full measure of combat air support should they need it. "Aerial Battlespace Beneath the Overcast" has been important in the past and probably will continue to be so.

Flying low over a battlefield has always been dangerous business because ground troops possess large numbers of guns varying from pistols to high rate of fire machine guns and medium caliber anti-aircraft guns. Remember how WWI ace, Baron von Richtofen ("Red Baron") was killed. A typical division may have as many as 10,000 automatic weapons. Troops are taught to create a hail of bullets above the battlefield for aircraft to fly into and they seem to enjoy the opportunity to shoot at airplanes. Most hits are received from the forward hemisphere and below. And, the faster the airplanes fly, the greater will be the depth of penetration of projectiles into their structure. When they concentrate their fires, Soldiers can make the sky virtually uninhabitable up to at least five thousand feet. If one must make passes over a battlefield, experience has taught that it is best to fly above 10,000 or below 100 feet. Flying very low, especially through rolling terrain or urban areas, minimizes the possibility of an air defense weapon being pointed at and tracking a passing aircraft.

Attacking ground forces beneath an overcast sky was especially hazardous on both the Eastern and Western Fronts in Europe during WWII but tactical pilots managed to be effective in spite of seemingly ever present gunfire. Has the gun density or lethality increased during the past fifty years? The problem lies not with gun density and lethality but rather with the character of our aircraft. Following 1945, the aircraft industry was directed to design for nuclear vice conventional war. For nuclear war, exposure to ground fire is not a problem worthy of consideration. Attack and fighter aircraft for the next two decades were designed primarily to deliver nuclear bombs to key targets deep in enemy territory under all weather conditions. Attacking enemy ground forces was not to be a part of their repertoire. During this period, airforces of the world spawned families of aircraft such as the USAF F-100 series including the TFX F-111, Navy F-4, A-3J, A-4, A-7, British Harrier, Lightning, Tornado, French Mirage, Russian Migs, etc. with no design consideration for vulnerability to ground fire. The design emphasis was on maximizing range and speed, and airplanes were especially tailored for high-low-high mission profiles. Nuclear warfare design criteria contributed heavily to the losses of such airplanes as the F-105, F-4, F-8, F-111 and A-6 in Vietnam. Typical deficiencies included a lack of fuel tank self-sealing, lack of redundancy of control arteries, lack of protection for the pilots, use of highly flammable hydraulic fluid and lack of protection for the very tender jet engines to name just a few examples. The yield of such design habits, appropriate for nuclear war, was low tolerance to bullets and shrapnel as demonstrated by the high performance combat aircraft employed against Vietnam.

Our 1960’s air forces were trapped into employing nuclear war aircraft in a fierce conventional engagement for which the DoD had not prepared. In terms of vulnerability, these aircraft were less than ten percent as tolerant to ground fire as aircraft such as the Army Air Corps P-47 Thunderbolt, British Hurricane/Typhoon, the German Stuka and FW-190 or the heavily armored Russian Stormovik.

The IL-2 Sturmovik: most produced combat plane, EVER!

The original Il-2 was a single-seater. The forward fuselage around the engine and cockpit was built with 700 kilograms (1,543 pounds) of steel ranging from 5 to 12 millimeters (a fifth to half inch) thick. The engine radiators were placed behind the engine in the armored body, while the air intakes were placed on top of the nose. K-4 armor glass was used in the cockpit, with thicknesses from 55 to 65 millimeters (2.2 to 2.6 inches).

38,000 IL-2 type aircraft were built in WWII, key to victory on the Russian Eastern Front!

In these latter aircraft as well as the fifties vintage Navy/AF A-1 SkyRaider, the pilot sat behind a massive piston engine which continued to operate in spite of significant damage and served as frontal armor protection for the pilot during attacks against ground targets. The engine of the P-47 also served as a battering ram making it possible to crashland/belly-in through a forest or a building and walk away from the wreckage ---- there are no such aircraft in any major airforces today. Considering the relative vulnerability of the high-performance jet fighters which populate the worlds airforces, it is understandable that flying about at lower altitudes above a battlefield is deemed foolhardy.

An anomaly occurred during the late sixties due to concern over the attrition of our tactical aircraft in Vietnam and projections of the possible disaster our pilots would face beneath the overcast in a war against the USSR in Europe. Out of this concern came the USAF AX program which produced the A-10 Warthog, the first U.S. airplane actually designed for the dirty mission of attacking ground forces and especially for killing tanks. Because the AX aircraft would be used primarily in support of ground troops, the U.S. Army had significant input into the necessary characteristics of the aircraft. The AX needed

"To perform in close coordination with ground troops, in a high intensity small-arms fire environment, and for extended periods of time with a high payload. The requirement for fast response to Army needs is to be met three ways: 1) the aircraft will have short takeoff and landing (STOL) characteristics and rugged landing gear which will permit it to operate from unimproved landing fields; 2) it will have a long loiter time, giving it the capability to remain over the battlefield where it will be on call at a moment's notice; and 3) the aircraft will have a rather high cruise speed to allow rapid deployment from home field to battle area, or from one battle area to another. The AX should be able to take off and land from 2,000-foot runways."

