I would love to know what the Stryker VC could see. There's virtually no place where you can see in all directions and the RWS probably suffers from many of the same flaws as a Predator drone. It sees what it's looking directly at but has no wide view. I can't imagine how this would work out against the NVA. So far they haven't come up with anything that can match a Soldier's eyes and reaction to fast evolving unknown situations.

No reports about the RWS......was ANYBODY manning it? It certainly doesn't match a human gunner head-out with a GUNSHIELD with situational awareness and experience. The RWS is a pile of junk, more appropriate on Playstation 2 than on a personnel carrier.

A Bradley or M113 Gavin could take a RPG hit better, and have human gunners working powerful 25mm and .50 caliber heavy machine guns; not a slow rotating, cheesy robot machine gun with the VC/gunner looking through narrow optics to PREVENT from getting hit in the first place! For all the money squandered on Stryker truck, the army could have had body armor, and GUNSHIELDS and extra RPG shielding on M113 Gavins, M2 Bradleys. And that no doubt is the reason that the Stryker was so easily ambushed and destroyed. Since the driver was focussed on driving the vehicle, only the VC was available to scan for the enemy. One set of eyes can't possibly keep a continuous 360-degree watch, and even if he saw both RPG gunners, one gun can't simultaneously engage multiple targets.

It seems common tactical sense that the situation begs -- no, screams -- for a rebirth of the ACAV. We don't know if it is feasible to install additional MGs on Stryker's thin steel hull. Even if it can be done, the hatch layout isn't nearly as well suited to turning the SUV into an ACAV, as is that of the M113 Gavin.

This is what is left of the Stryker that tried to run by a roadside bomb with its "blazing" 60 mph speed (non-sense):

The point of WAR is to get results on the ground, to have your will dominate. When the Iraqi guerrillas can incinerate a $3.3 million Stryker and embarrass us with just $30 of RPGs they are winning. If you don't understand this, you need to research what 4th Generation Warfare is all about.

For $400,000 we could upgrade M113 Gavin light tracks that wouldn't have got trapped into the bad, restrictive terrain in the first place and could have survived RPG hits without any damage. In other words, guerrillas lose, we win because we are not a flaming BBQ on the 6 o'clock news.

Burned-out Stryker armored car: where are its 8 rubber tires?

The Stryker is supposed to be the wheeled vehicular base for a quasi-cavalry team with specialty versions providing a combined-arms synergism expedited by "network-centric", "information-driven" digital comms. Read one of the Army's brazen lies and full-of-BS manuals for the Stryker wheeled BCTs:

FIELD MANUAL NO. 3-21.11 HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, DC, 23 January 2003

CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW OF THE SBCT INFANTRY RIFLE COMPANY

Excerpts:

"The organic vehicles in the platoons are for moving infantry to the fight swiftly and providing tactical flexibility while tailoring the Soldiers' loads through a "mobile arms room" concept. There is also a mobile gun system (MGS) platoon that supports the infantry fight with long-range precision fires. The MGS is a fighting vehicle but is not a Bradley or a tank and should not be employed in the traditional sense of a fighting vehicle."

"The SBCT is an infantry-centric, full spectrum, early entry combat force pre-configured in ready-to-fight combined-arms packages (Figure 1-1). The design includes embedded unit-based capabilities such as military intelligence (MI), signal, engineer, antitank, artillery, and combat service support (CSS) elements. This organization allows the SBCT to fight using combined arms down to company level. The following are key organic assets that allow the brigade commander to conduct shaping and decisive operations more effectively:

Brigade headquarters and headquarters company (HHC).

Infantry battalion (x3).

Reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron.

Antitank company.

Artillery battalion.

Medium engineer company.

Military intelligence company.

Signal company.

Brigade support battalion.

HERE'S A WWII/COLD WAR MENTALITY LIE FROM A GENERAL OFFICER: "TRANSFORMATION" IS ALL ABOUT RISK-AVERSE, LINEAR WARFARE FROM THE TOP-DOWN (MANIFESTATION OF THE COLD WAR MENTALITY OF ARMY GENERALS)

http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:ExKsbIZ3T50J:starbulletin.com/2003/11/02/news/story8.html+c-17+bradley+fighting+vehicles+three&hl=en&ie=UTF-8

Soriano, the Army's highest ranking officer of Filipino-American ancestry, said the Stryker was never intended to be a fighting vehicle, like the heavier M-1A1 Abrams tank or Bradley fighting vehicle. "It was never meant to be a vehicle designed for a fight-on-fight, but merely to take Soldiers to the battlefield. "Unlike past military doctrine, which was designed around using heavy armored tanks and infantry brigades to make contact with the enemy, Soriano said the idea now is "to find where the enemy is before we take them on ... to see the enemy at a distance before we engage."

What General Soriano is really saying is that he wants weak vehicles that physically cannot fight, populated by weak people who since they are not empowered to take the initiative, must ask higher headquarters, "Mother, May I?" before they do anything---so no one has their careers ruined by anything that is risky and doesn't work out. If we are just going to take Soldiers TO THE battlefield, and not fight with vehicles, why do we need $3 million Strykers that brag that they are armor protected? Why do we need Stryker variants with missiles and mobile guns? If we can make linear battlefields with "rear" areas to shuttle troops in we can use unarmored trucks. We all know this is not true. The Army needs to stop LYING and speaking out of both sides of its mouth when it serves their interest to invoke a linear battlefield that doesn't exist to conveniently excuse away the Stryker armored car/truck. We are NOT fighting on linear battlefields; the Stryker is NOT A COMBAT VEHICLE and it does not belong in the U.S. Army.

4 years ago, before we had 1,000 dead and 10,000 wounded Soldiers in Iraq the Army dragged its feet about armoring their trucks using the same linear WWII/Cold War non-sense now used to excuse away the Stryker truck:

http://216.239.41.104/search?q=cache:yfZANtxC0_0J:www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/article.cfm%3FId%3D61+up-armored+fmtv+trucks&hl=en&ie=UTF-8

National Defense magazine, April 2000 "Vulnerable Truck Fleet Worries Army Investments needed in armor kits for medium trucks, officials assert" by Sandra I. Erwin reports:

Army officials are mulling over options to develop and deploy armor kits that would protect truck crews in combat. "Our truck fleets are the most vulnerable pieces of our logistics system," said Brig. Gen. William E. Mortensen, commander of the Army Transportation Center, Ft. Eustis, Va. "We need R&D [research and development] efforts" to bolster ballistic protection for wheeled vehicle crews, he told a conference on tactical wheeled vehicles in Monterey, Calif. Because the Army has dozens of truck models comprising a fleet of about 220,000 vehicles, armor packages should be "scalable," said Mortenson. That means armor plates could be put on and taken off as needed and should be adaptable to various truck sizes and configurations.In the mid-1990s, the Army began purchasing armor plates for its light trucks, notably the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, known as the Humvee. This was necessary, officials said, because these vehicles were being driven in landmine-ridden countries such as Bosnia and Kosovo. The addition of armor protection to the Humvees meant lives would be saved if a truck hit a landmine. Now, the Army is considering whether it should extend the same protection to a portion of its medium-size fleet of 2.5-ton and 5-ton trucks. Under the Cold War view of the world, those trucks were intended to remain in the rear of the battlefield and, therefore, were not expected to be fired on. The sort of military contingencies that the Army has been involved in recent years, however, make it more difficult to separate the front lines from the logistics support units. Recent deployments in the Balkans are a case in point." The Cold War mentality was to have trucks behind the front line. So nobody wanted to spend the dollars on protection," said John D. Weaver, a consultant for the Army's Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM), in Warren, Mich., and a former program manager for light tactical vehicles. For medium vehicles, the "survivability requirement is more complex if the vehicle is not originally designed to put armor on it," said Weaver in an interview. "After it's been designed, it costs more" to add the armor. Today's combat environment, he noted, exposes Soldiers to the so-called asymmetric threats, such as anti-personnel and anti-vehicle landmines, so "there is a need for protection." The Army's medium vehicles, particularly, are difficult to protect because, for the most part, they feature a "cab-over" design, where the driver sits above the axle, said Weaver. "That is the toughest position to defend against landmines, because the blast comes straight up." ...Weaver explained: "One way to protect people is not to try to block the blast but to deflect the blast, vent it away from the vehicle. The angles of the wheel well area and of the floor of the vehicle are key to that aspect. "If the design takes into account if the wheel hits a landmine, you want to vent the blast away from the vehicle. It's clearly easier to do that when you are designing the vehicle than afterwards," he said. The weight and space can be significant drawbacks. "If you want to add an after-market armor package to install only in an area of threat, it makes a lot of sense to design into the vehicle the mounting points: the bolt holds, the studs, things like that," Weaver said, "so that when you get the kit, you have the mounting points to mount it to the vehicle." When the driver sits above the axle, "it's not impossible to protect the driver, but it's more difficult," he said. "In the cab-over design, such as the FMTV and most of the European trucks, you don't have the angles to deflect the blast as readily. You are going to put more force into the driver and passenger because they are sitting right over the mine, and there is going to be more of the blast going into the structure of the vehicle."

TRUTH:

ANYWHERE YOU ARE ON TODAY'S NON-LINEAR BATTLEFIELD IS "BATTLEFIELD".

THE ARMY IS LYING BY MAKING US BELIEVE THERE IS AN "EDGE" OF THE BATTLEFIELD WE CAN CREEP UP TO AND THEN DISGORGE INFANTRY FROM STRYKERS WHO ARE SOMEHOW "SAFE" BEHIND THE FRONT IN "REAR" AREAS.

Wheels vs. Tracks Study: www.geocities.com/wheelsvstracks

A Vietnam Combat Veteran and senior Army officer writes:

"Mike,

I want to point out the broken tie rod dangling from the left steering wheel. Even though the tire is still inflated, if the tie rod is broken, and you can bet it is, since dangling is not normal configuration, the vehicle cannot be steered. The wheels will either go pigeon-toed, or wall-toed, which will result in the vehicle becoming immobile. It will turn into a plow, and the power isn't there to force it ahead, even if the second set of steering wheels still work. I never figured that all of the steering apparatus was outside the ballistic hull, but it stands to reason that it has to be, since that's where the wheels are. Point being: You don't even have to breach the hull to render the vehicle hors de combat, all you have to do is break a 1.5" tie rod, and it's the end of movement for the vehicle. You can break them on a rock, curb stone, or a concrete lined ditch.

Another thing: That appears to be the same Stryker we had in earlier pictures with all the wheels flattened, having been dragged. And again on a flat-bed truck with the RPG repellant off. Notice the hatch configuration, unless, like a roach, they all die alike blowing all their hatches, including the engine one.

This is not a fighting vehicle, it is a travesty."

Stay tuned!

This mental gymnastics continues when you narrow your analysis towards just the Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV) which is supposed to carry a 9-man infantry squad + 2-man vehicle crew. The Army sophists say the Stryker is "not a combat vehicle" because it will transport its dismount infantry squad TO THE EDGE OF THE BATTLEFIELD. Read the one of the recent BS Stryker Field Manuals, FM 3-21.1.11 Chapter 1:

"These mounted crews provide critical support to the platoon by operating and maintaining the ICVs and properly employing them on the battlefield to ensure protected delivery of the infantry squads to their dismount point. Once the infantry squads have dismounted the ICVs, the vehicle crew may employ local defensive armament to defeat 'thin-skinned' enemy vehicles (trucks or lightly armored vehicles) or dismounted infantry.

(1) The VC is responsible for the overall employment of the ICV and operates the ICV's defensive armament. The vehicle driver operates the vehicle during all conditions--day or night. At the VC's direction, the driver negotiates the vehicle through all terrain and obstacles to deliver the infantry squad safely to the point of employment on the battlefield."

Debka file "The Stryker: U.S. Military`s Great White Hope against Iraqi RPGs" DEBKAfile Special Military Analysis, December 3, 2003, 2:24 PM (GMT+02:00) reports:

"But the vehicle is not designed for heavy combat, say its advocates. Its function is to race on its eight huge wheels to the edge of a battle zone, including urban areas, drop off infantry Soldiers and lay down covering fire."

The 4th Generation Warfare battlefield of today is NON-LINEAR, the enemy can attack from any direction at any time. The enemy does not and will not "cooperate" by attacking where/when we want him to; the enemy already attacks Stryker ICVs as combat vehicles. Anything that carries combat troops is a COMBAT VEHICLE to the enemy and its his "vote" that counts not what Army Generals say/want. The implication that we put troops in completely unarmored trucks and they are "not combat vehicles" is even more damning; we shouldn't do it.

In typical Army double-talk in the Stryker FMs they brag about (and lie) how the Stryker vehicle will protect Soldiers from artillery, mortars and all the usual battlefield suspects. Nevermind that these are outright lies because these weapons will shred and set fire to the Stryker's tires, the hypocrisy is self-evident: IF THE STRYKER IS NOT A COMBAT VEHICLE AND ITS ONLY GOING TO THE "EDGE" OF THE BATTLEFIELD WHY IS IT GOING TO GET PELTED BY ENEMY FIRES? Clearly, the Army wants to "have its cake and eat it too". When its in their self-interest the Stryker is NOT a combat vehicle when its found to have indefensible vulnerabilities; when it seems to look good (they think as a bragging point) its got combat vehicle selling points. The enemy will not be stymied from these verbal, mental smoke screens and lawyer games as he physically finds and exploits the many Stryker weaknesses.

Strykers after being constantly stuck in Iraq have been ordered to stick to the pavement; what will we do in the jungles, mud and rice paddies of the far east?

So despite Army lies, the Stryker IS being attacked as a combat vehicle, and the Army IS using it as a combat vehicle which it should not do, which is why Strykers are being hidden in the quietest part of Iraq to give them a phony "combat record". The Army's secret ulterior motive behind digitization is to mouse-click with computer graphics a LINEAR BATTLEFIELD THAT DOES NOT EXIST so they can work-around physical weakness like Stryker wheels and perpetuate units of weak, co-dependants who are unable to be self-sufficient and take initiative: they must ask "mother, may I?" from senior leaders and beg for help from other "specialty" sub-units within the cum-by-ya SBCT. What the Army's current narcissistic leaders want more than anything is to perpetuate their WWII/Cold War-style snobby Army; the Army where everyone is weak and co-dependant and reverent towards the linear, blind-obedience chain-of-command despite all of us living in a non-linear world. As narcissists, the Army's senior leaders want a "narcissistic supply" of fawning subordinates tied to computer screens to prop up their egos. The U.S. military is primarily populated by people with Narcisstic Personality Disorder (NPD), a mental illness. The other half of the military are weak co-dependant victims simply trying to raise families and pay for college; these folks are abused as objects of the NPD leaders. Today's Army digital hold-hands-together mentality is nothing more than a modern, gadgety manifestation of the Korean War road-bound timidity and use of radios as a crutch that General Ridgway blasted in the quote at the top of this web page. Boldness requires empowering people and working with them via mutual respect not narcisstic belittlement and class snobbery.

