South Korean Semi-Plastic Infantry Tank: Puts our Bradley to shame--if it works

The light South Korean NIFV/XK-21 can:

1. Swim WITHOUT A SWIM SKIRT just like a M113 Gavin can--just using a trim vane and side pontoons

2. Is more mobile over soft and steep terrain than the heavier Bradley but not the lighter M113 Gavin

3. Has 40mm autocannon firepower superior to the Bradley

4. Survivability IS a question mark--its an semi-composite (plastic) tank. Will it burn if hit? Will it survive years of field use without cracking? Half of it is aluminum alloy so perhaps this will not be a problem.

www.asiafinest.com/forum/lofiversion/index.php/t81088-50.html

At 25 ton combat weight, NIFV is on the lighter side of IFV family of vehicles. The developers, however, boast that the NIFV, due to its use of carbon fiber armor material, offers equal protection as the heavier vehicles. The base frame and the lower portions of the hull are constructed of aluminum alloy. The upper portion of the hull is made out of carbon-fiber material reinforced by ceramic plating in key vital areas. The forward section is said to be capable of defending against 30mm armor-piercing rounds, and the side and the rear capable of offering protection against 14.5mm machinegun fire.

5. Turrets smother infantry in the back = "Bradley" Disease

If we were the South Koreans, we'd remove the turret and place the 40mm autocannon in the hull and reduce its silhouette drastically. 15 degrees left or right and 20 degree elevation is enough and use S-tank aiming by turning entire hull towards target. Infantry out of open hatches and remote weapon systems provide 360 degree security from close-in attack with rifles and machine guns.

The NIFV/XK-21 shows the South Koreans value mobility more than we do. It shows they are men of action and we are BS racketeer talkers.

We should put a 25 to 40mm autocannon and larger cannon in the hull or in remote weapons mounts of high technology upgraded M113 Gavins for both "female" infantry-carrying and "male" fire support light tanks

OTHER NIFV videos:

www.youtube.com/watch?v=4se_9WrWyPw

www.youtube.com/watch?v=zVwzJR9z9S8

American 27-ton FCS Network Fantasy: Mental Replaces the Physical?

"This is a game of wits and will. You've got to be learning and adapting constantly to survive."

---Former U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General Peter Schoomaker, Uber Light Infantry Narcissist and Big Army Racketeer speaking words he failed to live by

The Army of foot and truck victims Schoomaker wanted

BREAKING NEWS!

OFFICIAL U.S. ARMY DOCUMENT: Army General Officers don't need any stinkin' analysis!

EXCERPT from Chapter 5 "Army Force Development", page 39: this captures how the Army generates "requirements":

"The new joint and Army concept development processes have changed to become top-down driven."

Basically, you will see an opportunity for a general officer to insert his vision (a "good idea") and how the rest of the Army is then obligated to make it happen...reality and facts be damned...

"How the Army Runs" an "untitled paper" from TRADOC circa 2005 (see above) institutionalizes no analysis programs, shows a preference for top-down general officer (GO) wish lists without factual examination; the process should not allow one individual to decide issues based on their prejudices on things like derogatory labeling like "cold war" or the urge to make some radical change to make a name for himself when what we already have might be best ie; M113 Gavin light tracks; Planet Earth and the laws of physics don't care about how many times the earth has revolved around the sun something has existed, this is something stupid avant garde' humans do that has no bearing at all on what a thing is capable of doing.

GOs should focus on the concepts required and let the true facts drive what specific equipment is used (Stryker trucks cause we want to be seen in wheels), otherwise he states his equipment demand sans analysis and those underneath scramble to give him what he wants by dishonestly cherry picking some minor silver lining while ignoring the cloud of failings, distorting data or outright lying.

Who will save the U.S. Army From Itself?

GAO/IDA Report on Army Modularity Plan's "mini-brigades"

www.combatreform.org/gao05926modularity.pdf

www.combatreform.org/gao05-926modularitysummary.pdf

Congressional Budget Office Report on better Army Modularity Options

www.combatreform.org/20050510_CBO_OptionsforRestructuringtheArmy.pdf

Congressional Research Service Modular Brigade Report

www.combatreform.org/CRSModularBrigadeReport.pdf

POOR QUANTITY: Winslow Wheeler on Army modularity plan: "force castration" weakens the force QUANTITATIVELY

Advocates in the Army talk at great length about the plan, called "Modularization," to allegedly expand the number of Army and Reserve brigades from 66 to 77 and to make these "brigade combat teams," no longer divisions, the primary level of command to fight twenty-first century warfare.

They talk a little less about how this plan will actually shrink the Army's actual combat forces. This apparent goal is achieved by reducing the number of ground combat maneuver battalions in each brigade, now generally three, to two in most new formations. Thus, while the number of brigade headquarters will increase by 11.5% (from 66 to 77), the number of actual combat units in the form of maneuver battalions will reduce from 201 to 161, or by 20%.

This force castration, under the guise of "reform," is critiqued at some length in a new study from the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA). The reduction in maneuver battalions is hardly the only problem with this plan the analysts at IDA found. A short commentary on this plan is now posted at the website for the Straus Military Reform Project at www.cdi.org/smrp.

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September 29, 2005

U.S. Army Take on Military Reform: More Tail, Less Tooth

Under the guise of modernization, the Army is in the process of shrinking its combat forces and enlarging its headquarters overhead to meet existing manpower ceilings.

At considerable effort and expense, the Army is reorganizing its combat formations. Called "modularization," the plan is to expand the number of combat brigades from 66 to 77 in the active duty and reserve components. These new "brigade combat teams," no longer divisions, will constitute the primary level of command to fight 21st century warfare.

It sounds like a reasonable reform - until you scratch the surface.

The expansion of brigades is accompanied by a reduction in the ground combat battalions (the units that actually do the fighting) each brigade will command. These "maneuver battalions" will be reduced to two, in a few cases three, per brigade. This is down from their normal three, sometimes four, maneuver battalions per brigade. Specifically, while the number of brigade headquarters will increase by 11.5 percent (from 66 to 77), the number of maneuver battalions in them will shrink from 201 to 161, or by 20 percent.

The new castrated brigades also have other potential disadvantages. Some plausibly fear they will be able to sustain only limited combat because there will be only two battalions to rotate into reserve or rest, not three or more. Others point out the "reform" will further stress our already overextended forces in Iraq: the pint-sized brigades will require larger manpower deployments to maintain a constant level of combat power.

All this, and quite a bit more that is highly critical of the Army's "Modularization," is explained in an analysis performed at the Institute for Defense Analyses for the Army. IDA is a highly respected federally funded research organization that performs work for the Defense Department, and in this case the Army. These unclassified documents have not previously been available to the public. Visitors to this website who wish to discuss or review these documents should contact the Director of the Straus Military Reform Project, Winslow Wheeler, at wwheeler@cdi.org.

# # #
Winslow Wheeler
Visiting Senior Fellow

Source:

www.army.mil/fcs/index.html

1. 27-ton FCS medium tank too light for open terrain combat, too heavy for closed terrain mobility or air transport, having it shown coming out the back of a C-130 is a lie

2. Its no surprise the one-size-for-all 16.5 ton weight was exceeded because of TURRETS and their inherent inefficiency; however the M8 Buford/Thunderbolt could have a turret and 105mm/120mm guns and still remain C-130 air transportable; something has to give--instead of making the hard choices the FCS racketeers chose to make their tank heavier with gadgets rather than rethink their flawed approach

3. Notice if you try the absurd video game that a FCS can't SWIM and needs a bridge that the enemy conveniently doesn't explode underneath it, FCS developers must have never cracked a book on the battle of Arnhem or ever read anything about Corinth canal in WW2; "swimming is not a FCS requirement" will be the BS excuse

4. Weak physicalism based on computers turning enemy into video game icon to destroy

5. Unmanned robots more weakness taking place of human machine powers

6. Spitting out lots of expensive sensors as bread crumbs to hopefully create video game effect is not likely to work; sensors need to be watched to prevent tampering/spoofing

This is a giant racketeering enterprise by the Army and corrupt corporations to $$ squeeze money from Congress.

By Major Daniel L. Davis, U.S. Army

The U.S. Army is the most modem, powerful and technically advanced ground combat force on earth. In order to maintain its advantage over potential foes well into the future, the Army created the concept of the Future Combat Systems (FCS) family of vehicles.

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ARMY MODERNIZATION

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But $4.6 billion and two years into the program, the FCS effort is further from its target production date than when it started, and its projected budget has ballooned from $92 billion to $125 billion (plus an additional $35 billion needed to "network" the various systems).

Far more troubling, however, is the growing realization that the "system of systems," as it is called, will not perform some of the most critical functions for which it was created and, if fielded in its present design, might lay the groundwork for defeat of the U.S. Army on a future battlefield.

FCS, as currently designed, is fatally flawed. Before pumping more funds into the program, Army officials should consider an alternate transformation program with principal components already validated by combat experience.

CORE OF FUTURE FORCE

FCS, as described on the Army's Web site, is "a joint networked system of systems. Future Combat Systems are connected via an advanced network architecture that will enable levels of joint connectivity, situational awareness and understanding, and synchronized operations heretofore unachievable. ... FCS is the core building block of the Army's Future Force. FCS will improve the strategic deployability and operational maneuver capability of ground combat formations without sacrificing lethality or survivability."

The system of systems involved in the FCS program is described as 18+ 1 + 1, which refers to 18 mechanical systems, plus the network, plus the Soldier.

In theory, the concept that gave rise to FCS is impressive. If its designers' goals could be achieved, FCS would combine eight manned systems (a "light tank" variant, troop carrier, command vehicle, four unmanned systems(armed robotic vehicle, ground sensors, etc.), four classes of unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) and two classes of smart munitions. These elements would be linked through a central communications network providing broadband-caliber connectivity to enable maps, photographs, graphics, enemy information and other data to be sent and received in real time by every node in the network. Ostensibly, this unparalleled degree of connectivity would allow American forces to attack and destroy enemy positions from safe havens far beyond the ability of the enemy to pinpoint or strike, reducing the need for robust armor protection.

That's the theory. But it doesn't square with a recent, independent analysis of the system and ongoing combat experience.

CRITICAL FINDINGS

At a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee in March, Paul Francis, the Government Accountability Office's director for acquisition and sourcing management, delivered a report on the state of FCS that contained a number of findings highly critical of the program. Here are five of them:

* FCS' advanced network architecture faces significant technical challenges that threaten the schedule for fielding some future force capabilities and makes their ultimate ability to perform uncertain.

* An estimated 34 million lines of software code need to be generated for FCS (about double that for the Joint Strike Fighter).

* Only one of more than 50 advanced technologies needed for FCS to function is mature.

* C-130 transport aircraft can carry FCS vehicles' original projected weight of 19 tons only 5 percent of the time. (The Army recently agreed to a weight of 24 tons for the vehicles, acknowledging that the 19-ton goal is not technologically feasible.)

* We don't know enough about the program's variables to conclude that the FCS program, as laid out, can be achieved, let alone completed within a predictable time frame and budget constraints.

In light of these shortcomings, it seems prudent that Army officials should search for alternatives to their FCS acquisition strategy. That so many critical, high-tech components of the system remain unproven throws open to question whether this system is the right one - at least right now - for the future Army.

FUTURE FIGHTS

Even if the system functioned perfectly, the network was flawless and the vehicles light enough for air transport, FCS is being de-signed specifically so it does not have to engage in close combat. With their lighter armor, none of the manned systems will be capable of engaging in direct-fire engagements with enemy tanks or withstanding coordinated assaults by ground forces armed with anti-tank weapons.

Virtually all military analysts agree that future wars are likely to be fought in urban terrain - in cities. Even if we have perfect knowledge of where enemy forces are and which buildings they are holding, there will still be a requirement to send in ground troops to engage them.

What would happen if an FCS-equipped force were directed to fight in a large, Baghdad-like city in a future war? This hypothetical question can be answered quite authoritatively.

In 1995, Russian forces moved on the Chechen capital city of Grozny. The Russians were equipped with T80 and T72 tanks and BMP armored troop carriers. The defenders of Grozny were equipped with a handful of tanks and anti-aircraft weapons, but primarily with hand grenades, AK47 assault weapons and variants of rocket-propelled grenade anti-tank weapons

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PIC of FCS

"Future Combat Systems vehicles will be lightly armored because they are not designed for close combat - a notion that may be unrealistic."

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An article in the Summer 1999 issue of Parameters, by Timothy L. Thomas, described what happened when lightly armored tanks and personnel carriers engaged in urban combat against an enemy equipped with even "basic" RPG-7s:

"The first unit to penetrate to the city center was the 1st battalion of the 131st "Maikop" Brigade, composed of some 1,000 Soldiers. By January 3, 1995, the brigade had I lost nearly 800 men, 20 of 26 tanks, and 102 of 120 armored vehicles."

Compare that with the U.S. 3^rd Infantry Division report of its 2003 combat operations in Iraq: "The M1 Abrams tank led the attacking columns of U.S. forces through urban areas and was successful in producing a strong shock effect against defending forces. M1s and M2s were attacked with small arms, BMP 30mm and 73mm cannons, T72 125mm rounds, numerous ADA [air-defense artillery] systems and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) without suffering the catastrophic loss of a single crew member." .

The Russian brigade lost 800 men in three days of urban combat; in contrast, according to the 3^rd Infantry Division's after-action report

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PIC of Chinese Type 96 Heavy tanks

Nearly all Chinese tanks are equipped with a cannon systems that can penetrate the hull of the vehicles planned for the Army's Future Combat Systems.

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in almost a year the U.S. unit lost none as a result of penetration of a tank because of the level of armor protection on the fighting platforms.

POTENTIAL ENEMIES

Four countries - China, North Korea, Iran and Syria - present the most likely potential threats to the United States. Of these, China is the most dangerous and capable.

Any combat system we develop must be able to withstand the risk posed by the greatest potential threat we face. Therefore, let's consider how FCS would measure up against threats posed by China.

If U.S. Soldiers in an FCS-equipped force were directed to intervene in a war between China and Taiwan, they would likely be defeated by Chinese ground forces. This conclusion takes into consideration the impressive benefits the U.S. force would gain from air and naval support Although this assertion is certain to raise some eyebrows, a recent analysis of the capabilities of an FCS-equipped force and the force China will likely have in the near future reaches this disturbing conclusion.

According to Richard Fisher, vice president of the International Assessment and Strategy Center, China continues to make improvements in its conventional forces that are specifically designed to counter the advantages that would otherwise accrue to an FCS-equipped force.

"While we are building lighter and more mobile armored vehicles, China is building heavier and stronger armor", Fisher points out "According to government study, the Chinese should have over 1,200 T96 tanks operational by the end of this year. The T96 is a vast improvement to the T72 in terms of both armor protection and firepower."

Virtually every tank in the Chinese inventory packs a cannon system that can penetrate the hull of every vehicle contemplated under FCS. If we had to engage China, we would need to load the front end of the ground force with the Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles; it would be suicidal to attack with an FCS-style force.

But what about the stated advantage of FCS using standoff, extended-range engagements made possible by the new information-sharing network?

"What the Chinese are most interested in is defeating the 7th Fleet," according to Fisher. "To win, they don't have to destroy the fleet, but to blind it. To do that, they currently have operational SRBMs [short-range ballistic missiles] with non-nuclear, electro-magnetic pulse [EMP] warheads. If they blanket an area over the fleet, it could devastate their electronics and communications. If they've got 'weaponized' SRBMs, then they've likely also got EMP mortars and grenades."

The significance of this observation for an FCS equipped force is that if an EMP device was fired near the central node, the entire network could be wiped out.

This is not an insignificant consideration. As Brig. Gen. Charles A Cartwright, deputy director for the Army Research, Development and Engineering Command, pointed out in a New York Times article in March, "If [the FCS network] does not work, the Future Combat System will fail." If FCS fails in combat, men will die.

Fortunately, there is an alternative to FCS - one that is far less expensive, more capable and directly engineered to meet evolving threats from potential adversaries. It's not some new armored vehicle, though; rather, it's a call to embrace warfighting concept that closely parallels some of the organizational developments we see in Iraq.

First publicly advanced in retired Col. Douglas A. Macgregor's 1997 book "Breaking the Phalanx" (published years before the FCS concept was developed), an alternative "system of systems" solution exists in the equipment troops use today.

Virtually all of the Army's major fighting platforms either already incorporate or can be upgraded with the latest technological developments. More significantly, they would derive most of their new utility and effectiveness primarily from being cast in new organizations designed to maximize their combat effectiveness.

Under Macgregor's plan, the Army would immediately transform its fighting formations from the brigades, divisions and corps we have used since World Wars I and II to "battlegroups" of 3,000 to 5,000 Soldiers and standing joint task force organizations. Not totally unlike the Unit of Action and Unit of Engagement concept being pursued by the Army today. Macgregor's plan would initially incorporate weapons systems that are proving their worth on battlefields today: M1 tanks, M2/3 Bradley fighting vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles, space-based platforms, attack helicopters, indirect-fire systems, etc. And, yes, there would even be room for Strykers. [EDITOR: BS. We have no room or need for road bound trucks moving infantry into roadside bomb ambushes]

40-ton Sensible FCS No Longer Pursued by the U.S. Army

www.youtube.com/watch?v=oxba0ynu_yk

There just wouldn't be any expectation that, at least for a few decades, these tried-and-true fighting systems might be replaced by a "do-all" FCS family. Funds that are being pumped into the FCS program would be used, instead, to develop the revolutionary fighting systems that will, one day, replace those being used in Iraq.

A year ago, during testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Macgregor explained how his original plan could be adapted to meet the Army's current needs: "In a period when rapid obsolescence is a high risk, 'wildcatting' with new [weapon system] designs, even aggressively courting failure with limited numbers of prototypes is absolutely necessary. The Army transformational methodology should be: Look forward to the next technology we can exploit that will help. Field it incorporate weapon systems that in limited quantities to the force. Play with it. Test it. Develop new operational, organizational and doctrinal modes for it. Feed that back into building the next based platforms, capability [again and again]. This means going through a rigorous process of experimentation in order to reach the goal of sustained military superiority."

At this point you're probably wondering, if this plan is so good, why wasn't it implemented instead of FCS years ago? There isn't a simple answer, but its rejection was probably due, at least partly, to a clash of personalities.

Macgregor can be quite pointed in his criticisms of those who disagree with his positions and of those who he felt lacked the knowledge needed to carry out the duties of their positions, particularly general officers. That isn't the way to advance in the officer ranks, as Macgregor ultimately found.