The design emphasis was on survivability through reduction of vulnerability to ground fire. Although it turned out to be much larger and less agile than desired, it was a major improvement over the nuclear age combat aircraft and serves as an indicator of what might be accomplished if a follow-on effort was sponsored by the DoD. Touted as a single-purpose aircraft, its loiter performance, ease of maintenance and toughness led to its broad application in Desert Storm. The Russians created the armored SU-25 Frogfoot CAS aircraft with an uncanny resemblance to the losing Northrop A-9 AX candidate. SU-25s have an excellent combat record in Afghanistan and Chechnya, and been almost impossible to shot down.

Flying beneath an overcast sky so as to discover and attack the enemy is generally discouraged and sometimes forbidden, even with the worlds least vulnerable jet airplane, the Warthog. [1] In addition to the gunfire threat, pilots are led to believe that the enemy has deployed a virtual "death-dot" shoulder fired missile which Soldiers merely have to point and shoot to achieve a kill. In reality, its not that easy for the air defender (who is also interested in his own survival), especially if the near sky overhead is dominated by aggressive pilots who are not only providing air support but concurrently hunting and attacking air defense elements. Of course, in view of the inadvisability to expose our inappropriate aircraft to gunfire, the air defender is unlikely to face such an air threat.

[1]

"Leveraging technology can relieve pilots from having to venture below cloud level thus putting them in greater danger from anti-aircraft and small caliber gunfire. The United States is capable of producing the technologies to see through the clouds and there are lots of techniques you can use to do that. Pilots should not have to venture below the clouds unless our troops are in jeopardy --- when our troops are in jeopardy, we will"

General John Jumper, USAF, Commander ACC as quoted by Defense Week 17 April 2000 following a presentation on Capital Hill regarding the need for the F-22.

In one sense, the overall threat faced by U.S. pilots at all altitudes has subsided since WWII. The most disruptive and worrisome air defense element hardly even exists in the world today, that threat is enemy fighter interceptors flown by experienced and competent fighter pilots. For perspective, the top ten German Luftwaffe aces shot down a total of 2552 aircraft. The leader among that band of killers was young Eric Hartman with 350 victories. To further remind of our experience: in WWII, the U.S. Army Air Force lost twice as many airmen in three and one half years of combat operations than the total number of men killed (air and ground) during ten years of fighting in Vietnam. And, the losses seldom caused a significant alteration of air campaign plans. Aircraft attrition rates overall for our most prominent military actions were: WWII-9%, Korea-2%, Vietnam-0.5% and Desert Storm less than-0.3%. Additionally, in terms of total losses, aircraft lost due to mishaps, collisions with each other or the ground, fuel exhaustion, etc. in SEA exceeded the number shot down. The personal attrition rate for one who may have been the worlds most aggressive attack pilot to survive WWII, Luftwaffe Colonel Hans Ulrich Rudel, was slightly over one percent having been shot down 32 times while flying over 2500 sorties on the Eastern Front, primarily against the Russian army.

From the perspective of a war planner, perhaps attrition should be considered within a framework that includes the aircraft, pilots and ground elements as a package. Should the survivability of pilots, because of their perceived value and scarcity, be considered independent of the total engaged force? Imagine what would have happened to the Army ground forces engaged in the desperate battle at Ia Drang in 1965 had there not been experienced and aggressive pilots attacking the enemy at below tree top level [2]. Also, consider that the air tactics and techniques required to be effective under such circumstances require frequent practice with the ground component because the skills of both are perishable. Is it rational to assume that pilots can practice high-altitude stand-off tactics for years and on the spur of the moment, descend and engage in a desperate fight at low altitude beneath an overcast and expect to survive and provide effective air support? Frequent and effective interplay of the air/ground team is a major contributor to survivability of the total force. Experience has shown that in "war", pilot and grunt survivability are intertwined with victory or defeat.

[2] Battle of Ia Drang, 1965:

"There were about 250 men of my battalion on the ground and still functioning. Casualties were beginning to pile up. I fleetingly thought of a predecessor of mine in the Seventh Cavalry, LTC George Armstrong Custer and his final stand in the valley of the Little Big Horn, eighty-nine years earlier. I was determined that history would not repeat itself in the valley of the Ia Drang. We had one thing George Custer did not have:--fire support."

We Were Soldiers Once and Young by LTC Hal Moore and Joe Galloway. In this situation, external fires, especially from the A-1s, saved the unit from annihilation. The presence of maneuver air support can reduce the probability of having such situations develop to the point where "save the day" actions are necessary.

One of my observations that relates to the proposed MAS with the COP JAAT is that the the Seventh Cav force that was inserted had never worked with/practiced with a "virtually organic" air support element. Under my MAS concept, key members of the Fixed-wing JAAT elements would have attended the mission prep briefing and would have been applying recce fires as the lift force was proceeding to the landing zone. They would have also been performing local recce and been in position when the contact was made. The North Vietnamese would never have been able to organize the attacks that resulted in a near Little Big Horn. And the total operation would probably have killed hundreds more enemy with little loss of 7th Cav. Under our concept, we don't wait until grunts are in trouble to call for support ---- its always there as part of the team. With our presence you would never need "bail me out" CAS or ARTY, even if the sky was overcast. You would not be supported by "strangers".