DoD computer infatuated people will buy electronic mental gadgets and ignore physical protection: tell it to these silly marines in Iraq now

Tragic marines in Iraq in unarmored HMMWV trucks without gunshields for gunners...but OMG!! they got a dome antenna for some electronic gadget!

In sharp contrast, current Army Generals are terrified of light Tracked Armored Fighting Vehicles (TAFVs) because light TAFVs can be filled with supplies, use up fuel/supplies at a miserly rate and can go anywhere at any time to actually outfight the enemy with little or no control or please for help from "higher headquarters". We used to call these CAVALRY units.

The non-linear battlefield be it against other nation-state armies or sub-national groups requires strong people in strong, tracked combat vehicles for combat and reconnaissance. Avant Garde media pundits full of mankind-worshiping hubris often forgot all about light tracked armored fighting vehicles; making it appear our only choices on the non-linear battlefield is between medium/heavy 25-70 ton tanks or medium-weight 19-21 ton Strykers. They try to paint the tracks as "old" and the wheels as "new" when the truth is the wheeled armored car was the first thing we tried to make into a "AFV" and after it failed in the muddy WWI trenches, we created TRACKED armored "tanks" afterwards. If "old" is sin, then wheels are the greater evil here. There is a joke: "What is the difference between Jurassic Park and the U.S. Army?" The answer is: "one is an amusement park populated by dinosaurs. The other is a movie".

Wheeled Dinosaur: the humongous Stryker armored truck (note size compared to nearby HMMWV trucks!)

A concerned citizen writes in:

"I've been trying to stay out of this discussion since this is all very old ground and it makes no difference since the decisions have already been made. First off no LAV, and that includes the marine version, has seen much combat. The only war they've ever fought in was IF (forget DS, they saw no action to speak of). They did not fair well according to early reports (two destroyed by RPGs). But at least the LAV-2 can defend itself and has a much smaller profile than the Whale-like and lightly armed LAV-3 that we are trying to pass of as a combat vehicle. You might be able to watch some combat on one of its monitors but don't try and fight it. This was clearly proven at both NTC and JRTC before it even left for Iraq.

The Stryker BDE that was originally deployed to Iraq was in the so-called Sunni triangle. This would have been a good test but it performed so badly in this terrain that it was shifted to the more open (and much less dangerous) north. A fully loaded 5-ton is much more stable than this thing. Although there has been few comments about the Stryker since going to Iraq, two young men of my acquaintance (one 1st Lt and an E-6) are in the deployed unit. My correspondence with them has not been great but one who was originally a big supporter of the former chief and the SBCT, has emailed me that, 'How could the system allow such terrible doctrine and equipment to thrive?' He was pleased to be moved out of the Sunni Triangle since disaster was imminent.

The other one has never been all that hot on the SBCTs. He's been in the army for close to ten years, with his first couple in the Ranger Regt. and the rest in Mech units. He pointed out to me that of course the majority of the Soldiers would like it since most had never done anything else. It's easy to sell young troops on anything if they have no other experience for comparison. He also pointed out to me that these things were running around Iraq empty. Everyone knows the 'Emperor is Naked' and red assed and was very much afraid that a huge loss of life was just around the corner should a fully loaded one hit a booby trap (IED is statespeak and I'm not using it in any serious discussion of life threatening operations). Keeping it from being filmed was the highest priority of the unit leadership.

I've been asking this question for close to three years and still have not got an answer. 'Could these vehicles have functioned in Vietnam?' The answer is no, but I would love to debate that with someone."

BURNED-UP STRYKER IN IRAQ: NOTE THE GAPS BETWEEN THE TILES (click on picture for larger version)

The reason the ceramic tiles on Stryker do not work well is that they are made of inexpensive aluminum oxide ceramics. GD put out a price bogey for the ceramics and a company from Germany, IBD, claimed that their armor could do more than it can. This is why the Stryker ceramic tiles failed to stop 14.5mm heavy machine gun bullets in testing last year and had to be reinforced with steel. This ceramic is much lower quality and capability than the silicon carbide ceramics being tested for FCS. The other problem as you can see from the above photo is that the Stryker ceramic tiles have big spaces between them.

In contrast, the M113 Gavin light tracked AFV is composed of 1.5" to 1.75" thick armor and is only 10.5 tons empty. This weight savings results in the ability to add up to 7,000 pounds of extra armor. M113 Gavins in IDF and other armies often have:

1.) external storage racks to hold troop gear that can pre-detonate RPGs,
2.) a layer of spaced or reactive armor
3.) peel 'n stick ceramic tiles and kevlar-type ballistic panels (that work) tightly placed together on the hull outsides
4.) the vehicle's 1.5" to 1.75" hull and
5.) internal kevlar spall liners and
6.) lots of sandbags.
7.) gunshields

That's 7 layers of protection rolling on steel tracks with rubber pads and solid metal road wheels, STILL LIGHTER than the 19-21 Stryker armored car which struggles to carry a mere 5,000 pound "bird cage". Since the Army bureaucracy does not supply this extra armor to make the mighty M113 Gavin more "vincible" units and Soldiers need to do-it-yourself: get your welders to create external storage racks and bolt them to the outside after buying and applying peel 'n stick armor panels:

Peel n stick armor panels defeat .50 cal @3000 FPS, AP proven in U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground Tests

Armor Systems International
110 Columbia Street
Vancouver, WA 98660
phone: (360) 993-5181
toll free: (866) 993-5181
fax: (360) 737-0743
info@armorsystemsint.com
www.armorsystemsint.com

Light, Medium, Heavy tracked AFVs can push aside barricades and rumble over parked cars to get out of ambush kill zones, wheeled vehicles cannot. Tracked AFVs can pivot turn in place, wheeled vehicles need hundreds of feet to Y-turn (think Austin Powers getting a golf cart stuck in an alley in the first movie).

Which would you rather be inside in combat? Oh, I forgot Army doctrine-technohubris; travel to the mythical "edge" of the battlefield in?

Some pundits then cite the alleged "speed" of wheeled vehicles as a virtue to couple with computer information sharing. Computers are not reserved for just wheeled vehicles as the 4th ID has them in their tracks--has this mental capability been decisive in Iraq? Don't we still have physical bombs going off every day killing and maiming American Soldiers? Maybe "network-centric warfare" is not a panacea? But to equate a slight 15 mph speed improvement via wheels that can be easily destroyed and cannot get you out of barricaded ambushes is dangerous assumptions. We in the free world, need to have effective militaries that kick the enemy's ass not the other way around. If you insist that we have 60 mph speed, remove the safety governors off tracked AFVs and they will go just as fast--and as dangerous--as wheeled vehicles. You can also use band-tracks and hybrid-electric drive and get 50 hp/ton power and INSTANT acceleration in M113 Gavins, too. What is good for the "goose" is good for the "gander", so these pundits should stop trying to reserve computer C4ISR as a benefit only possible when you buy impotent and dangerous wheeled vehicles. Tracked vehicles will not look like something new that senior Army officials selected so they can brag that they were doing something "revolutionary" to exalt their egos. Its all about their egos and image not getting the mission done and protecting the troops.

For recon its now possible to hybrid-electric drive and rubber "band tracked" a light TAFV so its far stealthier than rubber-tired armored cars in addition to tracked vehicle superior unpredictable cross-country mobility. There is no longer any reason to use wheeled armored cars even for recon. Band-tracked TAFVs are just as 60 mph fast on roads, too! The world army that realizes and exploits this first will be the dominant land power on earth.

The difference between "icing" and "cake"

AN OPEN LETTER TO LEADERS IN THE STRYKER BRIGADE IN IRAQ

Dear Stryker Leader,

Many are confusing transformation "icing" with the "cake" its placed on.

ICING

*Lots of infantry Soldiers on the ground

*Training non-stop for complex terrain - especially in urban areas.

*aerial recon and fire support

*Every Soldier with a M16 assault rifle, M249 LMG (SAW), or M240 MMG with precision lethality via day/night optics.

*Soldiers confident that they will hit what they shoot at and shoot only at "bad guys".

* thermal sights on crew-served weapons.

*Vehicle FLIR in an overwatch to spot enemy at night

The things above are "icing" that could be applied to almost any "cake" ie; platform and does not have to be a thin-skinned Stryker armored car rolling on 8 air-filled rubber tires.

CAKE

* All vehicles need to be hardened

Including the Strykers which roll on 8 air-filled rubber tires which will burn if set off by an explosion or molotov cocktail. The problem with current Army transformation is it tries to excuse away physical weakness like wheeled armored cars which are 28% less space/weight efficient than tracks in addition to wheel vulnerability just because they have the "icing" of a computer inside for mental gymnastics. All of the "icing" above would be better applied to an upgraded M113A4 Gavin light tracked AFV that would not only be lighter than the overloaded 19-21 Stryker armored cars but would be better protected by virtue of its metal roadwheels, steel tracks with rubber pads and 28% more efficient composition so you would have several multiple layers of physical, armor protection not just 1/2 inch of steel, defective ceramic tiles and a bird cage all in "Fulda Gap" green camouflage in desert tan Iraq all trying to "tap dance" around the enemy by computer "situational awareness". A 500 hp hybrid-electric M113A4 Gavin with 50 hp/ton would have in excess of 8,000 pounds of payload for extra armor to slap on its 1.5 to 1.75 inch thick armored hull. Layer 1 troop stow in external racks (better than bird cages). Layer 2 spaced or ERA armor Layer 3 ceramic tiles that work and have no spacing between them or peel 'n stick ballistic materials, Layer 4 the vehicle's thick hull Layer 5 sandbags Layer 6 kevlar spall liner, Layer 7 gunshields. THINK ABOUT IT. That 28% goes a long way on the non-linear battlefield where you need every advantage. Put the same C4ISR package in the more physically robust tracked M113A4 Gavin if you want to be "network-centric".

* HMMWVs and FMTVs spend just as much time on the road as the Strykers

If the "cake" we applied the infantry-centric and C4ISR "icing" to was an upgraded M113A4 Gavin light tracked AFV we could go off-road at will without fear of being stuck or blowing a tire via lower ground pressure and sturdy tracks AND AVOID ENEMY AMBUSHES IN THE FIRST PLACE. Resupply and liaison should also be in light tracks, too.

* "The NCO who recently drowned would his mission have been approved if he had stopped to ask permission?"

Is this what digitization is all about? an Army of "mother, may I?" where we are micro-managed from the top-down by computer? No computer in the boat this time. If the NCO had been successful would he have gotten a medal or an Article 15?

* Because of a lack of amphibious vehicles, you are not routinely able to shut down enemies firing using rivers as protection

If you had amphibious M113A3/4 Gavin based ICVs instead of Strykers (that do not have props and rudders like the USMC LAV-1s) YOU COULD SWIM INTO THE RIVER AND ATTACK THE IRAQIS ACAV-style just like we did in Vietnam. In fact, there are kits to add waterjets to M113 Gavins so they can swim in the oceans from Army APS RO/RO ships to shore, and attack inland rivers/lakes with even greater boldness regardless of water conditions.

Let's say the Stryker is a good vehicle, which most of us think it is not. (You can and probably should think otherwise until you are out of Iraq.) At over $3 million each and at $53-a-mile to operate we cannot afford to supply it to the other 28+ brigades in the Army to transform them, but WE CAN upgrade M113 Gavins for under $500,000 each which are arguably far better vehicles and operate them at $3-a-mile.

Check out the wear and tear on these $1000 Stryker tires:

The Army and marines are spending $$ millions of tax dollars replacing flimsy rubber tires in Afghanistan/Iraq

If LAV armored car tires bust daily as they do in Afghanistan/Iraq, are we saving any money at $1000 a pop? Wouldn't tracks that don't break be more economical?

I know you must be dying to invoke the Stryker 60 mph road speed as your final rebuttal to infer all of this "mobility". The fact is a 50hp/ton M113A4 Gavin on band tracks will go over 55 mph and "scoot" around just as nimbly as under 20 hp/ton overloaded Strykers, in fact more so. If you encounter a barricade as part of a deliberate ambush you couldn't avoid (it happens, respect the enemy) the tracked M113A4 Gavin can push it aside or rumble over it. The M113A4 Gavin can pivot turn in ZERO length. The Canadian Army is sending their M113s into Afghanistan combat with band tracks, and their country makes the Stryker.

Why are we writing you?

If we were in your shoes I'd want someone to write me just as I have written you.

Here is what we propose:

Why don't you request the 4 M113A3 Gavins that the Army used in the Fort Lewis Comparison Evaluation (CE) tests (that beat the other platoon's 4 Strykers) be sent to you in Iraq to get your men out of those HMMWV trucks that will NEVER be made RPG and IED resistant?

Or request some of the thousands of M113A2s/A3s that are in war stock or simply in storage be sent to you to replace your FMTVs and HMMWV since they can haul over 7,000 pounds of supplies and do it protecting their vital cargo and our even more valuable Soldiers?

Where is your mobile gun system?

The Stryker-MGS isn't going to work.

GDLS is trying to wash their hands clean of it.

Why not request the 4 x M8 Buford Armored Gun Systems with 105mm guns that DO WORK that the Army owns be sent to you in Iraq?

As leaders of the Army's first motorized brigade in combat with the enemy surely HQDA will not deny you what you request to improve your situation and protect the lives of your men as you better accomplish the mission.

Playing politics with American Soldiers' lives in Iraq: Army hunkering down in Iraq for November election and protect wheeled cash cows

Strykers safe from criticism?

Stryker expert Lonnie Schoultz writes:

"Well, there is really no problem with them getting hit. The Stryker Brigade in Iraq is the 3/2. As it was taking the field Congress was considering whether to buy any more of those hermaphrodites. Before the first shot was fired two of the Strykers tumbled into a canal and killed three men. While attempting to negotiate a back road, one hit an IED and caught fire after breaking the driver's foot. Then, they had another roll-over with a Stryker barreling down a major highway that just flipped over. It tore up the slat armor but nobody was hurt.