But recall that, in early 1991 when so many others were warning of large numbers of American casualties in the pending war to expel Iraq from Kuwait, Macgregor correctly predicted that American armor would quickly cut through the Iraqis and crush them. Also, according to Rowan Scarborough's book "Rumsfeld's War," well before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Macgregor correctly predicted that fewer combat troops would be needed than in earlier operations. Further, and more critically, Macgregor asserted that the answers to stability in post-Saddam Iraq were to avoid disbanding the Iraqi army, and to immediately appoint Iraqis to the interim government. In short, Macgregor has been right before.

So we should pay particular attention to his testimony before Congress in July 2004, in which he outlined the shortcomings of FCS - observations that were echoed the following March by the GAO's Francis.

Perhaps the best response to transforming the force that will fight our nation's future wars involves adopting ideas raised in the past. We should acknowledge inherent weaknesses of the current FCS development program and set it aside as a system. In its place, we should explore the best ways of integrating the viable tenets of Macgregor's ideas with several of the promising, truly revolutionary developments in the FCS program, such as the unmanned air and ground sensors and the advanced defensive suites being designed for some vehicles. To get the ball rolling, Congress should commission a study on Macgregor's ideas to accurately and impartially evaluate their potential worth in light of contemporary challenges.

It wouldn't be surprising to find that Macgregor's ideas, perhaps like the man, were just a bit ahead of their time.

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Maj. Daniel L. Davis is an Army armor officer who fought in the Battle of 73 Easting, the largest tank battle of Operation Desert Storm

P.S. if your last complaint against the M8 Buford/Thunderbolt AGS light tank is that it has an autoloader, how hard would it be to NOT install it in the turret and just weld storage racks for more rounds and a seat for a 18-21 year old young buck Soldier to "autoload" with biomechanical means? Let's get our foot-in-the-door here amidst the absurd wheeled armored car, thinks-its-penny-pinching Army, and if we need to we can easily undo the autoloader if it will make things better.

If we want to defend places like Taiwan, the U.S. Army had better break out its M113 Gavin light tanks and supply them immediately to its light infantry Delta Weapons companies and get our own Air-Mech-Strike capabilities ASAP.

So why doesn't the U.S. Army and marines do these things to be high quality "Light" infantry? The Curse of (Garrison) Line Infantry: where does it come from?

Other countries like Australia have M113 Gavins + light infantry without feeling their penises have fallen off, why not the U.S.?

THE THREE STAGES OF TRUTH

"All truth passes through three stages. First, it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed, and third, it is accepted as self-evident."

--German philosopher, Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860)

It would appear to be an indelible human trait that the "truth" about all issues goes through three distinct phases known colloquially as "the three stages of truth". During the first stage, the issue goes unnoticed and is ignored. The second stage is characterised by a period of vehement denial. The third stage witnesses the the truth about the issue being recognised as self evident.

Examples of this sort of thing a legion. Thus for example, five hundred years ago contemporary Western (meaning European) society believed that the Earth was flat and at the centre of the Universe and anyone who had the temerity to suggest otherwise was invariably burnt at the stake. It wasn't until the Magellan expedition's circumnavigation of the globe in 1522 that the reality of a round Earth was finally acknowledged as being "self evident".

The reason why "truth" goes through these three stages is that humans in general are very reluctant to give up their beliefs as to the nature of reality because they have invested a lifetime of expense and effort in arriving at those beliefs. Acknowledging that their perception of reality may no longer be applicable in the light of new evidence usually presents humans with the uncomfortable choice of dispensing with a paradigm that they are used to - and which has probably worked quite satisfactorily to date - in favour of a something new and yet to be properly defined. Few humans have the courage or strength of character to pursue such a course of action, as it usually results in considerable personal discomfit associated with a lack of supporting structures around new ideas and a fear of the unknown, not to mention the vociferous ridicule by their contemporaries towards anything new. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that those who question society's prevailing orthodoxy are by definition dissenters who, by "rocking the boat", tend to threaten the very lifestyle and comfort of all around them who hold to the prevailing orthodox position. It is for this reason why dissenters have been relentlessly pursued and persecuted throughout history by their contemporaries.

We began this web page with the premise that the U.S. Army and marines WANT TO BE GOOD LIGHT INFANTRY. The sad fact is they do not want to be light infantry they want to be LINE INFANTRY. Using pack mules, bikes, carts, light M113 Gavin tracks etc. would cut into their garrison BS narcisso-ego time. In other words, it would take EFFORT on their part and they would have to CHANGE THEMSELVES and apply some humility which as we alluded earlier, they generally have none of.

Recently, we were asked where does the U.S. Army's Light infantry divisions come from with their absurd hard-headed refusal to even light mechanize in light to medium tracked tanks? If you don't want to read through the power point slides below, we offer you a down & dirty history of the U.S. Line Infantry mentality.

Rather than give the questioner the trite "official" answer that Light Infantry Divisions (LIDs) were created in the early 1980s to fit on x amount of C-141A/B Starlifter jet transport sorties to reinforce Europe by fighting in closed terrain "not passable to tanks" after the Societ tank armies invaded so they had to forgo organic ground vehicles yadda yadda yadda, we have thought long and hard because the question also applies to all of the USMC infantry units, too.

Here is what we think the actual truth is:

1. Infantry that moves slowly on foot comes from the CIVIL WAR (19th century) to create linear formations to fight set-piece battles in the Napoleonic nation-state vs. nation-state mode.

2. We have LINE infantry because we WANT TO HAVE line infantry.

3. We want line infantry because it is simple and allows us to have GARRISON activities (BS = bull shit).

If we created a MOBILE infantry, the time needed to play GARRISON spit 'n polish, "From Here to Eternity", lawn and building care, parade ground ceremonies would have to be devoted instead to our MOBILITY MOUNTS and not self-worship. We want line infantry so we can have GARRISON BS.

We are in the 21st Century with a 19th Century military organization, culture and weak narcissistic egomaniac population. As you will see, the U.S. military has NEVER properly adapted and exploited the tank (mech) and the airplane. We are two centuries behind already.

Here is how its progressed over time:

1860 Civil War--------------------->WW1-------------------->WW2 1940

Despite creating a MOBILE infantry (Cavalry on horses) to defeat the Indians after the Civil War, we kept the LINE infantry that could advance in lines or entrench into lines, hitting its zenith in WW1's carnage. "Soldiering" was not that technologically complex and we could stab each other in the back all day long with GARRISON "From Here to Eternity" crap. Everything was shiny to be visible from a distance and polishing kept the troops busy. The mobile warfare folks in love with the HORSE forgot that it was MOBILITY that counted and refused to mechanize with machines to get it.

The failure to understand the battle against the earth (TBATE) loses wars; in 1940 the Allies ASS U MEd the Ardennes forest was not passable by German light tanks and had no Maginot line forts there. The Germans poured through and France fell within weeks and the British were forced from the continent.

Germany panzers primarily in excellent Czech-built T35/T38 Light Tanks Swarm through Ardennes Forests Allies Thought were "No-GO" terrain

www.youtube.com/watch?v=g4MD3-fzglM

PART 2: light tanks gobble up Poland, Stukas help with CAS, France, Germans concentrate all their light tanks in 200 mile frontage to bust through Ardennes forests, main battle tank BS, still LIGHT tanks, Panzer IV are infantry fire support role, leadership on the scene to exploit fast-moving situations, attack a village: commanders able to decide how/when to do it, GFAC liaison officer radios to Stuka pilots where to attack,

Yet a year later, the Germans not yet fully tracked mechanized and with many wheeled trucks and no Airborne 3D to act as cavalry ahead of the main body falls short of Moscow due to severe winter mud and snow---and Russian bypassed troops and inserted paratrooper and light tank resistance.

Partially-Mechanized German Army on wheels and horses defeated by TBATE

The irony is that today, TBATE is ignored by the techno-narcissist U.S. military with increasing regularity as it emasculates itself into wheeled trucks under the delusion that help by mouse-click will solve physical problems in the mud.

WW2 1941------------------------->Korea-------------------->1960

In the closed terrain of the Pacific, WW1 generals could refight linear WW1 using air and sea craft to deliver the infantry to the battlefield (parachute and airland airborne and amphibious operations), where they could then engage in linear Civil War re-enactments. Garrison was safe for post-war games/lifestyle. However, in the exposed, open terrain of Europe, ground forces needed to move much faster, and WW1 generals used wheeled trucks to "motorize" infantry to try to keep up with tracked tanks and dismount to fight linear Civil War-WW1 style at every opportunity, in addition to using air and sea craft. When no tanks were taken even to WW1 foot-slog better with armored fire support---like during the invasion of Holland, defeats were suffered.

MYSTERY: the British tank museum's Tetrarch light tank has a 3-pounder gun for fire support as shown above. So don't even try to whine about these light tanks being inadequate to kill heavier German tanks, they were needed primarily to BLAST GERMAN INFANTRY OUT OF BUILDINGS, BUNKERS AND DUG-IN POSITIONS. This was known AT THE TIME as proven by the Tetrarch with the 3-pounder gun. Yet we only know the 6th Airborne Division having an Armored Reconnaissance unit with light tanks, not the 1st Brititsh Airborne which landed near Arnhem. The photo above of a Hamilcar at a landing zone west of Arnhem adds to the mystery as SOMETHING has rolled off its front nose ramp. We also know 412 Hamilcar heavy gliders were built so the question arises WHY DIDN'T THE BRITISH GLIDER-LAND A FORCE OF 100-400 LIGHT TANKS AND BREN GUN CARRIERS WEST OR ARNHEM AND PUNCH THEIR WAY THROUGH TO REINFORCE LTC FROST'S MEN?

The troubling question remains: where were the light tanks?

www.combatreform.org/airbornetanksnoexcuse.htm

Heavy Lift Gliders + Bren Gun Carriers = Airlanding Troops with Armored Mobility

Heavy Lift Gliders + Bren Gun Carriers + 75mm Pack Howitzers = Airlanding Troops with Armored Mobility + Firepower

The British 6^th Airborne Hamilcar glider airlanded Tetrarch light tanks on D-Day....was the 1^st Airborne Division ignorant of this practice? What about Bren gun carrier tankettes? In the PBS "Battle" series documentary they sing the praises of the 75mm pack howitzer...why didn't anyone mount a 75mm pack howitzer on a Bren gun carrier making it a "Pack Howitzer Carrier"? With such mobile firepower, the British Airborne could have punched through to reinforce LTC Frost at the road bridge and hold it long enough for even the slow mechanized XXX Corps to arrive.

Was Airborne Ego rivalry cause of Arnhem Debacle?

1. Its undeniable that the British 6^th Airborne glider-landed both Bren gun carriers and Locust light tanks with 37mm guns on D-Day and they were SUCCESSFUL. You can read a veteran's account of glider-landing a Bren tankette on D-Day on the web page below:

www.geocities.com/air_mech_strike/groundvehiclephotos.htm

Here's as picture:

2. Its undeniable that Brens could have been and were fitted with both 37mm and 25 pounder anti-tank guns in turretless hull mountings to get more firepower even if turreted light tanks with suitable firepower were not available

3. The British 6^th Airborne and Hobart's 79^th Division "funnies"

www.geocities.com/armysappersforward/sappertanks.htm

were NOT there for either the Market or Garden part of the operation, the British 1^st Airborne Division had the job and they DID NOT EMPLOY ANY GLIDER-LANDED TRACKED ARMOR AND THEY FAILED TO HOLD ARNHEM BRIDGE. Fact.

4. The British 6^th Airborne later on did the Rhine crossing and glider-landed Tetrarch gliders and were SUCCESSFUL.

Therefore;

could it be that the British 6^th Airborne had its act together with air-mech and the egomaniac 1^st Airborne under vain "Boy" Browning refused to employ their glider-landed tracked armor tactics bringing about their ruin?

5. We know for a fact that Browning et al dismissed the threat of German panzer tracked armor at Arnhem showing an anti-mech pussy, "we-are-supermen" attitude.

The 6^th Airborne BEFORE Arnhem glider landed Tetrarch and Brens on D-Day. The 6^th Airborne AFTER Arnhem glider-landed Tetrarch light tanks for the Rhine river crossing.

WHY WASN'T THE 1^st BRITISH AIRBORNE EQUIPPED LIKE THE 6^th AIRBORNE WITH BRENS AND TETRARCHes?

I have not a shred of evidance of any Tetrarches being glider landed by the 1^st British Airborne.

We were hoping a British Soldier/Historian might know...too bad the legendary Ian Hogg isn't still around...he'd have known...

If the light tanks had they been glider landed by 1^st Airborne forces could have:

a. given infantry a ride to cross the 6-8 miles from their DZs to Arnhem bridge in under an hour

b. given high explosive firepower to blast through German forces blocking them from reaching Arnhem bridge

c. Result would have been 1^st Airborne consolidating strongly around Arnhem making it a strongpoint not unlike the 101^st at Bastogne where small caliber guns that were not supposed to be able to stop German light, medium and heavy tanks did just that.

No XXX Corps allied tanks arrived at Arnhem or crossed the Rhine to help LTC Frost and his men.

Maybe some enterprising war gamer/grognards out there might run a simulation on our hypothesis?

Arnhem According to Gavin

1. According to General Gavin in Airborne Warfare (1947) two measley German wheeled armored cars stopped the 3^rd and 1^st battalions of the 1^st British Airborne following a railroad track from getting to the Arnhem bridge held by LTC Frost's 2^nd Battalion. When a 57mm anti-tank gun being towed by an unarmored wheeled Willys jeep tried to get into firing order, it was blasted by the armored cars.

Canadian, Tim Brown's war game professionalism [http://saskminigamer.blogspot.com/2007/06/tiger-route.html] puts 99.9% of the Army and marine corps types on active duty to shame.

The FACTS are that NO TANKS opposed the 3^rd Battalion of the the 1^st British Airborne Division they were simply fucked up lacking the minimum of self-propelled, ready-to-fire weaponry on a tracked armored vehicle to overcome just a little German resistance by men with hand weapons. Tim says:

"This was the path to be taken by L.Col Fitch's 3^rd Parachute Battalion along the Utrecht-Arnhem highway. The battalion was to sweep into Arnhem from the north and link up with Frost's 2^nd Battalion at the bridge. In his way, however was the 16^th SS Grenadier Training and Reinforcement Battalion commanded by Major Sepp Krafft (and later elements of the 9^th SS Panzer Division!)."

In airborne operations, you must SEIZE THE DAY! the day you arrive is your opportunity to strike the enemy when he's not ready and take things like Arnhem bridges. If you let yourself get stopped by reaction forces THEN you open yourself to his "panzers" opposing you.

2. The failure of the British Airborne to move the 6-8 miles from their drop zones west of Arnhem to reinforce Frost at the Bridge ruined the entire operation which was to be a bridgehead across the Rhine river.

LESSON #1: Quantity (mass)

Its clear the British fucked up Operation Market-Garden by war weariness and a lack of willingness to suffer casualties in the face of a mere pair of armored cars. The truth is that the Airborne forces did their job to include holding Arnhem bridge for several days and XXX Corps in mechanized armored Bren gun carriers, half-tracks led by Sherman medium tanks took too long to link-up stymied up a narrow single-lane highway. Where was Percy Hobart's 79^th Armored Division with the "funnies" tanks to include amphibious LVT-4 Buffalos that could swim across rivers? The relative of an 82^nd Airborne Arnhem veteran writes:

"Uncle XXXX said that when they took the northern end of the Nijmegen Bridge, the Brits said something to the effect of, 'Thanks chaps. We'll be across in the morning.' He said that Gavin had to have his MPs hold Julian Cook's regiment at gunpoint to prevent them from comandeering the British tanks and taking them up the road themselves. They were furious. Had they known the Brits would hold in place until morning, they could have paddled across the river at night and taken far fewer casualties. They took 50% casualties taking the bridge. Uncle XXXX died over 40 years ago from wounds suffered in the Battle of the Bulge - quadrapalegic and had kidney failure - but he was adamant that they could have made it up the road to the Brits. He was a very direct guy and not prone to BS'ing."

While the Allied Airborne in general did not fail the mission, it did fail themselves when it could have held on long enough even for XXX Corps to arrive had the 1st British Airborne had its act together better. If you are not willing to lose men and lack the mobility to move several miles quickly because you are foot-slogging, you damn well better jump DIRECTLY onto the bridge and have someone willing to fight hard to do it, namely General Gavin's 82nd Airborne do the job. Gavin would have likely jumped in at NIGHT directly onto the north and south of Arnhem bridge to evade anti-aircraft fires and used aircraft bombing to precede the effort to suppress what couldn't be avoided. Another possibility would have been using gliders at higher altitudes and sneaking in to the bridges Eban Emael and Orne River Bridge-style to get by the AAA guns.

The majority of the 82^nd would have then arrived in concentrated form and held the bridge and a nearby resupply drop zone insuring a successful mission. The 101st should have then taken Nijmegan bridge and Groesbeek heights with the 1st British Airborne taking the lower bridges and being relieved first by XXX Corps in motor vehicles. Gavin cites a lack of airlift during Market-Garden to drop all paratroopers and launch all gliders at the same time, therefore having the Arnhem assault echelon jump in at night and a few hours later the other elements during the day would have enabled the planes to return to base and be loaded up for the day time assaults. The 1st Allied Airborne Army being led by the British General Browning who were the weakest practitioners of airborne warfare and not someone from the British 6th Airborne Division who aggressively used gliders to deliver light tanks and stand-off glider surprise attacks or having General Ridgway in command was a fatal mistake.

LESSON #2: Quality (aircraft precision firepower)

Where was the excellent IX Air Force P-47 fighter-bomber close air support (CAS) when the British ran into the German armored cars and panzer tracked tanks leading to Arnhem? It seems that they didn't have the CAS air and ground forward air controllers (AFACs and GFACs) that the American forces had and thus should not have been given the toughest assignment of taking Arnhem bridge if they were the weakest force.

One of the whines of the Arnhem post-mortem excuse-mongers is that the 1st British Airborne Division had a break-down in radio communication and couldn't coordinate their actions. This again shows inexcusable INCOMPETENCE on the part of General Browning/Urquart.

The British Army had Lysander liaison planes that could STOL land to relay messages or if they couldn't land they could drop and pick-up messages. Lysanders could have easily landed and took-off from any of the British drop or glider landing zones. Browning/Urquart should have had Lysanders ready to resume communications if radios failed and then they could have shifted their 1st and 3rd battalions to take the water's edge route to reach Arnhem bridge to reinforce Frost, and flown all the way back to England to shift where the resupply drops were taking place to land where their new defensive perimeter was at Osterbeek. The Lysanders could have acted as radio relay aircraft and even dropped ammunition to Frost's men directly.