The introduction of nuclear weapons in 1945 reinforced a long held view that the best use of air power is attacking those critical strategic nodes which a military commander chooses to believe are essential for his enemy to continue fighting. Although the use of nuclear weapons was unlikely, the orientation of air forces toward deep strike established a mindset and doctrines which carried over to the employment of air-delivered conventional weapons. Nuclear warfare thinking proved to be an obstacle to maintaining effective conventional air warfare doctrine. Existing and proposed fighter/attack airplanes, for reasons discussed above, are not optimum for supporting ground forces, especially in the direct attack mode of WWII. And, generations of pilots, trained to perform deep strike interdiction with these aircraft and lacking combat experience in direct air support are unlikely candidates to recover the lost art described in the opening statement of this paper. Since the Nation lacks appropriate resources for such combat flying, revival of the mission is unlikely to occur without a major effort by the benefactors of such services, the ground forces. Change can only occur if current ground component commanders speak out on behalf of the grunts who will be confronted with classical combat situations in the future.

Where are the ground combat veterans who might testify as to the value of and need for the air support that was once available? They were sparse in number to begin with and most are retired or deceased. The strategic strike focus of the fifties dominated the minds of air planners during the Vietnam War. Could this account for the fact that direct air support was provided for only ten percent of SEA ground actions? Perhaps "out of sight, out of mind" may account for the fact that ground force commanders seemed content with this meager contribution by air. Considering that U.S. did not win in Vietnam, it seems fair to ask how it might have gone had the ground forces requested and received effective air support for say eighty instead of ten percent of their missions? Accompanying this question is the observation that the resource consuming effort of bombing North Vietnam and attempting to interdict the flow of supplies into the South failed to accomplish its objective. These thoughts lead to questions like: (1) Lacking personal experience with vintage air support, to what degree can current ground commanders visualize its potential value and (2) Might it help to conduct experiments to illustrate the possibilities for a revived form of air support which can exploit projected technology and innovative design?

Part II: How might TacAir contribute to evolving ground warfare concepts ?

In seeking the answer to this question, the author interviewed scores of ground combat veterans from three wars and other military events in addition to many who are involved in thinking about a range of possible future conflicts. Concepts such as STOM (ship-to-objective maneuver), DMO (dominant maneuver operations), JSF (joint strike force) and RDO (rapid decisive operations) all portray insertion of light forces into enemy territory. Evolving doctrines portray Light Forces operating deep in enemy territory relying on information dominance and quick decisive actions to keep the enemy off-balance. Light Force concepts emphasize reliance on external fires and various forms of "reach back" assistance. Also popular among "advanced thinkers" is the term "effects based assessment" (EBA) for evaluating various external fires alternatives. Encouraging troops to a higher level of aggressive conduct in the face of adversity would clearly be a positive "effect". The testimony of the Battalion Commander in the opening paragraph of this paper illustrates how the visible direct support by skilful pilots can serve to lift the spirits of the troops at a critical time. Is this not an example of the ultimate in terms of "effects based" value.

Ground Combat Elements (GCE) performing three dimensional maneuver, STOM or JSF operations will need all the external help they can get and without incurring additional logistical or manpower burdens. Interviews with scores of combat veterans (retired and active) reveal the need for Continuous Overhead Presence (COP) of perceptive air crews who are working as an integral part of the GCE. The expressed need is for a virtually organic airborne partner who understands the commanders intent and can provide the following functions with minimum interruption to ground maneuver:

Part III: What is the nature of the desired air support?

In this paper, the package of desired services listed above is named Maneuver Air Support (MAS). MAS is very different from CAS (close air support) which has become a highly controlled alleged air-substitute for artillery fire and will, in the future, be delivered from remote locations well beyond the grunt’s view on the battlefield. COP and MAS are provided by combinations of aircraft flown by specially trained crews executing variations of Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT) tactics tailored to exploit the low altitude region that has been vacated for missions such as close air support and battlefield air interdiction. MAS is tailored to provide visual and continuous support of Light Forces employing three dimensional maneuver warfare concepts to accomplish limited military objectives. Most important, MAS will be available even if the ground action is taking place beneath an overcast sky.

MAS mission pilots and aircraft would routinely perform as an integral part of a combined-arms maneuver warfare team. These specially trained pilots (all FAC qualified) must be perceptive aerial observers who are fully informed regarding their assigned ground force commander’s intent and would be in constant contact with him. Most important, MAS designated units become virtually organic and satisfy the expressed need for air presence, as emphasized repeatedly by combat experienced infantry officers. Experience with this mode of operation has proven effective as described by various pilots who flew OV-1 Mohawks and OV-10 Broncos in support of both Marine Corps and U.S. Army ground forces during Vietnam and Operation Desert Storm. Similar favorable experience was accumulated with A-1 Skyraiders and F-4U Corsairs in South East Asia and Korea. Also, variations of this mission were popular and effectively flown by pilots of P-47’s in support of Patton’s Third Army as it raced across France in 1944 as recounted by David Spires in "Patton and Weyland: A Model for Air Ground Cooperation". There, the mission was sometimes referred to as "column cover".