The Brigade Commander, Colonel Rounds, was told to not have any more accidents or have any more people hurt or killed. He restricted all Strykers to 45 mph and then had a second thought and just restricted them to the base. So, the 308 Strykers are in motorpools under tight security and haven't recorded 25 miles among the 300 of them since Rounds got his chain pulled."

Tribune reporter returns from Iraq

www.tribnet.com/news/iraq/stryker/story/4816485p-4756614c.html

News Tribune staff reporter Michael Gilbert has returned home to Tacoma after four months in Iraq with the Fort Lewis-based Stryker brigade.

Gilbert completed his assignment to cover the new brigade's deployment to Kuwait and its first few months of combat operations in Samarra, Balad and now in Mosul and across northern Iraq.

Stories and photographs wrapping up his stay as an embedded reporter with the brigade will be published soon. The News Tribune will also continue to cover the brigade's activities via e-mail and telephone interviews.

The brigade -- the first of its kind in the Army, built around the new Stryker vehicles -- is expected to remain in Iraq until November.

(Published 11:00AM, March 5th, 2004)

How do we kill the ruinous Stryker program?

GET CONGRESS TO KILL IT.

Demand that Congress stop buying these deathtraps even if the Army wants to call them "Future Combat Systems". Didn't the Army just say the Strykers were "not combat vehicles"???. The acronym is "FCS"...I guess the Army will have to come up with another lie, ehh acronym. With Retired Army Generals Heebner and Keane now working for General Dynamics, importers of the LAV-III/Strykers from Canada, its high time the "revolving door" of corruption be put to an end before more of our men are killed/maimed in these death traps. Isn't there a law restricting you on how long you have to wait before you can join the company that makes the "cash cow" system that you got accepted while in uniform?

Write your Congressman now!

www.congress.htm

Generals Shinseki/Schoomaker only got funds to ruin 5 active brigades with it. The other 28 Army brigades need help NOW to win the WAR we are in and that help should be HE drive, band-tracked, RPG resistant, applique armored, gunshielded M113A4 Gavin light tracked AFVs, the only affordable and available choice we have N-O-W. The good news is the tracked M113 Gavin is a far better vehicle than the wheeled LAV-3/Stryker anyway. Gavins only cost $3-a-mile to operate, its costing us $53-a-mile to run the Strykers. So much for wheeled armored car "economy". Maybe we should have read Hornback's study and TACOM fuel and operating cost data before we decided to buy LAV-IIIs and pretend to have an open competition for the best vehicle? The fix was in from the beginning that the LAV-III was going to be bought by the Army as General Heebner left the Army to be a GDLS Vice President with thousands of dollars of stocks. Strykers cost $3 million each. We already have the Gavins and only $478 thousand dollars makes them into the most capable, stealthy armored fighting vehicles in the world. Do the math. Employ the logic. Let's hope General Schoomaker will be a pragmatic and practical man who wants RESULTS and does the smart thing here to win battles and save our men's lives. That's the conventional Army. SOF needs light TAFVs to do multiple raids simultaneously after parachute insertions and stay on the ground for long periods of time to flush out enemies hiding in restricted, enemy controlled terrain and it cannot do this in road-bound and vulnerable wheels. The Army to save face will quietly transfer the Strykers to MP Brigades once enough Soldiers are killed/maimed inside such that Congress forces them to act responsibly.

BEHOLD, NOW THE "UP-ARMORED HMMWV" WHEELED TRUCK MADNESS IS UPON US!

EXCLUSIVE! WHY TRUCKS ARE NOT COMBAT VEHICLES:

To show a little of the lethal NLB firepower possible today, we have this video gun camera footage from Iraq of a 224th Attack Aviation Battalion AH-64 Apache attack helicopter lighting up some Iraqi terrorists in soft-skin wheeled trucks using the M230 30mm autocannon. The point is, watch what these large, exploding bullets do to human bodies and thin-skinned wheeled trucks. THIS IS WHY THE MINIMUM TRANSPORTATION STANDARD ON THE BATTLEFIELD MUST BE A LIGHT TRACKED ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLE NOT A WHEELED TRUCK.

Another way for today's Tofflerian/RMA crazed Army Generals to get what they think is cheap wheeled vehicles made into combat vehicles in order to keep everyone in their social-pecking-order-place in the Army is to slap armor onto the HMMWV truck, and of course eventually a computer to do the required mental gymnastics. This is nothing more than a check-the-block, cosmetic change to placate the very real concerns of our Soldiers that they will be killed and maimed in wheeled vehicles. The Army is asking for $239 MILLION from Congress for manufactured up-armored M1114 HMMWV trucks that will take 2 years to build and WILL NEVER BE RPG RESISTANT and will quickly be overmatched by enemy road bombs exploding through their vulnerable windows and soft rubber tires.

Many Soldiers are reporting a far different situation than what is being presented to the general public by Army PAO news releases. Soldiers are not "in" the Army, they are the Army, a fact the General Officers (GOs) "club" does not acknowledge. GOs think the Army belongs to THEM as a toy to do as they wish. On today's Non-Linear Battlefield (NLB), the enemy intermixed with civilians and difficult terrain can attack at any time in any direction--there are no safe "rear" areas for Soldiers to drive around in rubber-tired trucks. We are in a long lasting, global war on terror; unfortunately the threat is learning from their successful attack on our troops in these wheeled trucks in Iraq; we need adequate and long-lasting improvements that overmatch the enemy's efforts not questionable and at best short-term cosmetic alterations to appease Soldiers concerned for their lives that are easily countered by the adaptive and asymmetric-advantage seeking enemy.

Lightweight 3-ton HMMWV 1 1/4 ton cargo-capacity trucks driven by our brave men and women Soldiers are specifically singled out by the enemy as targets for command-detonated car/roadside bombs and land mines mislabeled by the buzz-word acronym "Improvised Explosive Devices" (IEDs); so far killing over 250 of our best and brightest people and ruining an undisclosed number of Citizens-Soldiers who are now maimed for life. Others are recovering from wounds that will take years to recover from--if at all. The enemy has lots of 155mm artillery shells and plastic explosives to make "IEDs" that are getting bigger and more sophisticated as the recent double-bomb attack targeted the first responder rescuers of the first blast; and this tactic has now spread to Afghanistan.

The daily toll of American dead, maimed and wounded makes time of the essence, these preventable casualties threaten the entire war effort by loss of public support and U.S. Army recruiting/retention is suffering potentially ir-repairable damage due to a loss of faith and trust in Army senior leaders who continue to fail to protect the troops by making them drive in these vulnerable trucks. Our Commander-in-Chief, President Bush has ordered that our troops receive the best gear they need to win and survive the war on terror and this has not happened.

3-ton HMMWV light truck make-shift armoring is not working as Soldiers have still died in them like Captain Ernesto Blanco, just 28 years old---of the 82nd Airborne Division when a bomb blast went through the window of his HMMWV and into his unprotected face. A Soldier in his unit writes:

REVELATION!

Dan Rather Interview with CNN's Larry King: blast thru HMMWV windshield: docs can't save men

www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0403/12/lkl.00.html

"Let me say that yesterday, Larry, on the road, just west of Baghdad, we saw the medevac team in action. We were on the road where, just ahead of us, a roadside bomb went off against an 82nd U.S. Army convoy. And just as we rolled up, the medevac helicopter was arriving; we saw them carrying away three Soldiers on three stretchers.

But the medevac people were tending to the Soldiers on two of those stretchers. They weren't attending to the Soldier on the third. And I said to myself as we saw that, 'I hope I'm wrong, but it probably means that at least one of those Soldiers is dead.' And indeed it did.

One was killed almost instantly. Another died if not on the medevac itself, just as they arrived at the hospital. And the third 82nd Airborne Paratrooper is still in serious condition.

I mention it because we had done the piece on the medevac people earlier in the week. And it's so much in my mind. And it was just a coincidence, but it was a sobering one, to see the people that we had done the story on earlier in the week actually do their job.

They got there very, very quickly. This was a case of -- I think this is typical of the way some of the injuries and deaths among the well over 500 Americans who have been killed here happens. The 82nd Airborne, Larry, as you know, is beginning to hand off their responsibilities in part of the Sunni Triangle -- in this case, just west of Baghdad -- to the 1st U.S. marine Division. And the 82nd Airborne Soldiers were on a mission to help a U.S. marine convoy.

And it was on that mission they made a stop at a certain place in the road. And when they did, what appeared to me to be a command- detonated mine at the side of the road. I'm not sure that's what it was, which is to say, somebody off in the distance by wire set this thing off.

And it was at just the right level. If it had been one foot lower or one foot higher, it probably wouldn't have blown through the window of that Humvee. But it was a combination of a sophisticated bit of good planning and some luck on the part of the people who put the bomb there that was placed just in the right place. They set it off at just the right time, with those tragic results."

The HMMWV's wheeled SUV configuration has windows, doors and windshield that can never be protected enough and lacks an unified armored body for all-around protection. The Army's recent message to units on vehicle self-help armoring (see below) says vehicles need hard steel to stop bullets and soft steel to stop blasts; HMMWVs limited to just a 1.25 ton payload can't even be fully covered by one thin steel layer let alone the two layers needed and can then only carry two troops inside. The recent unclassified, Headquarters Department of the Army message on HMMWV armor kits [see APPENDIX A], "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX" states: (emphasis in boldface mine)

WAITING FOR FACTORY-MADE ARMORED HMMWV "SALVATION" THAT WILL NEVER COME: WHILE M113 GAVIN LIGHT TRACKS SIT IN STORAGE

05Mar04 Baghdad Report by CA Soldier:

"I had an interesting chat with a lady captain named Beverly who was down from one of the more hostile areas north of Baghdad today. She's from the Army's Civil Affairs outfit. These are U.S. Army units who have the job of building clinics, keeping hospitals supplied (the NGOs having left) and generally getting up and out every day to make life a bit better for the workaday, Iraqi folks in their areas.

She'd had a couple of rough weeks as she and her people are constantly on those dangerous roads up north, where IEDs and ambushes are common. She's young and very pretty, but there's lines creeping in around her eyes and they're not from the sun.

'We were in a regular convoy, going off to drop antibiotics at a local health clinic when the IED went off,' she said. 'The fifth vehicle in our convoy was hit by an artillery shell rigged to go off on command. It flipped the vehicle over and the driver was killed immediately. Everyone else is in Walter Reed.'

Well, it was a little more than that. She went on to tell me that the driver that was killed was a little girl only 19yrs old, just out of high school. The device had gone off right next to her side of the vehicle. I won't go into detail, but this girl was more than just killed. If you have any idea what happens to someone in close proximity to an exploding artillery shell, you know what I am talking about. At least it was mercifully quick. The rest of the team was so busted up it's unsure if they'll ever make it back to duty at all and one young man has probably lost his sight.

Oddly enough, Beverly isn't bitter about that. She's a senior Soldier and has reconciled herself that these things happen in war. Their Humvee was a regular, soft skin vehicle that had been modified by local contractors with steel plate, known to the troops as a 'Hadji Hardshell.' You see a lot of them around, with boiler plate bolted or welded on in a hodge-podge of different styles and configurations. All of them emergency field modifications concocted as things turned hostile over the last year. The protection they provide is dubious at best and in some cases it is obvious that the additional plate would only make things worse in an explosion of any force, adding to the shrapnel involved. Steel plate for armor is a special composition and hardness. It is made especially for the task. Boiler plate from an Iraqi contractor's yard doesn't cut it.

For example, I talked to some MPs who for kicks and curiosity 'tested' their 'Hadji Hardshell' against an AK-47 they had captured. The rounds went right through. So then they pushed a bayonet through it with a little help from a ball peen hammer. They are now some very, very worried MPs. Their "Armor" wouldn't stop a knife. This is the type of Humvee that most Civil Affairs Soldiers ride around in.

To truly understand this, you need to know that there is a new barometer that the troops measure their relative risks in Iraq by. It's called 'Road-time' and if you get lots of road-time, you're bucking the odds against the IEDs. You don't get much road-time, you're sitting on a base, behind walls and wire. With most of the heavy stuff being pulled back to base camps, road-time also means Humvees. 'Road-time' doesn't apply to some guy in a tank.

CA gets lots of road-time. They have to, as on any given day they're responsible for supporting the workings of everything from clinics to water treatment plants to the sanitary conditions in a local market. For every stop on their schedule it means 'road-time' and that means driving past about 10,000 different places where someone could rig up a bomb.

I spoke to one CA doctor who has put 3,000 miles on his Humvee and he's been here since January. This is probably the only place in the world where regular Army MPs, National Guard truck drivers and Army Reserve CAs tip their hats to each other. Both are at top of the "road-time" food chain.

But here's the real kicker; an emergency order of armored Humvees from factories in the US is due to start arriving sometime soon. Scuttlebutt has it, however, that Civil Affairs is somewhere near the bottom of the list to receive them.

'I have an area that stretches from Kirkuk almost down to the outskirts of Baghdad,' Beverly said with a sigh. 'And now I've got five less people to cover it with because we can't seem to get up-armored Humvees.' What she didn't mention was that those five less people aren't your average Joe with an M-16 pulling guard at Camp Victory. They're public health nurses, infectious disease doctors, veterinarians and civil infrastructure engineers. They're a little hard to replace. They come from a demographic that isn't exactly lining up to join the army.

But incredibly, Civil Affairs is apparently below tank drivers who have traded in their M1s for an armored Humvee and who drive around for an hour or two on 'Patrols' but rarely, if ever, stop and interact with the Iraqis whose country we're trying to rehabilitate. To be fair, such patrols are necessary to show a visible, Coalition presence and those boys need decent vehicles as well.

But it boils down to a question of return for time and effort invested and a bunch of guys speeding past on a "presence patrol" doesn't stack up against a load of unobtainable cancer medication delivered to a children's hospital. The priorities seem to be fouled up and until someone takes notice of it, ladies like Beverly are going to keep racking up 'road-time' in death traps."

Slightly larger HMMWV trucks are not much better than the "vanilla" ones. Most bulk supplies are hauled by much larger FMTV trucks as HMMWVs primarily move people around though they are obviously inadequate as combat personnel carriers on the lethal NLB and may even be unsafe to operate when overloaded with make-shift armor. The Army bulletin elaborates:

Rubber burns. What a revelation! Does the Army's officials know this yet?