Again this is all yet another example of the lack of flexibility on the part of Britain's WW1 mentality linear war Generals who persecuted the non-linear mechanized war Generals from the ranks; General Percy Hobart etc. so by the time WW2 began even Churchill couldn't fire enough of them to find someone competent. Hobart had constantly used liaison aircraft during WW1 to achieve battlefield C2 and was a huge proponent of actions on the ground backed by close air support (CAS) attack aircraft. Had Hobart been running the Arnhem battle, he would have insured Typhoon fighter-bombers were on-call to the 1st and 3rd battalions who were stopped on the way to the bridge by using Lysanders as radio relay planes probably with himself inside ascertaining that his men were being blocked from the bridge--just like LTC John Paul Vann did overhead in an O-1 Bird Dog at the battle of Ap Bac in 1963, and Rommel (Storch)/Patton (L-4 Piper Cub) did during WW2.

Lysander STOL observation/attack/liaison aircraft

Museum Examples

LESSON #3: Quality (self-propelled anti-tank vehicles)

Moreover, the 1^st British Airborne division had at least 13 x Hamilar gliders capable of delivering 13 light tanks or 26 Bren gun tankettes. We know for a fact that the 2d Battalion of the Paras had at least one Bren gun carrier, tracked AFV.

This was the D-Day allocation so more Hamilcars may have been available since 412 total were built during WW2. Proof that the Bitish Airborne had glider-landed 17-pounder, jeep-towed, anti-tank guns and Bren gun carriers:

www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/frames.htm

"The men of the Reconnaissance Squadron, together with one of the 2nd Battalion's Bren carriers, were to carry out this task, and Frost told Gough that it would be his chance to win his family's fifth Victoria Cross."

www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/war_1stBatt.htm

1400 - New positions consolidated in area X rds 726778. By now we were joined by 60 men of the 3 Para Bn under Capt Dorrien Smith, and 1 17 lb gun and 4 6 lb guns of 1 A.L. A/Tk Bty. We also had one carrier. This position was held against increasing opposition from the east and north.

1930 - Withdrawal to area railway bridge 712774. The night was spent in preparing posns with 1st Bn on the right, 11 Bn on left and 3 Bn in centre. During the night there was some enemy shelling and mortaring. Casualties during the day were about 6 killed and 20 wounded. The carrier and the 17 lb A/T gun were knocked out.

Unlike their brother 6^th Airborne that landed at Normandy with Tetrarch light tanks, the 1^st doesn't seem to have even had a reconnaissance element with light tanks. Jeeps with machine guns don't cut it against armored vehicles. First off, what the hell was the 6^th Recce Squadron of the 6^th Airborne Division doing in September 1944? Did they have something more pressing than say little ole' WW2? Why wasn't the 6^th Recce Squadron which HAD LIGHT TANKS cross-attached to the British 1^st Airborne seeing they would need their mobility and firepower to bust through the 6-8 miles to Arnhem if the Germans reacted with impromptu blocking forces? Why weren't Bren gun carriers modified to have 75mm pack howitzers in a ready-to-fire condition and supplied to Freddy Gough's Recce squadron in the 1st British Airborne since they only had vulnerable jeeps? Just a few Brens with 75mm guns could have taken out the two German armored cars and enabled the 3rd and 1st battalions to link up with Frost at Arnhem bridge on the first day, securing the victory and providing enough combat power to stay certainly until the 23rd when XXX Corps finally arrives at Driel, south of the bridge. According to the details below, the 1^st Recce had 20mm cannon towed by their jeeps, why couldn't they have been employed against the German armored cars? The excerpt below from their Arnhem war diary indicates the Polsten 20mm guns were used in combat. Its clear that the inability of towed guns to fire instantly when threats are encounted DAMNED THE ENTIRE OPERATION.

www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/war_recce.htm

1645 - Polsten sections leave to support A and D Troops who are under strong pressure from the enemy. Section fire on their objective. Lieut Christie killed whilst attempting to save Jeep and Polsten.

Vulnerable, unarmored jeeps are easy to knock out

www.airbornerecce.com/oca/1stars.htm

1^st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron

A BRIEF HISTORY

"Leading the way (into Arnhem) would be a motorised reconnaissance squadron of jeeps and motorcycles. General Urquhart was counting on Major 'Freddie' Gough's highly specialised force of some 275 men in four troops - the only unit of its kind in the British Army - to reach the highway bridge and hold it until the main body of the brigade arrived "

Extract from A Bridge Too Far by Cornelius Ryan

The Squadrons' History

By April 1943 the Sqdn had been made up to strength of about 250 men and was stationed at Bulford near Andover when it left for North Africa via Liverpool on the troopship Staffordshire with the rest of the 1st Airborne Division. After a few days acclimatisation inland from Oran in Algeria the unit picked up its vehicles, jeeps and motorcycles. After a few more days the Jeeps and their drivers with Motorcycles and other unit gear in the trailers left on a 1000 mile trip to Msaken near Sousse in Tunisia. The rest of the unit went by train.

Training continued but was switched to loading gliders and towing them about the airfields to place them at the rear of the tug planes ready for the invasion of Sicily in July.

After returning to normal training, in September the Sqdn loaded its jeeps and m/cycles onto the famous light Cruiser USS BOISE because there were no gliders left after the Sicily drop. Also on board were 5 under-strength Sqdns of the SAS and 25 men of Popski's Private Army. With the British cruisers Penelope and Abdiel carrying the rest of the Division they entered Taranto Harbour to offload. Unfortunately, the Abdiel hit a mined barge and sank in the harbour losing much of the division's artillery and the Sqdn's 6 pounders. The Sqdn left straight away for its task of exploring the route to the Bari on the East Coast via Massafra and Motola to Gioia del Colle, running into some German opposition and suffering some casualties. After a brief stop the Sqdn moved on towards Bari where it was the first British Unit to enter the town and again after a brief stay moved on where it took the Airfield at Foggia. From then the Sqdn was especially active, being always in the front of the advance.

Amongst the losses were some men from B troop which was never reformed.

In November, the Sqdn moved back to North Africa and left Philippeville in Algeria, some on the (sick) Duchess of Bedfordshire (so called as she had no stabilisers and rolled alarmingly) and others on the Monarch of Bermuda getting back to the UK in time for Christmas. (Actually, the Duchess hit the Monarch in the Med - a Zig Zag went wrong - and the Monarch had to dock in Gibraltar for temporary repairs but still got back to the UK for Christmas)

After a very brief stay at Spalding the Sqdn moved to Ruskington just north of Sleaford in Lincolnshire and stayed there for the next 9 months until the battle of Arnhem in September.

In February 1944 Major Gough told the Sqdn that it had been decided that while its vehicles and drivers would go into their next operation in gliders the bulk of the Sqdn would have to jump and they would have to volunteer to be paratroops. (Most had been posted to the Sqdn as it was a glider unit, one had to volunteer to become a paratrooper). He told the parade that any man who did not wish to volunteer should take a step forward - and no one moved. Training took place at Ringway with jumps into Tatton Park and intensive training continued. The unit was retitled 'Airborne' - not 'Airlanding'.

In accordance with Recce policy the firepower of the jeeps was substantially upgraded. Every jeep had a Vickers "K" .303 caliber machine gun mounted with a round magazine holding 96 rounds. In addition they had 2 x 20mm Polsten cannons carried behind the jeep. The Polsten cannons were an Anti-Aircraft gun but due to its high firing rate was a very effective ground weapon. They also carried standard infantry weapons including two 3" mortars and 2" mortars, a Bren Light machine gun, standard rifles but with sniper sights, a PIAT (ant tank) gun and many and various hand grenades. Most men had a Sten submachine gun and the Radio Operators, a revolver.

There were several false alarms but at the end of August a seaborne party of some 40 men with the Sqdn transport vehicles left for France designed to collect and re-equip the Sqdn during its next battle.

Then on 17th September 1944, 45 men who had previously driven the Sqdns jeeps and motorcycles and heavy weapons and ammunition to Tarrant Rushton in Dorset flew in Gliders to the Dutch Town of Arnhem, where they were joined 30 minutes later by their 160 comrades who had flown from Barkston Heath Airfild, Lincolnshire and landed by parachute. Two of the 22 gliders (out of a total of 358) allocated to the Sqdn did not arrive so they only had 28 instead of 31 jeeps they should have had. Furthermore several of the Gliders on Landing crashed on the soft soil and it proved very difficult to get the vehicles and equipment out which meant that the Sqdn was quite a bit under strength 'HQ, D & C' Troops headed for the Bridge as a coup de main but were held up by "strong" German opposition and suffered several casualties. 'A' Troop had stayed behind as a reserve as planned. Unfortunately radio communications had broken down and when Freddie Gough got a message to say the General wanted to see him he left for Div HQ taking some of H Q Troop and a few from 'D' Troop with him, By the time he found the General the party he had left behind had returned to the D.Z. and when he left Div HQ, after several skirmishes, got to the bridge where the Sqdn was supposed to be and where there were remnants of several units. Our D.R. Chalky White was sent back to Div HQ and was probably the last man to leave the Bridge.

Those at the Bridge held out until Thursday morning 21st September when they had to surrender because they had no ammunition left. The remainder of the Sqdn under Captain Alsop fought on as part of the force at Oosterbeck from which a few of them (perhaps 2,000 of the original 10,000) escaped including about 30 of the Sqdn on Monday 25th September. That night the survivors met up with the Seaborne party and got new clothing and other gear and the next morning were flown back to the UK arriving back in Ruskington on Friday 29th September at about 9pm.

The full story of the battle of Arnhem is well known and the part the Sqdn played is well documented in the book Remember Arnhem: The Story of the 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron at Arnhem by John Fairley. The seaborne party came back a few days later. The villagers were as devastated as the men by the terrible loses sustained. In fact the loses although high were not as bad as at first suspected and many had been wounded and they and the others who did not return, totalling some 140, were taken prisoners of war.

Shortly after their return of the 30 and the seaborne party, following a period of debriefing and two weeks disembarkation leave, the unit was allocated to barracks at Newark, Nottinghamshire, and reluctantly left Ruskington for ever.

During the winter reinforcements made up the strength to 160 and retraining began. On the 10th May 1945, two days after V E day the Squadron flew with its vehicles to Stavanger, Norway, and quickly moved to Oslo to help organise the withdrawal of German troops. Their mobility was needed to escort German units from some of the more rural areas and they also aided the new Norwegian authorities round up some of the Norwegians who had co operated with the Germans. Whilst they were there they took part in a parade with other Airborne Troops and Russians to welcome Crown Prince Olaf back to Norway after his exile. No medal was issued for this operation as the war in Europe had officially ended but Prince Olaf gave the Squadron a Signed Certificate of Thanks for their part in the difficult task they had successfully completed and members of the squadron who were there were issued with a copy.

In September, the Sqdn returned to the United Kingdom to Broham in Wiltshire from where it was disbanded about 4 years after its formation. The men were dispersed to various other units. The men who were wounded and who had been taken prisoner of war in Italy and at Arnhem returned to this country but not to the Sqdn.

www.airbornerecce.com/oca/6thaars.htm

The 6^th Airborne Armoured Reconnaissance RGT. R.A.C.

A brief history

"The role of the Light Tank Squadron will normally be the capture of an objective, in anticipation of a quick follow up by part of the Airborne Division, followed by patrolling infront of the main position.

It was agreed that the likelihood of heavy opposition would entail the withdrawal of the Squadron"

That was the role laid down in the unit manual but in fact the Unit used its tanks to defend troops against heavy enemy opposition and led the way of all British troops into Germany against the best enemy units.

In 1941 3 Special Service Squadrons of Tanks were formed from various cavalry and tank units but 2 were disbanded in 1942, the third becoming the Airborne Light Tank Sqdn RAC which moved to the 1st Airborne Division on the Salisbury Plain. When the 1st Airborne Div. With the 1st Airborne Recce Sqdn, went to Africa the Airborne Light Tank Sqdn which had used tetrarch tanks was transferred to the newly formed 6th Airborne Division. The Hamilcar Glider was designed to carry the Tetrarch Tank. Command of the squadron passed to Major (later Lt.Col.) Godfrey Stewart in April 1943, and he commanded the Squadron, and later the Regiment, for the remainder of the war.

Initialy the unit appears to have 3 Squadrons: A (light tank Sqdn) with 5 troops each with 4 Tetrarch tanks, B (Recce) with 4 troops with scout cars and carriers, a blitz (infantry support) troop on motorcycles and 2 troops of 3" mortars. HQ Squadron had 4 more Tetrarchs, REME, MEDICS, Signals, a resupply unit and 2 troops each with 4 Vickers MMGs. Regimental HQ also had 2 Tetrarchs.

Tetrarch Light Tank being loaded into a Hamilcar Glider

On D Day a small "Harbour Party" of 1 Officer and 15 men flew in with the advance Pathfinder Para Unit to secure the Regimental landing ground. Unfortunately this unit lost its Officer and one stick of men on landing. 20 light tanks and other carriers and vehicles flew in with the second main lift from Tarant Rushton in 30 Hamilcars while others flew in from Brize Norton in Horsas. Some Tanks were lost due to a crash on landing and for a while some tanks were disabled as parachute canopies and rigging getting wrapped round the tracks which had to be burnt off. After 10 days the Unit was withdrawn but the tank units went straight back in their Tetrarchs to support the remaining hard-pressed ground troops. Once again the tank crews were withdrawn but after 10 days retraining went back in with Cromwell tanks and continued supporting the breakout. The Unit was taken out of the line at the end of August and by 6 Sept had regrouped at Larkhil.

There the Unit was enlarged to a Regiment of 4 Sqdns with a compliment of 32 officers and 326 other ranks. The 2 Recce Sqdns each had 4 [M22] Locust tanks when airborne or Cromwells otherwise, and 3 Recce Troops each with 2 carriers and 2 Dingo scout cars. The support Sqdn had 2 MMG troops with 4 Vickers on carriers, a troop with four 4.2" mortars, and a blitz troop on motorcycles.

In December 1944, the Division was sent to France to help with the Battle of the Bulge in the Ardennes and on Monday the 30th December the AARR was involved on the Meuse with the 6th A/B Div with their Cromwells. By 16th Feb the Rgt left for the UK but left a tail, including the Cromwells in Holland. The tail soon found out they were part of the ground force support of the next operation.

M22 Locust Light Tank

On 24th March, as part of Operation Varsity, 8 x Locust tanks were flown in in Hamilcars along with the troop of 4.2" mortars in Horsas. In fact less flew in "Varsity" than in the D-Day drop. Although the operation was a great success and the battle having been won by nightfall, casualties were very high and of the 8 tanks, only 2 survived fully serviceable. Several tanks and vehicles had been destroyed on landing and casualties were high. The rest of the Regiment had left on 17th March and joined up with the airborne sections on the 26th. The Division continued the advance with the Airborne Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment well to the fore and on several occasions suffered severe casualties, especially at a battle at Minden. On 30th April the Division reached the Elbe and on 3rd May elements of B Squadron met elements of the Russian Stalingrad Armoured Division. 2 days later the war was over and on 16th May the Division was ordered to return home, the Recce Rgt leaving all its Tanks and Carriers in Germany.

Training began for war in South East Asia but as the Japanese surrendered they were reallocated to security duties in Palestine. The Rgt landed in Haifa on 22 Oct 1945 and worked as part of the division facing civil disobedience by both Arabs and Jews and terrorism by Jews.

On 1st Feb the 6th AARR was disbanded and most of the personnel were transferred to the 3rd King's Own Hussars which became a Recce Rgt.

Hi there, Alecto!

While steel is too heavy to enclose an infantry squad and have it light enough to be flown by WW2 piston-engined aircraft and gliders, what we could have done was build an open-topped, mini-STUG copy of the German Sturmgeshutz concept with a semi-fixed gun in the hull without a turret to save weight to be air-transportable--exactly---what the American and British Airborne should have done in WW2 by mounting at least a 6-pounder (57mm) anti-tank gun on a Bren gun or Tetrarch or Harry Hopkins light tank chassis (Alecto) and Hamilcar glider-landed them into Arnhem to punch through to reinforce LTC Frost's battalion at the bridge and kill even German Tiger heavy tanks when they appeared. Even heavy tank duelist, Keith Flint agrees in his classic and revelational book, Airborne Armour, pages 20-23:

With a bridgehead across the Rhine in September 1944, WW2 ends 6 months sooner without Russians getting to Berlin at all--no Battle of the Bulge casualties, no Iron Curtain Soviet domination for 45 years. Big strategic consequences for not having a few little light tanks, huh?

www.combatreform.org/airbornetanksnoexcuse.htm

But a 57mm gun on an open-topped tracked chassis would be a Russian ASU-57, wouldn't it?

Some criticize the British type of tank dedicated to infantry fire support. The Germans under the inspiration of Manstein had the same type of tank--but turretless, the STUG. We don't hear anyone criticizing them. The difference was that many pre-war and WW2 British officers thought that infantry fire support tanks to punch through lines for infantry and hold lines were the ONLY tanks we needed. Since that time, we have the heavy-tank-for-everything mentality that has to be a tank destroyer, breakthough tank, exploitation tank and when the "mech pussies" really feel vulnerable somehow act as cavalry/recon tanks. Is it a wonder that after all of these tasks are being considered that infantry fire support is neglected? The British and the Germans knew that they needed tanks DEDICATED for infantry direct-fire support and they were right then and they are correct today. Tank/Infantry co-operation today is pathetic with the heavy-tank-for-everything mentality. Reading the German STUG doctrine they realized that before an attack its not possible to target all the enemy threats and that commanders need a dedicated infantry heavy high explosive fire support tank force ready for unexpected threats to appear.

Allied Ground Combat Weaponry Available

WW2 Today

_____________________________________________________________________

Small arms .30 caliber (fire & maneuver) .223 caliber

Suppressive .30 and .50 caliber MMG/HMGs same

Everyone with Rifle grenades Select few with grenade launcher

Light/Medium/Heavy Mortars same ($ guided rounds maybe)

SP/Towed artillery (indirect fire saturation) same ($ guided rounds maybe)

Towed Anti-Tank Guns/Field Guns (AT defense/HE blasting) ATGMs ($)

Re-usable Bazooka rocket launchers (HE blasting) --

Disposable rocket launchers (stolen from Germans) AT4s

Medium breakthrough Sherman tanks (USA) --

Medium Churchill infantry support tanks (UK) --

Light STUG turretless tanks (Germany) --

Heavy breakthrough/defensive tank destroyers (Pershing) Abrams/Challenger

Observation/attack/liaison planes (L4s, P-47s, Typhoons) --

Naval gunfire support (cruisers, battleships) --

Light Units = No Bang for a Lot of Bucks

If you compare WW2 with today, we have far less "BANG" for a hell of a lot more $$$ (bucks). In an Army LBCT or a marine infantry battalion there are ZERO TANKS, none, nadda. Rephrase, there are NO metal boxes with tracks with metal tubes shooting shells with high explosives in them to blast things when in WW2 these things were plentiful. Before whining about attaching this or that and other ad hocery, if you attach an AAV or a Bradley or a Gavin to the LBCT/marine unit, they at best only shoot a tiny shell with HE fill, no building/bunker blasting. After WW2, we replaced the 1, 000 pound AT/field gun/howitzer with first recoilless rifles then ATGMs man-packed or mounted on flimsy, unarmored wheeled trucks in light units. In EVERY Army and marine unit I was a part of TOW ATGMs were so expensive we only shot live missiles once-a-year. Unless we went to a large training center like NTC/JRTC with MILES laser simulation, TOWs were not war practiced with realistic simulation at unit-level. Ditto this for disposable rockets and the select few that have a 40mm grenade launcher under their M16/M4 .223 caliber assault rifle/carbine. Walking infantry trucked to the "front" (line) or delivered by fixed-wing or helicopter aircraft to a non-linear battle area WITHOUT TANKS is PRE-WW1 force structure. If you had a time machine and sent an Army LBCT or marine infantry battalion to WW1 trenches to fight, THEY'D BE SLAUGHTERED. The 1918 WW1 "Tommy" or "Doughboy" with early tanks is better off than today's sunglasses-clad foot slogger with only what is in his hands to face enemy fire. You may say, "we don't fight in WW1 trenches anymore", are you sure? What is a city? What is urban combat? Is not fighting in a built-up area the equivalent or worse than WW1 trenches?

You can say, we'd attach some Abrams heavy tanks for fire support of the walking infantry. This is ad hocery. The crews have not worked with the infantry before, they only have 44 x 120mm shells and there is no HE plastic round, getting the HE fill round that blows up obstacles is not a certainty. The heavy tank dueler egomaniac doesn't give a crap about infantry fire support, he wants to kill other tanks (tank destroyer) and his heavy tank is designed to do this; 1000 degree heat from rear turbine engine means infantry cannot follow behind for close-in escort if doing FIBUA...no tank-infantry phone....too heavy and too wide to go many places without getting stuck.....

Heavy Units = Little Bang for a Lot of Bucks

In an Army HBCT we have our best force structure but its only good for open, firm terrain if we limit ourselves to the medium-to-heavy Bradleys and Abrams and not exploit the superior cross-country mobility of their M113 Gavins. The infantry that ride in back of Bradleys are awful due to the turret blocking them into a second-class security guards-for-tanks role. So if the HBCT does FIBUA if it needs to clear buildings it has "mech pussies" with little vigor to fight on their feet, so commanders "thunder run" keep everyone mounted and slice off sections of a city at a time fighting mounted "death before dismount" stereotype fulfilled. If we fight a smart enemy he could bait and draw in our cavalry-less HBCTs as their main bodies THINK they are thunder running into specially-prepared kill zones where close-range HE weapons like gunmen with RPGs will swarm them from all sides, forcing the weak mech, actually armored infantry to dismount where they will fight at a severe disadvantage. With tracked vehicles, the HBCT could rumble through barricaded cars and drive out of the kill zones if not blocked by land mines but they have failed if their mission was to seize the urban area. You could say we will truck up the LBCT/marine infantry to the FIBUA city and they will do a slightly better job fighting on foot and being turned into bleeding casualties. If that's what the enemy wants to do, which is delay us reaching his capital city to topple his government and/or bleed us, we've just played right into his hands.

Solutions Now

We can fix the lack of infantry direct fire support in Army LBCTs and the marines immediately today by supplying them M113 Gavins with TOW launchers and create an affordable "dumb" HE missile that is point/shoot without expensive guidance electronics in the nose to be the "male tank". Other Gavins can have 30mm autocannon on a remote 360 degree swiveling mount for suppressive HE fires as a "female tank". This is a 2-for-1 deal because not only do Gavins act as STUGs, they have space in the back to transport infantry under armor cross-country to include swimming across lakes/rivers, and with waterjets--in the ocean, ship-to-shore. C-27Js, C-130s, C-17s, C-5s and CH-47/CH-53E helicopters can transport Gavins. LBCTs with Gavins should have combat engineers permanently assigned to strengthen the defacto cavalry force that has been created. Army HBCTs can get a cavalry by replacing Humvees with Gavins and fully optimizing their engineers with specialized M113 variants with Hobart's Funny-type devices.

Landing Craft + Trailers + Trucks + Bren Gun Carriers = River Crossings

Another weird video fact is you can see Higgins boats---LCVPs on trailers towed by TRUCKS being driven around to cross rivers. Bren gun carriers could be carried and off-loaded by Higgins boats to cross rivers. Why didn't anyone think of this to cross the Rhine and push the Germans off the Arnhem bridge?

You'll also see LVTs and DUKWs in the video footage...WHERE were Percy Hobart's 79th Division "funnies" which had LVTs when Arnhem was underway to supply amphibious vehicles? LVTs could transport infantry, AT guns and even Bren gun APCs!

It could also then deliver a LIGHT TANK if it couldn't swim like the M3 Stuart Light tank attached and below on the www:

TRACKED AMPHIBIOUS SALVAGE OF OPERATION MARKET-GARDEN, 1944

WW2 Mystery: A Bridge Too Far or We Didn't Go Far Enough? Part 4

www.youtube.com/watch?v=7WftY4JUHMo

Therefore, had XXX Corps been equipped with enough LVT amphibious tracks organically or by at least some sub-units of Hobart's 79th Armored Division being attached, when it finally did arrive at Driel on September 23, 1944 instead of withdrawing the 1st British Airborne, it could have pushed across and REINFORCED it. Once the toe-hold was strengthened, a Bailey bridge could have been erected for Sherman medium tanks with 17-pounder guns to cross and ward off the German heavy Tiger tanks and the offensive could have swung around the city of Arnhem and encircled the Germans like the paras were a few days before. Good land armies are able to cross rivers and keep maneuvering.

Of course, its better if your light tanks SWAM themselves across lakes/rivers like the M113 Gavin and PT76s can...the point here is that if your light tanks don't swim like the M8 Buford/Thunderbolt AGS you are not necessarily "sunk" if you are willing to pay for trucks or better yet XM1108 Gavin tracks towing a flat-bottom Higgins boat on a trailer to wherever the river or lake crossing is required so you can have FAR SHORE COMBAT POWER to hold against enemies with much heavier tanks if your light tank has the firepower to kill them. The combat engineer force reinforced by a CAVALRY in light tanks can seize a bridge from both sides 82nd Airborne @ Nijmegan-style or proceed to build their own bridges for the medium-to-heavy vehicles of a 2D maneuver force to cross.

Garrison was safe for post-war games/lifestyle! Contrary to popular mythology, the motorized infantry did not work that well and it was a dismal failure in Korea against a genuine MOBILE infantry that could go up/down mountains/hills. Task Force Smith had M24 light tanks that could have been flown in with them by USAF C-124s to ward off the North Korean T34/85s but they didn't even THINK OF IT. Infantry narcissism strikes again.

AUSA ILW THE, LAND WARFARE PAPERS No. 42 MAY 2003, "How We Got There: Air Assault and the Emergence of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), 1950-1965 by John M. Carland writes:

In the Korean conflict, American combat units lacked cavalry. Armor units, no matter what their unit designation, were too heavy and road-bound to be considered cavalry. Therefore, American forces were more likely to arrive on the battlefield "lastest with the leastest" than the more desirable "fustest with the mostest." Major General James M. Gavin, a senior officer with extensive airborne experience in World War II, vigorously made this point in his seminal piece of writing, "Cavalry-and I Don't Mean Horses," in 1954. He argued that America's lack of true cavalry in its military provided the common thread in explaining the nation's military defeats in the Korean War's early months.

When North Korean forces invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950 and achieved almost complete surprise, what South Korean and American forces needed most was time to regroup and properly assess their predicament. How to do this? "The tactical situation called for a cavalry force," Gavin believed, "to be committed at once, to screen and delay, while the heavier infantry and armored forces built up a more substantial defense."

However, the United States/Republic of Korea force possessed no cavalry worth its name and therefore nothing to commit. [EDITOR: INCORRECT the 24th ID had M24 light tanks but chose not to use them] Then, on 15 September 1950, America turned the tables with the Inchon landings. At first, the American ploy succeeded brilliantly and North Korean forces disintegrated. "The situation screamed," wrote Gavin, "for highly mobile cavalry forces to exploit this unprecedented opening." Such forces could have moved quickly south to the Naktong River line to trap the North Koreans between the American units breaking out of the Pusan Perimeter and the cavalry moving toward them. Instead [he concluded], we took almost two weeks. . . . When the first breakout of our forces from the southern perimeter moved northward, it was a combined tank-truck column, essentially an infantry column limited in its performance by its road-bound equipment.

A cavalry arm-"airlifted in light planes, helicopters and assault-type aircraft"-to pursue the enemy and exploit the situation did not exist. A "debacle . . . a tragic chapter in our history" was the sad consequence. Next, on 26 November 1950 thirty Chinese divisions achieved "complete and overwhelming surprise" against the United Nations force that, as a result, suffered a terrible defeat. Again, that there was no cavalry to reconnoiter and gather intelligence explained precisely why the Chinese could surprise the Americans. [8]

Gavin attributed these failures to the "deification of heavy equipment" in World War II. American military leadership had deluded itself into believing that "heavy armor is cavalry." Consequently, noted Gavin, "we lost the cavalry when we mounted it in weighty tanks and trucks, all of which move (if the terrain will allow them to move at all) at exactly the same speed as motorized infantry, if not slower." He proposed that it might be possible to regain battlefield mobility and mobility differential through the use of assault transports such as light utility planes, helicopters, or convertiplanes.

General Gavin creates the M113, the "American STUG", greatest light tank of all time, ever

General Gavin and others began to for the first time really try to make a mobile infantry that FIGHTS MOBILE not just uses mobility means to get there and then fight without much mobility. He wrote:

"Where was the cavalry? ...and I don't mean horses. I mean helicopters and light aircraft, to lift Soldiers armed with automatic weapons and hand-carried light anti-tank weapons, and also lightweight reconnaissance vehicles, mounting anti-tank weapons the equal or better than the Russian T-34s...If ever in the history of our armed forces there was a need for the cavalry arm--airlifted in light planes, helicopters and assault-type aircraft--this was it... Only by exploiting to the utmost the great potential of flight can we combine complete dispersion in the defense with the facility of rapidly massing for the counter-attack which today's and tomorrow's Army must possess"

The creation of the simple-to-operate, M113 air-transportable, all-tracked, all-terrain, all-armored, amphibious light tank for the first time in history offered us the possibility of a MOBILE infantry better than the horse. The whole purpose of the M113 was for INFANTRY, particularly Airborne infantry coming by fixed-wing aircraft, to FIGHT MOBILE, not foot-slog.

However, in the critical year of 1960, with General Gavin retired, the GARRISON Army generals refused to create a mobile infantry; they did not give M113s to the light units, they instead gave them to the units assigned to follow TANKS, creating a perceived inferior social underclass bogged down in VEHICLE CARE lumped in with the heavier M48/M60 medium tanks. The Garrison Army was safe to play garrison Army games, and so was the USMC. During WW2, the USMC had used open-topped "amtracks" to hit the beaches, with the advent of aluminum alloy armor, they could fully enclose the vehicle and use it for MOBILE warfare inland. No-can-do. "The USMC is walking line infantry, we are not going to give up two riflemen; a driver and a track commander---to move every rifle squad, we're gonna get at least 2 squads in every amtrack to cut down on costs and who's 'goldbricking' and not marching into battle." Enter the post-WW2 enclosed and bloated family of USMC amtracks that continues to the present day---they will only take marines ashore and then they'll walk, even though in every damn war necessity finds the bloated amtracks being used as defacto inland war APCs with disastrous results.

1961---------------------->Vietnam 1975---------------------------------1980

The helicopter turned out later in Vietnam to be nothing more than a conveyor of troops like the earlier transport plane, sea landing craft and wheeled truck. However, the urgencies of Vietnam resulted in units that should have had M113s all along, getting them and we created a kick-ass MOBILE infantry that routinely beat the VC and the NVA; the world's best light infantry---by superior all-terrain mobility over soft, muddy terrain and woods and in the face of enemy fire. Operating M113s did NOT make the troops become motor pool "pussies".

The Smoking Gun: Light Tanks/APCs More Mobile than Medium-Weight Ones, and M113 Gavins were the MOST effective weapon in soft open and vegetated closed terrain terrain Vietnam--NOT the helicopter

Noted armor historian and WW2 Hobart's "Funnies" (combat engineer tanks) combat veteran Major Kenneth Macksey wrote in his 1991 book, Tank versus Tank, page 167:

"The Vietnam War was a war dominated by infantry and firepower, in which AFVs, initially, were relegated to a limited part because the Vietnamese possessed virtually no tanks of their own and their enemies persisted in thinking of the struggle as a guerrilla war in country unsuitable to tanks. Not until 1967, when the United States carried out a feasibility study, was it discovered that tanks could move in 61 per cent of the country during the dry season and in 46 per cent in the wet; and that APCs could move in 65 per cent of Vietnam all year round. Thereafter the forces of South Vietnam rapidly raised their armor content to be matched only meagerly, however, by their opponents. As a result, AFVs were almost entirely employed in support of infantry; the principal threat to them was posed by mines and infantry anti-tank weapons, including ATGW. Yet AFVs were rated the most cost-effective weapon system for a country where the helicopter was enjoying a great vogue on the battlefield."

What this means is as follows:

M113 Gavins (light tank/APCs) 8 PSI ground pressure = 65% of Vietnam dry/wet 24/7/365

M48 Pattons (medium tanks) 11.2-12.2 PSI * ground pressure = 46% of Vietnam wet season

.............................................................................................................61% of Vietnam dry season

A light mechanized infantry with M113 Gavin light tank/APCs would fight mounted and/or with these vehicles nearby rendering fire support and ammunition, water, food transport 65% of everywhere to include swimming across lakes/rivers; only 35% of the terrain was dismounted foot-travel only--we fight the enemy from positions of overmatching SUPERIORITY with more firepower and units of fire, as well protection from his fires.

If we medium-mechanize or motorize with high ground pressure FCS 30-ton tanks (12 PSI) or 20-ton Stryker truck (30 PSI) wheels 54% of a soft, wet terrain like Vietnam will be NO-GO to them and be enclaves for the ENEMY to reside in safety lest we fight them M16 vs. AK47 & RPG even or at a disadvantage. The enemy could attack us during the wet winters and withdraw without fear of us pursuing them lest we get stuck or stick to roads where they ambush us with land mines. The FCS will only be mobile in firm, open terrain types, and the Stryker, road-bound unless very firm, dry, open terrain is available. Neither FCS or Strykers can swim.

Sub-Notes

* http://afvdb.50megs.com/usa/m48patton.html

The M113 Gavins were so simple to operate folks wrongly assumed that if they were needed they'd be assigned ad hoc and THE PERMANENT ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES NEEDED TO CREATE A MOBILE INFANTRY WERE NOT DONE. If you wanted to play garrison "From Here to Eternity" games and own/operate M113s you could. The only excuse left was the ego card, and both the "heavy" tankers and the "light" infantry weighed in.

The WW2 tankers led by Starry with Soviet tank terror on their minds got an American Tiger heavy, defensive, big gun "male" tank to stop them on the Fulda gap. However, they still had swarms of Soviet infantry to kill in BMPs, and a M113 even with a BMP-killing autocannon would not do (AIFV) for their schemes. They didn't want infantry all over the place doing its own thing, they wanted just enough infantry to protect THEM and their tanks, so they created a "female" tank with space for a few security guards, the Bradley.

The lightfighters decided they needed a "pure" foot line infantry force using the limited USAF C-141 airlift excuse to create a whole culture of folks doing the garrison BS they wanted to do, yearning for easy war opportunities which came later in Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989). There were some smart lightfighters who remembered how well light tanks worked in Vietnam and kept it going with the 3/73rd Armor BN's M551 Sheridans, using borrowed M113s at places like NTC and JRTC but the MTOEs were never changed to make infantry mobile and have the long-term use to see new possibilities like "Air-Meching" them by USAF fixed-wing and army rotary-wing aircraft.

1981------------------------>1993-----------------------------------2000

Bradley disease kicks in; a 25-33 ton tank that can't fly by C-130 much less helicopters, can't swim, can't go cross-country at will without getting stuck. During Operation Desert Storm in Iraq, M113 Gavins had to lead the way because Humvee trucks are too vulnerable and Bradleys not mobile enough--the U.S. Army already has its "Future Scout Vehicle" (FSV)--upgrading its M113s with high technology will make them even better! Everything Captain Tien wants for the FSV (shoot-on-move, stabilized weapons, thermal vision etc.) can be applied TODAY to existing M113 Gavins!

U.S. Army ARMOR Magazine - March-April 1993

The Future Scout Vehicle: A DESERT STORM Endorsement

by Captain John K. Tien

Having introduced three different scout vehicles since the 1970s, the Armor Center has outlined characteristics of the next scout vehicle designed to take U.S. Army reconnaissance into the next century. In its white paper, "Armor 2000 - A balanced Force for the Army of the Future," the Armor Center said this vehicle - the Future Scout Vehicle (FSV) - should have the following characteristics: (1) self-defense weapon; (2) high mobility; (3) lightweight body design, (4) area surveillance tools; (5) long-range communication assets; and (6) NBC countermeasures.[1] Based on my DESERT STORM experiences as an armor task force scout platoon leader, I endorse these six characteristics of the FSV, as well as advocate adding three more features to the vehicle's design: (1) a maintenance design which enables the operator to fix. forward without direct support assistance; (2) sufficient space on board for combat support and command and control assets; and (3) a built-in Identification of Friendly Force system to avoid fratricide incidents. Since the Armor Center published the paper on July 10, 1990, one month prior to the onset of Operation DESERT SHIELD, I believe I can now offer an updated and DESERT STORM-influenced endorsement of the Armor Center's concept of the Future Scout Vehicle.

The first Armor Center characteristic I endorse is the scout vehicle's self defense weapon. My scout platoon consisted of three M113A2 Armored Personnel Carriers and three M901Al Improved TOW Vehicles. I had the

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Given the mission of visual reconnaissance in the Gulf War, with little need to engage the enemy with heavy firepower, the author's M113s proved surprisingly adequate: Its mobility and ease of maintenance also proved to be assets.

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M2 caliber .50 [heavy] machine gun, the Dragon [anti-tank guided missile] system, and AT-4s in our store of quick-reaction weapons. In the high-speed mobile warfare of DESERT STORM, the M901A1 TOW launchers were basically ineffective; neither could we shoot them on the move, nor could we afford the stationary engagement time. Thus, we could not have quickly destroyed even an enemy armored personnel carrier.

However, that was not our mission. In keeping with current doctrine, my DESERT STORM mission was to engage the enemy with visual reconnaissance and leave direct fire to other segments of the unit.

Therefore, although my platoon was limited in its direct-fire destruction capacity, my battalion commander ensured that we were part of an advance guard that could provide quick reaction tank support. Likewise, when we were screening the flank, the flank tank company provided us with similar support. When the enemy engaged us on the screen line, it was either by tanks that were to the direct front at ranges greater than 3,000 meters or by indirect fire. Clearly, given the proper support, I needed only self-defense weapons to accomplish my forward and flank screen missions.

The Armor Center cannot, however, make the characteristic of a self-defense weapon a stand-alone one. If the Armor Center wants the FSV to go deep and stay deep, it must couple its self-defense weapon with the ability to escape enemy detection or, if need be, evade enemy direct fire. They must ensure that the vehicle possesses high mobility. This [M113 Gavin] characteristic greatly contributed to my survivability on the DESERT STORM battlefield.

When our brigade fought on Medinah Ridge on 26 February 1991, our task force received enemy artillery across our flank. This artillery bracketed my scout screen line. The initial bursts hit 25 meters to both sides of three of my vehicles. Due to the high mobility of the M113-series vehicle, we were able to quickly push the screen line forward and then toward the main body to evade the enemy artillery. These evasion drills worked to keep the artillery from impacting too close to our thin-skinned vehicles and gave our direct support artillery enough time to use counterfire to neutralize the enemy artillery.

Page 18

The M113's high mobility also came into play during a simple vehicle recovery mission during the cease-fire.

My battalion commander tasked me to take a section of two Bradleys and one M113A2, 75 miles north toward Basrah, Iraq, to recover a lost vehicle.

The Bradley led until it hit an unexploded bomblet. The driver in the Bradley was too recessed from the front of his vehicle and could not see to maneuver around the ordnance-littered battlefield. On the other hand, my M113A2 driver, who sat six inches from the front of the vehicle, was easily able to bypass the danger areas. Consequently, I put my "protection-Bradleys" behind me and led the remainder of the mission, having the Bradleys follow in my M113 tracks. High mobility, therefore, was crucial to my vehicles' surviving on the DESERT STORM battlefields.

A feature that is often linked with high mobility is a lightweight design. Such a design was key to the M113 scout series vehicle's success in my task force for two reasons, First, twice as many M113s could go on the Saudi Arabian Heavy Equipment Trucks as M1A1 combat tanks. Consequently, upon my task force's arrival in Saudi Arabia, the task force commander chose my platoon to be the first combat force to leave Al Damman port for Tactical Assembly Area Thompson in the desert. Second, the 13-ton M113 has a three mile per gallon fuel efficiency compared to the 0.7 mile/gallon efficiency of the Bradley and 0.3 mile/gallon efficiency of the M1A1 tank. As a result, my platoon refueled only once every 24 hours, whereas the Bradleys needed to refuel every 12 hours and the tanks every 6 hours. In summation, my scout platoon could have made the 300-kilometer VII Corps envelopment sweep without ever refueling. Thus, the lightweight design of the M113 gave it an advantage over the larger combat vehicles of the task force in terms of transport and fuel efficiency.

What the Bradley lacks in weight and mobility relative to the M113, the Bradley compensates in terms of night vision as an area surveillance tool. The answer to the Bradley's night sight on the M113 or HMMWV is the PVS-7. This is not a satisfactory answer. The FSV must have a thermal night sight. The thermal sight would enable the scouts to perform during limited visibility times, which is when reconnaissance is most effective.

The fog, rain, and sand during DESERT STORM all degraded the capacity of the PVS-7. The first night of the ground war, I was lead element for the task force's move to its first assault position just south of the town of Al Busayah. There was a driving rain storm throughout the night which was accentuated by fog during the early morning. The brigade commander changed brigade formations from brigade box to brigade diamond. I had to flex left of the task force trains to our front and find the left flank combat unit of that same task force. The rain

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The author moved his M113s forward when his leading Bradley hit an unexploded bomblet its driver couldn't see. With a driver's position high and in the front of the hull, it was easier to spot and avoid ordnance littering the battlefield.

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totally washed out my PVS-7s, requiring me to send the lead scout vehicle to move within 50 meters off the flank of the front task force in order to correctly identify when we had reached his left flank. While we made it to the left flank and ultimately the assault position, we had discovered that our area surveillance capabilities were almost nonexistent during a heavy desert downpour at night. If the old scout adage of being the "eyes and ears" of the battalion is to hold true, then the FSV must have both excellent day and night surveillance capabilities.

Linked in with being the "eyes and ears" of the battalion, the scout platoon must be able to communicate what is seen and heard over extended distances to the battalion commander. FM 17-98 states that "because of the extended frontages and distances over which the scout platoon operates, it must rely heavily on effective communication techniques." [2] While, I cannot offer any technological solutions to the problem of long-range communications, I can endorse the need for such a capability based on my DESERT STORM experiences.

Page 19

Due to the importance of staying under brigade command and control, my platoon's primary mission as we crossed the Iraq border was to screen forward and keep our task force linked with the brigade formation. On 23 February 1991, as 1^st Armored Division left Forward Assembly Area Garcia north of the Tapline Road and south of the Iraq-Saudi Arabia border, a dust storm reduced our day vision capability to less than 50 meters. Within an hour, the lead tank company that was following my platoon had lost contact with my trail vehicle. For an hour I vectored the lead company commander to my position on the brigade's left flank with longitude and latitude readings.

The radio was also key at critical graphic control measure sites throughout the battalion's move. I was able to relay every phase line during the battle to the battalion commander enabling him to relay our unit's FLOT to the brigade commander. I was able to pass on key passage of lines and natural obstacle information during the battalion's movement across the Wadi Al Batin, the Tapline Road, and the Iraq-Saudi Arabia border. Our radio capabilities, however, were never challenged by any Iraqi electronic warfare; had the Iraqis jammed us, we would have been impotent in many of our missions. In short, without effective long-range communication assets, we would have failed the majority of our DESERT STORM missions.

Neither did the Iraqis challenge our NBC countermeasures during the ground battle. Similar to electronic warfare, NBC warfare would have rendered my M113-series scout platoon nonfunctional. While we could have survived a short-term MOPP4 environment, the M113 is not equipped to fight in an NBC environment, as is the M1A1 tank. Our answer to the M1A1's overpressure system was simply to go to MOPP4 as

Page 20

the NBC trigger signals hit (e.g. yellow airbursts) and begin the standard M256 kit drills. Fortunately, Saddam Hussein chose note to employ such weapons, and we had to go to MOPP4 only twice during the ground war.

Nevertheless, if the FSV is to go deep and stay deep on a future battlefield in which the laws of land warfare are ignored, the FSV must have effective NBC countermeasures on board.

In addition to the NBC countermeasures and other features the Armor Center lists in its white paper, I would advocate adding three more features to the vehicle: (1) the ability to fix forward, (2) additional load plan space, and (3) a built-in IFF capacity.

Under the current doctrine, the scout platoon will go 4-6 kilometers forward of other friendly assets and even further if employed as part of a divisional cavalry or regimental cavalry troop organization. Given such a separation from its parent unit, the crew must often fend for itself in terms of maintenance support.

During DESERT STORM, my platoon had no attached maintenance assets, and in general, this was a satisfactory arrangement in terms of how we were employed within the formation. One of my vehicles, however, became separated from the task force when its engine malfunctioned and the M113 could not continue forward.

After checking on the crew's condition and life support systems, I told them that follow-on maintenance support would recover them within 48 hours. During the next 24 hours, the sergeant track commander bypassed the electrical fault and used green duct (100 mile per hour) tape to repair the worn, fan belt in the engine. Consequently, he put his vehicle back into operation, albeit a -reduced form of operation, and moved eastward until he linked up with another friendly unit for the remainder of the war. I do not offer this example as operator-level maintenance doctrine, but rather more as a supporting argument to ensure the FSV's mechanical system is not so overly complex that the crew is stranded if just one electrical connection or computer board diode fails. The FSV's design should also allow for the task force commander to task organize the scouts with additional combat support personnel and command and control assets without adding additional vehicles to the platoon.

FM 71-2 states that the battalion commander will often task organize an engineer NCO with the scouts to assist in obstacle identification and pre-breach operations. [3] PM 71-2 also states that a single forward observer can go forward with the scouts to assist in target identification and call-for-fires. [4] My battalion commander task organized my scout platoon in accordance with both these concepts during DESERT STORM.

Consequently, I had to make room for two additional men, their personal gear, and their equipment. In the case of the engineer, I had each vehicle carrying half of a footlocker of C-4, TNT, and detonation cord. The FO brought three GVS-5s [laser target designators] and two radios.

While I was certainly pleased to have such combat support assets, I was already at full strength in terms of personnel. Moreover, I was at maximum space capacity with my own scout platoon combat load plan, which included Dragons, AT-4s, and extra Class I, III, and V. In terms of command and control assets, four of my vehicles had the LORAN positioning system mounted, and I tasked all six of my track commanders with tracking the battalion's movement on their 1:250,000 map, which at 4 x 3 feet, covered the left wall of the M113.

Given the scout platoon's mission to act as the forward security force for the task force, as well as provide accurate navigational intelligence, the FSV designers will need to attend to the space capacity and ergodynamics

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The M113's resemblance to other vehicles used by the enemy in the Gulf War made fratricide a disturbingly real possibility in the heat of rapid operations. The author argues that an effective IFF system should be a must on any future scout vehicle.

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of having more than what the MTOE calls for in a scout platoon in terms of men and equipment.

The FSV designers must also deal with the biggest dilemma of the Gulf War: fratricide. Of all friendly vehicles in our task force, my scout platoon most closely resembled the enemy because of two reasons: (1) the positioning of my platoon forward and on the flanks of the unit, and (2) the enemy also had M113-like vehicles. Our unit attempted several solutions to the fratricide problem. We tried using the aircraft panel markers for day recognition and thermalized number 10 coffee cans on our antennas for night recognition. Both were only mildly effective because of the general field conditions.

Their ineffectiveness was particularly evident during one "fog of war" incident which occurred on 27 February 1991. Up until this day, my platoon had been the only force on the brigade's left and northern flank since the start of the ground war. On 27 February, however, the brigade commander moved the mechanized infantry task force to the left flank for further security. He swung them around in a wide arc (at approximately 45 degrees at a distance of 3,000 meters) to ensure that the infantry task force did not become entangled with my task force.

As the mechanized infantry task force's right flank tank company/team oriented towards our M1A1 FLOT, one of the tank gunners immediately identified and lased to a column of enemy vehicles moving in from the northeast toward my task force's M1A1 FLOT. The tank commander, who was also the platoon leader, looked through his gunner's primary sight extension and identified the vehicles as definitely moving toward the friendly FLOT but could not confirm them as friendly or enemy. After calling the spot report in and closing in to a distance of 1,000 meters toward our M1A1 FLOT, the platoon leader was able to identify the vehicles as friendly. What both he and his gunner had seen was my scout platoon in an echelon left moving off the left flank of our M1A1 FLOT. This was not apparent to either Soldier because of our movement formation, our undistinguishable vehicle form, and our lack of any easily identifiable friendly identification.

Other studies have proven that DESERT STORM made fratricide more probable because of our lack of good Identification of Friendly Force (IFF) markings and the distances at which we were engaging perceived enemy vehicles. Undoubtedly, the FSV must go forward with some system of IFF marking.

The Army wants a "ground scout vehicle that can penetrate undetected into areas under enemy control" during both "forward deployed and contingency area operations." To do so, the army needs to make that vehicle light, mobile, and survivable. Survivability will depend an its ability to sustain operations independent of immediate task force support, escape enemy detection, and distinguish itself from enemy vehicles in the form of an IFF system. Based on my DESERT STORM experiences as a task force scout platoon leader, I endorse, with some additions, the Army's current direction it is heading with the Future Scout Vehicle.

Notes

1. Armor 2000 - A Balanced Force for the Army of the Future. U.S. Army Annor Center, Fort Knox. Ky., 10 July 1990, p. 14.

2. FM 17-98, Scout Platoon. HQ, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., October 1987, p. 2-60.

3. FM 71-2, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force. Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., September 1988, p. 3-44.

4. Ibid.

5. Armor 2000. p. 14.

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Captain John K. Tien wrote this article based on his experience as the task force scout platoon leader for 4^th Battalion, 70^th Armor, 2^nd Brigade, 1^st Armored Division, which fought in the battle of Medinah Ridge during Operation DESERT STORM.

He is a 1987 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and received a degree in Political Science from Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar. A graduate of the AOAC, AOBC, Airborne, and French Commando Courses, he served as a tank platoon leader, scout platoon leader, and battalion adjutant for 470^th Armor in Erlangen, Germany. He is currently assigned to the 2^nd Armored Division at Fort Hood.

Why would we want to be in a thinly or non-armored, wheeled truck that is permanently wed to roads/trails offering not even armor or firepower advantages?

The wise military commander does not want wheeled trucks even on roads because without any cover from enemy fires you need every ounce of protection you can get. NOT ROAD SPEED which has been proven not nearly fast enough to evade a roadside bomb explosion with fragments flying at 30,000 feet per second. In open terrain you cannot afford to squander 28% of your armor potential by using rubber tire wheels. So for roads which are actually OPEN TERRAIN you need the heaviest tracked tanks with the heaviest/best armor protection possible that with steel tracks with rubber pads or rubber band tracks can travel up/down without tearing the pavement up. As said before, a light tracked cavalry should proceed this main body to make first contact with the enemy and to hold them by the nose or at the least report back and find a cross-country route via trial/error the heavier main body vehicles can take to hit the enemy in the flanks. Up-engined M113A3 Gavins are far more mobile than 33-ton Bradleys and even under-powered A2 Gavins are more mobile in closed terrains than Bradleys to be light mechanized cavalry.

This is what the M113 Gavin-based 197^th Infantry Brigade did for the 24^th ID in Desert Storm so well. If this is not possible, the medium to heavy tracked tanks can go up the middle and hit the enemy frontally with the best armor and firepower possible to hopefully breakthrough.

Light Tanks Lead the Way in Desert Storm: M113 Gavin 197^th Light Mechanized Infantry Brigade

www.tim-thompson.com/desert-storm.jpg

The 197^th Brigade in M113 Gavins because of their lower ground pressure LEAD the entire force through the marshy areas that BRADLEYS COULDN'T TRAVERSE as indicated in the history narratives below which 197th IN BDE veteran NCOs told us.

Lucky War: Third Army in Desert Storm
By Richard M. Swain, 1999

http://books.google.com/books?id=mZty9wdfHRkC&pg=RA1-PA243&lpg=RA1-PA243&dq=197th+infantry+brigade+desert+storm&source=web&ots=EhTuMUNRDz&sig=FvanJMXSm7oMD3LS48gLkCR7S6E&hl=en

The Complete Idiot's Guide to the Gulf War
By Charles Jaco, 2002

http://books.google.com/books?id=EcCv1wwcdjAC&pg=PA241&lpg=PA241&dq=infantry+brigade+m113+197th&source=web&ots=nkGjCktn_9&sig=qecyCsUGmQHgb2rA_9xxlRJ28EQ&hl=en

Despite the clear lessons of DESERT SHIELD/STORM, we persisted with the Humvee truck scout non-sense that clearly doesn't work even though M113 Gavins that are great cavalry scout vehicles were and ARE available! The only conclusion possible is the heavy whoppertankytards are threatened by a real light mechanized cavalry so they keep 19D scouts in a crippled, wheeled truck state. Eco-nazis on garrison post don't want any trees and woodpeckers knocked over. Troops in back can't see shit or fight mounted. Infantry flees from Bradley units into the "lightfighter" narcissist orbit. Look at their 11B and 11M career paths:

Don't let this "everyone a 11B" change fool you; if you are a mech pussy, you ain't gonna go to jump school etc. you will be stuck in death-before-dismount 2nd class citizen Bradley and Stryker mech-land and motor-land.

USMC likes the Bradley so much their new AAAV/EFV amtrack will be arranged just like it. The Lightfighters without mobility gets their asses kicked in Somalia in 1993, but nothing changes. TF Hawk airlanding of heavy M1s and medium M2s is a clusterfuck and embarrrassment, so Shinseki rather than do the right and best thing, which would be supply the infantry M113 Gavin tracks, saves institutional face by pitching thinly armored trucks (LAV-III/"Strykers") aka motorized infantry as the Army's salvation for sub-national conflicts. Garrison line Infantry loves the high road speed, comfortable ride wheeled trucks because they think they will not have to spend much time on them and are then free to play their garrison BS games with gusto. No more Bradley second-class citizenship in back. Problem is that its no better than road-bound motorized TF Smith in Korea in 1950 asking to happen all over again. A future daily road ambush disaster awaits in Iraq, it happens and nothing changes.

The root cause of all of this is GARRISON.

The desire to have 19th century trappings of rank, privilege, barracks, lawns, parades, saluting, look-at-me-shoot, look-at-me-slowly-march, me-me-me narcissism; all of this chokes out ANY technotactical excellence.

If we do not fix this, and get rid of the 19th century military, America will not make it into the 22nd century. Maybe you are fat and happy with the way things are and the garrison BS. You think its AOK every time we go to war its always a "gee-this-is-a-new-thing-to-me" and the learning curve is measured in dead Americans in flag-draped coffins. You want to ride to the battle, have this event completely erased since its not important and focus ALL THE ATTENTION ON YOU, THE INFANTRYMAN. You have "arrived" and will now do your Civil War/WW2 re-enactment. But the one thing you better not try to do is foist yourself as a "hero" and a "patriot" or a military "professional", since you are neither. Garrison piece-of-shit is what you are and chose to be, Mr. Line Infantry.

M113A3 Super Gavins in Iraq combat by 1^st Cavalry

This is a pic from a recent Fort Benning BAYONET newspaper showing a heavily up-armored M113A3 Super Gavin in Iraq being used as a HOOAH! backdrop showing its still a vehicle beloved by Soldiers in the Army; in this case, the Cavalry---who should have had these light tracks all along!

Humvee madness: All Clinton's Fault???

Notice the BS Humvees when superior M113 Gavins were available to field an effective cavalry!

Again, brass within the Army FEAR an effective cavalry, especially a light one that could hog up "all the action" by being air-transportable.