COP of MAS pilots employing adaptive-cooperative command & control (C2) techniques would provide immediate response to the menu of needs of a ground combat element (GCE). They could also serve as an informed airborne relay to expedite the response and enhance the performance of other air units providing CAS whether it is to be delivered from above or below the overcast. Of major importance is that MAS pilots would be proficient at providing spontaneous light fires to erase small problems which otherwise might escalate to an emergency status requiring artillery and massive CAS fires to save the day. An applicable bit of wisdom here is: "a stitch in time saves nine".

The expressed need for COP to support future light forces destined to execute three dimensional maneuver warfare concepts, compels the DoD to explore possibilities to include fielding a dedicated aircraft such as an ASP (agile-survivable-potent). In general terms, an ASP might be described as a small, very agile and survivable cross between a Bronco and a Warthog (an "OAX") that could fly either from a maneuver element dirt strip forward arming and refueling point (FAARP) to avoid fixed-site air base targeting or an aircraft carrier without using catapults or arresting gear (as did the Bronco). But of course, to be effective at MAS, the pilots of these birds must be specially trained and routinely practice with a ground element and other components of a joint air attack team (JAAT). They, with specialized equipment and weapons, may be the keys to recovering and exploiting the lost battlespace beneath an overcast sky.

MAS tactics and flight techniques can be expected to evolve from exploratory exercises. Here, a sample of possible aerial activity is offered to aid in visualization of a concept of operations. When in support of a battalion sized ground combat element (GCE), an airborne JAAT might consist of three to five ASPs and two or three AH-64 Apaches linked and working in the terrain flight environment (between the ground and two hundred feet) with AC-130U Spooky in orbit at 12000 feet. The JAAT, while flying in mutual support of each other, is simultaneously seeking, gaming, suppressing and killing enemy air defenses while applying light fires against enemy ground forces as desired by the GCE commander. Also, ASPs assist with coordination of artillery and control of CAS when either is needed and available. And, during three dimensional operations, this group will fly "shotgun" escort for insertion elements employing V-22s or compound or regular configuration helicopters.

ASP pilots, while hunting and providing local "recce-by-fires" in a high threat zone, would avoid rising above the terrain mask for periods in excess of 10 or 12 seconds and abstain from steady heading flight in excess of five seconds; such tactics minimize susceptibility to air defenses.

Experiments with such tactics over rolling terrain have demonstrated that ground observers are seldom able to point at and track the aircraft for periods in excess of five seconds, far short of the time required for a missile to be launched and guide to the target.

The nature of such flying plus the observation and communications burden may well dictate the need for a second air crewman, probably a ground combat officer. Night MAS can feature AC-130U Spooky (gunship) above the overcast, coupled with AH-64D Apache Longbow and UCAVs below. Of course, both night and day tactics will vary with the terrain, weather, threat and the tactical objectives. As in the past, definitive forms of the equipment and the techniques for effective application are best determined from exercises which afford opportunities to couple innovative technology with variations in air-ground team tactics.

Part IV: What is the character of an ASP?

            One response to this question is to imagine the architects creed, Form Follows Function, guiding an unbridled creative aircraft design genius --- herein lies the key to recapturing the lost battlespace beneath the overcast. A vivid picture of the "functions" of the MAS mission can be had by reading USAF Major Marshall Harrison’s fascinating account of his experience as an OV-10 airborne FAC in Vietnam and Cambodia; it is titled "A Lonely Kind of War". Combine Harrison’s book with that of Colonel Rudel’s "Stuka Pilot" and mentally ponder aircraft characteristics such as: light, agile, quick, tough, resilient, potent, survivable, long loiter, austere, and affordable. Emphasizing these attributes in conversation with innovative designers will likely yield candidate aircraft yet unimagined by most aviators. As examples, Bert Rutan's ARES (Agile, Responsive, Effective Support) and the Lockheed ATLAS (Anti-Tank Light Attack System) featuring the GE Unducted Fan engine and pictured in figures 1 and 2, were products of such discussions which occurred over a decade ago.

Detailed discussion of possible ASP aircraft: "Killer Bees"

Pilot survivability is a major mission consideration and because there would be frequent exposure to air defenses, the demand for vulnerability reduction will drive the design toward aircraft which, even when critically damaged, provide a high probability for pilot survival. In wartime, survival and recovery of pilots is especially important because they are a critically in-short-supply resource that must be returned to action, hopefully, within hours of being shot down. We are reminded that it was the loss of experienced pilots, not their aircraft, that was the downfall of both the German and Japanese airforces.