Furthermore, HMMWVs and all wheeled vehicles--roll on air-filled rubber tires that burn if set off by a "molotov cocktail" or nearby explosion immobilizing the vehicle and our Soldiers inside for the enemy to concentrate rifle, machine gun and RPG fire into them to finish them off. The HMMWV is a rear area "people mover" and light resupply truck not a combat vehicle--and cannot protect against the current threat let alone keep up with the threat's bigger bombs and possible discovery and use of expedient flame weapons.

Its self-evident to nearly everyone directly involved in the Army that HMMWV light trucks are unsuitable for NLB combat whatever we try to do with add-on or built-in materials; 45+ mph road speeding has not evaded enemy bomb attacks lying ahead and only makes matter worse by increasing the severity of the often fatal accidents as the struck vehicles spin out of control.

Up-Armored HMMWV destroyed by RPG hit. Soldiers inside were not protected.

Store-bought bigger engine/frame M1114 "up-armored HMMWVs" have already failed to protect our men in Iraq and CAN NEVER BE MADE RPG-RESISTANT. At 12,075 lbs combat loaded, up-armored HMMWVs can only carry 4 troops not a full 9-man infantry rifle squad; they cannot go off-road at will without getting stuck which offers no future for a global Army which has to be able to fight away from roads and trails over marshes, rice paddies, farms, rivers, streams and through jungles. Even on roads they tend to overheat and break-down often. What a "future" for the Army, huh?

Just in case pic is taken off USMC web site:

Caption:

Captain Jason Frei sits with the humvee door that was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade in Iraq. Frei lost his hand north of An Nasiriya on March 25 while serving as the commanding officer of Battery A, 1st Battalion, 11th marine regiment, during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Frei, a 31-year-old native of Hazen, N.D., recieved the Purple Heart for his wounds. Whether Frei will be allowed to remain in the marine corps and what his duties may be is still up in the air pending a medical review.

Even unarmored HMMWVs are getting stuck in flat, desert Iraq. Note the vehicle is in the wrong woodland green "Fulda Gap" camouflage while in desert-tan Iraq. Look at the surrounding buildings/terrain. Maybe we have a death wish and want to help the enemy aim and shoot at us?

THE HORSE-HOLDER PREDICAMENT: WHO IS LEFT TO FIGHT ON FOOT?

In the U.S. Army Cavalry of old, every 4th Soldier had to hold the horses for 3 other Soldiers to fight on foot. To move a 9-man infantry rifle squad, you need two HMMWV trucks, each can seat 4 men and have one standing upright through the roof manning a weapon.

Rifle Squad

HMMWV truck A

Driver
VC/Gunner
Soldier 1
Soldier 2
Soldier 3

HMMWV truck B

Driver
VC/Gunner
Soldier 4
Soldier 5

No matter what you do, in the two-HMMWV trucks-per-squad situation 4 SOLDIERS ARE STUCK IN THE VEHICLES, leaving just 5 men able to dismount and fight on foot! That's a tooth-to-tail ration of 1:1. The Old Horse Cavalry had a better 3:1 ratio. We need LOTS of good dismounted light infantry on the non-linear battlefield. We need a M113 Gavin light tracked AFV that can carry the entire 9-man infantry squad. Even if you don't provide a driver/Track Commander (TC), you can still dismount 7 men, all at the same time from one place instead of twos and threes from two places in the two-HMMWV truck set-up.

Rifle Squad

M113 Gavin light tracked AFV

Driver
TC/Gunner
Soldier 1
Soldier 2
Soldier 3
Soldier 4
Soldier 5
Soldier 6
Soldier 7

Gambling scarce taxpayer resources on a pair of overweight armored HMMWV trucks to move every Army infantry squad to hope-to-get-by the present disintegrating security situation in Iraq is tactically unwise and inefficient. It takes two HMMWVs to do the job of one M113 Gavin with a 275 hp engine and then with inadequate armor protection, lousy mobility and inability to swim at that. Calculate TWO HMMWVs with 200 hp engines and all of the so-called "cost savings" go out the window.

The wheeled truck doesn't belong on the non-linear battlefield. Overweight, thinly-armored HMMWV trucks will force American Soldiers into easy predictable paths for enemies to set bombs which will explode through their doors, windows, windshields and overcome thin, expensive $ and exotic---but easily overmatched material. Again, when you start off using wheeled vehicles instead of tracks, you are at a 28% space/weight disadvantage when you NEED EVERY SHRED OF ADVANTAGE YOU CAN MUSTER because the enemy has "homefield" advantage of fighting on terrain he knows, can prepare ahead of time and cache weaponry, ammunition as he "gangs up" on us ala Mogadishu, 1993. Once the enemy barricades the path in front and behind wheeled vehicles they become trapped as he pours on his fire until the wheeled vehicles catch fire and are totally destroyed. Tracked AFVs can push aside barricades, smash over abandoned cars and fight their way out of ambushes if aggressively driven. Wheeled vehicles cannot turn on a dime like TAFVs can. 2-years and $250K each for 2 HMMWVs for every squad is too little protection, too late for our Soldiers dying and being maimed in Iraq today and will condemn us to further preventable casualties in future conflicts.

Armored HMMWVs break down; General Paul Kern: 800 HMMWV trucks broke in middle east

The cheapskate U.S. Army has condemned the current troops in Iraq with almost no tracked armored vehicles while they try to milk from Congress at $250,000-a-pop, so-called "up-armored HMMWV" trucks that will require 2 years to build. Our troops are getting blown up killed and maimed in wheeled vehicles NOW on the non-linear battlefield where the enemy can attack in any direction at any time. Our troops need better armored mobility means today to keep order in Iraq: if they are getting blown up they can't win over anyone's "hearts and minds" if their own body parts are spread out all over the ground. 4th Generation Warfare requires the nation-state to keep the peace against sub-national discontent not be powerless victims. It takes two 6-ton quasi-armored HMMWVs with 190 hp engines to move just one 9-man infantry squad, so the cost is really $500,000 and fuel burn is 5 mpg. The Army is not saving any money.

Slapping 2 tons of armor onto originally a 3 ton wheeled vehicle is like a lady trying to carry a safe on her back while wearing high-heeled shoes: it overloads too much pressure onto too narrow wheels, suspensions and drive trains. In civilian life, an armored car has to be rebuilt several times because their armored boxes over-tax their drivetrains. The commander of Army Materiel Command General Paul Kern said the service takes an estimated eight hours to reset a HMMWV; some experts say that figure can skyrocket to 62 hours to pull the vehicle's engine, whereas fixing (swapping of the engine) an M1A1 Abrams heavy tracked tank requires only about 30 minutes. When even thin armor is added to HMMWVs for minimal protection against roadside bombs, the weight places an additional strain on engines, Kern said during the 2004 Winter Symposium sponsored by the Association of the U.S. Army. "I've got 800 of them right now sitting around . . . trying to get back to the United States with a retrograde problem...the challenge I see is making decisions quickly enough and getting on with a new development, because the vehicles are wearing out pretty fast."

No one really knows what it costs to maintain the M113. There has NEVER been a life cycle cost study and the M113 preceded the Army's systems for managing fleets, so don't be dismayed by those who say light tracks are somehow "too hard to do". OSMIS, the Army's system for capturing costs, does not differentiate between A2s and A3s except for one of the models, and that only since 2002 and without analysis. $/mile quotes from people like the Stryker PM are ridiculously high because they are based upon about a week's worth of anecdotal data and extrapolated beyond reason to achieve whatever the guy doing it needs to say.

The logistics system for M113s is fully mature, and needs no funding of any type for buildings, training, etc. 133+/- M113s will be deployed in every modularized brigade. More than any other vehicle type in the heavy UA. 48 other countries in the world have M113s also and we could forge an international M113 support base in a heartbeat for expeditionary operations.

Maintenance for the M113 Gavin is only different mechanically from a Humvee truck in that it has two tracks and 10 metal roadwheel sets compared to the Humvee's 4 wheels and 4 air-filled rubber tires--12 items to 8. However, a single Gavin can move 1 rifle squad that takes two Humvees to move---12 maintenance items to 16. Both use roughly 200 hp class diesel engines. It requires maintaining two Humvee engines to move 1 rifle squad and only 1 engine to move a rifle squad in a Gavin. Humvee users are finding in Iraq that "run flat" inserts do not work well enough to not have a spare lest they be stranded in "bad guy land". They are learning the hard way how to jack up a Humvee and change out a flat.

In contrast, Gavins with steel tracks and rubber pads simply do not break, deflate or burn from sharp objects and enemy attacks. According to Humvee users NO TIRE type exists that is good in sand and mud and they at best their tread lasts only 8 months--tracks can last for years and they are good in sand and mud and roads. www.flashoffroad.com/features/Tires/tires.htm

With a low ground pressure of 8 PSI, Gavin rubber track pads are gentle on paved roads so they can convoy themselves to training areas and APODS and SPODs if rail transport is unavailable. Many NG M113 users simply do limited PMCS each month, hop inside their Gavins that sit untarped in the cold, rain and sun for years at a time and operate them successfully. A single simple, tracked AFV like the Gavin is actually less maintenance needy than two Humvee trucks rolling on fragile air-filled tires. Unless the T150 track breaks--and it takes a lot to do this---you get 10,000 miles for sure with Gavins, and the 10,000 miles of life of a Humvee rubber tire only if it never runs over a sharp object. Unlike shredded rubber tires that are constantly thrown away at $1,000 a pop, if a track breaks IT CAN BE FIXED AND RETURNED TO DUTY at almost zero cost. Usually only a track pin bushing fails; replace it and your track is as good as new. During PMCS switching out track shoes with worn bushings prevents tracks from breaking in the first place. If a bomb blast takes out several track shoes, you simply short-track to the nearest roadwheel and drive home to add the remaining track shoes. Gavins get 3.5 mpg, heavy Humvees about 8 mpg---since it takes two Humvees to move a squad this means 4 mpg or essentially the same amount of fuel demand as a single Gavin.

APPENDIX A: M113 GAVIN ARMOR POTENTIAL GREATER THAN ANY WHEELED VEHICLE

The Gavin is a compact, unified 1.5 inch to 1.75 inch thick aluminum armored box that is 7.62mm AP bullet proof and floats. The Humvee is a flimsy, unarmored framework with 1 roof, 4 door openings and a windshield; even with armor added around the openings its full of penetration points and it cannot swim. Because its engine can only move 1.25 tons, it cannot accept enough armor all around to cover all its original weak points, the roadside bomb threat is quickly surpassing the uparmored Humvee truck's spotty armor in Iraq. The Gavin by being a unified armored hull and spreading its weight over large tracks can move 3.5 tons of payload so it not only starts off with greater bullet/blast armor protection (the Humvee starts with no armor protection) it can easily accept several layers of armor to react to missile strikes, pre-det RPGs and shrug off road bomb blasts. On top, M113s can have ACAV gunshields with clear see-thru panes for infantry to face outward ready to return fire and ambush the ambushers.

Even if you started with an unified armored hull and placed it over wheels (LAV-1s, 2s, 3s "Strykers") it will have to be 28% bigger than more compact tracks---that's 28% potential armor protection we cannot afford to lose from the get go, and such a vehicle still rolls on air-filled rubber tires that restrict it to roads/trails where attacks will puncture, shred and set its rubber tires on fire. Armored trucks like LAVs sit too high above their tires to clear the rear ramps of C-130s for LVAD parachute heavy drops, and are often too heavy even stripped of all men and equipment for the C-130 to fly them beyond 1 hour's flight time to airland them.

An armored Humvee weighs 9, 000 pounds, since it takes two to move 1 rifle squad, at 18, 000 pounds its essentially no different from the Gavin's 20, 989 pound weight--in fact it weighs the same as 5-ton cargo capacity FMTV trucks Army Airborne, Air Assault and Light infantry units use. However, to airdrop two Humvee trucks you will need two 16 foot Type V airdrop platforms, two sets of extraction and cargo parachutes and twice the rigger man-hours than the single M113 Gavin on a 20-foot platform requires. The rigging procedure to airdrop a Gavin is simpler than the many steps needed to pad, reinforce and cushion a Humvee truck to heavy drop. However, you cannot airdrop two armored Humvee trucks from a C-130 because their rigged weights exceed the C-130's payload limit. So far, armored Humvees have not even survived parachute drops without damaging their wheeled suspensions overtaxed with armor they were not designed to carry. In contrast, not only can you airdrop a Gavin with extra armor from a C-130 without ill effects, you can also have its 2-man crew and designated 9--man rifle squad follow it out the rear ramp to land closer together to get its armored mobility and mobile firepower into combat within minutes on the drop zone. To maximize the Airborne combat power the C-130 can deliver by parachute and airland, light tracked AFVs are the answer.

The answer is to stop playing with expensive, fragile HMMWVs and solve the problem by immediately shipping over to Iraq some of the thousands of better protected, thick-skinned 11-ton M113 Gavin light tracked armored fighting vehicles the Army has ready TODAY in storage and the 235+ Gavins the National Guard's 30th and 81st Brigades left behind when they went to Iraq. As General Kern alludes, tracked AFVs are mechanically simpler than wheeled trucks, spreading their weight over a larger area to go easier on their running gear; a single light tracked AFV like the M113A3 Gavin with 275 hp engine can carry an entire 9-an rifle squad with gunshields, extra RPG-resistant armor at a 3.5 mpg fuel cost with far better armor protection than vulnerable HMMWVs with 2 windshields, 8 windows, 8 doors rolling on 8 air-filled rubber tires that easily burn. The M113 Gavins roll on metal roadwheels with steel tracks with rubber pads or band tracks--so they are easy on Iraqi pavement--you can have 50+ mph road speeds and vibrationless "stealth" for raids. The latest T150 track lasts for 10,000 miles--a lot longer than rubber tires that bust daily. M113 Gavins are the most successful vehicles in Iraq with those units lucky enough to have them. Its time EVERY Army unit use them like the U.N. does when they go to a dangerous area. If the security situation collapses in June, when we turn over Iraq to the new government, crowds of Iraqis could swarm around HMMWVs, start rocking their wheels, turn them over and set them on fire; you can't do this to a much denser M113 Gavin. HMMWVs are SUVs not combat vehicles! They are easily attacked and are at shoulder height; firebombs can be easily thrown into their open windows and doors!