A great find by Mark Ash!

From the 1992 DoA Historic Summary...

www.army. mil/CMH/books/ DAHSUM/1992/ ch02.htm

Force cuts, from 18 to 14 division PRIOR TO BILL CLINTON EVEN BEING NOMINATED FOR PREZ!!!!!

Under the Base Force concept, the Army inactivated four divisions and one corps, reducing its strength to pre-Korean War levels. During fiscal years 1990 and 1991 the Army had inactivated the 9^th Motorized Division and the 2^nd Armored Division. After its return from Southwest Asia in 1991, the VII Corps was officially inactivated on 15 April 1992. The 8^th Infantry Division had already disappeared from the rolls on 17 January 1992, and the 3^rd Armored Division followed on 15 August 1992. During FY 1992, U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), also lost the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, which the Army planned to reorganize as a light armored cavalry regiment. During the fourteen months prior to May 1992, the V Corps, USAREUR's major combat corps, lost fifty-six battalions and thirty-seven company-size units. The Army thus reduced its end strength in Europe by 72,500 men, close to 200 Soldiers per day, during FY 1992.

About the 2^nd ACR going "light"...

Light Cavalry Regiment

In response to the lessons of DESERT STORM, the Department of the Army in September 1991 directed TRADOC to design a light cavalry regiment. The Chief of Staff had approved the concept and the reorganization of the 2^nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (Light) using the assets of the 199^th Separate Infantry Brigade (Motorized). The 2^nd would serve as the light cavalry regiment for the XVIII Airborne Corps and also as the Joint Readiness Training Center's operational force. In April 1992, TRADOC prepared two designs for a light cavalry regiment. An interim design envisioned 4,354 troopers in three ground squadrons, one equipped with M1 tanks, one with M113A3 armored personnel carriers, and one with M113 armored personnel carriers with Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire command link-guided (TOW) antitank missile systems. It also called for a regimental aviation squadron containing forty-eight multiple-purpose light helicopters (MPLH).

The Army Staff and FORSCOM expressed concern about the interim design. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), told TRADOC to reduce the light cavalry regiment to less than 4,100 officers and men, to drop the number of helicopters from forty-eight to thirty-six, and to include only one type of gun in the organization for field artillery. The regiment would use High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) with TOW until the Army fielded the armored gun system. The revised design contained 3,922 spaces in two ground squadrons, a reconnaissance squadron, and a regimental aviation squadron. During the summer the design underwent further alterations. On 7 August 1992, the Chief of Staff approved a transitional design of 4,017 spaces in three ground squadrons with HMMWV TOW and a regimental aviation squadron with thirty-three MPLHs and ten UH-60 helicopters. He also accepted the FY 1995 conversion.

Certainly Clinton didn't help the military that much, but most of the stupidity that was seen on his watch was inititiated on "What a Dick" Cheney and Dumsfeld's watch.

We need a MOBILE INFANTRY (defacto cavalry) if we want to defeat enemies today that are more mobile than us; its long overdue. The plains Indians could do it with 19th century technology. See excerpt Dave Reeder found below. Its high time that our light infantry get the M113 Gavin light tanks needed to do 3D maneuver warfare over and through closed terrain to help our heavy forces in heavier tanks doing 2D maneuver warfare over open terrain. If we don't fix this and soon, forces like Hezbollah will not be just a nuisance to the Israelis in rocky southern Lebanon.

From The Prairie Traveler, Capt. Randolph B. Marcy, 5^th Infantry, Chapter 6, 1859

INDIAN FIGHTING.

The military system, as taught and practiced in our army up to the time of the Mexican war, was, without doubt, efficient and well adapted to the art of war among civilized nations. This system was designed for the operations of armies acting in populated districts, furnishing ample resources, and against an enemy who was tangible, and made use of a similar system. [EDITOR: nation-state war]

The vast expanse of desert territory that has been annexed to our domain within the last few years is peopled by numerous tribes of marauding and erratic savages, who are mounted upon fleet and hardy horses, making war the business and pastime of their lives, and acknowledging none of the ameliorating conventionalities of civilized warfare. Their tactics are such as to render the old system almost wholly impotent. [EDITOR: sub-national conflict by people who have no civilian "life", they live for violence; sounds like Hezbollah today]

To act against an enemy who is here to-day and there to-morrow; who at one time stampedes a herd of mules upon the head waters of the Arkansas, and when next heard from is in the very heart of the populated districts of Mexico, laying waste haciendas, and carrying devastation, rapine, and murder in his steps; who is every where without being any where; who assembles at the moment of combat, and vanishes whenever fortune turns against him; who leaves his women and children far distant from the theater of hostilities, and has neither towns or magazines to defend, nor lines of retreat to cover; who derives his commissariat from the country he operates in, and is not encumbered with baggage wagons or pack-trains; who comes into action only when it suits his purposes, and never without the advantage of numbers or position-with such an enemy the strategic science of civilized nations loses much of its importance, and finds but rarely, and only in peculiar localities, an opportunity to be put in practice.

Our little army, scattered as it has been over the vast area of our possessions, in small garrisons [FOBs] of one or two companies each, has seldom been in a situation to act successfully on the offensive against large numbers of these marauders, and has often been condemned to hold itself almost exclusively upon the defensive. The morale of the troops must thereby necessarily be seriously impaired, and the confidence of the savages correspondingly augmented. The system of small garrisons has a tendency to disorganize the troops in proportion as they are scattered, and renders them correspondingly inefficient. The same results have been observed by the French army in Algeria, where, in 1845, their troops were, like ours, disseminated over a vast space, and broken up into small detachments stationed in numerous intrenched posts. Upon the sudden appearance of Abd el Kader in the plain of Mitidja, they were defeated with serious losses, and were from day-to-day obliged to abandon these useless stations, with all the supplies they contained. A French writer, in discussing this subject, says:

"We have now abandoned the fatal idea of defending Algeria by small intrenched posts. In studying the character of the war, the nature of the men who are to oppose us, and of the country in which we are to operate, we must be convinced of the danger of admitting any other system of fortification than that which is to receive our grand depots, our magazines, and to serve as places to recruit and rest our troops when exhausted by long, expeditionary movements.

"These fortifications should be established in the midst of the centers of action, so as to command the principal routes, and serve as pivots to expeditionary columns. [EDITOR: only have the minimum necessary FOBs that are operationally located to have maximum effect]

"We owe our success to a system of war which has its proofs in twice changing our relations with the Arabs. This system consists altogether in the great mobility we have given to our troops. Instead of disseminating our Soldiers with the vain hope of protecting our frontiers with a line of small posts, we have concentrated them, to have them at all times ready for emergencies, and since then the fortune of the Arabs has waned, and we have marched from victory-to-victory. [EDITOR: Quick Reaction Forces]

"This system, which has thus far succeeded, ought to succeed always, and to conduct us, God willing, to the peaceful possession of the country."

In reading a treatise upon war as it is practiced by the French in Algeria, by Colonel A. Laure, of the 2^nd Algerian Tirailleurs, published in Paris in 1858, I was struck with the remarkable similarity between the habits of the Arabs and those of the wandering tribes that inhabit our Western prairies. Their manner of making war is almost precisely the same, and a successful system of strategic operations for one will, in my opinion, apply to the other.

As the Turks have been more successful than the French in their military operations against the Arab tribes, it may not be altogether uninteresting to inquire by what means these inferior Soldiers have accomplished the best results. [EDITOR: just like ARVN were able to get good results in M113 Gavins]

The author above mentioned, in speaking upon this subject, says:

"In these latter days the world is occupied with the organization of mounted infantry, according to the example of the Turks, where, in the most successful experiments that have been made, the mule carries the foot-Soldier.

"The Turkish Soldier mounts his mule, puts his provisions upon one side and his accoutrements upon the other, and, thus equipped, sets out upon long marches, traveling day and night, and only reposing occasionally in bivouac. Arrived near the place of operations (as near the break of day as possible), the Turks dismount in the most profound silence, and pass in succession the bridle of one mule through that of another in such a manner that a single man is sufficient to hold forty or fifty of them by retaining the last bridle, which secures all the others; they then examine their arms, and are ready to commence their work. The chief gives his last orders, posts his guides, and they make the attack, surprise the enemy, generally asleep, and carry the position without resistance. The operation terminated, they hasten to beat a retreat, to prevent the neighboring tribes from assembling, and thus avoid a [decisive] combat. [EDITOR: fight way out with mobility before enemies can converge like they did to Delta/Rangers on October 3, 1993 in Mogadishu]

"The Turks had only three thousand mounted men and ten thousand infantry in Algeria, yet these thirteen thousand men sufficed to conquer the same obstacles which have arrested us for twenty-six years, notwithstanding the advantage we had of an army which was successively re-enforced until it amounted to a hundred thousand.

"Why not imitate the Turks, then, mount our infantry upon mules, and reduce the strength of our army?

"The response is very simple:

"The Turks are Turks-that is to say, Mussulmans-and indigenous to the country; the Turks speak the Arabic language; the Days of Algiers had less country to guard than we, and they care very little about retaining possession of it. They are satisfied to receive a part of its revenues. They were not permanent; their dominion was held by a thread. The Arab dwells in tents; his magazines are in caves. When he starts upon a war expedition, he folds his tent, drives far away his beasts of burden, which transport his effects, and only carries with him his horse and arms. Thus equipped, he goes every where; nothing arrests him; and often, when we believe him twenty leagues distant, he is in ambush at precisely rifle range from the flanks of his enemy.

"It may be thought the union of contingents might retard their movements, but this is not so. The Arabs, whether they number ten or a hundred thousand, move with equal facility. They go where they wish and as they wish upon a campaign; the place of rendezvous merely is indicated, and they arrive there.

"What calculations can be made against such an organization as this?

"Strategy evidently loses its advantages against such enemies; a general can only make conjectures; he marches to find the Arabs, and finds them not; then, again, when he least expects it, he suddenly encounters them.

"When the Arab despairs of success in battle, he places his sole reliance upon the speed of his horse to escape destruction; and as he is always in a country where he can make his camp beside a little water, he travels until he has placed a safe distance between himself and his enemy."

No people probably on the face of the earth are more ambitious of martial fame, or entertain a higher appreciation for the deeds of a daring and successful warrior, than the North American savages. The attainment of such reputation is the paramount and absorbing object of their lives; all their aspirations for distinction invariably take this channel of expression. A young man is never considered worthy to occupy a seat in council until he has encountered an enemy in battle; and he who can count the greatest number of scalps is the most highly honored by his tribe. This idea is inculcated from their earliest infancy. It is not surprising, therefore, that, with such weighty inducements before him, the young man who, as yet, has gained no renown as a brave or warrior, should be less discriminate in his attacks than older men who have already acquired a name. The young braves should, therefore, be closely watched when encountered on the Plains. [EDITOR; career-ism and Achilles-style narcissistic existentialism, Indian-style]

From The Prairie Traveler, Capt. Randolph B. Marcy, 5^th Infantry, Chapter 7, 1859 offers suggestions to improve U.S. tactics:

By making short excursions about the country they acquire a knowledge of it, become inured to fatigue, learn the art of bivouacking, trailing, etc., etc., all of which will be found serviceable in border warfare; and, even if they should perchance now and then miss some of the minor routine duties of the garrison, the benefits they would derive from hunting would, in my opinion, more than counterbalance its effects. Under the old regime it was thought that drills, dress-parades, and guard-mountings comprehended the sum total of the Soldier's education, but the experience of the last ten years has taught us that these are only the rudiments, and that to combat successfully with Indians we must receive instruction from them, study their tactics, and, where they suit our purposes, copy from them. [EDITOR: obvious condemnation of garrison mentality in favor of head-on adaptation to defeat the enemy; like many similar calls, it may be heeded but only with expectation that when Indian problem is over, return to garrison will ensue]

The union of discipline with the individuality, self-reliance and rapidity of locomotion of the savage is what we should aim at. This will be the tendency of the course indicated, and it is conceived by the writer that an army composed of well-disciplined hunters will be the most efficient of all others against the only enemy we have to encounter within the limits of our vast possessions. [EDITOR: you crazy? The narcissistic garrison egomaniacs will have none of this "self-reliance"!!! STAY-IN-YOUR-LANE!!!]

I find some pertinent remarks upon this subject in a very sensible essay by "a late captain of infantry" (U. S.). He says:

"It is conceived that scattered bands of mounted hunters, with the speed of a horse and the watchfulness of a wolf or antelope, whose faculties are sharpened by their necessities; who, when they get short of provisions, separate and look for something to eat, and find it in the water, in the ground, or on the surface; whose bill of fare ranges from grass-seed, nuts, roots, grasshoppers, lizards, and rattlesnakes up to the antelope, deer, elk, bear, and buffalo, and who have a continent to roam over, will be neither surprised, caught, conquered, overawed, or reduced to famine by a rumbling, bugle blowing, drum-beating town passing through their country on wheels at the speed of a loaded wagon. [EDITOR: sounds like a Stryker "wagon"]

"If the Indians are in the path and do not wish to be seen, they cross a ridge, and the town moves on, ignorant whether there are fifty Indians within a mile or no Indian within fifty miles. If the Indians wish to see, they return to the crest of the ridge, crawl up to the edge, pull up a bunch of grass by the roots, and look through or under it at the procession."

Infantry, Don't Forget to Heavy Weaponize your Tracked Armored Personnel Carriers

Not having a heavy-caliber, high explosive delivering weapon but having the tracked armored fighting vehicles to mobilize such weapons is the tragic mistake of the "A Bridge Too Far" fight for Arnhem bridge over the Rhine river in 1944.

Thanks to Keith Flint's book, Airborne Armour we now know what went wrong on the way to Arnhem bridge: unlike the British 6^th Airborne Division that took both Tetrarch/Locust light tanks with turreted 37mm-40mm-3 inch guns and Bren gun armored personnel carriers into D-Day and the later Operation Varsity---the 1^st Airborne Division only glider-landed 18 x Bren gun carriers to move SUPPLIES for the infantry---but without the light tanks did not even have a single "Universal Carrier" outfitted with a large caliber gun in a ready-to-fire mode when they bumped into a mere pair of German armored cars. While the walking infantry fanned out and hit-the-dirt, the Germans blasted their 1^st Reconnaissance Squadron's unarmored jeeps towing 20mm Polsten anti-aircraft cannon before they could unlimber and fire.

Had just a few of these Bren gun carriers been carrying a fixed mount 20mm, 37mm, 40mm, 57mm, 76mm antitank or 75mm pack howitzer gun as the photos below show were actually tested and proved functional---they would have enabled the men inside to save the day on "Tiger Route" to Arnhem, reinforcing LTC Frost's men there so they could have held on a few more days until XXX Corps link-up. The pay-off?

WW2 would have ended 1 year sooner, Berlin would have been entirely in Allied instead of half communist hands. Untold deaths, sufferings and atrocities would have been prevented...no Battle of the Bulge debacle....you get the point. A technotactical failure had STRATEGIC consequences for the entire world resulting in millions of people suffering. It wasn't one bridge "too far", it was a case of NOT BRINGING ENOUGH.

So why didn't Brens have big guns?

Because the egotistical infantry has and continues to refuse to admit it needs high explosive (HE) building/bunker/dug-in enemy blasting firepower help from a VEHICLE because it smacks of a "tank". Well, they are correct. Anything that is tracked and armored is indeed, a TANK, and a Bren gun carrier with a BIG gun would be a tank---which is too fucking bad. That's what they needed on the dusty road to Arnhem when they chose to glider-land 6-8 miles to avoid anti-aircraft fire that would decimate a daylight drop of airborne or glider infantry directly on to the bridge. Paradoxically, infantry will tolerate HE firepower if its coming from a fellow narcissist on foot--but just barely. They don't like it and don't embrace HE firepower with lots of RPG gunners and yearn for kinetic energy bullet gun-slinging to carry the day. Any HE weapons carried by infantry have to be low-key and not grab the limelight from the rifleman. When the 82^nd Airborne kicks German ass in WW2 they don't let us know it was greatly assisted by captured German panzerfaust disposable rocket launchers because its bad for their Superman image. You have to read carefully into LTG James Gavin's writings to learn this secret. So if Western infantry in love with bullet garden hosing the enemy is reluctant to employ HE rocket launchers from their own shoulders, how do you think they'll look upon HE from one of their tracked infantry carriers making it into a defacto tank obvious for everyone to see?

They will not like it nor want it.

This is why you can see APC/AFVs all over the world armed with only machine guns and weak cannons when they can clearly have a large HE weapon fitted--because infantrymen are little penis egomaniacs who want all the glory to themselves via dismounted foot action--blasting an enemy position is "un-heroic". This is indeed true as an ignorant, corrupt and incompetent practice but its moreover tragic and battle-losing. History is filled with accounts where hand-carried firepower was not enough since the earth can easily absorb it if the enemy skillfully employs fortifications and denies the KE bullet shooter access to a line-of-sight (LOS) on him. The disastrous amphibious raid on Dieppe in 1942 was Eban Emael--but without the gliders 3D maneuvering infantry into LOS access---and the medium-heavy Churchill tanks stuck on the beach were unable to render vehicular fire support. Arnhem was APCs/AFVs being there with the infantry by virtue of their tracked, armored mobility but not having the meeting engagement and dug-in enemy defeating firepower to carry the day. The infantry rice bowl protector reader will remark, "but that's the job of the tankers to provide us shock action". Well, did Armor branch get this memo? They appear to be only interested in dueling other tanks in the heaviest tanks possible not risking themselves by being in a lighter tank to be there where infantry can walk to give YOU FIRE SUPPORT. Like the USAF, tankers want to win wars all by themselves by first "shooting down" the enemy's mirror image of themselves, and then when that's done, win wars ONLY by their mounted maneuver without ever dismounting anybody. They have the same technohubris as the fly boys---just bound to the earth. Both false narrow mentalities were born when we failed to fully understand and employ both the tank and the airplane at the dawn of the 20th Century. We still don't have it figured out going on now into the 21st Century! The facts are we need both mounted (remember the U.S. Army's 3^rd Infantry Division "Thunder Run" that took Baghad when the truck-centric USMC got pinned down?) and dismounted action, how can we get both without creating factions who only want to do one or the other?--is the dilemma. We have not even broached the subject of parachuting or airlanding in light tanks or to be a forward Cavalry for the open terrain, 2D maneuver force's medium-to-heavy tanks, THEY DON'T WANT TO DO IT! Today's tankers have lost sight of what Cavalry is and in the process have by refusing to field light tanks like the M113 Gavin into Cav units in 1970/80s, the Rapid Deployment Force Light tank in the 1980s and the M8 Buford AGS in the 1990s, forfeited the torch of mobile warfare, air-delivered Cavalry to the infantry to their present day shame and branch digestion into the Army borg.

So its now up to infantry to save itself with their own tank fire support, but first infantry has to save itself from its own wheeled stupidity. Motorized infantry is dead infantry or soon-to-be-dead infantry along roads/trails/streets where land mines and increasingly sophisticated ambushes await. In infantry's vanity to not appear like the cursed tankers, they have chosen non-functional rubber tire trucks and damned themselves to reliving the Korean war debacle again and again in Iraq/Afghanistan. Infantry needs to practice what it preaches--"the easy way is mined" and employ M113 Gavin light tracked APCs/AFVs to go cross-country through and over by available C-130/CH-47 aircraft closed terrains where heavier 2D maneuver forces cannot traverse or fly in a timely manner. Next, infantry needs to get over who is going to get the glory and wake up that they will be damn well lucky just to WIN using everything they have got and can get to help them. This means some of their APCs/AFVs will need powerful HE weaponry to be there in an instant to render fire support in a meeting engagement and to bust through enemy strong points in the face of their fire so as to not get pinned down re: Arnhem. In the final analysis, infantry needs to learn to save itself with its own light tanks derived from their own infantry-carrying light tanks AKA APCs/AFVs. The only vehicular fire support the infantry can count on is the vehicles it takes with them that can go wherever they can walk, and this means light, low-ground pressure tracks not bloated, high ground pressure Humvee/Stryker/MRAP/JTVL wheels.

The good news is all of this is that infantry's M113 Gavins can easily take a drop-in turret for firepower up to 105mm. Its not as efficient weight-wise as a fixed-gun STUG nor as survivable and hard to hit but its easy to do as the South Korean AIFV with 90mm turret below shows.

However, a turret means a manual as thick as a telephone book to master and someone becoming a "pussy" (Gunner) perhaps even two (Commander/Gunner) "cowards" being created who are "getting over" compared to the dead men walking. It also means 360 degree traverse/firing in seconds and armor protection so the weapon isn't easily knocked out....

If this is too rich for infantry blood/ego since it would be...gulp...a TANK to even the morons who think such things only have turrets (look at WW1 "tanks", how many of them had turrets? I guess they were not tanks, huh?).

OK, fine, no turret, no STUG gun in the hull.

Then a simple exposed pedestal or ring mount of a recoilless rifle or a TOW ATGM launcher on the M113 Gavin gets the necessary HE blasting effect at $500 a round or $5, 000 a missile. Some gunners will die firing from exposed positions and shields should be fitted to help. There should be no qualms about this since light infantry already has Humvee trucks with TOW ATGMs on top for tank effects (remember how Saddam's sons died?) as long as the truck its mounted under doesn't get you incinerated first. Switching out the dead horse of the wheeled truck for a light armored track solves not only light infantry's lack of Armor branch showing up to the fight after parachute and airland insertion, but there's space in back for infantry to get mobility to perhaps get into position after crossing enemy fire to do an Eban Emael and M16 versus AK47 defeat the enemy that needs rooting out.

Its almost as if....the M113....was designed by infantryman General Gavin to do this all along....that its program name of Airborne Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle Family implies it was supposed to be used as an air-transported armored mobility mount for multiple tasks such as....INFANTRY FIRE SUPPORT. That would mean our forebears actually knew what they were doing at times, and we could learn from them by studying military history for practical applications for today and the future, right?

The time is long overdue for infantry to start mounting heavy weaponry on its light tracked platforms and stop expecting someone else to save them.

PROFESSIONAL NOTES

Modernizing the Airborne

By Stan Crist

In the years preceding, World War II, the combat triumvirate of the U.S. Army was composed primarily of foot-mobile infantry, towed artillery, and a handful of light tanks. The onset of hostilities, however, was the catalyst for a modernization effort that would dramatically change the organization, training, and equipment of U.S. ground forces. The Army transformed itself, from a force trained and equipped for the static nature of World War I, into one well adapted to the high-mobility demands of blitzkrieg.

The increased use of truck transport allowed the infantry to be moved about the battlefield much faster, although only when out of contact with the enemy. To overcome that problem, the thinly armored M3 "half-track" was developed, which provided improved cross-country ability and some degree of protection from small arms fire, although its open-top design left it vulnerable to artillery airbursts. In the 1960s the creation of the M113 [Gavin] armored personnel carrier (APC) produced another leap ahead in mobility and protection, thanks to its full-tracked, completely enclosed configuration. Two decades later, the adoption of the M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) gave the U.S. infantryman even greater combat capability.

The artillery branch evolved in a

Page 8 INFANTRY July-December 1997

STANLEY C. CRIST

similar fashion over the past six decades, going from completely unprotected, towed artillery pieces to improvised mountings of howitzers on half-tracks and tank chassis, to purpose-built self-propelled guns such as the MI09A6 Paladin. The tank force, which began with combat vehicles that were inadequately armored and woefully under-

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When the 82^nd Airborne Division was activated in 1942, it was primarily made up of foot-mobile infantry, with a few small-caliber, towed artillery pieces--and no tanks.

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gunned, now fields the best main battle [heavy] tank (MBT) ever made-the M1A2 Abrams. The history of the airborne stands in stark contrast to the progress of the infantry, artillery, and armor. When the 82^nd Airborne Division was activated in 1942, it was made up primarily of foot-mobile infantry, with a few small caliber, towed artillery pieces-and no tanks. The 82^nd has changed little since its inception half a century ago. It is still mainly a light infantry force, with a small number of towed howitzers for support; it also has some additional combat power in the form of TOW missile launchers mounted on HMMWVs (high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles) and a single battalion of M551A1 Sheridan light tanks. Essentially, the paratroopers are stuck in World War II mode, while "leg" infantry is becoming a 21st Century force, having advanced from foot mobility to truck, then half-track, APC, and IFV. The traditional role of paratroopers is to drop into the enemy's rear area, seize critical objectives, and hold on until relieved by conventional ground forces.

This linkup must occur quickly to achieve mission success and paratroop survival. A prime example of the inherent weakness of this strategy is Operation Market Garden (September 1944), in which British and Polish airborne forces were annihilated by German Panzer units while attempting to capture and hold Arnhem bridge. Many paratroopers were killed, wounded, or taken prisoner, in large part because they were outclassed in firepower, armor protection, and mobility: They couldn't run, they couldn't hide, they had precious little with which to fight, and the relief force failed to reach them!

www.youtube.com/watch?v=VSm5nBZ4X0A

As a consequence of similarly bitter wartime experience---along with some thoughtful, farsighted analysis-the Russian (formerly Soviet) General Staff eventually concluded that airborne units must have the means to conduct operations without the need to link up with ground troops. Doing this meant giving the paratroops roughly the same degree of tactical and technological advantage enjoyed by the heavy forces. The result was the introduction in 1970 of the BMD airborne combat vehicle (ACV), which enabled the innovative creation of the world's first fully mechanized airborne force.

www.youtube.com/watch?v=_hrvgYEI90c

Somewhat ironically, the parachute deliverable M113 APC had entered production a decade earlier, a fact that would have permitted the modernization of U.S. airborne forces ten years before their Russian counterparts.

www.youtube.com/watch?v=zD4RWmotso0

Curiously, the interest--and the vision-has been lacking in this country. Instead of embracing mechanization as a means of expanding and enhancing their warfighting capability, the U.S. airborne community seems to decry the concept stating two basic reasons: "There is not enough airlift," and "We can fight heavy forces, successfully in all but the most open kinds of terrain, so why make a change that would rob us of our strategic mobility?" These issues are certainly serious enough to merit examination and analysis in an effort to determine their validity and provide possible alternatives.

Not enough airlift? If this is true, the obvious answer is, "Get more!" If, however, politico-economic factors prohibit the acquisition of additional transport aircraft for this purpose, then what options are available that could be implemented with existing airlift assets?

Just how many transports would actually be required to lift a mechanized airborne force? Before answering these questions, it is first necessary to know the basic specifications of the airborne combat vehicle.

The Vehicle

Although it would be desirable to develop a state-of-the-art ACV family-an airborne combat system (ACS}---budget constraints would doubtless prevent it. Fortunately, a vehicle currently in service--the M113A3 APC (and certain of its variants) has most of the required characteristics: First, with its small size and light weight, the M113A3 is capable of transport and low-velocity airdrop (LVAD, or "heavy drop") by all four major U.S. Air Force cargo planes-the C-130, C-141, C-5, and C-17; it can also be carried a short distance as a sling load by the CH-47D helicopter. The only other full-tracked, armored vehicle now in the inventory that has the same LVAD capability is the M551A1 Sheridan tank. If the Sheridans of the 82^nd's 3^rd Battalion, 73^rd Armor (originally slated to be replaced by the now-defunct XM8 [Buford] armored gun system) are withdrawn from service as planned, M113 variants will be the Army's only tracked combat vehicles with full LVAD capability.

www.youtube.com/watch?v=htdQVbmvLgQ

The M113A3 is a vast improvement over the previous M113s. A more powerful but more fuel-efficient turbocharged engine and a new transmission deliver automotive performance on a par with that of the Bradley fighting vehicle. Internal kevlar spall liners and external fuel tanks provide a great increase in crew survivability; mounting provisions for bolt-on armor packages make possible the upgrade of protection trom the basic level (small arms, artillery fragments) to 14.5mm heavy machinegun, 30mm cannon, and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) rounds. The MI13A3's tactical mobility is further enhanced by its ability to swim across small bodies of water with little or no preparation.

www.youtube.com/watch?v=9VMgdFUd1JU

While basic armament-a .50-caliber [heavy] machinegun-is rather minimal for modem warfare, the elegant simplicity of the M113A3's box-like structure makes it ideally suited to a "modular" approach to armament installation.

www.youtube.com/watch?v=9SPHgpLWPws

Weapons that can be mounted on the vehicle include the M2 .50-caliber heavy machinegun (HMG), the Mk 19 40mm grenade machinegun (GMG), the M60/M240B 7.62mm medium machinegun (MMG), the M40A2 106mm recoilless rifle, TOW, Dragon, and Javelin antitank guided missiles (ATGMs), 81mm and 120mm mortars (in the M125 and M1064 mortar carrier variants). Even the Hellfire missile has been fired from a modified M113 that was fitted with a prototype eight-shot turret assembly. With the exception of the multiple Hellfire launcher, the weapons listed can be mounted in various combinations according to mission needs. The following are some examples:

General Purpose, Urban Terrain.

One GMG or HMG, one Javelin ATGM, two MMGs, and one LMG.

Configuration allows maximum, continuous 360-degree observation and target engagement.

Direct-Fire Support (Version 1).

One 106mm recoilless rifle, one 40mm GMG, and one 7.62mm MMG-a no cost "armored gun system." Direct-Fire Support (Version 2).

Two 106mm recoilless rifles, one .50 caliber HMG. Spanish TC-7/l06 one-man turret would provide armor protection for the gunner.

Page 9 July-December 1997 INFANTRY

Antitank.

Incorporates a two-man turret similar to that on the French AMX-1O HOT vehicle, with four ready-to-fire ATGMs-TOW, TOW follow-on, or Javelin.

Indirect-Fire Support or Antitank.

M1064A3 self-propelled 120mm mortar has almost three times the lethality of 81mm mortar, six times that of 60mm mortar currently used by airborne. 120mm precision-guided rounds would allow engagement of enemy armor at extended range (7,000-plus meters) and in defilade.

www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Y-j4KCNqKM

Airlift Requirements

In addition to the paratroopers, an airborne infantry battalion has 20 x TOW HMMWVs, 36 x cargo HMMWVs, and 10 x 2.5-ton trucks [ED: these weigh 10.5 tons--exactly the same as M113s]. The artillery battery has six HMMWVs to serve as prime movers for the M1l9A1 [105mm] howitzers, the air defense platoon has four HMMWVs, and the engineer platoon has several pieces of heavy earthmoving equipment. Ten C-130s or eight C-17s would be needed to transport the 730 jumpers of the battalion task force. To airlift all of these vehicles and heavy equipment mentioned would require about 54 x C-130s or 19 x C-17s. An ACS battalion with, for instance, 45 x M1l3A3s, nine x M1064A3s, and six scout HMMWVs would need 57 x C-130s or 19 x C-17s. If the paratroopers were to "tailgate" the vehicles-jump from the same aircraft, immediately following the heavy drop load--the personnel aircraft would not be needed, thereby freeing eight to 10 airlift sorties. A mechanized force might require slightly more (C-130), the same amount (C-17), or even significantly fewer ("tailgating") aircraft for transport than does the current organization; this is quite contrary to the widely held belief that a mechanized airborne unit would require excessive airlift resources.

www.youtube.com/watch?v=50cpPAVoxJQ

Organization

Two organizational approaches seem worth considering. One of these is to follow conventional practice and mechanize each battalion in all three brigades. This route would cost more to implement and would place greater administrative, logistical, and maintenance demands on the units, but it would also permit all nine battalions to be mechanized at the same time.

This configuration would have been very appropriate in August 1990 when

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One organizational approach is to follow conventional practice and mechanize each battalion in all three brigades.

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the entire 82^nd Airborne Division deployed to Saudi Arabia. There in a landscape without cover and concealment or shade from the sweltering summer sun-and facing a mobile, armored opponent-the foot-mobile paratroopers could do no more than dig in and hold on until the heavy forces arrived. Fortunately, although the Republican Guard T-72s may have been superior to the World War II German Panthers and Tigers, the Iraqi soldiers displayed only a fraction of the competence--and none of the will to fight-that the Panzer crews showed at Arnhem, thereby avoiding a replay of that debacle.

Another factor to consider is the pending retirement of the M551A1 Sheridans. When the Sheridans are gone, the paratroopers will not have an armored gun system that can be parachuted into the drop zone alongside them. In a mechanized airborne force, however, some of the M113A3s could be equipped with recoilless rifles to provide organic direct-fire support; both the M40A2 106mm and the M3 84mm Ranger antiarmor, antipersonnel weapon system (RAAWS) could be used in this role. Although the M40A2 has greater range and lethality, the M3 is light enough for easy dismounted use should the need arise. There are a few M40A2s still in storage at Anniston Army Depot (28 serviceable, as of this writing), but the 106 has been manufactured recently by Israeli Military Industries, and the 3A-HEAT-T round made by the firm of BOFORS reportedly has twice the penetration of the conventional 106 round and can defeat explosive reactive armor. These options are clearly less than ideal, but they are still far superior to hand-held weapons such as the LAW (light anti-armor weapon) and the AT-4.

The other organizational approach is to have an autonomous ACS brigade within the 82^nd Airborne functioning in much the same manner as the 3^rd Battalion, 73^rd Armor. Indeed, the armor battalion is probably the logical choice to serve as the nucleus of the proposed ACS brigade. (This battalion could also initially serve as a battalion-size Airborne Experimental Force to test the concept in Advanced Warfighting Experiments.)

There would be a number of advantages to having a separate brigade. The infantry battalions would not be saddled with the added maintenance and supply efforts required by organic light armor, nor would the paratroopers lose their dismounted skills, because they would have the use of the M113s only for required training and maintenance and periodic operations.

This should not be viewed as simply an armored transportation brigade, however. Even though it would function in that role for operations requiring mechanized infantry, it has the potential for employment in a variety of roles and missions.

In a Desert Shield type of scenario, for example, the M113A3s could be configured as tank killers, with ATGM launchers installed for line-of-sight engagements, while M1064A3 120mm self-propelled mortars could have precision-guided mortar munitions for long-range and indirect-fire use. This configuration would need only four crewmen per M113; a substantial reduction in personnel requirements compared to the manpower-intensive infantry units.

A single ACS brigade could field as much antitank firepower as two bri-

Page 10 INFANTRY July-December 1997

gades of parachute infantry--twice the combat power, with half the troops. Class III supply (petroleum, oil, lubricants) would be about as demanding as for those same infantry brigades, but this should be mostly (if not completely) offset by the greatly reduced requirements for Class I (food) and water, the latter being as critical as fuel in a desert environment. The need for items in Classes II, IV, VI, and VIII should also be minimized because of the reduced number of Soldiers.

As for deployability, only 22 C-5 sorties would be required to transport the brigade's 170-plus armored vehicles. A force of armored, high mobility, high-lethality weapon systems could maneuver according to the evolving situation-instead of just sitting and waiting behind a "line in the sand" hoping the enemy would attack at the most favorable time and place.

During World War II, the available technology did not permit the mechanization of parachute infantry. The workhorse of the air fleet--the legendary C-47-was not designed for parachute delivery of light armor; and the existing APC-the M3 half-track-was too big and heavy to be airdropped.

With the post-war development of the C-130 and other, larger transport aircraft, and the adoption of the aluminum-hulled M113, the technological aspects of the situation changed. Unfortunately, the U.S. airborne community failed to take advantage of these new circumstances. Other nations have been more adaptive, however. Israeli paratroopers readily incorporate the M113 into their operations, making full use of the vehicle's tactical mobility and armor protection. The German airborne has recently added a mechanized antitank battalion-armed with the ultralight, helicopter-transportable Wiesel (TOW and 20mm cannon versions}-to its force structure. And, of course, the Russians have equipped several divisions with BMD variants.

These countries have taken the lead in adding a new dimension to airborne warfare. By combining the superior tactical potential of mechanization with the inherently unique advantages of vertical envelopment, they are creating parachute-deliverable forces capable of employment across the entire operational continuum. Since 1989 the U.S. Army has been downsized from 18 divisions to ten, and there is talk that end strength could be reduced even further. This smaller Army of the 21st century cannot afford large, special-purpose units. Every division needs to be equipped and trained to fight and win on all types of terrain, and across the entire spectrum of ground combat scenarios. If the 82^nd Airborne Division is to become a full-spectrum force, it must mechanize; failure to do so is an open invitation to military obsolescence and battlefield defeat.

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Stanley C. Crist served in the 3^rd Battalion, 185^th Armor. He has written numerous articles on small arms testing and evaluation, some of which have appeared in INFANTRY.

Let's be brutally honest, shall we?

Where is the constructive effort to be good at warfighting in the garrison Army and marines?

U.S. military is not even "AMATEUR hour"; amateur implies at least we are TRYING; we are not trying; U.S. military is PHONY.

Air Force & Navy when they fly aircraft and sail ships are kept somewhat honest and combat capable because if they at any second fail they can be dead falling from the sky or in the water where man really doesn't live. To warfight they need to actively operate air/sea platforms.

In contrast in land combat, man lives on land; he does not need a platform to exist on land that automatically has a war function. He is under no compulsion to be combat ready even by platform default. Man can die on land from EXPOSURE however, and since he lives on land all the time for a peaceful, civilian life his answer to this is FIXED BUILDING SHELTER. Since man has a civilian existence means that has no military platform utility, both the Army and marines have been corrupted by building and lawn care as convenient excuses/time wasters by people who are phonies who do not want to be combat ready, they want to be phony narcissist snobs and extended adolescents paid middle-class wages.

Actives: wake up each morning sleep-deprived, roll call troop formation, do non-sense sports PT, then breakfast, some more troop formations, "leaders" meetings, document-everything-with-perfect-paperwork via desktop computers, Mondays wasted in motor pool doing PMCS on tactically unsound Humvee SUV trucks, Tuesday/Wednesdays building and lawn care, Thursday meetings, Friday paperwork. WHERE IS THE TIME TO DO ACTIVE WARFIGHTING EXCELLENCE? The entire daily and weekly routine established by the narcissist egomaniacs to baby sit the economic weak co-dependants is geared around BULLSHIT (lawn and building care) not active thinking cat vs. mouse warfighting.

www.combatreform.org/sleeplessarmy.htm

Reserves: one weekend a month they arrive and waste Saturday and Sunday with roll call formation, sports PT then lunch, then yadda yadda meetings, then time to go home for the day. Two weeks in summer is fun time away from wife and kids.

Solutions

1. Get rid of static buildings: force ground troops to every day do combat things by making them live every day in tactically-sound, portable, fortifiable "Battle Boxes" THERE IS NO GARRISON. There is only the FIELD.

www.geocities.com/strategicmaneuver/battleboxconcept.htm
www.geocities.com/strategicmaneuver/battleboxes.htm

2. Make Reserves go to war for 24 hours each month

www.geocities.com/paratroop2000/realreadyreserve.htm

3. Get rid of phony narcissists and economic bennie boomers and replace with warfighter enthusiasts

www.geocities.com/paratroop2000/weakcodependantarmy.htm

4. Cat & Mouse Warfighting Experimentation Needed

www.combatreform.org/cluelessarmy.htm

Once we cut out all the BULLSHIT we will face the tools we have in front of us and start grappling with how we will use them in war and how to better use them by ACTIVE THOUGHT. Force everyone to FACE THE TOOLS THEY HAVE IN FRONT OF THEM their minds will be forced to THINK about what it is they have. FORCE THEM TO BE IN A WAR SETTING AND THEIR MINDS WILL PONDER hey, what if I left on foot over there to patrol and an enemy sapper team is already there?

The same intellectual development and innovation that I undertake will happen with the troops, what we call FIELD CRAFT. How can you have FIELDcraft when you are NOT IN THE FIELD but in garrison doing LAWN CARE?

A few examples:

Drive vehicles and lay smoke screens with OPFOR to perfect what it takes to evade optical weapons engagement

Off-road, x-country driving of TRACKED armored fighting vehicles to avoid roadside bombs/RPG ambushes

Finding out how to hide vehicles from thermal imagery

Shoot actual soft nose RPGs at vehicles and practice evading them

Actual hardening of combat vehicles and loading arragements perfected not static BS "this is the SOP we've always used so go back to sleep"

5. Create Mobile units able to prevail on the Non-Linear Battlefield

www.combatreform.org/combatlight.htm
www.combatreform.org/m113combat.htm
www.geocities.com/armorhistory

itsg@hotmail.com

Army Requirements Should be Driven by Capabilities DEmonstrated not General Officer's Demands

Chuck Myers, Former DoD Director of Air Warfare writes:

"Just to remind: I have always believed we should erase the word 'requirements' from the force development/acquisition vocabulary, however, since we are still stuck with it, consider:

From your previous attached Army Document [EDITOR: "How the Army Runs"]:

Phase I-Develop capability requirements

5-3. Capabilities integration and development
a. The Joint Staff has adopted a functional approach to developing and integrating capabilities within the Joint force.

The reader should consult CJCSI 3170.01d, dtd 12 March 2004 (latest is 3170.01F 1 May 2007) for the most recent Joint terms and process instructions.

The Army has adopted a similar functional capabilities approach and the following paragraphs attempt to capture the emerging terminology and process changes. Capabilities-based requirements generation begins the Army force development process.

_________________________________________

Re your discussions of ground combat vehicles: there should never be an 'up-front' suggestion of the character of the vehicle insofar as wheels vs tracks vs air cushion, etc. The Army users should articulate the spectrum of perceived operational employments, battle environment, desired performance, forward support possibilities, threat specifices, etc. etc. and some indication as to how many of these vehicles they might hope to own/support.

Then they should examine possible use of upgraded versions of stuff that is available within their existing inventory or that of other armies. After exhausting existing possibilites, they might embark upon design exercises to discover the character of the options, cost, timeframe, etc.

I can agree that their should be no edict from the "top" re the specific details of the system (weapon, powerplant, wheels, tracks, etc.). What I can tolerate and may encourage is an edict that says something like: CS says I want the Army to develop a new ground combat vehicle that will get the "job" done (capabilites) and be avilable in say 2015 for 1/4 the life cycle cost of an M-1 tank and permit us to afford expanding our forces structure.

Chuck

Tanks that can swim have important tactical Mobility

Legendary combat tanker, Ralph Zumbro writes:

"Mike;

In early 1968, shortly after TET, the SF camp at Plei Mi, was besieged by NVA with a few PT-76s...We were called and sent a platoon of M-48s and broke the siege. The fleeing PT-76 were amphibs and crossed a river. We had to find a ford and lost them. And suddenly found ourselves in Cambodia. That platoon which I'd better not ID, spent a week wreaking havoc on the Trail. Another platoon of ours, commanded by an officer who recently retired as a brigadier, acted as our artillery support, using the 90s for indirect fire.

You want ground search capability, send out armored cav. A screen of 113s with sensors and dismounts, backed up by enough DIESEL tanks to bail them out. The drill is to sweep, emplace magnetic, thermal and siesmic sensors, and move on. When the sensors report activity, THEN you send in a stealth patrol. The ground units can be supplied by air, with offset airdrops or helidrops, IE the air comes in to a point and the ground goes to that point, rather than the ground forces setting up a laager in injun country under hostile observation.

The trick is that you have to have some manner of controlling the politicians and pentagon brass who would instantly try to block operations like this.

Ralph

OTHER COUNTRIES ARE USING FULL POTENTIAL OF LIGHT TANKS

"Excellent website I just want to say that. I enjoy your work on airborne warfare. I have studied airborne warfare since I was 14 and am now 21 and I do so like your site.

I research militaries in SE Asia and a good deal of airborne operations have happened there. Indonesia leads the pack and I am surprised you do not mention them as more then a footnote in East Timor in relation to the LAV and M-113. Indonesia took East Timor with a large airborne assault (for the region) during Operation Seroja in 1975. KOSTRAD (Indonesian Strategic Reserve which has 2 Infantry Divisions and 2 Airborne regiments along with armored cavalry units) and KOPASSANDHA (now called KOPASSUS) dropped in waves from AURI (Air Force) C-130s over the capital city of East Timor (Dili) and took on the left wing fighters of the Fretilin in close combat at night. The Fretilin had expected a round offensive to go through the rough territory of East Timor and hope to bog them down but the Indonesians out maneuvered them through a large airborne drop. The mission was a massive risk as the Indonesians only had 2 AC-47s (with 3 M-2HBs) to support the assault and had enough C-130s (9) to move about 2 battalions at once but little support weapons. 4 C-130s carried the KOPASSANDHA commands and 5 carried the KOSTRAD paratroopers of the 501st battalion. One C-130 was damaged from ground fire during the drop and had to return to base with 72 commandos on board. The second and third waves brought in the KOSTRAD 502nd battalion and the Brigade staff of the 18th Airborne Brigade. The fighting was up close and savage and worse at night. The commander of the 501st got lost and the battalion was unable to close to the lines of retreat for the Fretilin.

At the same time marines landed in BTR-50s and backed by PT-76s drove for the capital. They were landed a distance away to keep their ships safe and used their armor to move fast while Special Forces and local allies lead the way. There were problems as the second wave of the 502nd upon hearing the heavy fighting the first wave of KOPASSANDHA commandos had suffered during the drop began firing at the ground with their AK-47s and throwing grenades. At the same time the marines had arrived on the drop zone and had to duck for cover and worse some marines fired into the air knowing the KOSTRAD's 502nd battalion were in the air. None was hurt but many were shaken up. Hell KOPASSANDA forces actually used "captured" horses to provide mobility for a unit which backed by local forces move on the capital.

Air Force commandos of the PASKHAS were used to bring the nation's airfield to service to airland in more troops A platoon leader of the 328th KOSTRAD airborne battalion (of the 17th Airborne Brigade) had been dropped in the water as well. The 328th arrived in from the air to reinforce the units on the ground. The 401st KOSTRAD airborne battalion was airlanded to move on the town of Baucua. Seroja was the bloodiest day since independence for the Indonesian armed forces but allowed a quick take over of the capital. Around 50 airborne troops had died with more wounded but they had quickly taken the capital.

After the operation the 328th battalion had 2 PT-76s and 2 BTR-50s attached to them and seized Baucua. After the capture of Dili they had to go around the nation and defeat Fretilin strongholds. More airborne operations were done during this fighting. What followed by 24 years of war which lead to thousands dying and a vote on independence. Indonesia did not lose in Timor they were forced to leave which led to scars in their military. By the time they left in 1999 10,000 of their troops had died and an estimated 200,000 Timorese were killed.

Even as late as 2003 Indonesia dropped paratroopers on Aceh to fight the GAM guerillas. This operation was done by about 600 paratroopers dropped by C-130s backed with Hawk-209s and OV-10Fs. The ground element of Army troops backed with Scorpion-90 light tanks and marines backed by PT-90s (upgraded PT-76s with a 90mm gun) mopped up afterwards.

They also used paratroopers during the fighting in 1961 with the Dutch in Irain Jaya. They dropped in para-commandos from C-130s, An-12s and C-47s to raid Dutch targets. Many of these raids failed but in the end America and Russia forced the Dutch to turn over the Island. They used the RPKAD (now called KOPASSUS) and the Air Force commandos the PGT (now called PASKHAS). Also in the late 1950s the RPKAD was used to take rebel airfields held by an American backed movement the PERMESTA. The RPKAD did several combat jumps from C-47s to take airfields and block the retreat. This was the operation which eventually lead to the shoot down of Alan Pope, a CIA B-26 pilot by an AURI (air force) F-51D and his capture. The American government more or less paid a ransom for his release. Airborne forces have been used also in Irian Jaya to fight the OPM.

It is hard to find a nation crazier about airborne operations then Indonesia. Unlike many other poor nations their paratroopers actually train for airborne operations and jump from planes in combat. Their Special Forces (KOPASSUS) wear a red beret as they used to be "just" Paratroopers and the KOSTRAD units were green berets. Still these are light units with rifles, machine guns and light mortars but are able to hit quick and hard. You should get the book "Kopassus: Inside Indonesian Special Forces" for more reading. The book goes into detail about different parachutes and different planes they used to jump from such as the C-47, An-12 and C-130 and how the different chutes 'acted. It's an excellent read for anyone. It also goes in depth about airborne operations across the nation.

About mortars for combat;

I agree the 81mm has a much bigger punch then the 60mm but the 60mm more then has a role. During the fight for Balibo in 1975 which was a small town in East Timor with a stone fort the KOPASSANDA was ordered to take the fort and were backed by local guerillas. The commandos had AK-47s, 90mm rocket launchers and 60mm mortars. The fort had about 20-35 fighters backed with machine guns, G-3 rifles and an 81mm mortar. The 90mm rockets went fired within 200 meters were unable to punch a whole in the stone walls so the commandos brought up the 60mms, which took out the fort and the 81mm mortar. Of course Fretilin 81mm's did cause losses during the border fight which came before the massive invasion. Fretilin even put some on barrages and tried to attack the coast of Indonesian held West Timor before being stopped by marine PT-76s.

Also the NVA/VS used the Type-63 (M-2 60mm) very well as it was light and they could bring it into service fast and move out before the enemy could fire back. The ARVN also found the M-2 great at the company level during the later phases of the war. From what I have read the Afghans also found it good as one guy could hold the mortar and move it around quicker then heavier systems.

Yes I am familiar with the fact the marine Raiders who used M-2s in WW-2 had massive problems in large set piece battles because it lacked the power of the 81mm though far more mobile by guys on foot.

I more then respect what you do on this site and keep up the good work."

XXXXXX

WHEELED 9th DIVISION HTTB WAS A JOKE, FSCS LIGHT TANKS ARE WHAT WE NEED TODAY

"Pretty good article at www.geocities.com/fscswheelsvstracks

Your article covers most of my military career. As an enlisted Soldier with 3rd ACR in the mid-80's, I 'fought' those guys in 9th ID in their dune buggys. What a joke. Seemed they were always running around on three flat tires. I spent eight years on M113's as a scout. Good vehicle, but loud.

A good hybrid electric drive and band track would take care of that. I drove one with band track while stationed at WES, 1999-2000. It felt really good. We were doing some band track testing for TACOM and I helped with that wheels vs. tracks mobility study done for LTC Reif.

This may sound ironic, but I was also on the Subject Matter Expert Team that supported the LANCER consortia during the FSCS ATD while stationed at Fort Knox. UDLP built the H-E drive chassis with band track, Alvis the turret, Raytheon the sensor suite, and BAE integrated it all. The first picture in your article is of the chassis at UDLP in San Jose, CA, with a mock up turret and gun. Slide 20 shows the fully integrated demonstrator with the real turret and gun. Unfortunately, that is the only picture. The rest are just the chassis with the mock up turret. The picture with the plane is showing the chassis only. The turret wasn't integrated until later in the UK. I was also part of the user trials in the UK. That demonstrator was the only armored vehicle I have ever driven that drove like a go-cart; agile, fast, and had great acceleration. On batteries only, it was silent as a mouse without the scream of an engine or squeak of a steel track. Like I said, great article though I have a couple of corrections.

"First, the courageous British have persevered and went it alone and created a FSCS Tracer prototype revealed here for the first time to the world---see slides from #20 onward! See photo above."

The Brits didn't go it alone.

The Integrated Demonstrator or ID (we didn't call it a prototype, there is a difference) was the effort of the LANCER consortia. The SIKA consortia had their own ID. (In my opinion LANCER's ID was much better.) Once the U.S. pulled the plug on the funding, the Brits had to fold too. They couldn't afford it on their own. The Lancer ID got ripped apart after the trials and the parts got sent back to the builders. No more LANCER ID, very unfortunate.

Neither of the ID's (both LANCER and SIKA) had a 40mm Bofors cannon.

It was decided to go with a 40mm gun firing Cased Telescopic Ammunition (CTA) manufactured by CTA International a French/Brit subsidary of Giat. It is an awesome gun, packing a 40mm punch in a 25mm envelope. Here are a couple of links.

www.dtic.mil/ndia/2003gun/cta.pdf
www.giat-industries.fr/DossierPresse/VA_mediumcalib.pdf

Just so you wouldn't think I am some jerk blowing smoke, I have attached a picture of the LANCER ID and myself taken during the user trials in the UK, April-July 2002.

Fell free to contact me, if you have any questions.

v/r MAJ XXXXXXXX

"Yes, but eventually the Soldier will have to close with the enemy in an environment where 'stand-off' capability is made moot; an environment where training, firepower, protection, and guts are the keys to victory." -

Mark Ash writes:

"The XM312 shows that the U.S. military is still fixated on fighting on wars only against those who lack the capacity to produce armored vehicles. Sure, 12.7mm ammo has reach, but it is ineffective against all but the lightest protected vehicles at range. No matter how well you arm your light infantry you still will not be able to employ them offensively against a mobile enemy in anything but the most enclosed terrain. Plus, the heavier you arm them the slower they move and shorter is the time they can stay in combat without being resupplied.

No weapon can an infantryman carry that can match the range and firepower an autocannon can deliver over and extended amount of time. That, coupled with a mobile platform and optics not infantryman can match either. While a vehicle like the LAV-25 can't assault and destroy an enemies position, it can prevent light infantry from making any movement, holding them in place. On a vehicle like a Bradley the autocannon can be used to devastating effect supporting an infantry assault. Not only can a mobile platform with an autocannon render light infantry immobile, it can be used to interdict attempts to resupply them.

A friend of mine told me a story once on how his LAR battalion in Camp Lejiene did a 4 day long force-on-force exercise against a whole infantry regiment, supported by AAVs. First night, infantry tried to move to assault the LAR battalion. The MILES gear equipped autocannons soon decimated the slow moving infantry. Second night they tried a mechanized assault using the AAVs.

Again, the autocannons were more then enough to prevent all the AAVs from getting close enough to deploy the infantry. Third night "heavy" artillery and Air attacks were simulated, causing "casualties" to the LAR Bn, however when the infantry assaulted, the same notional massacre happened again to the infantry. Finally on the forth day M1s were called in, the mechanize assault began, then the LAR Bn fell back to terrain more suited to wheeled mobility, caught the mechanize force in the flank and the day was called a draw with heavy notional casualties declared on both sides. How does me friend, who was only a LCpl at the time know what happened and how it happened? He was riding with the Bn CO in the LAV-C2 as the Comm Tech.

Now look at it from the prospective of a Stryker brigade, that doesn't have a heavy gun that can fire on the move, nor does it possess anything that can engage mobile targets, in a mobile battle with a chance of defeating them in numbers. A Stryker Brigade can't fight an enemy that has anything more then foot-mobile infantry and Toyota Truck mounted Heavy Weapons (anything that is too heavy for a grunt to carry)."

An Army officer writes about how a band-tracked M113 Mini-Gavin with autocannon would do organic to light infantry units...it'd be an American version of the German Wiesel...

"At the JRTC, I distinctly remember the Wiesels killing everything in their path. It went nearly everywhere the dismounts did. They were shuttled all around the battlefield in CH-47s. When one broke down, it was hauled off in a HEMTT wrecker. Easy to transport, easy to maintain, killed everything with its 20mm cannon.

Interesting though, the Bundeswehr special operations forces uses the Wiesel 2 as a networked, decentralized, command and control platform. It is even equipped with a hybrid-electric drive. Looks like they already have proven technologies that Stryker is still trying to prove."

www.trackpads.com/forum/general-military-discussions/878149-collapse-armor-branch-infantry-save-thyself.html#post3341030

Very Interesting article. This was a lesson learned by the old SADF very early on in Angola its APC the Ratel packed quite a punch

Quote from Wikipedia which is reasonably accurate

The SADF Mechanised Infantry deployments generally all had all four Ratel Variants with them on deployment and thereby always had albeit rather unconventional tank killing capacity as the Cubans found to their cost!

Steve