WHY ARE WE
PUTTING POP GUNS ON VEHICLES?
EXCLUSIVE!
Iraq Combat video clip: what happens when you bring a rifle to a tank fight!
www.combatreform.com/dontbringarifletoatankfight.mpeg
www.combatreform.com/ArmyBIGREDONEinfallujah.asf
The
video above shows how typical middle eastern building can suck up small caliber
bullets easily. Notice even AT4 84mm rockets, expensive Javelin ATGMs, don't
render that much of a "bang".
Note
the ability of tracked AFVs to venture out and get into a firing position where
their 25mm autocannon and 120mm large caliber cannon MIGHT have an effect on
known enemies seen even for a second in a building. We should have had our
M109A6 Paladin SPHs pitch in, too!
You
can draw many lessons here, to include whether aircraft bombing and leveling an
entire building minutes and hours after an enemy is spotted is helpful, either.
CPT Frank Sherman, U.S. Army "C" Company
Commander of 3rd/73rd Armor who parachute airdropped in his light tanks to
support the 82nd
Airborne Division writes; "Our first encounter with the Panamanian
Defense Force (PDF) occurred as the infantrymen of 1st Battalion,
504th PIR were establishing a supply route from Toucumen International
Airport to their initial objective of Tinajitas. The convoy had only moved a
few kilometers when it stopped to clear a roadblock located on a bridge. As the
Sheridansmoved
to the edge of the highway to support the infantry, SSG Troxell, the lead tank
commander, called me on the radio and stated, 'This is hell of a place for an
obstacle, buildings all around and no cover. It looks like swamps on both sides
of the road'. As the infantry dismounted and began to execute their obstacle
drill, they began receiving automatic weapons fire from the buildings no more
than 50 meters away. The lead tank commander opened up with .50 caliber fire as
the wing tank commander screamed to his gunner to identify the threat. A moment
later, SFC Freeman, 1st Platoon sergeant, yelled, 'I got 'em, concrete
building, second floor, fourth window from the right'...He fired a 152mm heat
round at the target, ripping through the room, collapsing the right side of the
building. The enemy fire stopped and the infantry finished clearing the
roadblock..."
LTC
John Barker, U.S. Army, former XO of 3rd/73rd Armor says:
"The Sheridan with its 152mm main gun was the
near-perfect light infantry support vehicle. It could swim. It had thermal
sights. It had long-range armor destruction capability equal to or greater than
a Hellfire missile (check your PH/PK classified data!) The Shillelagh with its
152mm HEAT round could blow a hole in a reinforced concrete wall large enough
for infantry soldiers to walk through side by side. An infantry leader could
use the external phone, it boasted a flechette' round that could blast 17,000
one-inch nails into enemy infantry as close support, and oh by the way, you
could parachute it into combat for those nasty 'forced entry' missions
typically laid at the feet of the Paratroopers
of the "Devils in Baggy Pants", "Panthers" and
"Falcons" of the 82d....."
Quotes from U.S. Army Armor magazine, Jan-Feb 1997,
Mar-Apr 1990, pg 15.
Robert
W. Black, in his book, "Rangers in World War II" said the following
about the disastrous Dieppe
Raid where commandos assaulted fortified positions with little fire support
other than what they carried in their hands;
"68% of the 4,963 Canadian troops were
casualties and 913 were killed outright.... On August 19, 1942, the Canadians
did all that flesh could do against fire, but has been proven on battlefield
after battlefield against an aroused, entrenched enemy, COURAGE IS NOT A
SUBSTITUTE FOR FIRE SUPPORT..."
"Within this evolutionary climate, fiscal
realities and the aging of existing systems have resulted in a significant gap
in our forced/early entry capabilities. The deactivation of the 3rd Battalion,
73rd Armor, coupled with the termination of the Armored Gun System (AGS), has
created a critical need for enhanced direct fire assault support and anti-armor
capabilities for forced/early entry forces".
Was
on this internet address: www.acq.osd.mil/at/losat2.htm as an Official U.S.
Army ACTD web site statement until it became politically incorrect
WHAT
DO WE DO? WE GET RID OF ALMOST EVERY HEAVY DIRECT FIRE SYSTEM WE HAVE!
Despite
urban combat realities, we've mothballed our Iowa
Class battleships, retired the M728
Combat Engineer Vehicle (CEV) with
165mm demolition gun, withdrawn the M551 Sheridans to NTC as training aids,
cancelled the M8 Ridgway Armored Gun System,
thrown M113s
into the sea to feed fish leaving us with the only BIG GUN to win a direct-fire
urban fight on a 70-ton Abrams tank that is sometimes too big to fit
into narrow
An Air Force TACP writes in to a
www.news group:
"Capt. Gary Jinks and I were the AF targeting
officers assigned to Just Cause. In one of our first meetings the lack of arty
support was a prime concern. Gary and I suggested that we get a battle
wagon off each coast and that would allow us to range all of the primary
targets. The response from an Airborne Army full bull [Colonel] was 'This is an
Army show, the Navy won't play.'
Well, they did, and lost
someone, and we never did get the arty
support required. The AC-130's did a good
job, but had point detonating fuzes instead of the delayed fuzes required for
the cement buildings in Panama, another point raised by Gary and myself.
Having said that, the worker bees got along well and did what had to be
done. The problems were at the upper levels.
And yes, it was a real war. I was at Ft. Clayton the nights the PDF
dropped mortar rounds on us. No fun".
Nor
can indirect fire from artillery or naval guns be counted on to work even if
they are available:
IN
0531 Combat in built-up areas states:
"The direct-fire system is the most effective
fire support in built-up areas. Once a target can be located in a building, one
or two direct-fire rounds can accomplish what entire salvos of indirect-fire
artillery cannot. Direct fire support is key to success in fighting in built-up
areas..."
"Securing and/or
clearing a built-up area is very manpower-intensive. A city block in Panama
City often included 50 buildings, many of them multiple storied, to include
high rises. Most buildings were constructed of concrete reinforced with
rebar."
U.S. Army Lesson Learned: Operation Just Cause Building Clearing
"The 25mm gun produces its best urban target
results when fired perpindicular to a hard surface (zero obliquity). In combat
in built-up areas however, finding a covered firing position permitting low
obliquity firing is unlikely unless the streets and gaps between buildings are
wide. Most shots impact the target at an angle which normally reduces
penetration. With the armor-piercing, discarding sabot with tracer (APDS-T)
round, an angle of obliquity of up to 20 degrees can actually improve
breaching. The rounds tend to dislodge more wall material for each shot, but do
not penetrate as deeply into the structure"
"Reinforced concrete walls which are 12 to 20
inches thick, present problems for the 25mm gun when trying to create breech
holes. It is relatively easy to penetrate, fracture, and clear away the
concrete, but the reinforcing rods remain in place"
---IN 0531 Combat in built-up areas
"From a historical perspective you are absolutely right about the
need for large caliber guns using direct-fire in urban fighting. The Germans
and the Russians considered it imperative to have big guns in street fighting.
In Patton's book "War as I Knew It" he describes using 155mm SP guns
firing one round at a very obtuse angle to breach all the buildings on one side
of the street. A 25mm gun would be of little value. While visiting a cemetery
in Luxembourg I met an infantrymen from 3rd Army. I was reading the book at the
time and over a beer or two he told me exactly how it was done.
They would fire the gun on the right side of the street and clear the
first house. He related how many times it would kill or wound the majority of
the defenders in the lower level of the buildings. Then you put a Bazooka team
in the back yard of the first house cleared and slowly work up the block using
the backyards and the whole created by the 155.
One point he emphasized over and over. Even tracked vehicles could not
move down the streets because of road blocks. The guns had to have engineer support to move
though the backyards and alleys. Usually when the attack on a block began the
guns would reposition themselves to fire on the left side of the street as the
attack progressed. All commo was with wire."
Emery
Nelson
Yet
we're spending BILLIONS$ on a fast water swimming assault vehicle and
putting .50 caliber "pop guns" on poorly armored 8x8 LAV trucks.
Only tracked M2/3 Bradley IFVs in heavy units have 25mm guns! Thus, all
Light, Airborne and marine troops will have only "garden hose" area
suppressive weapons--less than 25mm---or low-velocity 40mm and .50 caliber
HMGs mounted on vulnerable wheeled HMMWVs---Somalia's debacle all over
again. Our men pinned down by superior numbmrs of enemies firing
bargain-basement AKM
automatic weapons and RPG
fire plus their own 30mm AGS-17 and
CHICOM W-87
man-portable autogrenade launchers behind urban cover are not going to be
able to stand up in the open and shoulder fire bulky rockets and missiles (AT4/M72A2 LAWs,
83mm SMAWs, M67 90mm
and M3
Carl Gustav RAAWS 84mm RRs, Dragon, Javelin,
Predator-Broadsword MPIM, ATGMs) to regain fire superiority. We're
fighting at best "even" and more likely losing.
So
even if our "Heavy" 2D forces can arrive before the enemy has escaped
as he recently did in Fallujah they'll have 25mm "garden hoses", and
a handful of 70-ton immobile tanks to do all the bunker-busting, building
clearing once done by the now retired M728 CEV, AND kill any enemy tanks that
show up with a mere 40 main gun rounds onboard? "That dog won't
hunt". We need a lot more direct-fire support than what we have now to win
cityfights.
WHERE
HAS ALL OUR WW2 FIREPOWER GONE?: It All Begins With Fuzzy Thinking
One
of the ways the Army blunders is by using fuzzy requirements instead of looking
at things clearly via generic reality. In the mid-1950s the Army had two fuzzy
requirements: a 10 ton airborne armored personnel carrier which became the
incredibly successful M113 Gavin and a 4-ton requirement for a recon, 106mm
recoilless rifle anti-tank and MEDEVAC litter carrier.
The End-State of the Humvee truck
circa 1954
The
wheeled T115 prototype was dismissed as not having cross-country mobility in
favor of the tracked T114 which became the failed M114 built by General Motors
who had little experience in designing successful armored combat vehicles. Had
people been thinking in concrete terms, they should have realized the 10-ton
APC could have been cut-down in size to be the smaller vehicle and saved the
Army millions of dollars and improved training by sharing as many of the same components
as possible. By the time FMC realized and made the cut-down M113 for recon the
Army was already committed to the M114 which failed miserably in Vietnam from a
design flaw of having hull overhang in front of its tracks that would impale
itself on the upper bank of a rice paddy trying to be crossed. This failure to
develop and field a scout vehicle even though the much larger M113 Gavin was
hugely successful even with extra volume in the back and a cut-down version was
hugely successful in use by our NATO allies would have tragic consequences down
the road as the XM800 program which needlessly started from scratch would fail
leading to scout requirements superimposed onto the already bloated Bradley
replacement for the M113 Gavin. The current M3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicle which
the Army has 2,000 is far too large and noisy for scouting but it can take a
hit and fight with its 25mm autocannon and TOW ATGM weaponry. The solution is
and always has been to take M113 Gavins that are sound automotively from an
all-terrain mobility perspective and logistically sound because 50% of the Army
uses them to make scout vehicles not to slap more and more armor onto Humvee
trucks morphing them into voila! the T115, or buying 8-wheeled T115s which is
what the LAV-III/Stryker thinly armored truck is.
BYE
BYE BIG GUNS, HELLO POP GUNS!
Along
the way that good and bad "cake" vehicles were being developed and
fielded, some important firepower "icings" were fitted. The need for
lightweight firepower adequate to kill tanks and blast buildings was
articulated by General Gavin in his visionary book, Airborne Warfare in 1947.
In it, he called for light tracked AFVs with recoilless weapons to get the
necessary "bang" without the heavy recoil dampening mechanisms of
regular cannons that at that point made it difficult to get into an under 10
ton package to be air-transportable by parachute drop from fixed-wing aircraft,
let alone by helicopters with even less payload capabilities. The fantastic M40
106mm recoilless rifle came into service derived from the successful 75mm RR
used in combat in WW2 and Korea. The marines quickly seized upon the 106mm RR
and came up with a low-tech answer to the exposed loading/backblast problem:
mount 6 of them to the sides of the tiny T55 carrier and have them already
loaded and steer the entire vehicle to get a general aiming and fine tune the
aiming from there all like a WW2 German assault gun. Fielded as the M50 Ontos,
it was highly successful in combat in Vietnam and was CH-53D helicopter
air-transportable but the marines gave up on it in favor of completely unarmored
TOW ATGM jeep 1/4 trucks. They didn't just throw the bath water out, they also
discarded the 106mm RR even on jeeps and M274 MULE platform trucks even though
this powerful weapon had saved the day for them on numerous occasions in
desperate battles in Hue City and the seige of Khe Sanh. This legacy of not
having firepower manifested itself in the aftermath of Vietnam the USMC not
mounting 105mm howitzers on their new LVTP-7s (now called AAV-7s) like the
older amtracks had and were successful in Vietnam with.
The
Army of the 1950s also needed lightweight anti-tank and bunker-busting
firepower and placed 106mm RRs onto jeeps using exposed mounts, and this
technique was also used to mount onto M113 Gavins to devastating effect in
Vietnam. Why 106mm RRs couldn't have been fielded on the XM733 class of tracked
AFVs to be helicopter air transportable fire support for the Air-Mobile troops
in Vietnam also becomes a question. Now the criticism of the 106mm RR is always
that "the gunner is exposed" loading and firing it. As if the TOW
gunner on top of a Humvee truck is not who has to sit there and track the
missile all the way to its target for a potential 20 seconds to a maximum range
of 3, 750 meters? But did you know that the U.S. Army in 1954---that's right 1954
had a 3-round autoloader 106mm RR 1-man turret perfected that SOLVES THE GUNNER
EXPOSED PROBLEM and then REJECTED IT?
Army
Perfects 106mm RR Lightweight Turret
The AutoLoader
HEAT Round (fin stabilized)
HEP round (spin-stabilized)
Yes,
the M114 would later on be discovered as bad "cake" to carry anything
or anyone. But this doesn't mean the good 106mm turret "icing"
couldn't have been brilliantly applied to an excellent M113 Gavin
"cake" to create a fearsome tank and bunker killer that is highly
cross-country mobile and amphibious. The hull of the Gavin could easily carry
100+ rounds of 106mm to feed the 1-man turret and stay well within C-130
payload limits. We now have the helicopters to lift this combination, too.
Starting in 1960 we could have and should have had a M113 Gavin based 106mm RR
assault gun that would have saved countless lives and won many battles in
Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, Afghanistan and Iraq. We need such a system TODAY.
ARMY
FIELDS A 20MM EXTERNAL AUTOCANNON IN COMBAT
The
inability of the Army to differentiate the good from the bad never ceases to
amaze the author. After the M114 was cancelled, the good M27 20mm autocannon
was made better by being able to be fired with the hatch closed and placed on a
M113 Gavin in 1975 to make for an excellent scout vehicle called the armored
cavalry cannon vehicle (ACCV). Instead of applying this to hundreds of M113
Gavins to get an immediate saturation fire capability to defeat a BMP, the Army
opted instead to squeeze the autocannon need to get an entirely new, from
scratch XM800 scout vehicle from Congress. This constant peddling of
ill-conceived schemes to get budget, power and prestige from Congress has no
doubt over the years damaged the trust and put the Army in a bad light by
Washington policy makers. When Congress rejected the XM800 it led the proud
Army to slap on the scout requirement onto the Bradley infantry fighting
vehicle when we should have been professional and humble and went back to the
proven M113 Gavin and derived an enhanced scout vehicle. Because of this
mistake, the Army's scouts are either in unarmored or poorly armored
rubber-tired Humvee trucks that cannot survive contact with the enemy nor swim
or armored and heavily armed M3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicles that are too heavy to
fly by helicopters or C-130s and cannot swim. We have the worst of both light
and heavy worlds. In the Army's perpetual quest for "perfect" systems
that prove failures and at best so costly only a few can be obtained, the entire
force never gets transformed and stays at the rifle-in-hand, ruck-on-back
hitch-a-ride-in-a truck default that the brass is so comfortable with in
garrison.
Had
we equipped all our M113 Gavins with high-velocity autocannons in the early
1980s we could have had not only organic self-defense from air attack up to
5,000 feet but building busting fire support capability in the light infantry
units of our Army since the Gavin weighs exactly the same as the FMTV trucks
they use. Simple 2.75 inch Hydra-70mm rocket launchers are put on smoke
screen-laying M113 Gavins to project a smokescreen into the enemy's face, but
rejected. Brass realizes someone smart would then figure high explosive 2.75
inch rockets could be fired, giving the underclass Chemical unit Soldiers a COMBAT
capability reserved only for the narcissistic infantry/armor Soldiers. We can't
have them help out and take our glory.
NO
ROCKETS FOR YOU!
Army
Air Defense Artillery (ADA) units in the 1990s retired both their towed and
M163 armored tracked 20mm gatling cannon Vulcan weapons systems in favor of
measly vulnerable, Humvee trucks with Stinger SAMs and an impotent .50 caliber
heavy machine gun with a small amount of ammunition for light units. Hunnicutt
shows a Stinger missile pod attached to the 20mm gatling Vulcan was offered but
rejected, raising the question if Army Air Defenders want to do anything but
keep their heads in the clouds looking for non-existant Soviet MIGs when if
they had autocannon along with SAMs (like the Russian Tunguska) they could
pitch in and help win the ground fight like Vulcans did in Vietnam...and quad
.50 calibers did in WW2 and Korea....When marine and army officers Carlton
Meyer and Mike Sparks propose that 2.75 inch rocket pods can be attached in
place of Stinger pods to give Avenger Humvees a ground attack capability, both
Army and marine air defenders are not interested. It makes one think that deep
down inside ADA doesn't want to fight, doesn't it?