Patrolling Iraq in HMMWV trucks is absurd and tactically unsound

HMMWV trucks are at shoulder level

Windows and doors are often open to attacks

Result: destroyed vehicles at $250,000 each and dead/maimed Soldiers

An Iraqi prepares to pour more fuel on a blazing U.S. Army Humvee vehicle following a shootout between American forces and guerrillas in the restive town of Falluja March 25, 2004. Two U.S. Soldiers were killed and four wounded in two separate attacks on convoys in Iraq (news - web sites), the U.S. military said. (Mohammed Khodor/Reuters)

Our troops in Iraq in any kind of HMMWV truck are at risk: its time to pull out the HMMWVs and replace them with M113 Gavin light tracks. The Israelis use up-armored M113s and don't lose a man a day in combat like we are in Iraq.

Casualties in Iraq are temporarily down because troops have been ordered to patrol less to reduce bad PR for Bush re-election. Type B personality NG troops are also less inclined to patrol and launch raids against the resistance. MSNBC's Chris Matthews on Hardball recently asked former presidential national security advisor, Sandy Berger about this. He is worried chaos will break out with the U.S. exerting less control. The cat is out of the bag. Whether American forces could survive a Tet-type offensive all over Iraq hinges on our troops not being properly equipped with M113 Gavin light tracked AFVs which are sitting back here in the U.S. when they should be there in Iraq.

However, the Bush DoD is Tofflerian: they think all you need to win wars is steer FIREPOWER by mental "mouse clicks" and "mop up" with troops-in-trucks. This care-free mentality has failed in non-linear Iraq; so far 550 dead, 10,000 wounded Americans--some maimed for life. Rather than admit their lazy view of warfare is wrong, the Tofflerians want to cover up their mistakes with an expensive 2-year program to slap armor onto wheeled trucks weighing down their tires making the entire Army too road-bound to fight in mud/rice paddies/jungles of the far east and much of the world. To save our troops, maintain control in Iraq and win future 4GW battles against terrorists we must value physical, ground MANEUVER using go-anywhere, adequately protected tracked armored vehicles. Upgrade these sound platforms for future warfare not waste money and time on trucks that can never be RPG resistant. A tracked AFV is 28% more space/weight efficient than a wheeled truck; we cannot afford to throw out 1/4 of our armor protection by rolling on air-filled rubber tires, and the troops cannot wait 2 years for a HMMWV armor cover-up. Congressman Davis from Tenessee last month sent a full report on these facts to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. Senator John Kerry knows what its like to be under enemy fire; if the Bush DoD doesn't act soon to send over M113 Gavins en masse to our troops in Iraq so they can make it home safely, then we need to send the Tofflerians home in November. We need people in DoD/the White House who are not concerned about transformation egos, who respond to NLB realities and get tracked vehicles to our troops so they can survive/prevail in combat.

REFERENCE: ITA News Report

MATERIEL CHIEF SAYS ARMY MUST SLASH HUMVEE REPAIR TIME: The commander of Army Mate-riel Command said last week the service must become faster at fixing its fleet of humvees, Inside the Army reports from Ft. Lauderdale, FL.

The service takes an estimated eight hours to reset a humvee; some experts say that figure can skyrocket to 62 hours to pull the vehicle's engine, whereas fixing (swapping of the engine) an M1A1 Abrams tank requires only about 30 minutes, Gen. Paul Kern said. Alternators on the popular infantry carriers also are larger due to increased energy demands, fed by equipment such as night vision devices and blue force tracking. And when armor is added to the humvees to aid protection against threats like roadside bombs, the weight places an additional strain on the engines, Kern said during the 2004 Winter Symposium spon-sored by the Association of the U.S. Army.

"I've got 800 of them right now sitting around . . . trying to get back to the United States with a retrograde problem," Kern said.

As a result, technicians from AMC and other Army com-ponents are examining technology to create stronger radial tires, tank tracks and improve power sources so that humvees do not have to rely so much on their engines. Other capabilities in-clude hybrid electric engines, systems that support suspensions, different types of batteries and energy storage capabilities. "The challenge I see is making decisions quickly enough and getting on with a new development, because the vehicles are wearing out pretty fast.

An Army Veteran journalist writes about the wheeled madness:

www.lonsberry.com/writings.cfm?story=1378&go=4

New York Post
April 10, 2004

Fight Like Americans

By Bob Lonsberry

DUSTIN Sekula made me think of basic training.

I saw Dustin's name in the paper Tuesday. And it made me remember 20 years ago in the open-bay barracks at Fort Knox, Ky.

The wool blankets and camouflage uniforms and the stubbly heads of a new crop of Soldiers: I remember it like it was yesterday. And one lesson has never left me. And that is that most Soldiers are boys. Oh, they are men, in many regards. They have the bodies of men and the courage of men and the responsibilities of men.

But they are mostly boys.

They have lived virtually all of their lives as children. Many don't have cars, most haven't made love to a woman, few are married, even fewer are fathers. They don't own homes or property, they typically don't have a pot to pee in. Their possessions are CDs and their memories are of the 10th grade.

It occurred to me, there in the barracks, that most of the Soldiers around me were just six months past their senior prom, and even less time had passed since their high school graduation.

They were men, but just barely. Yet they were beside me learning how to fight, and upon graduation some of them went away to units and training that would put them potentially and quickly in combat.

That made me very sad 20 years ago in Fort Knox, and my feelings became more somber over the years as my own son grew to that age and he and his friends, lads I had known since they were in diapers, were the age and the stature of my former comrades.

We send boys to fight our wars.

Dustin Sekula reminded me of that.

A marine private out of Edinburg, Texas, the county seat of Hidalgo County, a little bit north of McAllen and a little ways inland from Brownsville. Dustin Sekula was 18 and a member of the 1st marine expeditionary force. He was listed in the paper after Geoffery Morris, a 19-year-old out of Gurness, Ill., and Aric Barr, the old man at 22, from Allegheny County, Pa. Three marines, like the seven more from the next day, and who knows how many to come.

We send boys to fight our wars.

I'm not saying those wars don't need to be fought, and I'm not saying young men aren't the ones to fight them, but I do think we forget the youthfulness and the innocence of the men who wear our uniform.

And I think we sometimes forget the value of their lives, and improperly weigh them in the equation of conflict.

Don't misunderstand me, this is not an argument for withdrawal. This is not one more whining cry to get out of Iraq, a cry against war and conflict, a call for an end to hostilities.

Actually, this is just the opposite. I think we're pussyfooting around in this Iraqi war, and I think it's costing us young men's lives. I think we care more about playing nice and currying the world's favor than we do about protecting these fine young Americans.

I think we are making the mistake of expecting our enemy to respect the value of our servicemen's lives when we don't appear to value them ourselves.

For example, we have been taking casualties for weeks and months from improvised explosive devices, hit-and-run gun attacks and rocket-propelled grenades. These are all effective attacks on infantrymen and light vehicles, like humvees.

So why do we keep exposing infantrymen and humvees?

In war, you should always play your high cards. Trump, and trump big. If they're hitting your infantry, send in your armor. If your humvees are vulnerable, deploy your B-52s. If it's not safe to drive a humvee down a street, try going down it in an Abrams.

Don't pussyfoot around with these jihad boys, blow them to hell. This isn't Marquis of Queensbury, this is kill or be killed. And with armaments, technology and numbers like we've got, the other side should be nothing but a grease spot in the road.

But it's not.

It's functioning and moving effectively against us.

At the cost of Dustin Sekula, Geoffery Morris, Aric Barr and about 600 others.

I think it's because we're making the Vietnam mistake, we're fighting with one arm tied behind our back. We're trying to curry world opinion and kiss the backside of people who are going to hate us no matter what. We're trying to be civilized in a contest with barbarians.

We've forgotten the arithmetic of patriotic battle: That it's better for a hundred of them to die than for one of us to die.

We owe that to these young men in uniform, and we owe it to their families and sweethearts back home.

It is better for a B-52 to flatten an Iraqi neighborhood than it is for one United States marine to die. It is better to roll tanks down a foreign street than it is to put an American Soldier in his grave.

If 100 Soldiers can get a job done, then 1,000 can get it done more safely. We need to use our strength, we need to use our technology, we need to use our power. We need to go big.

More troops, more arms, more aggressive tactics and strategies. Let's flood Iraq with American men and munitions and let's steamroll anybody who gets in our way. No more pussyfooting.

It's time to fight like Americans.

That's the best thing for our troops - the best thing to give them a chance to come home and live the lives the rest of us enjoy.

And it's the best thing, ultimately, for Iraq.

Bob Lonsberry is a veteran journalist and talk-radio host.

ENTER THE GAVIN

If America's Army is going to expand to handle world-wide commitments from the current 33 brigades, even if Strykers were combat vehicles (they are not) at $3 million each we simply cannot afford to put all of our Soldiers in them. We have lots of HMMWVs but they CANNOT be made protective enough and are not mobile enough. We need an affordable vehicle platform that can be supplied en masse to ALL OF THE ARMY NOW, that can be up-armored and fitted with the C4ISR digital computers the Army's Generals are infatuated with. There is only one vehicle that the Army already has thousands of that can do this.

Gavins to the rescue: The U.S. Army has thousands of M113 Gavins to transform the entire Army quickly (days not years) and at low cost to save lives in Iraq/Afghanistan

The good news to report is; the U.S. Army has thousands of thick-skinned armored, 10.5 ton M113 tracked Armored Fighting Vehicles (AFVS--or nicknamed the "Gavin" by the troops after Army General James Gavin who created it while Army R&D Chief) in storage with fully enclosed armored bodies to shield up to 13 troops inside. The M113 happens to be the most reliable, combat successful AFV of all time, ever, in use by dozens of free world countries. M113 AFVs weigh the same as the large, 22,000 pound FMTV series trucks now used to haul supplies for Army use, but externally are about the same size as a HMMWV truck, though that concentrated armored weight results in armor protection and robust construction to hang even more armor and offers tracked mobility superior to any of the Army's wheeled vehicles to include the $3 million dollar each, but 14mm (1/2 inch) thin-skinned Canadian-made Stryker. Gavins roll on solid metal road wheels and solid steel tracks with rubber pads to be gentle on paved surfaces and each M113 can replace two HMMWV trucks so all HMMWVs in Iraq can be withdrawn from daily use in a matter of days not 2 years from now (see APPENDIX C). Overnight, we will no longer present easy, tempting, unable to-fight-back wheeled truck targets for the enemy to exploit for media public perception points to further their unjust cause and kill/bleed our manpower. Below is a listing of another set of M113s that are combat-ready now in war stock that could be dispatched to Iraq/Afghanistan:

Tracked M113 Gavins: steel tracks don't burn

Wheeled HMMWVs: rubber tires burn

When U.N. peacekeepers go to troubled area they often use up-armored M113 AFVs.

So does the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and they do not lose a man-a-day like the U.S. Army is in Iraq.

American Gavins in Iraq:

Israeli Zeldas:

www.waronline.org/IDF/pictures/Army/M-113_Zelda/index.html

Funny how the wheeled armored car fanatics are always saying M113 Gavin light tracks cannot do stability operations on paved roads when they have been doing them for years and are doing so as we speak. So while U.S. Army Soldiers are getting killed/maimed in Iraq/Afghanistan, Army leaders sit on thousands of thick-skinned, M113 Gavins that are sitting in storage and at National Guard armories while they beg for millions of dollars from Congress to buy vulnerable, road-bound thin-skinned HMMWV trucks rolling on air-filled rubber tires. "That dog don't hunt."

The M113's 1.5 to 1.75 inch armor hull protects as-is against rifles/explosions says the Army's TACOM M113 Data Book on page B-6 states:

Basic Armor, M113 FOV

IMMEDIATE GAVIN ARMORING FOR IRAQ & UPCOMING CONFLICTS

There are 1, 775 Gavins in combat in Iraq now. Time is of the essence. The Army over the years has refused to attach the spaced armor they are supposed to have. We do not have to wait any longer! There are 1, 600 old M2A0 Bradley fighting vehicles (BFVs) here in the U.S. that have thin laminate armor skirts that are of no use to them since these beat up and rotting BFVs need to be completely refurbished and fitted with thicker skirts to hold explosive reactive armor (ERA) tiles since the skirts are bolted directly to the BFV hull without separation to pre-detonate RPGs. These old BFV skirts sitting at Red River Arsenal and on decaying BFVs in other locations can be cut and fitted to Gavins for only the cost of installation. These "A0" kits can be sent forward to Iraq for Soldiers to attach to their Gavins themselves. The A0 armor kits can remain in Iraq when units rotate out to help the incoming units prevail in combat.

1. To get A0 armor kits for your Gavins, have your unit send up an Operational Needs Statement (ONS) through your chain-of-command to get the BFV skirts sret aside.

2. Contact UDLP, maker of the mighty M113 Gavin and alert them of your combat need:

UDKP Larry Clark (703) 312-6127

The A0 kit also includes extra armor plate for the front glacis of the Gavin!

Note the separation for the skirt to act as a "strike face" for incoming enemy fires. Most M113 Gavins come with mounting provision bolt attachment holes or they can be added easily.

Notice how the BFV skirt is cut by high-pressure water cutters to fit the compact M113 Gavin.

Notice the extra front armor plate attached to the Gavin's front.

The Army M113 Data Book figures indicate that each M113 depending on model horsepower has a 4,000-8,000 pound payload carrying capability which means up to 4,000-7,000 pounds of additional armor on top of the rifle/explosion resistant hull armor to stay ahead of threat and still carry troops/weapons/supplies to accomplish mission. Troops supplies hung outside in external racks furthers armor protection even further.

The issue here is the weight of the vehicles. 70-ton heavy tanks with tracks do tear up the roads. But the facts are that a 20T tracked vehicle has lower ground pressure than a 20T wheeled vehice. The Australians found that their LAVs were craking the thin pavement in East Timor because of the intense point pressure directly under each wheel -- on Stryker for example, 24 tons over 8 wheels is 3 tons each, spread across less than 1 square foot -- that is a lot of ground pressure. Correspondingly, the Australians brought 11-ton M113s into East Timor specifically because they did not tear up the roads.