Such a perspective presents an opportunistic challenge to an aircraft designer both from the standpoint of minimizing aircraft vulnerability and pilot injury. Also, designers are challenged to moderate cost so that the aircraft that can be procured in such quantities as to provide "on-hand" replacements. An additional consideration is that even though an aircraft has low vulnerability, it may incur damage such that it is not safe to return to battle without undergoing time consuming repair. Here again is a reason to provide spare aircraft so the pilot can return to the fight in a fresh machine. In one sense, such a capability increases total force survivability because it improves the prospect for victory.

It is crucial to recognize that War consumes vast quantities of equipment. Ergo, there is concern that the evolving U.S. "token" air forces may be insufficient for War and, at the same time, too expensive for employment in military political gymnastics.

Part V: Beyond CAS: the Possibility for Vintage Air Support

What lies beyond CAS? Is it possible to create a form of air support that surpasses the best that was available in the past? Exploitation of available technology, the talents of modern airmen and operational vision of ground commanders can evolve the combined arms performance needed for battle dominance with three dimensional maneuver warfare. Continuous Overhead Presence (COP) of variable mix/match JAATs is a realistic possibility. The path to such capability begins with experimentation.

To quote Socrates: "One must learn by doing the thing, for though you think you know it, you have no certainty until you try."

Fig.1 ARES by Scaled Composites, Inc.

Low IR and Visual Signatures, Gun: 25mm GAU-12/U Gatling, Redundant Controls, Tough, Prototype Flow in 1989; Privately Financed

Fig.2 Sample ATLAS (Anti Tank Light Attack System) Design

GE Unducted Fan Engine and GAU-13 (4 barrel 30mm or 25mm) Gun Rate of Turn>25 deg/sec; Low SFC (long loiter), Low IR Signature, Low Vulnerability

Carrier Operable without Catapult or Arrested Landing: Exploits Reverse Pitch

Comments appreciated via email: cmyersaero@aol.com or cmyers@ida.com

Draft: 29 August 2001

Suggested Readings

"A Lonely Kind of War" by Marshall Harrison. Presidio Press

An OA-10 FAC in Vietnam.

"Air power for Patton's Army: Forging a legendary air-ground team" by Spires, David N. Spires

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Patton's Air Force: Forging a legendary air-ground team
Originally published: "Air power for Patton's Army", Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2002

Includes bibliographical references and index. (316 pages) ISBN 1-58834-087-2

1. World War, 1939-1945 Aerial Operations, American.
2. United States Army Air Forces. Tactical Air Command, 19th History.
3. Close air support
History 20th century.
4. United States. Army. Army 3rd History.

I. Title. D790.S65 2002b 940.54¹4973--dc21

By special arrangement with the U.S. Air Force, this publication is being offered for sale by the Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington, D.C.

For permission to reproduce illustrations appearing in this book, please correspond directly with the U.S. Air Force. The Smithsonian Institution Press does not retain reproduction rights for these illustrations individually or maintain a file of addresses for photo sources.

Biographical Sketch for C.E. "Chuck" Myers, Jr.

Mr. Myers served as the Director for Air Warfare in the Office of the Secretary of Defense between 1973-78 during which time he launched Project Harvey which later became known as the "stealth" program (see "The Five Billion Dollar Misunderstanding" by James Stevenson, Naval Institute Press). Chuck had the extraordinary experience of playing an integral role in creation and development of nine front-line military aircraft: the F-14, F-15, A-10, F-16, F-18, EF-111, EA-6B, F-117 and the B-2. While in DDR&E, his projects included Pershing, Tomahawk, Advanced Sparrow and Sidewinder, HARM, IR Maverick, Laser Guided Bombs and AMRAAM.

In 1961, Mr. Myers created Aerocounsel, Inc., a mini-think tank to serve the aerospace community. Since then, he has consulted or worked for 16 aerospace companies, NASA, FAA, GAO, CNA, IDA, OMB, CSIS, DoD, USAF and USN. During the past forty years he has written and lectured about various military missions including air superiority, close air support, fleet air defense and fire support for ground forces. In 1978, he began the effort which led to reactivation of the Iowa Class battleships and much later, a Navy proposal to create a Battle Surveillance Airship to assist in air defense against the "sea skimmer" cruise missile threat. This was coupled with briefings on his Littoral Warfare study which illuminated the need for a dedicated "fire support ship". During 1985-2000, Aerocounsel, conducted workshops on tactical air support for maneuver warfare. He chaired forums sponsored by COMNAVAIRPAC which led to a novel concept wherein fixed-wing pilots perform as a self-adaptive cooperative element in support of infantry.

Mr. Myers had the unique experience of completing both Army Air Corps and Navy pilot training. He flew low-level attack versions of B-25s with the Fifth Air Force in the Pacific Theater in WWII, separating from the Army Air Force in October 1945. Chuck then served as an USAF reserve pilot while attending Lafayette College, graduating with a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering in 1949. He was then commissioned Ensign, USN and trained as a Naval Aviator, graduating in April 1951 and later joining VF-72 to deploy aboard the carrier USS Bon Homme Richard to fly F9F-2 Panther jets in the Korean War.

In 1954, Lt. Myers graduated from Navy Test Pilot School after which he flew as a Navy Test Pilot for nearly two years before resigning to become a civilian engineering test pilot for CONVAIR. His first assignment was to develop a new flight technique for the "Pogo Stick" VTOL Navy fighter. After this project was terminated for engine problems, he joined the CONVAIR fighter-interceptor test team at Edwards AFB, CA. During five years at Edwards, he served as President of the Society of Experimental Test Pilots, became Chief Test Pilot on the USAF F-106 program and flew the speed envelope extension necessary for the Air Force to capture the World Speed Record from Russia in 1960 at 1544 mph. He later flew with the U.S. Army during early experiments using armed helicopters for fire support at Ft. Rucker, Alabama. In December 1999, Chuck was inducted into the Virginia Aeronautical Historical Society's Hall of Fame for his contributions to aeronautical progress during the past 50 years.

U.S. Pilots Faulted in Bombing of Canadians-Official
Wed Jun 19, 7:48 AM ET
By Charles Aldinger

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - A military investigation has found that a U.S. fighter pilot did not follow proper procedures when he mistakenly bombed Canadian troops in Afghanistan in April, killing four Soldiers and injuring eight, U.S. military officials said on Wednesday.

The officials said the investigation report found that the F-16 pilot, Maj. Harry Schmidt of the Illinois Air National Guard, did not take time to properly assess the threat on the ground before dropping a 500-pound (227 kg) laser-guided bomb.

The 1,500-page report recommends that Schmidt and a fellow F-16 guard pilot, Maj. William Umbach, face an Article 32 hearing that could lead to criminal or other charges against them. Such a hearing is the military version of a civilian grand jury.

The bombing of the Canadian troops on April 18 was among the deadliest "friendly fire" incidents of the 9-month war in Afghanistan and was the first time that Canadian Soldiers have been killed in a combat zone since the Korean War.

The U.S. military officials, who asked not to be identified, told Reuters the report had not yet been presented to top-level Pentagon officials, but it found that Schmidt did not check properly before he dropped his bomb on the Canadians as they conducted a nighttime live-fire exercise on the ground south of Kandahar in southern Afghanistan.

Umbach, an Air National Guard squadron commander, also let things get out of control, according to one official.

Details of the report were published in The New York Times and The Washington Post on Wednesday. The Times said Schmidt is a seasoned former Navy pilot and instructor at the Navy's elite Top Gun weapons school.

Canada is conducting a parallel investigation, but the U.S. probe found that Schmidt dropped the bomb after being told by air controllers not to release a weapon until further checks were made.

But after seeing ground fire and believing his flight was threatened, he dropped the bomb instead of leaving the area to assess the threat and plan a counterstrike.

U.S. President George W. Bush and Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien had pledged a thorough investigation.

The Soldiers of the Third Battalion of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry had only been firing on surface targets in a recognized training ground, and Canada's top general, Ray Henault, said the U.S. commander in the region had been fully informed of the exercise.

The U.S. investigation was headed by Air Force Brig. Gen. Stephen Sargeant.

American military officials said the report still remained to be approved by senior officers.

The U.S. Army Center for Lessons Learned (CALL) monograph, High-Altitude Operations by George J. Mordica II, Senior Analyst, CALL states:

OBSERVATION: The traditional assault aircraft has been the Black Hawk Helicopter (UH-60). In actual operations today in Afghanistan, it is the Chinook Helicopter (CH-47).

DISCUSSION: Due to the limitations of the UH-60 at high-altitudes, the CH-47 is the primary lift aircraft for air assault operations. CH-47s can quickly outpace escorting AH-64s. AH-64s primarily train to fly at night to take advantage of their capabilities. They are being forced, however, to fight during the day due to the limitations of the CH-47 night capability.

TTP:

Units must integrate the CH-47 into training as a lift asset during air assault.

AH-64s [crews] must be mentally prepared to operate in daylight conditions in Afghanistan.

CH-47s should operate at a slower speed to ensure they maintain attack aviation protection.

At home station training, AH-64 attack and CH-47 lift helicopter [crew]s (air assault) need to get into the habit of working together.

CH-47 crews should train on NVD more often.

OBSERVATION: Army forward observers (FO) used Air Force (AF) close air support (CAS) as the primary means of fire support, using indirect positive control of emergency close air support (ECAS) during Operation Anaconda.

DISCUSSION: No artillery fire support was available during the first few months in Afghanistan. Units relied on company and battalion mortars. The only other fire support available was AF CAS. Normally, FOs do not use CAS, but the techniques used by the FO and ETAC was indirect positive control. FO communicates with ETAC; the ETAC communicates to the aircraft. ECAS is when the fire support officer (FSO) or FO speaks directly to the aircraft and identifies himself as an untrained observer.

TTP:

It is extremely important that fire support officers (FSO) and forward observers (FO) are trained as an untrained observer to provide redundancy to the ETACs. Indirect positive control is necessary for the FOs to accurately identify the target with a 10-digit grid. Since CAS cannot bracket, FO accuracy is a must for a first round hit.

OBSERVATION: Operations at high altitudes greatly affect attack aviation since aircraft do not have the lift capabilities they normally have at lower altitudes.

DISCUSSION: Air assault from 8,000-10,000 feet must be conducted by the CH-47. However, the CH-47 and the AH-64 previously have not trained together. The high altitude prevents the AH-64 from maintaining a hover above escorted helicopters. The AH-64D Longbow cannot fly at the operation altitude due to the additional weight of the Longbow system dependent on aircraft weight or weather and temperature. The AH-64D radar is not relevant due to the threat.

TTP:

Pilots must attend high-altitude training (HAT).

Aerial gunnery preparation for Afghanistan should focus predominately on running fire. This requires ground observers to report position, then the ranges and bearing, to the aircraft.

Due to the altitude, all engagements are considered running fire.

Army aviation units need to modify the traditional close combat attack (CCA) to orient attack aviation on the target during a running fire.

AH-64 pilots should use the combat mission simulator set to replicate high altitudes.

OBSERVATION: Ground and aviation unit commanders must understand and accept the significance that high altitude and dust have on aviation assets and aviation availability.

DISCUSSION: Lift helicopter assets in this unit are CH-47s, UH-60Ls, and UH-60As. Aviation unit operations are primarily taking place at 10,500 feet above sea level (ASL). The environment drives all other operational considerations. The long distances require the unit to use "fat cow" refueling operations and forward area arming refueling point (FARP) operations that require extensive planning and preparation. Units found that maintenance was all pushed up due to the flying conditions and high operational tempo. Scheduled and phased maintenance was moved to 30 hours of operation instead of the normal 45 hours conducted at home station. The dusty conditions required full cleaning after every mission, to include lube and purge. Larger air movements are a necessity in this environment; some were executed 165 nautical miles.

TTP:

Leaders need to focus on the maintenance and plan phase to ensure maximum availability for operations.

Pilots need to have high-altitude training (HAT) in Colorado, Utah, or Idaho. These sites are trained in power management and flying in high mountain winds. All lift aircraft need to be prepared for non-standard casualty evacuation (CASEVAC).

[BE CLEAR YOU MEAN SKEDCO HOVERING LITTER HOISTING, RIGHT? SAY IT!]

Units must train for extensive aerial resupply in the mountains."

Question #1: Why not send Army Arty FOs to the USAFs aircraft CAS FAC (ETAC) school?

Question #2: If AH-64Ds are too heavy for Afghan mountain combat ("A" models trouble in Kosovo/Albania TF Hawk, too) why not:

a. Lighten them up for more power--with just GUN pods and rockets?

How much weight must we shed to get effective mountain flying? Or is it the tail rotor is too weak?

b. Give them Piasecki VTDP for more tail rotor authority?

Piasecki Vectored Thrust Ducted Propeller (VTDP)

c. If rotor gunships can't work in high altitude mountains why not.....(drum roll please)

GET FIXED-WING ATTACK AIRCRAFT WITH BETTER AERODYNAMIC LIFT FOR MOUNTAIN COMBATS INTO THE ARMY TO DO MAS SINCE THE USAF DOESN'T WANT TO DO CAS THAT AGGRESSIVELY?

www.geocities.com/equipmentshop/a10cactusairforce.htm
www.geocities.com/equipmentshop/killerbees.htm

1. OV-1 Mohawks
2. Rutan's ARES
3. OV-10 Broncos
4. Sadler Piranha
5. SAAB Supporter

FEEDBACK!

itsg@hotmail.com

The author, WWII and Korean War CAS pilot, Charles Myers writes about the Afghan "friendly" bombing incident (Murphy's Law of Combat: "Friendly fire ain't"):

"It illustrates why fighter pilots are nervous about ad hoc CAS assignments. You can go to jail or at least ruin a career.

Also why bombs are a dumb idea for CAS.

The definition of 'danger close' for trained guys using guns is probably about 50 yards vice using smart bombs is a thousand yards".

Chuck

Combat Veteran Ralph Zumbro writes:

"That's a valid concept. The Army needs its own air force back.

This would be more of the border patrol's own airforce. Many of these guys own (and lovingly maintain) many planes that would be suitable against contrabandistas, including F-86s etc.

You gave me the idea when you suggested cowpokes enlisting with their horses.

The other CAF:-

Leave the wild blue yonder to the glory boys and 'Top Guns'. We desperately need the hedge hoppers back. The best air support we got in RVN was from Vietnamese pilots flying old Skyraiders. I swear some of those guys were down between the trees. I called for a strike up in the highlands one time and got back. 'You are too close, all I have left is one 500 pounder.'

'This is a tank, fer Chrissake'

'OK shut your hatch, it's coming down on your smoke'

And that's exactly where it hit. Read up on the Cactus Air Force on Guadalcanal.

Mike mentions these, but I'd not realised the origin was Guadalcanal. This is the concept Chuck Myers calls 'Manuever Air Support'-different concept to homeland defence, obviously. Phil West has links about this over at:

www.angelfire.com/art/enchanter/buzzard.html

The traditional air forces have completely given up on ground support but that was one of the secrets of Blitzkrieg. The JU-87 freed the commanders to move at tank speed, not at the speed at which artillery could limber up and displace.

And, I believe, some tanks carried Luftwaffee forward air controllers

The reason the armed helicopter exists is partly military politics.

The Air Farce simply did not want to get involved with ground attack, and when the service was created, the Army was left with helicopters. We took a page out our experiences in Korea and worked with what we had."

A USAF Vietnam F-4 Phantom fighter-bomber pilot writes:

"One of the keys will be a good reliable multi-fuel engine with a fuel consumption rivaling a diesel. There is a light aircraft diesel under development in Europe. I just read of an outstanding electronic navaid in the latest issue of kitplanes that unites GPS and a 'chipped map' that could be upgraded to use UTM coordinates. (My handheld Lowrance GPS can display UTM).

Anyway the lightweight CAS is a decent concept.

Need some way to defeat Stinger type 'UV hole seeking' missiles plus survive under automatic fire. There will be a big 'give and take' problem/argument deciding what to use for armament and how fancy to go. The Mauser 27mm would be a good gun Missiles - 2.75s or hellfires?

Anyway it'd be a lot easier to deploy and operate than the F4s I flew out of DaNang on CAS missions."

The following is an unvarnished report from a Senior NCO who fought in Anaconda. I made some punctuation and spelling corrections. Clarifications in brackets [ ].

Rakkasan lessons learned (EXCERPT pertaining to CAS)

By a 187th Regiment 1st Sergeant

"I would like to pass on a few things learned during our recent deployment. It won't be in a specific order so bare with me.

Equipment wise, our greatest shortcomings were optics and organic or direct support long-range weapons. After the initial fight all our targets were at a minimum of 1500m all the way out to as far as you could see. Our 60[mm] and 81[mm]'s accounted for most of the kills. Next was a Canadian Sniper team with a MacMillian .50 cal [sniper rifle]. They got kills all the way out to 2500m.

The problem with our mortars was there as a 24 hour [Close Air Support] cas cap. And they wouldn't fly near us if we were firing indirect. Even though our max ord[nant: how high mortar rounds arc into the sky] was far beneath their patterns. Something for you and your alo [Air Liaison Officer] to work out. The other problem was the Air Force could never fly in small groups of personnel, I watched and called corrections on numerous sorties and they could never hit the targets. My verdict is if you want it killed use your mortars. Pay close attention to ti-hz direction of attack your ALO is bringing in the CAS. Every time it was perpendicular to us we were hit with shrapnel. Not to mention the time they dropped a 2,000 lbs [bomb] in the middle of our company, it didn't go off by a sheer miracle I'm sure. [Marine] Cobras and 2.75" [rockets] shot at us. Also, once again, they were shooting perpendicular to our trace. Aviation provided the most near misses of all the things we did.

I recommend all sl's [Squad Leaders] and pus [Platoon Sergeants] carry binoculars with the mils reticle. Countless times tl's [Team Leaders] and sl's had the opportunity to call in mortars. More importantly is leaders knowing how to do it. Our bn has checked all the blocks as far as that goes. Guess what they still couldn't do it. Especially the pus contrary to popular belief its not the pl [Platoon leader] who's going to call it in its the Soldier in the position who will. If you don't have the binos guess what? You have to wait for somebody to run to the M240[B Medium Machine Gun] position to go get them. Also same goes with not knowing how to do It, you have to wait for the FO [artillery or mortar Forward Observer] to move to that position.

Plugger [AN/PSN-11 Global Positioning System] battle drill is the way to go, even with the civilian models [Signals are unscrambled now thanks to President Clinton]; the contour interval on the maps is outrageous so terrain association was difficult. Range Estimation was probably the most important or critical thing you do. If you close on your estimation you'll get the target. We all carried in 2 mortar rounds apiece and that was more than enough. We took mix of everything; the only thing we used was wp [White Phosphorous] and he [High Explosive]. All together we took in at least 120 rounds as a company"

A U.S. Army Combat helicopter pilot writes:

"Like everyone else in the Army there are not enough people to go around, at least not down to battalion level. I spent almost a year in Germany as the LNO to any brigade in 3AD that went to the field. During a REFORGER the brigade commander put me and another CPT out as LNO to the two forward brigades. Worked great. The Army is trying to figure out how to have enough aviators to build up the staffs so that we can really function for 24 hours. Doubtful we will see an increase in the number of slots for enough LNO's at battalion, but there is an appreciation that it is good to have LNOs at the ground maneuver brigades. A job for a senior (post command) CPT. One could make the argument that it would be a great pre-command assignment, but better to have a CPT who understands how to fight an attack unit down with the ground troops, even if at brigade. If the brigade wants to push the LNO to a battalion I suppose that could happen to.

An alternate idea would be to introduce a FAC school that trains NCO's and junior officers how to coord with Apaches. Would send Apache drivers to go through the school too, with a ground portion so that they can get an idea who they are working for. Also make them mo glad they are aviators :) Oh well another stupid "lets make everyone a little more combined arms oriented" idea................ School should be at Benning or Knox."