Today,
a unit is lucky if it has a .50 caliber heavy machine gun on its trucks, the
norm is a medium 7.62mm or a light 5.56mm machine gun with NO MOUNT; just a
lower-ranking Soldier standing exposed in the back of the unarmored truck. Do
not mistake the desperation slapping of one layer of armor onto the trucks in
Iraq as "transformation". The rest of the Army is unchanged and when
they rotate to do a tour in Iraq will use these same trucks until they are worn
out and discarded which is what the brass wants--to return to the pre-war state
where vehicles are unarmored and unarmed. Its clear that the Humvee and now
Stryker wheeled mentalities are the manifestations of a deeper desire to
demilitarize within the U.S. military.
SO
WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE ARMY & MARINES, DON'T THEY WANT TO WIN IN COMBAT?
The
inescapable answer is NO, they do not.
As
Norman Dixon documents brilliantly in his book, On the Psychology of Military
Incompetence, the militaries of the west are populated by weak people with
hang-ups about not only their masculinity but want a safe, garrison lifestyle
where everything is set for them so they needn't have to think while projecting
a strong image of masculinity to the outside world. The anal retentive military
mind is obsessed with control; weapons and ammunition are locked up and as
Dixon says the "sword is always blunted" because deep down inside,
these weak people are afraid of the pandora's box of life let alone COMBAT.
Driven by a basic lack of self-esteem based on the intrinsic value of ALL human
beings, the western military mind cannot trust subordinates---who are looked
down on as an inferior social class---and supply them FIREPOWER via a
lightweight, portable weapon on a tracked armored vehicle that is
self-sufficient. Firepower is only reserved for the "gods" the higher
ranking brass through artillery and directed aircraft bombings not the lowest
level where it is most needed immediately to save our men's lives. Remember, we
learned war from the methodical and snobby French chateau generals in WW1. What
General Gavin wanted from WW2 non-linear warfare experience with Paratroopers
dropped deep into enemy territory where the threat was all around them is
diametrically opposed to the linear, snobby, condescending outlook of the weak co-dependants
who want to move cautiously ahead with the enemy only to their front so they
can pour artillery and aircraft firepower on them from a safe distance. So as
you study American military history from a Dixonian perspective, the absurd
decisions that are constantly made with no combat logic become clear as
manifestations of the mental illness that inhabits the narcissistic military
mind. Its always easier to DO LESS---not more in today's blind obedience,
lemming military where higher ranks get to order those around with unquestioned
authority. Notice when the M728 CEV was retired a smart combat engineer
suggested we put 165mm demolition guns in M1 tanks---we have hundreds sitting
unused---and the capability was NOT retained. The military's downsizing mentality
is a loser's mentality--do LESS WITH LESS. At the highest ranks, this means no
Congressional oversight of how the Pentagon spends money unless a
Congressman/Senator has either the common sense logic or past military
experience to see through the BS and demand military excellence based on combat
demands.
WHY
WIRE-GUIDED AND EVEN FIRE & FORGET MISSILES WILL NOT WIN THE CLOSE FIGHT
FOR US
Wire
guided missiles will fail miserably in closed terrain like Korea against a
swarming enemy. A good crew can fire two rounds of high velocity ammo from a
gun, before one round from a wire guided missile can reach it's target. LOSAT
and high velocity laser beam riding missiles (Hellfire) are the only smart way
to use missiles, but they are not available on ground mounts/vehicles yet in
the U.S. Army. Fire & Forget missiles are simply too costly to field in the
numbers needed to blast all the tanks and buildings and bunkers we need to
bust. There is still a big place for guns on the modern battlefield, especially
combined with the latest range finders and the latest optical advances like
FLIR to get 100% one-hot/one kill capability, day or night. With the proper use
of technology they can have the same first round hit probability as the wire
guided missile.
We
have heard some suggestions lately that tanks are done. We do not concur.
Highly
mobile gun platforms will always have tremendous advantages. We may have to change the shape
and improve ballistic protection but they are too important not to have.
Right now if we had a decent light tank with a good
gun and the right ammo (HEAT, AP, HE-FRAG, HEP, and Canister) we could optimize
the tanks abilities and move them
quickly all over the world. This could be done at considerably less cost
and greater speed than the M1 and other heavy land-mastadon MBTs.
The
following quote from the Korean war Web site has me grinding my teeth.
"Russian
weaponry, as Russian equipment generally, had one marked characteristic: it was
extremely rugged, of the simplest design consistent with efficiency, and very
easy to maintain, making it suitable for the equipping of peasant armies.
Despite its simplicity and lack of refinement, it was good.
What's
wrong with non-peasant armies having good simple and reliable equipment?
The
old Soviet union produced a variety of weaponry, meant to fight on all
battlefields for about a tenth of what we spent. Towards the end of the Soviet
Union they started trying to copy us. Recently in Grozny they had to ship AT
Guns and Heavy Mortars from reserve units to the
city. The western-style equipment for open area Desert Storms were all but
useless in the closed terrain fight. They were reduced to fighting the Chechens
with AKs and other personnel weapons, which of course the Chechans had, too and
in greater numbers. The simple RPG-7 was the deciding
factor in most fighting. The Soviets didn't have enough of them and believed
that mechanized units with BMPs and MBTs would
do the job. Wire guided missiles turned out to be useless and the lack of HE in
tanks made them ineffective after firing most of their HE (five rounds). The
Soviets were the last country on earth to produce assault guns and towed
anti-tank guns. They had mothballed them in the late eighties and were forced
to bring them back for Grozny. We can't even bring them out of storage. The
Russians were lucky.
ARE
WE GOING TO BE OUT-GUNNED ON THE NEXT NON-LINEAR NATION-STATE WAR?
Even if we get the open terrain fight, we lust for to fight
high-tech French methodical battles using stand-off artilley/air strikes, the
cards are stacked against us on the ground because we stupidly emasculate
ourselves with rubber-tired trucks. The Russian's swimming AFVs, on sale to
anyone with a modest amount of money, the BMP-3 in
comparison is a light tank that can hold a squad of
infantry---it has a 100mm main gun that fires HE to demolish buildings, can
fire long-range ATGMs through its barrel, AND a 30mm autocannon
"pop-gun" and medium machine gun as ONE UNIT in the turret. Its has
500 horsepower pushing just 18 tons of vehicle--the Bradley is about the
same power pushing 33 tons of vehicle with a 25mm "pop gun". The
BMP-3 if it can shoot on the move, out-classes the Bradley in every
category except protection---but if the BMP-3 hits the Bradley first by
its terrain agility with a long-range, signature-less ATGM, will this be
enough? What matters in future armored
warfare is ABSOLUTE MOBILITY in all
situations--including swimming----to get into FIRING POSITION first with a long
range "smart" ATGM. This includes "stealth" to not be seen
or detected in the first place. A silenced "stealth" BMP-3 is our
worse nightmare, we create for ourselves by putting "pop guns"
instead of real guns on our vehicles leaving only a handful of M1s with big
guns to fire support for the infantry, play engineer vehicle AND destroy enemy
tanks AND BMP-3s----if they can get within 120mm main gun range without being
destroyed first by the BMP-3's ATGMs. We may be out-gunned in close and at a
distance...
WHAT
WE CAN DO TODAY TO GET BIG GUNS TO THE BATTLE?
The
U.S. being "out-gunned" began in WWII, where then Colonel James M.
Gavin's Paratroopers fired 2.36" bazookas
at German Tiger
I tanks and got killed on Biazza Ridge on Sicily. Fortunately the wily Gavin
insisted on taking 75mm
pack howitzers instead of light mortars and he held the ridge, saving the
invasion of Sicily. Immediately work on a 75mm recoilless rifle
that could be air-delivered began and was used by the 17th Airborne Division
for the jump across the Rhine in 1945. General Gavin
wrote in Airborne Warfare after the war:
"I should point out the rapid strides toward
improvement of the weapons now available to Airborne troops
for ground combat. Recoilless artillery, hollow charge weapons such as the
bazooka and panzerfaust, lighter metal in weapons construction have all
improved the chances of survival on the battlefield for Airborne units of all
sizes. In fact they can not only survive, they can carry the attack to the
enemy deep in his own territory.
It is interesting now to
recall that as late as 1942 the faculty of one of our leading service chools
was generally of the belief that Airborne
operations were "impossible" on a divisional scale..
The 75mm Recoilless Rifle grew to be the awesome 106mm
Recoilless Rifle!
Dominican
Republic, 1965
"Elements of the 82d Airborne Division
discovered the anti-sniper possibilities of the 106mm Recoilless Rifle in their
Santo Domingo operation....if you can do the job with firepower instead of
troops, then thats the right way.
..elements of the 1/17th
Cavalry had to push to the west bank of the Ozama river across the Duarte
Bridge, which was nearly a kilometer long. When the point element was almost to
the western end, they began receiving heavy sniper fire from an apartment
house, pinning down
the element and inflicting casualties.
Other elements supporting
by fire from the east bank, but the apartment house was beyond the tracer
burnout of their M60s. As a result, jeep-mounted 106mm Recoilless
Rifles were brought up. The .50 caliber spotter rounds were adjusted on the
sniper's windows. Then, whenever a gunner saw a puff of smoke at the windows he
was covering, he fired his main gun. The sniper's effectiveness was quickly
diminished, which allowed the unit on the bridge to finish its push to the west
bank of the river.
Vietnam, Hue City, 1968
A squad leader who served in World War II and Korea
said: "we used to send four marines to get a sniper. But here, the AK47 on automatic can pin down a whole
company just like a well-emplaced machine gun"
Unlike the jeep-mounted
106, the Ontos provided some limited cover for its gunner. It was more
maneuverable in narrow streets than a tank, allowing it to move quickly to a
covered position after expending its ordnance. The gunner could ripple fire his
weapons with HEAT, HEP-T and flechette rounds.
Crew served Recoilles
Rifles can be employed in pairs or loaded with an anti-personnel round, a
single 106 can be combined with several LAWS.
--CPT
Grady Smith "Old Doctrine, New Techniques", Infantry magazine,
May-June 1971, Page 28
"CPT Smith's asessment of the value of the 106mm
Recoilless Rifle is quite accurate. In Hue, it was a real workhorse. By
"trial and error" we learned several helpful points in mind when
deploying the 106mm in a city environment. We found that it was more effective
to aim the 106 just below the window where the snipers werre located, rather
than fire through the opening. This creates more shrapnel than a round that
sails through the room. This is equally true for the LAW and
the 3.5 rocket launcher.
In Hue, we also learned
that NVA, positioned along a street several blocks away were able to place
accurate grazing fire down the street. Since the street had to be crossed, we
used the backblast smoke of the 106 to cover and conceal movement across the
street. This was done by popping smoke, a tactic that always drew enemy fire,
to reveal the enemy's location.
mule
mounted" 106 was moved partially into the street and a round was fired at
the NVA position. (The jeep mounted 106 could be employed in the same way.)
This caused the enemy to duck their heads and allowed us to move across the
street, concealed by the backblast smoke and dust. Once a foothold was gained
in the next block, fire could be directed from a new position to eliminate the
NVA resistance.
CPT G.R.
Christmas, Instructor U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance, Nov-Dec 1971
Infantry magazine page 53
"The
106 is a real combat veteran. It has been extremely effective in Vietnam,
primarily as an anti-personnel weapon utrilizing the beehive round. However the
106 doesn't fully meet the HAW requirements and is programmed to be replaced in
the near future by the TOW."
MAJ Robert
Dutcher and CPT John Cooke "HAW, MAW, LAW: the anti-armor family",
Jan-Feb Infantry magazine, Page 50
Mavinga, Angola, 1990
The forces of UNITA used
HUMMWV-mounted 106mm Recoilless rifles to decisive effect in the 1990 battle of
Mavinga. U.S. Army 5th Special Forces Group "Green Berets" used 106mm
RR mounted HMMWVs to storm back into Kuwait with Arab coalition forces they were
advising. The 106mm RR is a battle winner from the jungles of Vietnam to the
deserts of Israel, the airfield at Entebbe...Both the Israeli Defense Force and
Taiwan make their own 106mm RRs and ammo.
However in the late 1970s for the
majority of the U.S. military, we replace 106s with TOW HAW ATGMs to destroy
Soviet tanks at the Fulda Gap, all the hard-lessons learned in Vietnam,
discarded, along with many combat leaders. But the
threat of overwhelming Russian tank armies is over, the enemy is an irregular
hiding in the city, like the VC/NVA. These same Battle-proven M40A2 106mm
Recoilless Rifles are awaiting a use in U.S. Army Anniston arsenal storage and
are ORGANIC to U.S. Army Special Forces Operational Detachments. 250,000 rounds
of bunker-busting HEP, APERS "beehive" flechettes, and HEAT are in
storage. New Bofors 3A-HEAT-T 106mm rounds will defeat the latest tanks with
explosive reactive armor tiles on, is effective out to 1800 meters and is 90%
first round hit accurate using the Canadian CLASS laser sight. The Canadian
Army used to mount 106mm RRs on M113 APCs, jeeps,
the Australian Army's on M113 AFVs and Land Rovers;
We could mount them using the
$6900 kit available from AM General that installs within hours to any generic
soft-top M998 HMMWV 4x4 vehicle. Honduras, Taiwan and
Morocco have HMMWV-106mm RRs. The 106mm RR will mount on the new diesel John
Deere Para-Gator 2x4 vehicle like the old M274 MULE did, but with
better off-road performance; and it will fit into the tiny multi-BILLION$$
dollar CV-22 Osprey. Mount a dozen 106mm RRs on Para-Gators or
designated HMMWVs in an Airborne
Infantry Battalion's Anti-Armor Company, redesignated:
"Anti-Armor-Assault" Company. The German 3-ton Wiesel
tracked, armored fighting vehicle is an even better choice for helicopter-borne
units like the 101st Air Assault Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky since it
can also fit INSIDE CH-47D Chinooks.
The U.S. Army owns 6 Wiesels for R & D work.
An Ontos
that works? German Wiesel today
The
fastest, most economical solution is to mount the 106mm under armor protection
for the gunner, is the plentiful, combat-proven
M113A3 Gavin Armored
Fighting Vehicle right roof antennae mount like the Australian Army is doing
now, and we did once in Vietnam. With applique'
armor, the tracked M113A3 is proof against HMGs, RPGs, cannon and has its
fuel tanks outside the vehicle.....
This is
the simplest, cheapest way to get a BIG GUN on a LIGHT ARMORED VEHICLE platform
NOW that can be airdropped and go anywhere our light troops go. As General
Patton liked to say: "Better is a good plan executed with audacity NOW
than a perfect plan too late..." Replace 22,000 pound FMTV
2.5/5 ton trucks now in service with a dozen 22,000 pound combat-proven M113A3s to a designated Airborne infantry
battalion in each of the 82d Airborne Division's 3 Ready Brigades, arm two with
106mm RRs, CLASS laser sights and kits. Pair up a M113A3 Gavin with Mk-19 40mm
and a M113A3 with 106mm RR to work together; one suppresses while the other
obliterates the target with one shot of 106mm RR fire. Put Tank-Infantry phones
removed from old M60 tanks or M551 Sheridans
on the tail end of the M113A3 for better communication during a loud firefight.
There are myriad mounting options
of 106mm RRs to M113A3s;
the dual 106mm RR TC turret that keeps the gunner under armor protection is
available from CETME in Spain. The TC-7/106 turret means only one crew member
has to briefly expose his upper body to reload the weapons. The gunner aims the
rifles within the vehicle with the reloading carried out through the troop
hatch. Both traverse and elevation are hydraulic with the gunner's handle
having fast target search at 15 degrees a second. The turret also has a .50
caliber Heavy Machine Gun and the .50 cal spotting rifle on the right hand RR.
Empressa Nacional Santa Barbera
Julian Camarillo 3
28037 Madird, Spain Telephone: (91) 585-0100 Telex: 44466 ENSB E Fax: (91)
585-0268
Pakistan has a twin 106mm RR mount
on their M113s with a laser range-finder that extends effective range out to
1500 meters using old ammunition. POF, Wah Cantonnement, Pakistan Telex: 5840
POPAC PK. Maybe we can have Pakistan and Spain fight with us the next time
there is a war?
These are all fine options,
too.... LETS JUST DO IT.
FEEDBACK!
E-mail
1st TSG (A) itsg@hotmail.com
A field grade officer writes:
"106mm RR a superb weapon.
Spoke with SF captain in my group who is at SOCOM at Bragg. The SF still play
with 106mm because it's part of their global mission if they go to a country to
support because that's all the AT power that poor 3rd world country can afford
-unlike us, with our wunderwaffe Drag it, Dragon M47 piece of crap. This
captain also is articulate about it and the demise of the AGS."
FEEDBACK!
"Your page is intriguing. I'm
worried that the wrong lessons might be learned from the Afghanistan fighting,
with many forgetting that our role in it was only part...and that the proxy
forces were not just air-supported."
Our reply:
The U.S. military is in love with air strike firepower
for BOMBARDMENT not firepower for MANEUVER.
By relying on the Air Force for firepower via a computer mouse-click, some in
the Army think we can get away with a thin-skin armored car with a machine
gun and not have to fire & maneuver. That America's enemies have
escaped this firepower (Iraq, Serbs, Taliban/Al Queda) because we did not have
adequate maneuver
to block and encircle them has not registered in the minds of our leaders
who want to wage quasi-war at maximum cost and minimum political risk.
GO TO POP
GUNS 2: OTHER OPTIONS