The M113's durable T130 tracks were good for 10,000 miles in soft soil Vietnam; reports from M113 Gavin combat commanders is they are go-anywhere and any distance via their low 8 PSI ground pressure and soft rubber pads, even under-powered 212 hp engine M113A2 Gavin 38 mph speed and acceleration from 0 to 35 mph in 69 seconds is more than adequate when standard convoy speed is 25 mph. M113A3 Gavins with 275 hp engines have a top speed over 41 mph and accelerate from 0 to 35 mph in just 27 seconds with a power ratio of 20 hp-to-ton. M113A4 Gavins with hybrid-electric 500 hp instant propulsion with band-tracks can go over 55 mph on roads with an unsurpassed 50 hp/ton power to weight ratio. (ref: M113 Data Book pages 15 and 37 and UDLP MTVL and HTTD fact sheet) See APPENDIX C for more M113 Gavin tactical advantages over HMMWVs. New T150 track has expected life of 15-50,000 miles for soft soil/hard surfaces. What more do you want? T150 track has been available in the Army supply system since 1QFY03.

M113s can go-off-road and cross-country, at-will to avoid enemy ambushes and strike at America's sub-national terrorist enemies hiding behind populations/difficult terrain.

M113A3 Gavin: most successful U.S. Army Combat vehicle in Iraq (and everywhere else)

An Army officer who commanded a Combat Engineer Company that fought with the Army's 3rd Infantry Division to Baghdad last year describes how they proceeded towards the capital city, that they were "pelted" by enemy Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) and enemy automatic weapons, destroying his HMMWV truck which was riddled with bullets. After two ambushes, his unit switched to entirely M113A2 Gavin light tracked armored fighting vehicles which offered far better protection than any wheeled vehicles. All wheeled vehicles were put as far rear in the column as possible. He reports:

"My company attacked with the Task Force (TF) in every major battle with XXXXXX. We were either 2nd or 3rd in the order of movement (OOM) for every battle but one in which we were 4th. We were in the middle of the action. Even though our light tracked M113A2s could go off-road, if we did, a M1 Abrams heavy tank would 'eat it' and get stuck, so we stayed road-bound for their sake.

I'm not sure of this but I'd say my M113's ate more RPGs and small arms than any other deployed to Iraq to date. We made several modifications that I'm convinced saved the lives of 5-10 Sappers because we were able to 'absorb' RPGs in a very unconventional manner. We basically made our M113's mobile fighting positions by welding together storage racks and bolting them to the outside of our vehicles. We then filled them with equipment and supplies to create 'baffling'. If we ate a case full of meals, ready-to-eat (MREs), we took the empty box and filled it with dirt and placed it back in the external racks to provide extra ballistic protection. When RPGs hit, they would hit a rucksack or a hard equipment case and go off, and fail to do more than gouge a hole in the vehicle's side.

As it was all we had just 6 Soldiers wounded, 4 were shot by AK47s and two had mortar shrapnel wounds; pretty good all things considered but could have been prevented if we had more gunshields on the top of our M113s like the Israelis have. Even after the 'war phase' was over, I always rode from base camp to say Baghdad International Airport in my M113 instead of a wheeled HMMWV, why risk your life on a roll of the dice?

We put 500 miles on these vehicles all the way to Baghdad no problem and WITHOUT A SINGLE REPAIR PART DELIVERED TO US THE ENTIRE TIME WE WERE THERE. All we had for repair parts was what we carried when we crossed into Iraq. We 'short-tracked' two of our M113s when their sprocket wheels were destroyed and ran them that way for weeks. Our light ground pressure with rubber pads on our tracks did not harm Iraqi roads and pavement. You can't ask for a more durable and easy-to-operate and maintain vehicle than a M113. I wouldn't be alive here now if it were not for the armor protection, tracked mobility and over-all durability of the M113s we used.

The M113 is an outstanding, durable and easy-to-maintain armored vehicle that can go anywhere, swim and be parachute dropped or lifted by helicopters, which is very important for Combat Engineers who have to lead the way for the entire Army; making sure the path is clear and safe. We should up-armor these outstanding M113 Gavin light tracked armored fighting vehicles to M113A3 standards which have external fuel tanks, spall liners extra outside armor and underneath with gunshields for our men to fire out behind and a bigger engine. On top of this, our external storage racks would add even another layer of protection. I hope our Congress and Army leaders will budget funds to upgrade these war-winning vehicles so they are supplied throughout our Army."

3D Air-Mech Maneuver: what the Stryker pundits brag about doing but can't; M113 Gavins can and have been doing for years!

NEW! 173rd Airborne Brigade flies in 15 x M113A3 Gavins to deliver a mechanized infantry medium ready company to Northern Iraq

Details: SETAF's Immediate Ready Forces

All the World's Airborne Operations

Shame on you, National Guard: leaving 235+ life-saving light tracked armored vehicles and accepting active army hand-me-down trucks in Iraq

The National Guard's leadership in Washington D.C. and in the 30th and 81st Brigades is so lacking in professional military knowledge--even self-preservation survival instinct---that they are going to Iraq as "temporary help" underlings of the active army without demanding they take with them their 235+ M113 Gavin light tracked armored fighting vehicles which are perfectly suited to urban stability operations threatened by car/road bombs, grenades, RPGs and AK47 attacks. I say "+" because I'm not counting the M113s their Combat Engineers use. If you count just the M113 Gavins their Infantry and Armor Battalions use/have they have over 235 light tracked AFVs which can each move 11 Soldiers at a time, or 2,585 people under full armor protection at a single time.

81st ARMOR BDE = 94 x M113 Gavin-type light tracked AFVs 30th INFANTRY BDE = 141 M113 Gavin-type light tracked AFVs

_______________________________________________________

TOTAL 235 x M113 Gavin-type light tracked AFVs

www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/toe/mech.htm

81st Armored BDE = has 94 x M113 Gavin type light tracked AFVs

http://216.239.41.104/search?q=cache:C6nd5-g1-pcJ:www.washingtonguard.com/81bde_Mob/81FAQ_Home.html+81st+brigade+washington&hl=en&ie=UTF-8

The designation "Armor Brigade" points to the two battalions of tanks and a battalion of infantry that provide the robust coverage for a myriad of possible scenarios.

Definitions

M113 or CARRIER or 113 = Gavin infantry carrier light tracked AFV
M577 = Gavin with higher roof as command post vehicle light tracked AFV
MTR CARR = Gavin M1068 120mm heavy mortar carrier light tracked AFV

1 x Brigade Headquarters

HHC
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Brigade = 9 x M113 Gavin type light tracked AFVs

M577A1 6
M113A1 1
M88 1
2 1/2 Ton 4
5 Ton 1

C2V 5
M577A1 1
HMMWV 12
M113A3 1
M88 1
FMTV 5

2 x Tank Battalions

2 x HHC Tank Battalions = 54 x M113 Gavin type light tracked AFVs

A HHC has:

Command Section

HMMWV
M1A2
HMMWV

S-1 SECTION

LMTV

S-2 SECTION

M577

S-3 SECTION

M577
HMMWV
HMMWV
M1A2
M113

S-4 SECTION

HMMWV
M577

COMPANY HEADQUARTERS

HMMWV
HMMWV
HMMWV
LMTV

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

HMMWV
HMMWV
M577

SCOUT PLATOON HEADQUARTERS

ARMT HMMWV
ARMT HMMWV

FOUR SCOUT SECTIONS

ARMT HMMWV SEC LDR x 4
ARMT HMMWV SQD LDR x 4

MORTAR PLATOON HEADQUARTERS

HMMWV
HMMWV

TWO MORTAR SECTIONS

M577
M577

SIX MORTAR SQUADS

MTR CARR x 6

SUPPORT PLATOON HEADQUARTERS

HMMWV

TRANSPORTATION SECTION

HEMTT
HEMTT
HEMTT
MTV
MTV
LMTV

FOUR TANK COMPANY III/V SQUADS

HEMTT
HEMTT
HEMTT

FOOD SERVICE SECTION

HMMWV x 3
LMTV x 6

MEDICAL PLATOON HEADQUARTERS

HMMWV

MEDICAL TREATMENT SQUAD

M577
M577
LMTV x 2

FOUR AMBULANCE SQUAD

M113 x 8

COMBAT MEDIC SECTION

NONE

MAINTENANCE PLATOON HEADQUARTERS

HMMWV
HMMWV

MAINTENANCE SUPPLY

LMTV x 5

RECOVERY SECTION

M88 x 3
WKR MTV
WKR HEMTT
LMTV

MAINTENANCE/SERVICE SECTION

HMMWV
LMTV x 4

FOUR TANK COMPANY MAINTENANCE TEAMS

M113 x 4
M88A1 X 4
TRK LMTV x 4

UNIT MINISTRY TEAM

HMMWV

8 x Tank Companies = 8 x M113 Gavin type light tracked AFVs

A Tank Company has:

HQ Section

TANK
TRK UTL
TANK
TRK UTL
CARRIER

Three Tank Platoons.

TANK TANK TANK TANK

1 x Infantry Battalion =

HHC = 20 x M113 Gavin type light tracked AFVs

COMMAND SECTION

HMMWV
M2
HMMWV

S-1 SECTION

LMTV

S-2 SECTION

C2V

S-3 SECTION

M2
HMMWV
HMMWV
C2V
M113

S-4 SECTION

HMMWV
C2V

COMPANY HEADQUARTERS

HMMWV
HMMWV
LMTV
LMTV

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

HMMWV
HMMWV
M577

SCOUT PLATOON HEADQUARTERS

ARMT HMMWV
ARMT HMMWV

FOUR SCOUT SECTIONS

ARMT HMMWV
ARMT HMMWV

MORTAR PLATOON HEADQUARTERS

HMMWV
HMMWV

TWO MORTAR SECTIONS

M577
M577

SIX MORTAR SQUADS

MTR CARR SQD LDR x 6

SUPPORT PLATOON HEADQUARTERS

HMMWV

TRANSPORTATION SECTION

HEMTT x 2
HEMTT SECTION x 2 Class V Transport
HEMTT FUEL SECTION x 3 Class III Transport
MTV POL SECTION Class III Transport
MTV FUEL SECTION Class III Transport
MTV SECTION x 2 Class V Transport
LMTV NBC SPEC Decontamination

FOUR RIFLE COMPANY III/V SQUADS

HEMTT SQD LDR x 4 PRC-119A Class V Transport
HEMTT SECTION x 8 Class V Transport
HEMTT FUEL SECTION x 12 Class III Transport

FOOD SERVICE SECTION

HMMWV x 4 COOKS
LMTV x 8 COOKS Food Service

MEDICAL PLATOON HEADQUARTERS

HMMWV PLT LDR

MEDICAL TREATMENT SQUAD

M577
M577
LMTV
HMMWV x2

FOUR AMBULANCE SQUADS

M113 x 8

COMBAT MEDIC SECTION

NONE

MAINTENANCE PLATOON HEADQUARTERS

HMMWV
HMMWV

MAINTENANCE SUPPLY
LMTV x 5

RECOVERY SECTION

M88 x 3
WKR MTV
WKR HEMTT
LMTV WELDER

MAINTENANCE/SERVICE SECTION

AMV
LMTV x 4

FOUR RIFLE COMPANY MAINTENANCE TEAMS

AMV x 4
M88 x 4
FMTV x 4

UNIT MINISTRY TEAM

HMMWV

3 x BFV Rifle Companies = 3 x M113 Gavin type light tracked AFVs

A BFV Rifle Company has:

HQ section

M2
TRK UTL
M2
TRK UTL
113

Three Rifle Platoons.

Each platoon having:

BFV
BFV
BFV
BFV

30th Infantry BDE = has 141 x M113 Gavin type light tracked AFVs

www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/30in-bde.htm

The 30th eHSB, headquartered in Clinton, is the largest brigade in the North Carolina Army National Guard. The brigade has three maneuver battalions, two infantry and one armor. However, there appears to be an extra tank battalion from the West Virginia National Guard that is a part of the 30th IB BDE, making it have 2 battalions of infantry and two battalions of armor.

· HHC, 30th HSB (M)
· 1-119 IN
· 1-120 IN
· 1-150 AR
· 1-252 AR
· 1-113 FA
· 230th Support Bn
· 105th ENG Bn (Combat)
· Trp E/196th CAV
· 230th MI Co - Burlington
· G/2-202 ADA - Marseilles, IL [IL ARNG]

Definitions

M113 or CARRIER or 113 = Gavin infantry carrier light tracked AFV
M577 = Gavin with higher roof as command post vehicle light tracked AFV
MTR CARR = Gavin M1068 120mm heavy mortar carrier light tracked AFV

Brigade Headquarters = 30 x M113 Gavin-type light tracked AFVs

M577A1
6 HMMWV
12 M113A1
M88
2 1/2 Ton
4 5 Ton
C2V
5 M577A1
HMMWV
12 M113A3
M88
FMTV 5

2 Tank Battalions of Armor = 64 x M113 Gavin-type light tracked AFVs
2 BFV Infantry Battalions = 46 x M113 Gavin-type light tracked AFVs

7 Points why the Army's Wheeled Vehicle Iraq Policy must be changed

1. The Absurd Wheeled Vehicle-Only Policy underway for the 1st Cavalry Division/30th/81st/39th Brigade Troop Occupation of Iraq starting in February 2004

Currently in Iraq, the Army is sending the active 1st Infantry and Cavalry Divisions, North Carolina 30th Infantry and Washington State 81st Armored Heavy Brigades WITHOUT ALMOST ANY OF THEIR TRACKED "TANKS". Together with the Arkansas National Guard 39th Light Infantry Brigade they have been thrown into HMMWV trucks ad hoc to present a "kinder, less threatening appearance" to the Iraqi people.

While the enemy is INCREASING in its roadside bomb attack lethality, WE ARE DECREASING VEHICULAR PROTECTION FOR OUR TROOPS. On today's non-linear battlefield (NLB) where the enemy can attack in any direction at any time, there are no "safe" rear areas for wheeled trucks to operate in. If you are not already in a thick-skin armored track when the bomb goes off, its too late to take cover. If the situation becomes unglued in Iraq into a civil war, our troops in wheeled trucks could get creamed.

Another excuse to not use tracked tanks is the misconception that they tear up pavement; which is not true when rubber pads are on steel tracks and even less a factor for light, under 11-ton M113 Gavin light tracked vehicles that press down softer at 8 psi than heavy 11-30 ton Army Stryker trucks with psis in excess of 30. So the truth is that, light M113 Gavin tracks can go anywhere at any time in Iraq without damaging roads while offering far greater armored protection than any rubber-tired wheeled vehicle which is 28% less space/weight efficient. With a 3.5 mpg fuel rate, M113 Gavins are affordable to operate, by nearly everyone unit in Iraq instead of vulnerable HMMWV trucks. The Army's Heavy units in or soon going to Iraq, the 1st Cav, 30th and 81st Brigades have hundreds of M113 Gavin-type light tracked AFVs that are combat-ready now, and may just need a coat of light tan paint. Furthermore, thousands of thickly-armored M113 Gavins are in storage ready to be sent to Iraq in a matter of weeks at a fraction of the cost of expensive armored HMMWV trucks that will always be vulnerable and needs years to build. Soldiers in M113 Gavins in Iraq since the war began have suffered less casualties than any vehicle except the ultra heavy 70-ton M1 Abrams tank, and even then not by much. More Soldiers have died in HMMWVs, other Army trucks, Stryker armored cars and even Bradleys than Gavins. The handful of Soldiers that have died in M113s did not have the underbody, side and gunshield armor that would have saved them because the Army refuses to supply these things to our troops despite President Bush directing that our troops get everything they need to win the war on terrorism.

But now the Army wants almost all of its tracked "tanks" removed from Iraq when every ounce of their protection is needed. A few days ago the Army's Commander General almost got assassinated when his vulnerable HMMWV truck convoy was ambushed. What more of a wake-up call do we need?

2. Outward Appearances?

M113s are indeed actually "tanks"--light tanks. Anything that is tracked and armored is a "tank". In WWI tanks didn't have 360 degree revolving turrets and they were still called "tanks". I am certain the Army's ARMOR branch's narrow definition of "tank" as being only an above 40-ton tracked armored vehicle with a turret has done more damage than anything towards full development/usage of the tank in our military.

M113 Gavin track or HMMWV truck? Does it make a difference to the Iraqi?

What's the difference--TO AN IRAQI--between a wheeled "M1114" HMMWV and a M113 Gavin light tracked AFV following in trace in overwatch to troops on foot? Are we saying, that the Iraqis will see the HMMWV, a thin box 85" wide, 196.5 inches long on 4 rubber tires with a .50 cal machine gun on top, and a M113 Gavin, a thick box, 98" wide at its tracks, 207 inches long with a .50 cal machine gun on top and see the former as "OK" and the latter is not? The M113 Gavin is far smaller than the Stryker or AAV-7 Amtrack, its HMMWV-sized and a bit taller.

Armor-laden Trucks cannot go anywhere

The M1114 is the heaviest armored HMMWV truck made to date. It weighs in at almost 5 short tons empty (9800 pounds) and has a max weight of over 6 short tons (12100 pounds) when combat loaded.

Light Armored Tracks that adequately protect our men can also go anywhere--to keep enemy guessing and avoid ambushes in first place

IF YOU ARE GOING TO "TURN THE OTHER CHEEK" YOU BETTER NOT HAVE A "GLASS JAW"!

While the image of a "tank" intimidates, its far more important that its actual increased protection be used than its perception of strength. We need to ask ourselves if appeasing the Iraqis that are offended by "tanks" is more important than offering our enemy easy casualties in vulnerable wheeled trucks which show our weakness and inability to defend the Iraqi people?

The 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) and Special Forces Soldiers say M113 Gavins with infantry facing out from top troop hatches behind gunshields are best for non-linear, urban combats. 3rd ID lessons learned from the nation-state conflict, from Chapter 7 at:

www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2004/onpoint

"As the Army fields Stryker Brigades and continues transformation, the OIF experience will influence combat development. Tanks and Bradleys performed brilliantly in OIF, but they did not meet all of the operational requirements. Despite their advantages in armor, tanks and Bradleys evinced a number of disadvantages --they could not elevate their weapons far enough to fire at the upper floors of buildings from close range. But as 3rd ID discovered, the lowly M113, full of engineers armed to the teeth, could engage the second and third stories. Clearly no weapon system is perfect for all environments, and even the superbly equipped forces that fought OIF have..."

An Army Special Forces Soldier in Iraq NOW during the sub-national conflict writes:

"You betcha. Brads are great for rolling around like a turtle and knowing nothing can touch you, but the problem with the insurgents here is that every time they take a shot at you and no one shoots back, they get bolder.

Now, take my boys in 91st engineers. We roll around with a gun in the tub, the back top open and guys hanging out with ARs and optics.

Go ahead, step out from behind that building against riflemen who are excellent snap shooters.....and can engage 360 degrees and up and down almost 180 degrees.....pretty much wherever they can point the rifle.

In a M113, this is almost everywhere.

Just my firsthand experience day after day in Gazalea and Abu Graib.

XXXX"

3. There are at least Two basic factions in Iraq, those who are undecided and those who ooppose the U.S..

GROUP A Fence-Sitters: Might become pro-American if persuaded

We are in a Vietnam-style situation in Iraq, where we have different groups of people we are trying to tailor/cater our actions to. There may be a group of Iraqis who see tracked vehicles and are offended/intimidated by them. I don't think so, I think those that are offended are offended because of who we are and we are occupying their country--not the vehicle type we use. But let's say there are Iraqis who will be won over to our side if we use rubber-tired trucks. OK?

GROUP B Rebels: Anti-American no matter what vehicles we use

Its also certain there is definately a violent group separate from the ones who will appreciate our "softer image" (Group A) who are going to exploit our driving in rubber-tired trucks and blow us up to kill us, hoping our casualty toll will make us pull out of Iraq.

NEW REPORT! Army troops-in-trucks in Iraq is medically unsafe and unsound

Do we win 4GW when enemy easily toasts our HMMWVs?

http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?g=events/iraq/082701iraqplane&a=&tmpl=sl&ns=&l=1&e=81&a=&t=&prev=80

Iraqi youths celebrate after a U.S. Army Humvee vehicle was set ablaze following a shootout between American forces and guerrillas in the restive town of Falluja March 25, 2004. There were no reported injuries in the firefight. REUTERS/Mohammed Khodor

If Group A sees Group B easily killing and wounding us, they will not likely see us as being able to PROTECT them since we cannot even defend ourselves.

Report from Iraq:

www.latimes.com/news/printedition/asection/la-fg-debate18apr18,1,2904597.story?coll=la-news-a_section

Marines Cultivate Iraqi Sources, but Reap Little

U.S. forces and a local couple hoped each could help the other. But the latter feared retribution

FALLOUJA, Iraq It was a roadside debate involving an Iraqi couple and four marines.

It won't merit a footnote in the history of U.S. forces' struggle with the insurgents who hold much of this city in their grip. But their interaction clearly demonstrated the difficulties marines are having in persuading Iraqis to help them.

"He's not working out like I thought he would," said Lt. Michael Scott, 26, of Boston, his voice redolent of disappointment.

The story began early Friday morning, when an Iraqi man, followed dutifully by his wife, approached Scott for help crossing marine checkpoints that were restricting the flow of traffic into Fallouja.

The 50ish man said he needed to drive his pickup truck into town to help relatives and bring back food to his family in the farming village of Saqlawiya. He smiled and gave the impression he wanted to help the Americans, if they would help him.

Scott agreed and hastily scribbled a note allowing the man to pass through the checkpoints. Scott hoped that in return, the man would provide information about insurgents hiding in the countryside and smuggling weapons and fighters into the city.

Each day, the U.S. launches unmanned surveillance planes to gather information on the movements of insurgents. Telephone calls are intercepted. Leaflets and public announcements beseech Iraqis to provide information.

But that is not enough.

"Until you get some human intelligence, you really can't get anywhere" in stopping the insurgents, Scott said.

Once the man and his wife had entered the city in their battered, bullet-pocked 1985 pickup truck, Scott returned to the marine outpost here. Hoping to ingratiate himself with the couple and their relatives, he gathered a large quantity of food and, organizing a convoy, headed toward the couple's home deep in the farm belt that encircles much of Fallouja.

The foliage on the rutted roads is thick, and the possibility of ambush is ever present. The marines have nicknamed the region "the Vietnam area."

Scott's convoy arrived in late afternoon, before the couple returned home, and began dispensing food to at least three dozen children and several adults: bags of rice, candy, biscuits, a tub of onions, canned goods, an enormous sack of sunflower seeds, potatoes and more. The children tussled happily for the candy as marines threw handfuls into the air.

But one of the adults, speaking to a marine interpreter, pleaded with them to leave, lest opponents of the occupation learn of their visit and take retribution.

A young girl began crying and flailing her arms. The marines left.

Then a call came through on the radio: The man and his wife, while on their way home, had been wounded in an attack several miles away. Their truck had also been shot up and, despite their injuries, they were trying to walk back to the village before the nightly curfew.

Both had been hit by shrapnel, the woman in her arms, the man in his back. Blood soaked his white garments. Both had been treated by Navy medics.

Scott rerouted his convoy to the site and greeted the man. His wife was weeping and shaking her head. The man was distraught. He said that he had been hit by American fire and that his truck, which he needed to support his seven daughters and three sons, was ruined.

Scott and the other marines struggled to explain through an interpreter that the shrapnel must have come from an insurgent's mortar round. The effort failed.

"He's got it stuck in his head that if he gets shot, it has to be an American," one marine said.

Scott offered to replace the truck with one that had been confiscated from insurgents. The man refused. To take a truck from the marines would mark him as a friend of the Americans, and he and his family could be killed, he said.

The man, however, wanted his truck towed to his farm. But the marines said they could not do so because it had been abandoned in an area thick with insurgents.

The man said he would instead accept money and quoted a price in dinars that translated into upwards of $5,000. Too much, Scott and the others said.

Scott, however, sought to bargain, telling the man that the marines wanted to help him but had to be helped in return.

The man shook his head, his eyes misting. He showed them his mangled foot, an injury he had received long ago while serving in the Iraqi army.

"I don't want to help either side, the U.S. or the others; both will shoot me," the man said.

As his wife's sobs grew louder, the debate continued in a circular fashion: money, truck, responsibility. Scott persisted in trying to enlist his support. Warplanes buzzed overhead.

"Tell him that unless he and his neighbors work with us, we cannot make progress for Iraq," Scott said.

The response was immediate and needed no translation: No, no, no.

In the end, nothing was resolved. The man and his wife accepted a ride toward their village: close enough to walk home but far away enough that neighbors would not see them accepting even that amount of aid from the Americans.

Some say gain the trust of the Group As and expand group so there are less Group Bs. I agree with this, except we will not expand Group A if we let Group B short-circuit everything by easily blowing us up and demonstrating our weakness and inability to keep the peace. The process of Group As becoming Group Bs is an issue, but we have to accept the reality that a lot of Group Bs already exist separately from the Group As.

Some think using tanks short-circuits the expansion of Group A by offending them with a too war-like appearance.

Others think not using tanks short-circuits the expansion of Group A by allowing Group B easy targets to demonstrate we cannot protect them.

This is the essence of the dilemma: how can the nation-state maintain "order" if its Soldiers are getting blown up?

www.d-n-i.net/fcs/lind_3_10_04.htm

Why They Throw Rocks

By William S. Lind

Last week, suicide car bombings left around 200 Shiite pilgrims dead and scores more wounded in Iraq. How did the locals respond?; By blaming the Americans. U.S. troops, including medics who were trying to help the wounded, found themselves attacked by stone-throwing mobs. Similarly, in Haiti, when gunmen opened up on a demonstration by Aristide opponents, the locals blamed American marines for the casualties.

What gives? Neither the American Soldiers and marines on the spot nor American citizens at home can understand why we get blamed when Iraqis or Haitians kill each other. After all, we didn't do it.

The answer gets at what the state is all about, or should be all about,and why the state is failing in so many parts of the world: order.

As Martin van Creveld writes in his important book, The Rise and Decline of the State, the state arose, in Europe starting in the 15th century, to bring order. Not freedom, not capitalism, certainly not democracy, but order. Between the decline of the High Middle Ages and the rise of the state, Europe was plagued by disorder, often in the form of roving bands of armed men looking for employment as Soldiers. Being skilled in the use of arms and semi-organized (and not having much to lose anyway), if they saw something they wanted, they took it. That meant not only money but the food a family had stored to get it through the winter, along with their warm house; women; boys and young men, to fill up their ranks; horses and other livestock; in short, anything. What they did not steal they destroyed, just for the fun of it. And seeing how long they could keep someone alive under torture often provided an evening's entertainment. Life was Hobbesian - nasty, brutish and short - for anyone without a castle.

The state promised to restore order, and in time it did. As the state spread throughout the world, usually in the form of European colonialism, it made that same promise good beyond Europe. While the state added qualities beyond order as it developed, its legitimacy still depended on upholding its first promise, maintaining order. And it still does so depend.

That is why, in countries such as Iraq and Haiti, the locals blame us when order breaks down. As the occupying power, we are responsible for maintaining order. That is true under international law as well as in the eyes of the local people. We are the state now in those places, and when order breaks down, we - the state - have failed.

Why do we fail? Any battalion commander in Iraq can easily answerthat question. We have far too few troops to do the job. We do not have, and for the most cannot get, effective human intelligence. We do not understand the local culture. "Force protection" keeps us isolated from the local population, and effective policing, which is what keeping order requires, demands integration with the people. As a state military, we are designed to fight other forces like ourselves. Our own rules of engagement keep us from simply hosing crowds with machine-gun fire, and when that happens anyway, it just creates more enemies. There is also the legitimacy problem: because we are a foreign occupier, many locals who want order nonetheless feel compelled to resist us.

But these local answers do not address the whole problem. It is not only "over there" where the state no longer brings order. In developed countries, including Britain and the United States, the state has also broken its contract. It no longer effectively provides order on its home soil. In Britain as in the United States, one of the fastest-growing industries is private security. Gated communities are the new castles. My own office on Capitol Hill in Washington, D.C., is in an area plagued by high levels of crime. The city that wants to rule the world cannot maintain order one thousand yards from the U.S. Capitol Building after nightfall.

The state's growing inability to maintain order, in Baghdad or in Washington, is a primary cause of its intensifying crisis of legitimacy. The remedy is not to be found in new techniques for our troops to use in Iraq or Haiti [BILL LIND IS WRONG HERE], or for police to use here at home. In the end, it requires not just new people at the head of the state, but a different kind of people, people who genuinely see themselves as servants of the state, not as racketeers gratifying their own vast egos and enriching themselves, their families and their supporters. That, unfortunately, is a tall order, in Haiti, in Iraq or in Washington.

4. Functional Realities

We're not convinced having troops LIVE 24/7/365 with the Iraqis will make them like us (USMC CAP philosophy). I would think it would make them hate us even more. But if I had to trade distance for closeness, I'd want to have a light track to fall back onto than a wheeled truck.

So what functionally is objectionable to the troops having a thick box on tracks with rubber pads instead of a thin box on air-filled rubber tires?

5. The TechnoTactical Problem in Iraq: at the Soldier-level

The guerrillas attacking our men in Iraq live there. They can intrude into homes and use buildings for ambush cover and concealment.

Americans are trying to create a condition of open-ness where its safe to move OVERTLY, to walk down a street safely without fear.

Light infantry, a man with a weapon in his hand, equipment on his body---can move very paranoid from cover-to-cover IN TIME OF WAR. In war, you cannot afford to be caught in enemy fire as light infantry so you "hug" every scrap of concealment and cover you can find. You fire pre-emptively at suspected enemy positions to compensate again for your absolute requirement not to receive ANY enemy fire.

We are not in a war where all pretensions of normalcy are off and you act as paranoid as possible.

6. Weak Vehicles = "Spray 'n Pray"

We are in a stability and support operation (SASO).

This means we have to operate in the open so others can. The problem is we are using light infantry without light tracked AFVs or light infantry in thin trucks on rubber tires which from the get-go are 28% less space/weight efficient and thus protected than light tracks. Armored HMMWVs have 4 windows, 4 doors, a large windshield, and roll on air-filled rubber tires easily penetrated by enemy bullets, RPGs, explosions and god forbid, molotov cocktail flame weapons. When we move overtly using vulnerable trucks and the enemy ambushes us we cannot "shrug off" the enemy fire because it it becomes effective it riddles our bodies and soft-skin vehicles making dead and burning metal hulks. So we return fire in all directions using fire as a "shield" aka Somalia. As we kill innocent civilians we alienate them against the U.S. and make new enemies who want revenge for their father, mother, sisters and brothers killed in blind retaliation of somebody else's ambush (Group B). Group A people become Group B rebels.

The above picture shows an Army Soldier trying to point through the window of an "up-armored" HMMWV a M4 5.56mm carbine. Even the shorter weapon doesn't enable the Soldier inside a HMMWV to hold his weapon to eye level to see and aim properly---at best its spray & pray!

This is again, why we need light tracked AFVs, so we can avoid having to use fire as indiscriminate 360 directional shields and focus our fires at positively identified bad guys. This is what I mean by our light infantry having a "glass jaw" when it is on foot and uses wheeled vehicles.

7. Better COIN Tactics

Troops are getting blown up IN CONVOYS FROM BASE CAMPS TO AND FROM THE PATROL AREA. Let's not confuse transportation with patrolling.

THE VEHICLE THEY SHOULD USE TO GET TO THE PATROL AREA SHOULD BE A WINDOWLESS TRACKED M113 GAVIN not a window and door vulnerable HMMWV rolling on air-filled rubber tires.

Once they are in the patrol area they dismount from their vehicles be it HMMWVs, go-carts, Strykers or M113 Gavins and interact on foot with locals.

There are COST and TIME factors. The Army does not have thousands of Bradleys. The Army DOES have thousands of M113 Gavins suited to this task that can be rapidly and inexpensively used at 3.5 mpg fuel rate for this task. The heavier Bradley has a 1 mpg fuel rate even if we had thousands available is too much of a cost. The more fuel our vehicles use, the more vulnerable convoys needed to refuel them. One M113 Gavin at 3.5 mpg beats two armored HMMWVs at roughly the same 5 mpg fuel rate.

We are also not convinced the BFV is better protected than M113 Gavin because its fuel tank is in the middle and the M113A3's fuel tanks are at the rear outsides. While the BFV hull is twice as thick as a Gavin, its loaded with ammo and fuel in a turret that can be easily set off in an explosion penetrating the hull. You can easily add outside racks to the Gavin and add beaucoup sandbags like the IDF does to get an absorbative layer for roadside bombs.

The fact that a unified hull armored vehicle does not have windows does not mean the people inside are blind. We are talking about the body of the vehicle not having any weak points that blasts can penetrate through. The troops in windowless armored vehicles ride WITH THEIR HEADS OUT FROM TOP HATCHES. If they are correctly equipped in M113 Gavins we have GUNSHIELDS (Strykers and Bradleys do not have these) that protect their face, necks, upper torsos as they look out from their vehicles AS THEY GO TO AND FROM THEIR BASE CAMP TO THEIR FOOT PATROL AREA.

Those are the horns of the dilemma upon which this discussion - and American policy - rest. So, the question is, which theory of the war should we follow. However, I think that our military history reflects a clear preference for the naive wheeled vehicle way which will increase the daily number of casualties beyong the current 540 dead and over 10,000 wounded. There is however, a very good way of doing basic COunter-INsurgency (COIN) tactics better by using light tracks and good tactics. However, we've never really tried - in good faith, across the board - this way, and what little historical evidence there is suggests that success is possible.

Think back to Somalia. Before the mission changed. We had made some good progress in settling things down, the Army and marines were respected because THEY WERE IN FORCE IN TRACKS, so they didn't have to bludgeon the people to achieve it. Here is where tracked "tank" intimidation" helped. I know one of the BN COs who served in Mogadishu then - they were making progress. Instead of going after Aideed, we ought to have figured a way to make him - or at least his tactics - irrelevant because the people didn't want that sort of life. Or not, and that would have been instructive as well.

We are literally strong enough when we are in tracked "tanks" that we don't always need to break things to prove it. Sometimes strength is proven in what we choose not to do, or the price we are willing to pay to do the things we choose. We have gone to Iraq to give them freedom - let's show them what freedom really tastes like. Here is a good place to start to get a sense of the theory of warfare I am working towards. I am not saying that I take his idea wholesale, but it is one component. Here is the link:

http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/trinquier/trinquier.asp#52

Our ideas are also supported by (in no particular order of relevance):

-Martin Van Crevald: "The Transformation of War" why we are in a 4th Generation War (4GW)
-marine corps "Small Wars" Manual
-Rifleman Dodd
-Various histories of the CAP
-USMC Evans Carlson: "Twins Stars of China"
-Various histories of the marine Raiders
-Mao: various
-Sun Tzu (attack the enemy where he is weak: where is the insurgent weak? with the people, because he does not have their full support: "attack" there)
-A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic, Martin and Lender
-Decisive Engagements, Westad
-Extensive research in Vietnam infantry and airmobile infantry memoirs
-The Army and Vietnam, Krepinevich
-A Viet Cong Memoir, Troung Nhu Tang
-Various histories of the Balkan Wars of the 1990s
-On Future War
-PREPARING FOR ASYMMETRY: AS SEEN THROUGH THE LENS OF JOINT VISION 2020, Melissa Applegate

Finally, I believe in time that the proper understanding of these events will be to reckon them as "The Insurgent Wars". That's what Al Qaeda and other "terrorist" organizations are, transnational insurgents. (I put terrorist in quotes because I would prefer to accord them more respect - their tactics are irregular, they are pushing the bounds of war, but in many respects they represent a legitimate political force.) I think we'll reduce the problem of terrorism far more if we consider the problem as insurgencies coming from various socio-political-economic forces and how do we deal with that. The "terrorist" actions will whither on the vine and become what we have here - crime. Mostly, our lives here are fairly secure - we have no real insurgents, the biggest problem of that sort is crime. And the media notwithstanding, most of us live a life free from it - that's why we're not backing anything politically radical. Bad, bad crime is a signal that you might have a larger political problem looming. It is proto or incipient insurgency, and below a certain point the police handle it, but it awaits that watershed event or critical mass of discontent to turn over to a fully fledged insurgency. That is, the problems lie in what causes the insurgency, what populates the "gangs" with new members - that is essentially what we need to do: reduce the flow of volunteers to the point that the organizations are irrelevant.

WHAT SHOULD THE U.S. ARMY DO NOW TO PREVAIL ON THE NLB?

We urge the active Army to immediately prepare 250 M113A2 Gavins from storage and weld/bolt external storage racks as Army Combat Engineers did for the war phase, paint them tan and send with a mobile training team to Iraq to replace 500 HMMWV trucks that would be parked and not used to transport personnel.

One as-is M113A2 Gavins with sandbags and external storage racks are far better protection for our Soldiers than two "new" up-armored HMMWV trucks for $500,000, and are available TODAY to save lives and limbs not 2 years from now

The National Guard on the other hand, has two Heavy Brigades going to Iraq, that OWN OVER 235, mostly modernized M113A3 Gavin-type light tracked AFVs that are modernized combat-ready NOW and should stand up and act like adult men not wimpy wannabes; and have these life-saving vehicles sent to Iraq. If the NG is not willing to think for itself and act like adult, non-weak, co-dependant men to protect its own troops; then it truly deserves to be looked down on as 3rd string, second-class Soldiers. The NG had a chance to field the first Airborne units in 1940 and chickened out; so going along with the active army wheeled bullshit would be going along with its loser tradition. In the '80s when the active Army went with mega heavy armored vehicles, the NG jumped like Pavlovian lap-dogs. Now in the 2000s, the pendulum of knee-jerk reaction to a lack of professional understanding of the modern battlefield has swung the other way; the active army now wants to play wannabe Delta Force "shooters" who are too "light" and the NG is foaming at the mouth to get several thousand "up-armored HMMWV trucks" when if it were smart and had some male testosterone would have used its M113 Gavin light tracked AFVs as air-delivered contingency forces back in the '90s and beat the active army to the punch for a change and lead the way instead of being dismal loser, followers. The NG could have shown the active army how to "transform" in a matter of weaks with greater capabilities at lower costs. But no, that would require LEADing----actually blazing a new path and standing on the feet of your own understanding---its too easy to follow the active army and hang by its apron strings, drinking from the taxpayer's watering hole.

Congress should submit emergency supplemental budget legislation to up-armor and up-engine another 250 M113A2s into either M113A3s with bigger diesel engines or M113A4s with hybrid-electric drives/band-tracks, both would have off-the-shelf, combat proven RPG spaced armor, underbelly armor, and gunshields to stand up from the vehicle and maintain 360 degree vigilance. The Army program to make M1068 Command Post and FIST-V M113s into hybrid-electric drive is already underway...all we are saying is expand this effort to 250 baseline M113 troop-carriers to create the world's first stealthy AFV force for on-going Iraq/Afghanistan combat. See APPENDIX B for details. HE M113A4 Gavins have an added benefit of driver and Track Commander (TC) placed farther back in vehicle center away from a blast if a track runs over a landmine. A "V" shaped inner wall could be placed around the driver/TC to add further inner-bulkhead armor protection. Costs to upgrade 500 M113 Gavins to overmatching protection/mobility capabilities against the threat are significantly less than the current inadequate HMMWV armoring plan.

If Army officials do not act in the above way to save the lives of their own Soldiers then Congress should hold public hearings into why the U.S. Army refuses to protect its men in Iraq/Afghanistan with the many M113 Gavin light tracked AFVs it has and persists on wasting taxpayer money while losing American lives and limbs on make-shift wheeled vehicle alterations that they know don't work now and will increasingly fail as the enemy adapts.

APPENDIX A

M113s are simple to operate and maintain. You could train a Soldier in a week quite well. You don't have 1 DA or civilian contractor per company running around like in SBCTs. The class IX is already in our supply system. The M113 is a multi-purpose vehicle: CSS, INF, ENG, MED. If you want to understand urban ops with a permissive and non-permissive environment blurring, and how to operate in it, look at Israel which operates thousands of up-armored M113s and doesn't lose a man a day in combat operations like we are in Iraq. Things Israelis know:

• New engine and transmission: provides 30% more horsepower, a 'glow plug' feature?, eliminates the pivot steer and transfer gear case assemblies, has far better reliability, and acceleration greater than the Bradley.
• It is equipped with T-150 track which delivers five times the durability of the current M113 track and five times the useable track life of the M2/3. Rubber "band track" is also available.
• Spall liners have been installed to 'catch' the spall from the interior armor wall in the event of an armor penetration by light anti-tank weapons such as the RPG. This liner prevents the killing effects of spall, interior fires, or explosions enhancing overall troop and vehicle survivability.
• Appliqué armor mounting provisions has been incorporated into the overall design giving the Gavin the ability to adapt its armor package to meet any expect threat. The Gavins basic armor provides crew protection far exceeding that of the armored HMMWV and the Stryker armored vehicle.
• New mine underbelly armor has been added, which has a demonstrated ability to withstand 22 pounds (10 Kg.) of TNT in extensive testing Belly armor kits were procured for operations in Bosnia/Kosovo, and variations of it have been available since Vietnam. Belly Armor Kit: Cage No. 80212, P/N 4240277
• Similarly, the M113A3 Gavin can mount a gun-shield kit* for the gunner's protection, other "ACAV" gunshields for Soldiers at the cargo hatch, and has been available for thirty years:
• Driver's seat: crushable (impact absorption) for protection against mines.
• Yoke steering has been added to eliminate the laterals for more precise steering. Full axis steer capable, the A3/4 Gavin has the ability to turn completely around in its own length which is a highly desirable feature in urban combat. As a comparison the Stryker armored car must pull forward and back up 22 times to perform the same maneuver.
• External fuel tanks eliminate fuel fires inside the vehicle.
• Smoke grenade launchers for survivability and escape and evasion capability.
• Driver's night vision device (AN/VVS-2) has been incorporate to give the crew and alternative to the active infra-red night vision device currently used which actively sends a signal across the battlefield easily identifying its location to the enemy.
• Upgraded four battery electrical system with a 200 Amp alternator for better cold starts, longer "silent watch" capability, and the ability to accommodate the Army's digitization initiatives.
• Modernized personnel heaters, water ration heaters, and improved stowage provisions for crew comfort and logistical support.

The Army has thousands of war-stock M113 Gavins, [See below where are the Army's unused M113 Gavins?]  44 could be converted to Engineer Cavalry "ECAV" war standards to immediately supply the Army's units now getting clobbered in Iraq. Heavy Engineers already know how to use M113-type AFVs. Costs to modify to ECAV standards would be in the $500,000 per vehicle price range that exceeds what would require two $250K up-armored HMMWVs. America's Army needs the M113 Gavin today in Iraq and future urban combats because it uniquely allows infantry to fight heads-out behind armor and gunshields for 360 degree awareness. The Army's Center for Lessons Learned reports after combat in Panama: