THE RULE OF LGOPs

(LGOP = Little Groups of Paratroopers)

After the demise of the best Airborne plan, a most terrifying effect occurs on the battlefield. This effect is known as the rule of the LGOPs. This is, in its purest form, small groups of pissed-off 19-year-old American Paratroopers. They are well-trained, armed-to-the-teeth and lack serious adult supervision. They collectively remember the Commander's intent as "March to the sound of the guns and kill anyone who is not dressed like you..."

...or something like that. Happily they go about the day's work........

"Show me a man who will jump out of an airplane, and I'll show you a man who'll fight."

--General James M. Gavin

"American Parachutists...devils in baggy pants...are less than 100 meters from my outpost line. I can't sleep at night; they pop up from nowhere and we never know when or how they will strike next. Seems like the black-hearted devils are everywhere..."

(An entry in a German officer's diary found after the Battle of Anzio)

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"Individuals had to be capable of fighting at once against any opposition they met on landing. Although every effort was being made to develop the communications and techniques to permit battalions, companies, and platoons to organize promptly, we had to train our individuals to fight for hours and days, if necessary, without being part of a formal organization. Equipment had to be lightweight and readily transportable....Since the beginning of recorded history, Soldiers have been drilled repetively to de-emphasize their individual behavioral traits and force them to adapt to larger combat formations. Perhaps the greatest efficiency in transforming each individual, squad, platoon, and so forth into a cog in a larger machine was demonstrated in the armies of Frederick the Great, and although machine weapons had changed all this, between World War I and World War II countless hours were spent on wheeling about and moving squads to the right and to the left, as though they were preparing to fight the wars of a century ago.

All this had to be discarded as we sought to train the Paratroopers to the highest peak of individual pride and skill. It was at this time that the use of nameplates was adopted, the purpose being to emphasize the importance of an individual's personality and reputation. To the Soldiers of another generation, it seemed to suggest too little discipline and too much initiative given to individual Soldiers. We were willing to take a chance that this would not have a disrupting effect on larger formations. It did not, and there were many occasions in combat when the Paratroop officers, and NCOs effectively took over the command of larger formations of other units. Aside from the impact of this type of training on the Airborne formations themselves, it had a tremendous significance to the Army as a whole. The morale of the Airborne units soared, especially after their first combat, when they could see for themselves the results of their training".

Are you of the "another generation" ilk? Wedded to obsolete traditions? Who says we have to use silly, useless D & C to instill fighting discipline in Soldiers? Why not in the field like Gavin did? Learning SERE skills? The usmc didn't even put nametapes on its individual member BDUs (camies) until after the Gulf War TV coverage embarrassed them into it. How about this for 19th century robotics?

Think about it.

"Zero defects" mentalities do not inspire the men to give their best, we must create an atmosphere where subordinates can use their personality and initiative to get the mission done. Mission-type orders not robotics. To win on the future, non-linear urbanized battlefield, where we had only just arrived within hours by AIR will require the Soldiership like that of Chamberlain and his men on Little Round top. These men must be able to communicate freely and truthfully without concern over their ego, peer status or career concerns.

"The Mongols, a classic example of an ancient force that fought according to cyberwar principles, were organized more like a network than a hierarchy. More recently, a relatively minor military power that defeated a great modern power--the combined forces of North Vietnam and the Viet Cong--operated in many respects more like a network than an institution; it even extended political- support networks abroad. In both cases, the Mongols and the Vietnamese, their defeated opponents were large institutions whose forces were designed to fight set-piece attritional battles.

To this may be added a further set of observations drawn from current events. Most adversaries that the United States and its allies face in the realm of low-intensity conflict, such as international terrorists, guerrilla insurgents, drug smuggling cartels, ethnic factions, as well as racial and tribal gangs, are all organized like networks (although their leadership may be quite hierarchical). Perhaps a reason that military (and police) institutions have difficulty engaging in low-intensity conflicts is because they are not meant to be fought by institutions. The lesson: Institutions can be defeated by networks, and it may take networks to counter networks. The future may belong to whoever masters the network form."

"Cyberwar is coming" (Scroll down to Selection 3) by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt International Policy Department RAND

[Editor's note: These guys are right on target at the source of our temporary foreign policy "loss" in Vietnam 1975-1991(?). However, war is not just a lethal sporting contest among combatants, its about whose IDEAS will dominate, in the case of FREEDOM, in the end the truth has won out over communism. However, if the forces of freedom were more open-minded and "networked" like the John Paul Vann did until he died stopping the 1972 NVA invasion or the enemy in general did, we could have won the struggle sooner on the battlefield and not just wait for cultural changes to do it for us. The men who fought in Vietnam need to know that their sacrifices did count-just ask the people of Thailand. But if we are to learn from our war there, we must not make excuses that the politicians "did this or that" when there is plenty to do at our own level within the military to network and "out guerrilla the guerilla".]

A noted Army writer and tactician responds:

"Mike:
It's interesting that the two great Army developments of WWII were Armored warfare and Airborne warfare. (We'll leave aside marines and SOF for the moment.) A field-trained individual who can play LGOP really works well.

I sure do agree that all of that D & C and similar obsolete stuff serves little purpose. Guess it makes someone feel good..."

"Gavin was such a good Soldier. Thx Mike."

An Army weapons analyst and Lieutenant Colonel writes:

"Most of the Airborne troops were very well trained infantry, first. They already went through the "depersonalizing and rebuilding" process so that they would be competent 'cogs of the machine.' Then, and only then, were they given special training to bring them to a higher level.

On another level, the Airborne WANTED to mirror a straight infantry division, with infantry regiments, divisional artillery, etc., etc. Their challenge was not only the lack of adequate communication, but the technical inability to to be consistently dropped in a cohesive formation at a specified drop zone. In practice, they were scattered and lost all over the battlefield and fought in little groupings of individuals and squads that wandered about until blundering and melding into ad hoc platoons and companies. Fortunately, such confused wandering also wreaked confusion upon the enemy, with reports and sightings coming in from EVERYWHERE!! This alone tied down considerable enemy forces, in addition to the troopers' sniping, ambushing, and other interdictions. Then, once the ground effort (which the Airborne drop was supporting) broke through for a linkup, all was forgotten in the glow of a successful operation (the ground effort)".

http://imabbs.army.mil/cmh-pg/104-13.htm

Airborne operations

army.mil/cmh-pg/documents/abnops/tabb.htm

North Africa, Sicily, Normandy, and Eindhoven and Nijmegen

pim.nl/mg/pega1.htm

reocities.com/CapeCanaveral/Hangar/4602/kreta.htm

Crete

With today's technology jump delivery is very precise and Drop Zone selection can be done instantly from space and the air recon means. Crete was a costly victory for the Germans because of the "Ultra Secret" (German codes broken to reveal all classified messages) told the Allies exactly where their DZ and drop times were....yet the Allies were still pushed to the sea. It was still a victory and proof deep Airborne operations can work in spite of no amphibious forces around to help. If you click on the hypelink above or here on Crete, you'll see the Royal Navy sank the amphibious forces that the Allied Commander defending the island thought were necessary to win. He was wrong. Years later, on Grenada the same thing happened, the enemy expected sea attack from marines, but instead, the Rangers and 82^nd Airborne came from long away and caught them by surprise. The invasion of Panama was a "deep" Airborne operation that worked as was The Russian seizure of Afghanistan and Czechoslovakia, though in the latter, ground forces were en route for link-up.

Had the British jumped south of Arnhem bridge, instead of 8 miles away at a 1 mph foot-slog, the entire battle would have been an undeniable Allied "deep" Airborne victory. Dien Bien Phu was a poorly selected firebase in the low ground, many other poorly defended positions have been over-ran that were established by ground and sea transport, also. In the Second Indo-China war, the U.S. set up better defended fire bases that were kept going by airdrop, most notably Khe Sanh. Deep airdrops of combat power can work, its what you do afterwards on the ground that is the key. If you sit still, the enemy is likely to gain the initiative whether you walked, flew or motored there. After the Paratrooper lands he must be MORE MOBILE than any enemy and that can be done by speed-marching, solving the Soldier's load, human powered vehicles and airdropped armor.

We are pushing hard for light Armored Fighting Vehicles (AFV aka TANKS) like the M113A3 Gavin and the M8 Ridgway Armored Gun System to be organic to the Airborne so it can fight actions like a Bostogne successfully and not end up like a 1943 "Cisterna" or 1993 "Somalia".

Good point about WWI: the U.S. Army Air Service was doing "Close Air Support" (CAS) to sweep the enemy during the 1918 offensives under the leadership of General Billy Mitchell personally directing the battles from SPAD XVI aircraft long before the usmc boasted "it invented CAS in the 1920s". By the end of the war, we were combining arms as we would have to do again in WWII.

"On the next day, before dawn, Pershing's main attack hit the Germans along the southern edge of the Saint-Mihiel salient while French Colonial troops under his command and the United States 4^th Division pushed eastward from the salient's western edge. Overhead, our planes gave close air support and bombed and strafed supply installations and troop columns in the rear of the German lines. French tanks manned by Americans supported the infantry assaults. The United States Army's first modern battle had begun."

Fighting Generals by Curt Anders, 1965, G.P. Putnam & Sons, NY

"Mike-
Interesting site. Thanks for showing me. Please keep me in mind for future areas of similar style. Although why anyone would want to jump out of a functional aircraft is still a mystery to me-"

God's design of the creation could easily be studied to find the principle of air resistance in action to gently descend from the air to the ground: leaves falling from a tree are a good example. It is believed that Chinese acrobats used parachute-like devices as long ago as 1306. The principle was recognized by several writers, and Leonardo da Vinci proposed the basic idea for parachutes in 1495. Leonardo da Vinci sketched a man-sized parachute with a man in mind to be lowered by it, even though no one had ever flown. He visualized it as a tool to escape from tall buildings and structures in event of fire. The dimensions he calculated as necessary to safely land a person 300 years before one was ever used are very close to the ones used today.

The first person to demonstrate the parachute in action was Louis-Sébastien Lenormand of France--in 1783 he jumped from a tower with two parasols. A few years later other French aeronauts jumped from balloons. André-Jacques Garnerin was the first to use a parachute regularly. He made a number of exhibition jumps, including one of about 8,000 feet (2,400 meters) in England in 1802.

In 1785, a French balloonist named Pierre Blanchard used a pet dog for his first idea of a parachute and dropped the dog several hundred feet, the dog ran off with the parachute and was never seen again.

In the 1800s, acrobats were dropping from balloons that resembled a parachute and a trapeze, they did this to liven up their act, because balloons got boring after awhile and they needed something else to keep the crowds interest, people watched mostly hoping to see a fatality.

The parachutes were rigid with stiffening rods to maintain there shape and tied to the bottom of the balloons, when it came time to jump a helper would cut the rope and they would ascend in their particular contraption.

It was an era of do it yourself designs some worked and some didn't. The ones that didn't were the unlucky ones (this could be considered an understatement).

One of the first parachutes was invented in 1837 by a man named Robert Cocking. Cocking developed a parachute like an upside umbrella, he felt being upside down it would control oscillations ( to bad he didn't know about an apex hole) He demonstrated in 1837 in England suspended from a balloon named Nassau, and piloted by Charles Green, who cut him loose.

The canopy was covered with linen and used stiffeners made of thin metal tubes to retain it's shape, the only trouble was it weighed 223 pounds . It worked fine at first, but the stiffening tubes started to give way , then a hole developed in the canopy, then it collapsed (it was the first parachute fatality).

After that England's interest in parachutes declined, but continued in America and Europe.

In 1884 the Baldwin Brothers developed a parachute similar to the one used today, it had no stiffeners, just a fabric canopy that was folded and stuffed into a soft container. The canopy was not attached to to the jumpers but to the balloons rigging and a harness was worn by the jumpers and attached to the chute, it was several years in development before they had a full size model and was first tested from 3000 ft, instead of being guinea pigs they used sand bags instead for the first drop, the parachute worked perfectly and they considered it a success.

They decided to demonstrate it publicly, and sold tickets for the event at Golden Gate Park in San Francisco, California on January 30, 1887. Thomas Baldwin the younger brother got elected for the task, the brothers took the balloon to 5,000 ft. before a sellout crowd.

Tom jumped and the chute worked perfectly opened within five seconds and he drifted slowly to the ground, and landed safely.

This do-it-yourself design also applied to airplanes with a lot of fatal results.

The Wright brothers finally got one to fly and it has been the "skies the limit" (Pilot, Engine, Airframe--PEA) every since, until the planes crash.

Now the interest in (and need for) parachutes really "took off".

Early parachutes were made of canvas, and later of silk. The first successful descent from an airplane was made by Capt. Albert Berry of the United States Army in 1912. In World War I, parachutes were used by observers to escape from captive balloons but were considered impractical for airplanes. Only in the last stage of the war were they finally used in aircraft.

In April 1914 Charles Broadwick invented the back pack container, his design resembled a sleeveless coat, the canopy and suspension lines were stowed on the back, the apex was attached to a static line on the back with a breakaway tie and a static line that could be hooked anywhere available, it similar to the design used today.

He demonstrated it to the army just a few months before WW 1, with his adopted daughter Tiny, then twenty years old. She had been jumping since she was fifteen years old.

She jumped from a Curtis biplane and used the risers to steer to a perfect landing. After that jump she was never seen again.

This amazed the General and his staff. The Generals report to the Army was great, but they ignored it, and later American pilots flew into combat without parachutes because the Generals thought they would abandon their planes at the very slightest chance of trouble, hence no parachutes.

During the war only Germans provided parachutes for their pilots, it was a canopy and suspension lines stored in a container. When it came time to depart the aircraft, they lifted the container from under the seat, stood on the seat and tossed the container over the side, then followed it, a little crude but it worked and all the other pilots envied them, especially since they had to ride theirs down in flames.

From the book, Into The Valley, by Col. Charles H. Young:

1918: Isolated French raids in WW I during which two-man demolition teams parachuted behind German lines to destroy communications.

1918, July-October: Small-scale Allied airborne resupply during the Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne campaigns.

Colonel Billy Mitchell attempted to get parachutes for his aviators, without success, but the Army did conduct some tests, and they were still testing when the war ended in 1918. But Colonel Mitchell thought of others ways to use parachutes. To him goes the distinction of suggesting the first Airborne parachute assault forces.

The idea of parachutes for military personnel to employ for 3D maneuver was first suggested by the late Colonel William (Billy) Mitchell, U.S. Army Air Corps during WWI even before they had chutes for American flyers!

His idea was to assign infantrymen to the Air Force and to jump them behind the enemy to cut them off and use the air force to protect them, but his idea was not used.

This is a letter I found in a book written by Colonel Billy Mitchell about his meeting with Gen. Pershing:

"I proposed to him that in the spring of 1919, when I would have a great force of bombardment planes, he should assign one of the infantry divisions permanently to the Air Force, preferably the 1^st division; that we would arm the men with a great number of machine guns and train them to go over the front in our large airplanes, which would carry ten or fifteen Soldiers. We could equip each man with a parachute, so when we desired to make a rear attack on the enemy, we could carry these men over the lines and drop them off at a prearranged strong point, fortify it, and we could supply them by aircraft with food and ammunition. Our low flying attack aviation would then cover every road in the vicinity, both day and night, so as to prevent the Germans falling on them before they could thoroughly organize the position. Then we could attack the Germans from the rear, aided by an attack from our Army from the front, and support the maneuver with our great Air Force."

The war ended twenty five days after the meeting. The idea came from the mind of a visionary who wouldn't live to see his ideas come into being. But he was proven right.

Recent reports indicate the ITALIANS actually dropped Paratroopers in WWI! The first use of Paratroops goes back to WWI when Italian officers landed behind Austrian lines for reconnaissance.

Colonel Young continues:

1928: Italian pilots dropped supplies by parachute to the dirigible Italia, stranded at the North Pole.

1929-30: Italian paratroopers made mass jumps in North Africa.

1931: The U.S. Army Air Corps flew a field artillery battery complete with equipment to Panama as a demonstration of "hemispheric defense." Two years later, in keeping with U.S. tacticians' preference for airlanding rather than parachute delivery during this period, the maneuver was repeated in Panama, but with a full battalion. Then, in maneuvers near Fort DuPont, Delaware, AAC Capt. George C. Kenney "astounded his colleagues" by airlanding an infantry detachment behind "enemy" lines.

1933, 18 August: Soviet demonstration, Moscow; 46 paratroops jumped from two large bombers, and also dropped a small combat tank by parachute.

1935, 1 March: During Soviet airborne maneuvers at Kiev, two battalions of infantry were dropped; three 18-passenger gliders were also landed on these maneuvers. Gliders had been towed 1,170 miles-in triple-tow. All pilots involved were women.

1936, September-October: Soviet mass drop of 1,200 paratroops at Minsk, while 5,200 paratroops jumped in maneuvers at Moscow.

1938, 7 October: Germans airlanded a complete infantry regiment of 2,800 men in a wheat field near Freiwaldau, Silesia.

The American Army didn't completely abandon development of the parachute, and in 1919 a board was established at McCook Field to determine which type of parachute was suitable for American aviators. The board was headed by Maj. E.L. Huffman, who sent letters to known jumpers in the country to demonstrate equipment and techniques that might be purchased by the government.

One of the respondents was a circus performer known as "Sky High" Irvin, who had been jumping since the age of sixteen and had logged numerous jumps over the years. He presented the first free-fall parachute, a concept that required the jumper to manually release the canopy with a rip cord instead of a static line. The Irvin model used a harness instead of a coat. The canopy was thirty two feet in diameter, with twenty four suspension lines. Instead of being extracted by a static line, the canopy was deployed by a pilot chute that sprang from the container when the jumper pulled the rip cord.

Until this time, it was believed that free falls couldn't be tolerated by human beings, who would either be immobilized by the force of the airflow or by fear of the situation. Irvan proved them wrong by making a delayed-opening jump from 1,500 feet, which convinced the board to sign a contract with him for 300 parachutes. By 1922 a parachute was a required part of the uniform of the military and airmail pilots, and the design remained unchanged for the next fifty years.

The first nation to form a real Paratroop unit was Italy, which makes sense if they had dropped Paratroopers in WWI. The Initial collective drop was made at Cinisello Balsamo, near Milan, on 6 November 1927 from CA-73 troop carriers of the Regfa Aerornautica. The Italians used the Salvator static-line parachute and used no reserve, a policy decision that must have seemed mistaken to the unit's General Gutdoni as he fell to his death a year later, his Salvator streaming above htm m the dreaded "Roman candle" In the late 1930s, the Italians raised complete parachute battalions, and these later expanded into the Folgore and Nembo Divsions, destined to fight with distinction--but never to partake in full-scale Airborne operations during WWII.

During the 1930s the Russians and Germans started using Airborne troops. The Russians even had bombers and gliders to deliver tanks and "people pods" on the wings of early aircraft to deliver Airborne troops.

The Russians formed Airborne units in 1935 and the Germans in 1937. The French also started in 1937, however the French were defeated before they could use them.

VIDEO: Paratroops in WW2 Europe & North Africa

Paratroopers

Part 1: German Airborne successes in Norway, Holland, Belgium

youtube.com/watch?v=Rrg4pCZAfu4

Part 2: British Paratroops created by Churchill, Corinth canal attack by German Paras

youtube.com/watch?v=6z_C4Wiypgc

Part 3: Germans attack Crete continued, American and British Airbornes drop on North Africa and Sicily

youtube.com/watch?v=3Bl_bVQ5bjk

Part 4: Russian Airborne used extensively, Italian fighting German Paras bitterly resist allies, American Airborne saves beach head at Salerno

youtube.com/watch?v=oqCd4r1apXk

Part 5: Monte Cassino, D-Day, wrongly implies heavy equipment did not arrive when most did by glider including Tetrarch light tanks and Bren gun APCs

youtube.com/watch?v=xxvT0cF0OXk

Part 6: Arnhem bridge operation, incorrectly states "armored" jeeps were lost, Battle of the Bulge

youtube.com/watch?v=j7hxl2ur3kY

Part 7 Battle of the Bulge, Operation VARSITY

youtube.com/watch?v=PlJ4HztWi_s

The success of the German Paratroopers in Holland, Belgium and Crete caused the United States to form an Airborne unit.

The first thing the United States did was to design a chute that could be used for military jumps since most chutes were only used by stunt jumpers.

The "AIR CORPS TEST CENTER" was commission to design and develop a chute for mass military jumps. They designed what was then called the T-4 and was the first chute to have four risers so it could be steered. They also developed the reserve parachute, something only the U.S. Airborne had. No other nation, at that time, used reserves.

German Fallschirmjaeger parachutes were hooked to a single "D" ring and hooked to the harness behind their head. The jumpers were unable to steer them and they landed where ever the wind took them, and contributed to many casualties and battlefield losses.

In April 1940, following the controversies, the War Department approved plans for the formation of a test platoon of Airborne Infantry to form, equip, and train under the direction and control of the Army's Infantry Board. In June, the Commandant of the Infantry School was directed to organize a test platoon of volunteers from Fort Benning's 29^th Infantry Regiment. Later that year, the 2^nd Infantry Division was directed to conduct the necessary tests to develop reference data and operational procedures for air-transported troops.

In July 1940, the task of organizing the platoon began. First Lieutenant William T. Ryder from the 29^th Infantry Regiment volunteered and was designated the test platoon's Platoon Leader and Lieutenant James A. Bassett was designated Assistant Platoon Leader. Based on high standards of health and rugged physical characteristics, forty-eight enlisted men were selected from a pool of 200 volunteers. Quickly thereafter, the platoon moved into tents near Lawson Field, and an abandoned hanger was obtained for use as a training hall and for parachute packing.

Lieutenant Colonel William C. Lee, a staff officer for the Chief of Infantry, was intently interested in the test platoon. He recommended that the men be moved to the Safe Parachute Company at Hightstown, NJ for training on the parachute drop towers used during the New York World's Fair. Eighteen days after organization, the platoon was moved to New Jersey and trained for one week on the 250-foot free towers.

The training was particularly effective. When a drop from the tower was compared to a drop from an airplane, it was found that the added realism was otherwise impossible to duplicate. The drop also proved to the troopers that their parachutes would function safely. The Army was so impressed with the tower drops that two were purchased and erected at Fort Benning on what is now Eubanks Field. Later, two more were added. Three of the original four towers are still in use training Paratroopers at Fort Benning. PLF training was often conducted by the volunteers jumping from PT platforms and from the back of moving 2 1/2 ton trucks to allow the trainees to experience the shock of landing.

Less than forty-five days after organization, the first jump from an aircraft in flight by members of the test platoon was made from a Douglas B-18 over Lawson Field on 16 August, 1940. Before the drop, the test platoon held a lottery to determine who would follow Lieutenant Ryder out of the airplane and Private William N. (Red) King became the first enlisted man to make an official jump as a Paratrooper in the United States Army. On 29 August, at Lawson Field, the platoon made the first platoon mass jump held in the United States.

The first parachute combat unit to be organized was the 501^st Parachute Battalion. It was commanded by Major William M. Miley, later a Major General and Commander of the 17^th Airborne Division, and the original test platoon members formed the battalion cadre. The Civilian Conservation Corps cleared new jump areas and three new training buildings were erected. Several B-18 and C-39 aircraft were provided for training. The traditional Paratrooper cry "GERONIMO!" was originated in the 501^st by Private Aubrey Eberhart to prove to a friend that he had full control of his faculties when he jumped. It was from a western movie they had seen the night before, so on a dare PVT Eberhart yelled the Indian warriors name so all could hear. That cry was adopted by the 501^st and has been often used by Paratroopers since then.

The 502^nd Parachute Infantry Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel William C. Lee with men from the 501^st as cadre, was activated on 1 July, 1941. The 502^nd was far below strength, and 172 prospective troopers from the 9^th Infantry Division at Fort Bragg, NC were needed. The response to Lieutenant Colonel Lee's call for volunteers was startling: more than 400 men volunteered, including many noncommissioned officers who were willing to take a reduction in rank ("take a bust") to transfer to the new battalion.

Airborne experimentation of another type was initiated on 10 October, 1941 when the Army's first Glider Infantry battalion was activated. This unit was officially designated as the 88^th Glider Infantry Battalion and was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Elbridge G. Chapman, Jr. Lieutenant Colonel Chapman later became a Major General and commanded the 13^th Airborne Division.

As more Airborne units were activated, it became apparent that a centralized training facility should be established. Consequently, the facility was organized at Fort Benning on 15 May, 1942. Since that date, the U.S. Army Parachute School has been known by a variety of names: The Airborne School (1 January, 1946); Airborne Army Aviation Section, The Infantry School (1 November, 1946); Airborne Department, The Infantry School (February, 1955); Airborne-Air Mobility Department (February, 1956); Airborne Department (August 1964); Airborne-Air Mobility Department (October, 1974); Airborne Department (October, 1976); 4^th Airborne Training Battalion, The School Brigade (January, 1982); 1^st Battalion (Abn), 507^TH Parachute Infantry, The School Brigade (October, 1985); and the 1^st Battalion (Abn), 507^TH Infantry, 11^th Infantry Regiment (July, 1991).

The first Airborne Regiment, the 501^st was formed in April of 1941 and the first U.S. Army jump school was started at Ft. Benning, GA. The idea for the 250 foot towers came from Coney Island, N.Y. They were built for the 1940 World's Fair, and are still there today. The rest were put together from scratch. With the advent of World War Two, the United States Armed Forces foresaw a need for highly mobile units that the Allies could quickly insert into the theater of battle. An experiment began at Fort Benning, Georgia where a group of volunteers began jumping out of "perfectly good aircraft" while in flight. Thus was born the American Paratroopers. Following great debate and an arduous command decision, the United States Army began forming Airborne units for combat. On 14 March 1941, Company "A", 504^th Parachute Battalion was constituted and then activated on 5 October 1941 at Fort Benning, Georgia.

Early Paratroops at the Louisiana Maneuvers

The 504^th moved to Fort Bragg, North Carolina for training in February 1942, and became part of one of the Army's first Parachute Infantry Regiments. The 503^rd and 504^th Parachute Infantry Battalions were joined together to form the 503^rd Parachute Infantry Regiment, with the 504^th being renamed Company "D", 503^rd Parachute Infantry on 24 February 1942.

Although several types of headgear insignia have been worn by parachute and glider organizations since 1942, an insignia peculiar to the Airborne was not authorized until 1949 and did not appear in Army Regulations until 1956. The authorization was first mentioned in AR 670-5 (dated 20 September, 1956), which stated, "Airborne insignia may be worn when prescribed by commander...The insignia consists of a white parachute and glider on blue disk with a red border approximately 2 1/4 inches in diameter overall."

In December, 1943, the all black "555^th Parachute Infantry Company (Colored)", later re-designated Company A, 555^th Parachute Infantry Battalion (and remembered by many as the "Triple Nickel"), arrived at Fort Benning for Airborne training. This training event marked a significant milestone for black Americans in the combat arms. The first troops in the unit were volunteers from the all-black 92^nd Infantry Division stationed at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. After proving their skills, the battalion was not sent overseas, but was deployed to the western United States for "Operation FIREFLY," dropping in to fight forest fires set by Japanese incendiary balloons in the Pacific Northwest. During this mission, the 555^th earned the nickname the "Smoke Jumpers." In 1948, after full integration of the Armed Forces was finally effected, black Americans were finally given their full rights as American combat Paratroopers and made their first combat jump while attached to the 187^th Regimental Combat Team during the Korean War.

As an independent battalion, the 503^rd sailed to Scotland in June 1942, becoming the first American parachute unit to go overseas in World War Two. It was attached to the British 1^st Airborne Division for training. The training included mass tactical jumps from C-47 aircraft at 350 feet, extensive night training, and speed marching for 10 miles to and from the training area daily; and on one occasion, 32 miles in 11 hours. On 2 November, as the 503^rd was staging for Operation TORCH, the invasion of North Africa, it was reorganized and re-designated as Company "D", 509^th Parachute Infantry. On this momentous day, as C-47's flew over the English countryside, the 509^th Paratrooper was born.

The first U.S. Army Airborne Divisions were created on August 15 1942. The 82^nd and the 101^st. Then came the 11^th, 13^th and 17^th Airborne Divisions. The following listing/descriptions takes this history to the present day. An "AIRBORNE" operation defined here as either airdropping with parachutes and/or airlanding from fixed-wing aircraft into "drop zones" or "assault zones".

Worldwide the beret of the Paratroops is bordeaux-red. This goes back to 1944 when a British Paratrooper suffered a head injury through a jumping accident. When he put his olive-green beret onto his head it changed with the colour of his blood into bordeaux-red. It was then decided that the colour should be changed into bordeaux-red because of the fact that Paratroopers have to get along with extreme dangers. Over the years more and more armies in the world copied these berets and so did the Bundeswehr in 1970. The U.S. Army Airborne wears a maroon red beret.

Gavin's paratroopers in WW2 were handicapped by civilian DC-3s that couldn't carry an intact platoon of men and easily caught fire without armor or self-sealing fuel tanks resulting in preventable losses of the 22 it did carry. Unable to carry intact towed guns much less parachute dropping ground vehicles, this forced DC-3s to tow gliders that could carry either a towed gun or a jeep---but not both. This meant open area landing zones had to be secured for the gliders to roll to a stop. Without armament, the DC-3s were vulnerable to enemy fighter planes so Gavin revolutionized airborne operations by night jumps which also protected the planes from anti-aircraft fires. To overcome the confusion of being in the dark, Gavin had his men memorize terrain features and sand table rehearse plans and contingency plans and be self-reliant and able to take the initiative in non-linear battlefield situations not be lemming marines. He created pathfinders to mark drop zones in the dark to improve assembly on top of objectives so they didn't have to walk far. Studying the German's troubles jumping from the very small JU-52 jump door, he exploited the large C-47 jump doors by having every Para jump complete weapons and equipment and minimize separate container drops to just 75mm pack howitzers in pieces--but roped together for fast re-assembly. Because supplies could only be dropped through small fuselage openings or underwing shackles, they were spread out all over and difficult to recover from open areas where the enemy could fire, and paras lacked vehicles with armor protection.

All of these conditions are not true today so there is no excuse why the U.S. Airborne is still handicapped! The current U.S. Airborne is a disgrace to the memory of the Airborne forefathers sitting on laurels bought and paid for by others and accepting self-serving handicaps that don't exist.

GPS insures that t-tail aircraft not only drop EXACTLY where we intend, but tell paras on ground exactly where they are. No need for rolling open fields for gliders to roll, a single nitrogen inerted fuel tank C-17 t-tail ramp aircraft can drop 80 tons on supplies on pallets, and M113 Gavin light tracked armored fighting vehicles (aka light tanks) can be on these pallets to not only recover the supplies with forklifts but also transport para infantry and anti-tank weapons ready-to-fire on the vehicle not towed---at 60 mph under armor protection. Air refueling enables fighters to escort our t-tail transports but our transport aircraft could and should be armed with their own air-to-air missiles and radar-guided cannon to swat SAMs in self-defense. Delayed opening timer parachutes with small drogue chutes would enable every para to jump if needed from high altitudes around 10, 000 feet above enemy air defense and have his main chute open at low altitude for a normal jump. Furthermore, with M113 Gavins paras need not land on top of heavily defended objectives but can take them by surprise from indirect drop zones. An American Airborne that foot-slogs or rides in road-bound, wheeled trucks when it has the most airlift of any force in human history---more than enough to have hundreds of amphibious, cross-country-mobile light tracked AFVs in use---is a disgrace.

All of the handicaps of the WW2 Airborne are solved, we just need people with 21st century minds in today's Airborne who want to execute 3D maneuver warfare as a Gavin "Sky Cavalry" not sit on their asses and do seize & hold re-enactments pretending they are crippled when its all in their minds.

Furthermore, reading the war diaries of the British light troops surrounded near Arnhem below:

pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/war.htm

Its increasingly clear that 3D maneuver troops must have a "hard shell" in the form of their own light tracked armored fighting vehicles (LTAFVs) so enemy high explosive pounding of them will not attrit them to where they cannot hold a position. These light tracked AFVs should also have back hoes attachments so overhead cover fighting positions and hull-down vehicle positions can be created to bolster the baseline vehicle armor. LTAFV armored mobility also insures airdropped supplies---however they are scattered---can be recovered so even though the 3D force is in a non-linear situation with enemy all around, their fighting strength can be perpetuated indefinitely 'til the heavier 2D forces link up or they themselves implode the enemy resistance by their own maneuver actions.

The other handicap light troops have against heavier enemy troops is that they don't have the supplies to artillery duel with them to keep them from laying down mortar, rocket and artillery pressures upon them since the latter has home field advantage of greater supplies in hand. The air-mechanized light force needs to never be outgunned and LTAFVs enable this because they can self-propel in a ready-to-fire manner tube and rocket/missile artillery that can through clever design keep the enemy's artillery shut down. Also notice how CAS fighter-bombers when overhead silence enemy guns---the AMS force should have its own "hip-pocket" air force of fighter-in-a-box (FINAB) aircraft in ISO container BATTLEBOXes delivered by KIWI pod aircraft right there on the scene operating from their airhead to do CAS as well as interdict enemy fighter-bombers and pesky UAVs from surveilling overhead to help target for the enemy.

Grenada 1983: Rangers jump under 500 feet to take Point Salines airfield

Date: 8 November 1942
Unit: 509^th Parachute Infantry Battalion (PIB)
Operation: Torch
Troopers: 556
Country: Algeria
Dropzone: Tafaraquoi, La Senia
Aircraft: C-47
Type Air delivery: Day Mass low-level tactical personnel static-line jump after long-range deployment from England.

"You Have Your Orders" by Jim Dietz

The training paid off when the 509^th spearheaded the Allied invasion of North Africa. The longest Airborne operation in history (so far) occurred 8 November 1942. After a C-47 flight of over 1600 miles from England, the battalion seized Tafarquoi Airport in Oran, Algeria by parachute assault. On the night of Saturday, November 7th, 1942, just eleven months to the day, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 556 Paratroopers of the 509^th Parachute Infantry Battalion, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Edson Duncan Raff, took off from England to jump into French Northwest Africa in the initial step to liberate Europe from German occupation. The battalion's mission was to seize two French airfields at Tafaraqoui and LaSenia to deny their use by enemy fighters. Operation Torch, as the amphibious landing in North Africa was codenamed, was an unusually complex military operation. Without any secure bases in the operational area, Allied forces had to deploy from bases in England and travel a great distance to the landing areas. In the Airborne plan of Operation Torch, the 39 x C-47 aircraft of the Paratroop Task Force, commanded by Colonel William C. Bentley, flew 1500 miles over the mountains of Spain, across the western Mediterranean Sea, to arrive badly scattered over the North African coast west of Oran, Algeria, at dawn on November 8th. Nearly out of gas, several aircraft landed in the desert without dropping their Paratroopers, several aircraft were shot down by enemy fighters, several planeloads jumped early and were captured in Spanish Morrocco, while the main force with Lieutenant Colonel Raff also jumped early some 35 miles east of the objective airfields. Although he broke several ribs in a hard landing, Lieutenant Colonel Raff continued to lead his Paratroopers toward their objectives. After a full day and a night forced march, a company of weary Paratroopers reached the airfield at Tafaraoui on the morning of November 9th. Both airfields had already been captured by Allied amphibious forces.

Date: 15 November 1942
Unit: 509^th PIB
Operation: Torch
Troopers: 350
Country: Algeria
Dropzone: Youks les Bains
Aircraft: C-47
Type Air delivery: Day Mass low-level tactical personnel static-line jump

Date: 24 December 1942--
Unit: 509^th PIB, Hdqt's. Co. Two French Paratroopers-
Troopers: 32 -
Country: Tunisia
Dropzone: El Djem
Aircraft: C-47
Type Air delivery: Day, Mass, low-level tactical personnel static-line jump

Date: 9 July 1943
Unit: 504^th Parachute Infantry Regiment 3^rd Battalion (Jumped first); 505^th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), Includes: 505^th PIR, 456^th PFA & Co. B, 307^th Engr.
Operation: Husky I
Troopers: 3,406
Country: Italy
Dropzone: Gela, Sicily
Aircraft: C-47
Type Air delivery: Night Mass low-level tactical personnel static-line jump, wing shackle bundle drops, Gliders

Date: 10 July 1943
Unit: 504^th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), Includes: 504^th PIR, 1^st & 2^nd Btn.; 376^th PFA & Co.A, 307^th Engr.
Operation: Husky II
Troopers: 2,304
Country: Italy
Dropzone: Gela, Sicily
Aircraft: C-47
Type Air delivery: Night Mass low-level tactical personnel static-line jump, wing shackle bundle drops, Gliders

Date: 5 September 1943
Unit: 503^th PIR and 2/4^th Australian Infantry Force
Troopers: 1,700
Country: New Guinea
Dropzone: Nadzab, Markham Valley
Aircraft: C-47, A-20s (smokescreens)
Type Air delivery: Day Mass low-level tactical personnel static-line jump, wing shackle bundle drops

youtube.com/watch?v=wuz0TpzqwWY

First American airborne operation in the Pacific took place at Nadzab, New Guinea. The American 503^rd PIR dropped from 85 x C-47s of the 374^th and 375^th Troop Carrier Groups, 54^th TC Wing, in a mission to secure the airfield at Nadzab and prepare it for airlanding the Australian 7^th Division, which was to then push toward Lae from the west and link up with Allied amphibious invasion forces moving in from the east. The same aircraft that carried in the 503^rd and some Australian artillerymen who were hastily trained as parachutists, also airlifted 420 planeloads of infantry Soldiers by 11 September. The paradrop, which took place in daylight as General MacArthur circled above in a B-17 observation bomber, was well coordinated, accurate, and effective. Along with several key Troop Carrier maneuvers in the States during the summer and late fall, strong support by General Ridgway, and in conjunction with the soon-to-follow emergency missions at the Salerno beachhead, this mission contributed to a renewed commitment to Airborne-Troop carrier by American military leaders.

1^st R.A.R's lineal history goes back to the 65^th Battalion, 2^nd Australian Imperial Forces (A.I.F.), engaged in the fight against the Japanese. That unit was a part of the Australian 7^th Division A.I.F. In 1943 a U.S. unit was to jump on a Japanese fortified area in New Guinea, elements of the 7^th Australian Division, A.I.F were hastily chosen to jump with them in the form of and Australian Artillery Section of 2 x 25 Pounders, from the ranks of the 7^th Australian Division, A.I.F. came a Section of 2/4^th Artillery Battery under command of Lt Pearson. The 33 men in the Section had two days hasty Parachute Training prior to the big day, at which time 2 of the originals were injured and ruled out. They were replaced on the day by two that had not jumped at all. On the Big Day, 5 September 1943, The U.S. 503^rd Parachute Infantry Regiment (P.I.R) went through the door over NADZAB in New Guinea, the 2/4^th Artillery Section went out the door with them. The jump master considered they were not trained well enough and thus made them jump without side arms. Their side arms/small arms went out the door in a pannier, after hitting the Landing Zone, they had one of their guns up and firing within 2 hours of the jump. Those gunners of the 7^th Australian Division, A.I.F., didn't know then that they were setting the pace for another Australian Unit to join with the 503^rd, some 22 years later on another foreign airstrip when 1^st R.A.R. whose lineal history goes back to the 7^th Australian Division, A.I.F., were to join with the Sons of the 503^rd P.I.R. at Bien Hoa, Vietnam.

Airlift historian and Vietnam C-130 combat veteran, Sam McGowan writes:

"...the Airborne assault on Nadzab, an airstrip in the Markham Valley in Papau New Guinea in the fall of 1943. If there is a single World War II battle that deserves to be studied by modern advocates of Airborne and Airland operations, Nadzab is it.

The attack on Nadzab was planned and executed by the air staff of the Fifth Air Force, the air element of the Southwestern Pacific Command of General Douglas MacArthur. Lt. Gen. George C. Kenney, the Fifth Air Force commander, conceived the attack as a means of catching the Japanese forces at Lae in a pinch between Airborne and Airlifted troops attacking from the northwest and infantry attacking up along the Huon Peninsula (sometimes called the Lae Peninsula) from the southeast. Nadzab was the fruition of a plan Kenney conceived in early 1943 after American and Australian troops, many of whom had been airlifted across the Owen Stanley Mountains, defeated the Japanese force at Buna, a village southeast of Lae. Kenney conceived an Airborne attack at a time when he had no Airborne forces at his disposal. During a visit to the United States in the spring of 1943 Kenney requested the assignment of an Airborne Division to his command. Instead of a Division he got a Regiment, the 503^rd Parachute Infantry (the 11^th Airborne Division arrived in the Pacific in time for the invasion of the Philippines.)

During the interim prior to the arrival of the first American Paratroops in the Southwest Pacific, Kenney ordered the construction of a secret advanced airfield on the north slopes of the Owen Stanleys less than a hundred miles south of Lae. The new field, at a village known as Tsili-Tsili (and pronounced Silly-Silly) was constructed entirely by airlift. Engineers and construction materials were flown into an existing strip at Marlinan, about four miles from the new site. (The Marlinan strip was not suitable for use by fighters, but it was suitable for C-47s.) Originally the engineers planned to use jeeps and trailers to transport materials between the two bases, until someone came up with the idea of sawing Army trucks in half and transporting the halves in C-47s, then reassembling them in the field. It was not until the base was ready for fighters that it was detected by the Japanese. An attack caught a formation of C-47s as they were approaching to land. At least one transport was shot-down before U.S. fighters broke up the attack.

The Nadzab attack was planned as a two-fold operation. American Paratroops airlifted from Port Moresby would jump onto an existing, but lightly defended, airstrip and secure the field while the C-47s returned to Marlinan to pick up/airland Australian infantry who had been prepositioned there by airlift in anticipation of the operation.

On the morning of the attack the drop formation of some 90 x C-47s from the 374^th, 317^th and 375^th Troop Carrier Groups took off from Seven Mile Aerodrome at Port Moresby and assembled over the field. While the C-47s were assembling into drop formation, then heading out for the drop zone at Nadzab three groups of powerfully armed B-25 strafers were taking off from other airfields in the area. Though factory produced versions of the B-25 gunships would later serve in the Pacific, the airplanes at Nadzab were mostly conventional B-25 medium bombers that had been converted in the field into forward-firing gunships. The bombardier's position was removed from the airplane and the nose was filled with a battery of eight .50-caliber machineguns while additional guns were installed in pods mounted on the sides and bottom of the bombers, giving each B-25 a battery of 12-14 .50-caliber Heavy Machine Guns firing forward along the longitudional axis of the airplane. In addition to the machineguns, each B-25 carried a bomb-bay full of small parachute-fragmentation bombs, bombs that floated to earth beneath parachutes to detonate right above the ground, spraying fragments in every direction.

Minutes before the C-47s arrived over the Nadzab drop zone, a very large force (as many as 90 ships) of B-25 gunships hit the airfield. After strafing the drop zone, the B-25s dropped their loads of parafrag bombs. As the last B-25 left the field a flight of A-20s came over and dispensed a cloud of smoke around the DZ to conceal the troopers from the enemy postions in the trees. Above the airstrip a flight of three VIP-carrying B-17s observed the operation. General Kenney was in one airplane, General Douglas MacArthur (who was erroneously referred to by some of his men as "Dougout Dug") was in another. A fighter cover of P-38s and P-39s kept the Japanese fighters at bay.

The Paratroopers landed under the concealment of the smoke without taking a single casualty from enemy fire. Within minutes after they were on the ground, the Japanese on the airfield surrendered with very little resistance. The Paratroops hurriedly secured the airfield perimeter and prepared the airstrip for the arrival of troop carrying C-47s that began arriving in the afternoon. As the C-47s arrived, the Australian infantry assembled and, along with the American Paratroops, began attacking toward Lae.

Now that, folks, is how an Airborne operation is supposed to work, as conceived by General Billy Mitchell and further developed in the minds of men like Kenney, who had served as an observer in Europe in 1940. The Airborne attack was swift and sure, and it followed behind a massive aerial attack by heavily armed fixed-wing gunships who literally swept the area with heavy machinegun fire. The Allies had previously achieved aerial superiority, the gunships suppressed the fire of the Japanese troops who were in the vicinity of the previously determined-to-be lightly defended area and the troops jumped onto a DZ where they met little resistance.

I might also add that the operation was planned and executed, not by a massive staff in Washington, at Fort Bragg and at Scott or Eglin, but by a commander and staff in the field who knew the area and the military situation, and who tailored their operation for the conditions. In fact, the whole thing was carried out by a single command that included heavy bombers, medium bombers, fighters and transports as well as Airborne forces and infantry. And it worked.

The U.S. Army Paratroopers of the 1/503^rd PIR roar over the smoke in C-47s and jump in at an incredibly low 250 feet! The airfield is taken over quickly with light casualties as the Kenney/MacArthur, Air/Ground team began their amazing run of spectacular victories against the Japanese without the thousands of friendly casualties the frontalist approach used by the Navy/mc in the North Pacific received.

ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-P-Rabaul/USA-P-Rabaul-11.html

Nadzab: The Airborne Invasion

The Jump

Capture of Nadzab had been spectacularly effected on 5 September. This mission, assigned to Col. Kenneth H. Kinsler's 503^rd Parachute Infantry Regiment, was coupled with the additional mission of preparing the airstrip for C-47's carrying Maj. Gen. George A. Vasey's 7^th Australian Division from Marilinan and Port Moresby.[17]

www.youtube.com/watch?v=5zo4PTMg9uA

Reveille for the men of the 503^rd sounded early at Port Moresby on the morning of 5 September. The weather promised to be fair, although bad flying weather over the Owen Stanleys delayed take off until 0825. New Guinea Force had prepared its plans flexibly so that the seaborne invasion on 4 September would not be slowed or altered if any threat of bad weather on 5 September delayed the parachute jump, but Kenney's weathermen had forecast accurately.

The paratroopers and a detachment of

--207--

C-47 TRANSPORT PLANES LOADED WITH PARACHUTE TROOPS for the drop at Nadzab. Two men at left are General Kenney and General MacArthur.

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2/4^th Australian Field Regiment which was to jump with its 25-pounder guns reached the airfield two hours before take off. [18] There they put on parachutes and equipment. The 54^th Troop Carrier Wing had ninety-six C-47's ready, and the troops boarded these fifteen minutes before take-off time.

The first C-47 roared down the runway at 0825; by 0840 all transports were aloft. They crossed the Owen Stanleys, then organized into three battalion flights abreast, with each flight in six-plane elements in step-up right echelon.

An hour later bombers, fighters, and weather planes joined the formation over Marilinan, on time to the minute. All together 302 aircraft from eight different fields were involved. The air armada then flew down the Watut Valley, swung to the right over the Markham River, and headed for Nadzab. The C-47's dropped from 3,000 feet to 400-500 feet. The parachutists had stood in their planes and checked their equipment over Marilinan, and twelve minutes later they formed by the plane doors ready to jump.

In the lead six squadrons of B-25 strafers with eight .50-caliber machine guns in their noses and six parachute fragmentation bombs in their bays worked over the Nadzab field. Six A-20's laid smoke after the last bomb had exploded. Then came the C-47's, closely covered by fighters.

The paratroopers began jumping from the three columns of C-47's onto separate jump areas about 1020. Eighty-one C-47's carrying the 503^rd were emptied

--208--

AIRDROP AT NADZAB, MORNING OF 5 SEPTEMBER 1943. The paratroopers began jumping from C-47's onto separate jump areas about 1020.

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in four and one-half minutes. All men of the 503^rd but one, who fainted while getting ready, left the planes. Two men were killed instantly when their chutes failed to open, and a third landed in a tree, fell sixty feet to the ground, and died. Thirty-three men were injured. There was no opposition from the enemy, either on the ground or in the air. Once they reached the ground, the 503^rd battalions laboriously moved through high kunai grass from landing grounds to assembly areas.

Five B-17's carrying supply parachutes stayed over Nadzab all day. They dropped a total of fifteen tons of supplies on ground panel signals laid by the 503^rd. The Australian artillerymen and their guns parachuted down in the afternoon. The whole splendid sight was witnessed by Generals MacArthur and Kenney from what Kenney called a "brass-hat" flight of three B-17's high above. MacArthur was in one, Kenney in another, and the third B-17 was there to provide added fire power in case the Japanese turned up.

The 503^rd's 1^st Battalion seized the Nadzab airstrip and began to prepare it to receive C-47's. The 2^nd and 3^rd Battalions blocked the approaches from the north and east. As soon as the parachutists had begun landing, the Australian units that had come down the Watut River--the 2/2d Pioneer Battalion, the 2/6th Field Company, and one company of the Papuan Infantry Battalion--began landing on the north bank of the Markham. They made contact with the 503d in late afternoon and worked through the night in preparing the airstrip.

--209--

The next morning the first C-47 arrived. It brought in advance elements of the U.S. 871^st Airborne Engineer Battalion.

Twenty-four hours later C-47's brought in General Vasey's 7^th Division headquarters and part of the 25^th Australian Infantry Brigade Group from Marilinan, where they had staged from Port Moresby. Thereafter the transports flew the Australian infantry and the American engineers directly from Port Moresby. By 10 September the well-timed, smoothly run operation had proceeded fast enough that 7^th Division troops at Nadzab were able to relieve the 503^rd of its defensive missions. Enough American engineers had arrived to take over construction of new airstrips.

The 503^rd's only contact with the enemy came in mid-September when the 3^rd Battalion ran into a Japanese column at Yalu, east of Nadzab. The parachute regiment was withdrawn on 17 September. It had lost 3 men killed jumping, 8 men killed by enemy action, 33 injured jumping, 12 wounded by the enemy, and 26 sick.[19]

This was, comparatively, small cost for the seizure of a major airbase with a parachute jump. Nadzab paid rich dividends. Within two weeks the engineers had completed two parallel airstrips six thousand feet long and had started six others.

The Advance Against Lae

The 25^th Australian Infantry Brigade Group moved eastward out of Nadzab toward Lae on 10 September while General Wootten's 9^th Division troops were forcing a crossing over the Busu River east of Lae. The Markham Valley narrows near Lae, with the Atzera Range on the northeast and the wide river on the southwest. A prewar road in the Atzera foothills connected Nadzab with Lae, and a rough trail on the other side of the Atzeras paralleled this road from Lae to Yalu, where it intersected the road. Thus while some troops blocked the trail at Yalu, and the 2/33^rd Australian Infantry Battalion guarded the line of communications, the 2/25^th Australian Infantry Battalion advanced down the road and part of the 2/2^nd Australian Pioneer Battalion moved down the north bank of the river.

When a small group of Japanese offered resistance to the advance at Jensen's Plantation, toward the lower end of the valley, the 2/25^th Battalion drove it back and on 14 September captured Heath's Plantation farther on. The 2/33^rd Australian Infantry Battalion then took over and pushed on toward Lae. By now the Australians had come within range of Japanese 75-mm. guns and found the going harder. But an assault the next day cleared Edward's Plantation and enemy resistance ended.

The advance elements of the 25^th Brigade entered Lae from the west the next morning, 16 September. In the afternoon the 24^th Brigade, which had advanced from the east and captured Malahang Airdrome on 15 September, pushed into Lae and made contact with the 25^th Brigade. Lae had fallen easily and speedily. The Japanese had vanished.

"Eight hours to Glory" by legendary artist Jim Dietz shows the 505^th PIR getting ready for the Salerno jump

Date: 13 September 1943
Unit: 504^th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) Includes: 504^th PIR, 376^th PFA & Co. "A" 307^th Eng.
Operation: Avalanche
Troopers: 1,300
Country: Italy
Dropzone: Paestum, Salerno
Aircraft: C-47
Type Air delivery: Night Mass low-level tactical personnel static-line jump

Date: 14 September 1943
Unit: 505^th Regimental Combat Team (RCT). Includes: 505^th PIR, 456^th PFA & Co.B 370^th Engr.
Operation: Avalanche
Troopers: 2,105
Country: Italy
Dropzone: Salerno, Paestum
Aircraft: C-47
Type Air delivery: Night Mass low-level tactical personnel static-line jump

Salerno was one of the bloodier, more critical operations of the Second World War. For a time the action hung in the balance as strong enemy counterattacks smashed and threatened the very existence of the initial beachhead. This was the opening struggle of the long and bitter Italian campaign.

The Fifth Army held the beachhead at Salerno for four days but were danger of losing it to advancing German assaults and needed assistance quick. The only choice was to utilize the 504^th Parachute Infantry Regiment, which had been performing mock assaults, in an effort to provide relief to the dwindling forces of the Fifth Army.

On September 13, 1943 1^st and 2^nd Battalions were alerted that they would be performing a parachute assault. "Another dry run", was the cynical comment of most men. Nevertheless, each man gave his equipment a last minute check - just in case. Early chow was eaten and immediately afterward the troops fell in at their bivouac areas in the appointed plane loading formations; then marched to the battered and roofless hangars where they picked up their chutes.

The first troopers to board planes were the Pathfinders of the 504^th who would be establishing and mark the drop zone which was located in the middle of the Fifth Army. These men devised a plan to mark the drop zone with a flaming "T" using sand and gasoline.

While the Pathfinders were on their way to the fight, the rest of 1^st and 2^nd Battalion were hard at work. Officers were checking maps and information to decipher the best course of action to help save the Fifth Army and save the beachhead. Noncommissioned officers had Soldiers hard at work issuing parachutes, performing maintenance checks on weapons, and starting to load planes. None of these paratroopers knew the location of this jump or what type of fighting was expected. It was not until the men were seated in the planes that the mission was disclosed. In probably the quickest briefing of any comparable operation of the war, men of the 504^th were informed that the Fifth Army beachhead in Italy was in grave danger of being breached and that the 504^th was to jump behind friendly lines in the vicinity of the threatened breakthrough in order to stem the German advance.

Under the cover of darkness the planes left for the beachhead. Flying in a column formation they passed over the clearly marked DZ and unloaded their much needed support. With the exception of eight planes which failed to navigate properly to the DZ, but whose planeloads were subsequently accounted for, there was little difficulty or confusion experienced in completing the operation. The regiment assembled quickly and moved to the sounds of cannon and small arms fire within the hour. Later checks revealed that, amazingly, only 75 men had suffered injuries as a result of the jump. In exactly eight hours the 504^th had been notified of its mission, briefed, loaded into planes, jumped on its assigned drop zone, and committed against the enemy.

By dawn the regiment was firmly emplaced in a defensive sector three miles from Paestum and Southwest of Albanella. The days of the 14th and 15th of September were spent in anticipation of a tank attack that threatened from the Calore River region to the North. The 2^nd Battalion assisted in the repulsing of one tank attack across the Sele River while E Company, on a reconnaissance in force of the same area, encountered scattered and small elements of the enemy. The regimental recon platoon patrolled the area several miles to the front and battalions also sent out reconnaissance and combat patrols of their own with particular emphasis on the Altavilla sector. Hostile artillery fire was spasmodic and largely interdictory in character. Air activity was confined principally to friendly craft, though the enemy in groups of two and three would occasionally make an appearance over 504^th positions only to be driven off by intense fire from supporting anti-aircraft units. On the morning of the 16th, the regiment marched four miles to occupy the town of Albanella, where at noon, Colonel Tucker issued to the battalion commanders the order to seize and hold the high ground surmounting Altavilla. The area in the region of Altavilla for several years had been a firing range for a German artillery school; consequently there was no problem of range, deflection, or prepared concentrations that the enemy had not solved long before the advent of the Americans. Needless to say, hostile artillery and mortar fire was extremely accurate and capable of pinpointing with lethal concentrations such vital features as wells, trails, and draws. During the three days that the 504^th occupied the several hills behind Altavilla, approximately 30 paratroopers died, 150 were wounded, and one man was missing in action.

The days that followed were, in the words of General Mark Clark, Commander of the 5^th Army, "responsible for saving the Salerno beachhead." They included repelling tank attacks and small enemy forces. As the 504^th took the high ground at Altavilla, the enemy counterattacked, and on the night of the 17th, it became evident that help had to be secured if the 504^th, now completely cut off from friendly forces, was to hold these key positions so necessary for the security of the beachhead. The Commander of 6^th Corps, General Dawley, suggested the unit withdraw. Epitomizing the determined spirit of the Regiment, Colonel Tucker vehemently replied, "Retreat, Hell! -- Send me my other battalion!" The 3^rd Battalion then rejoined the 504^th, the enemy was repulsed, and the Salerno beachhead was saved. This, the first contact with the enemy for men of the 504^th since Sicily and the first time that the regiment had been committed as a unit in any single tactical operation, was a battle that turned the tide of the German onslaught on the Salerno beachhead and frustrated their attempts to contain the Fifth Army within the confines of the coastal plain reaching as far as Altavilla. On 1 October 1943, the 504^th became the first infantry unit to enter Naples and 3^rd Battalion became the first U.S. parachute unit to receive a Presidential Unit Citation as a result of the fierce fighting.

The 504^th fought hard in all battles they encountered in Italy. Nothing reflected this more than a diary entry of a German officer found at Anzio. The passage read:

American parachutists...devils in baggy pants...are less than 100 meters from my outpost line. I can't sleep at night; they pop up from nowhere and we never know when or how they will strike next. Seems like the black-hearted devils are everywhere...To this day the paratroopers of the 504^th PIR are still known as "The Devils".

Date: 14 September 1943
Unit: 509^th PIB
Operation: Avalanche
Troopers: 640
Country: Italy
Dropzone: Avellino
Aircraft: C-47s
Type Air delivery: Night Mass low-level tactical personnel static-line jump

Date: March 5-May 17 1944
Unit: Chindits and 1^st USAAF Air Commandos
Operation: Thursday
Troopers: 15, 000 men
Country: Burma
Landing Zones: "Broadway" and "Pacadilly"
Aircraft: C-47s, Waco gliders
Type Air delivery: Night Daylight glider assaults and resupply landings with mini-bulldozers to clear landing strips for C-47s to airland troops, pack mules, pack howitzers

Legendary British Major General Orde Wingate

In preparation for Wingate's Burma operations, to begin in early 1944, a special AAF unit which came to be known as the 1^st Air Commando Group was formed lead by Colonel Phil Cochrane...

Colonel Phil Cochrane and a Paratrooper

and went into training for purposes of flying Wingate's troops into battle, evacuating the wounded, providing airsupply and direct air support.

This elite unit included contingents of Troop Carrier, Fighter, Medium Bomber, and Reconnaissance outfits, and totaled more than 500 men. Aircraft in the Group included C-47s, P-51s, B-25s, observation aircraft, and CG-4A Waco gliders. After Stilwell's offensive had penetrated well into Burma in February 1944 and were reinforced by the American regiment that came to be known as Merrill's Marauders, Wingate got his orders, which included the establishment of his forces in Burma to cut the supply lines of Japanese forces opposing Stilwell's units. Wingate's plan called for a forced march by one of his brigades through jungle terrain deep behind enemy lines, to be resupplied nightly by 1^st Air Commandos. Next, beginning in early March, came the transport by glider of two of his brigades up to 165 miles behind enemy lines, where they would quickly carve out airheads, build up their forces, and set out to complete their primary tasks. Wingate's forces, trained as guerrillas and known as the Chindits, included British, Gurkha, Burmese, Indian, and Nigerian troops. The Troop Carrier operation, which began on 5 March, authorized overloads for the Wacos (4,500 lbs payload rather than the standard 3,750 lbs). Eighty gliders were to fly double-tow for more than 250 miles and then make a night landing at a large clearing near the village of Indaw. A total of 34 x C-47s and CG-4As took off and climbed to 8,000 ft., a feat that took some 80 minutes at full throttle on double-tow. Due primarily to overloading, most gliders broke loose, and only 31 made it to the LZ. Casualties were heavy among those who made it to the target: 31 men dead, 30 seriously injured. No resistance was encountered upon landing. The mission, preceded by a Pathfinder unit, delivered 539 men, along with 65,972 lbs of cargo and three mules. Glider-borne engineers cleared and leveled the field and by nightfall had built a runway 5,000 ft. long and 300 ft. wide. During this same night the first C-47s landed, delivering 500 more Soldiers, ammunition, and supplies; by 11 March, more than 9,000 Chindits had been flown into this airstrip. On the night that C-47s began landing at the first airfield, 12 more CG-4As-on single tow-were delivered to a nearby location, and within two days engineers there had built a new 3,000 ft. strip. During the next two months, the 1^st Air Commando Group flew 96 more glider sorties-most at night. Glider snatches were also performed, and most of those took place at night as well. Northern Burmese objectives were secured by Stilwell's forces near the end of August 1944, and up until that time, the Troop Carrier crews continued to fly airsupply missions to the Chindits and others in the Allied offensive in Burma.

To read more about the amazing CHINDITS:

VIDEO! on the CHINDITS

Part 1

Japanese masters at jungle warfare bicycle infiltrate and outflank British taking Malaya/Singapore, demoralized in restive India, Wavell calls for maverick Wingate who lead Israeli Special Night Squads and Gideon Force to victoria in Ethiopia, he creates long-range penetration groups resupplied by air to out-junglefight the Japanese, attacking their supply lines

youtube.com/watch?v=BB1KJn_IPvw&sdig=1

Part 2

300 man columns with 100 mules, RAF radiomen with each column to insure resupply, 90 day operations, 2 columns sent south to divert Japs, 5 columns under Wingate head east to cut rail lines, bad weather prevented resupply so columns went without food for 10 days, men got sick, had to eat their pack mules, need for SERE skills to gather food and lightweight rations or rice seems evident, seriously wounded men shot when should have been air-evaced by STOL grasshopper planes, 1, 000 men out of 3, 000 died, of 2, 000 survivors, 600 were unable to return to duty, wily Winston Churchill has Wingate accompany him to Canada to get Americans and Canadians to create their own Special Forces, 1^st Air Commandos created to better support CHINDITS and American Galahad penetration force that became Merill's Marauders now the Army's 75^th Rangers

youtube.com/watch?v=j-sP7JRALnI

Part 3

Colonel Phil Cochrane's Air Commandos well-equipped with P-51 fighter-bombers, C-47s and 100 x Waco gliders to infiltrate without having to march in, gliders carrying tiny tracked bulldozers to improve landing areas so C-47s could airland with mules and the rest of the men

www.youtube.com/watch?v=7sbYl88SblM

Part 4

Operation THURSDAY: multiple CHINDIT brigades in strong points deep inside Jap-held Burma, Wingate liases with his brigade commanders by STOL grasshopper but switches to a longer-range B-25 bomber to return to headquarters that crashes, killing him. Cochrane's fighter-bombers offer maneuver air support to help ward off Jap attacks

www.youtube.com/watch?v=a2OckZaiNJI

Part 5

Air resupply and CASEVAC by Sunderland seaplanes on the river, CHINDITs ordered to take Mogang to assist Stillwell's taking of Mytykinkya town after taking the airfield, Slim's 14^th Army with Bren gun carriers and light and medium tanks repulses Jap offensive, Stillwell and CHINDITs link-up and latter are flown back to India, Ledo road connected to Burma road to resupply China, Japs in retreat, CHINDITs disbanded and stupid idea that resources would have been better used with Slim's predictable advance is non-sense, without Stillwell and CHINDITS UNHINGING the Japs from the inside-out, Slim wouldn't have got anywhere

www.youtube.com/watch?v=px1U8egyJDE

A good Hollywood depiction of CBI Paratroop/Glider Airborne operations, see Errol Flynn's 1945 movie, "Objective Burma" which features actual combat footage including a CG-4A glider snatch at the end!

1944: D-Day

VIDEO ONLINE FOR FREE:

www.cinemanow.com/TitleDetail.aspx?titleID=26509&grpID=435&device=0&cpt=0

Geronimo: The U.S. Airborne in World War II

Available for Windows PC

Stream - Standard (700K)

Synopsis: The United States Airborne played a major role in the success of Allied operations throughout World War II. From their first jumps in North Africa and Sicily, to the massive drops in Normandy and Holland, the Airborne was an important part of Allied military strategy. Initially conceived as an assault force able to parachute behind enemy lines, to seize and hold strategic areas until ground forces could link up with them, the Airborne unites were used in many different ways. From dropping in to capture key positions behind enemy lines in Normandy and Holland, to fighting as tough ground forces at Anzio and the Battle of the Bulge, the Airborne was ready for anything. Elite, confident, and ready for action, the men of the United States Airborne were the best trained and best conditioned fighting force of the war. These men represented the finest combat troops America had to offer and they proved it in the face of unbelievable odds and under the most extreme conditions.

This Documentary is THEIR story. Told entirely through veteran and historian interviews and supported by rare archival footage, this set features the stories and experiences of the Paratroopers in their own words, creating a uniquely personal perspective of the United States Airborne forces during World War II.

MPAA Rating: NR
Length: 2hr. 43min

Windows Media Player 10 Required

The "Red Devils" of the 508^th storm from the sky and knock out German anti-aircraft guns for the gliders to land safely...

Date: 6 June 1944
Unit: 82^nd Airborne Division (507^th, 508^th) 505^th RCT, Includes: 505^th Parachute Infantry Reg., Co. B/307^th Engineer Battlion & 456^th Parachute Field Artillery Batalion. 28 Pathfinders, 504^th PIR, (7 returned).
Aircraft: C-47
Type Air delivery: Night Mass low-level tactical personnel static-line jump, wing shackle bundle drops, Gliders

Operation: Titanic (Dropping of parachute dummies, "Oscar").
Operation: Overlord
Troopers: 6,418
Country: France
Dropzone: Normandy
Aircraft: C-47

"We Were a Band of Brothers" by John D. Shaw, depicting the famed men of Easy Company, 2/506^th PIR preparing for the fateful jump into Normandy on the 'night of nights'. After nearly 2 years in the planning and creation, Ghost Wings and Liberty Studios have had the honor of having the participation of over 14 original veterans of Easy Company in personally signing these lithographs. Each of these distinguished "Band of Brothers" participated in the D-Day jump on June 6, 1944, and continued on to make military history, immortalized in Steven Ambrose's bestseller and the award-winning HBO miniseries.

Date: 6 June 1944
Unit: 101^st Airborne Division [326^th, 377^th, 501^st, 502^nd, 506^th]
Operation: Titanic (Dropping of parachute dummies, "Oscar").
Operation: Overlord
Troopers: 6,638
Country: France
Drop Zone: Normandy
Aircraft: C-47
Type Air delivery: Night Mass low-level tactical personnel static-line jump, wing shackle bundle drops, Gliders

www.youtube.com/watch?v=-O-bMTKtJlg

Soon after D-Day, the Paras lead the way cleaning-up all Germans in Southern France

www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Lewis/Lewis.asp

Jedburgh Team Operations in Support of the 12^th Army Group, August 1944

Excerpts from Dr. S. J. Lewis' U.S. Army study on the activities of a number of Jedburgh teams operating in northern France during the last year of the war addresses this often-overlooked aspect of the war in Europe.

In the summer of 1944, Allied special operations teams known as Jedburghs parachuted into occupied Europe to cooperate with resistance groups behind German lines and to aid in the advance of Allied ground forces. Each of the ninety-nine Jedburgh teams consisted of three specially trained volunteers. Clandestine operations of the kind that the Jedburghs conducted often have been recounted in memoirs and novels, but only a portion of the actual operational records have been declassified. The Jeds, as they called themselves, were but one group charged with clandestine work. Individual agents, inter-Allied missions, Special Air Service (SAS) troops, and other such organizations will only be included in this study when they specifically influenced Jedburgh operations.

This study examines the operations of the eleven Jedburgh teams dropped into northern France during the summer of 1944, with particular emphasis on the degree to which they assisted in the advance of the 12^th Army Group from Normandy to the German border. The treatment of these Jedburgh teams will be arranged chronologically, by date of insertion. The area of operations covered by these teams reached from the Belgian border in the north, south to Nancy. Jedburgh operations south of Nancy lie beyond the scope of this study. The operational records of the eleven northern teams form the core of the documentation for this study, although a good deal of the story told here has been gleaned from other sources, memoirs and interviews with Jedburgh veterans (see map 1). Regrettably, the records of the Special Forces Headquarters (SFHQ), the organization with General Eisenhower's Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), that provided operational command and control for Jedburgh teams, remain classified and, therefore, were not available for use in this study.

The sun was setting on 7 July 1944 at Harrington Air Base some fifty miles north of London. Captain Bill Dreux, a thirty-one year old lawyer from New Orleans, like his two partners, was weighted down by a .45-caliber pistol, carbine, ammo, binoculars, money belt, escape kit, flashlight, tobacco, and map case and could barely move. Over all this equipment, each man wore a camouflaged body-length smock. Dreux felt wrapped like a mummy and had trouble getting out of the station wagon. Finally, after the driver had assisted each out of the vehicle, the three tightly wrapped men waddled slowly in short, jerky steps toward a black-painted B-24 Liberator. The absurdity of the situation was not lost on the bomber's U.S. Army Air Corps crew, who succumbed to laughter. After a last cigarette, Bill Dreux, his partners, and the crew scaled the B-24 and took off for Brittany. Dreux and his two colleagues were Jedburghs. [1]

Jedburghs were volunteers specially trained to conduct guerrilla warfare in conjunction with the French Resistance in support of the Allied invasion of France. Bill Dreux and his two partners survived their mission. Their story has already been told, however, and with some skill, in one of the few published Jedburgh memoirs. This paper will examine the role of the eleven Jedburgh teams parachuted into northern France in the summer of 1944 whose story has not been told (see map 2). These eleven teams, like Dreux's, worked mostly with French teenagers and the few Frenchmen not drafted into German labor organizations or prisoners of war in Germany. Many Jedburgh teams had difficulty radioing London, and some that did contact London doubted that their reports were acted upon. After the Jedburgh operations in France concluded, the teams' after-action reports reflected a sense, not of failure, but rather of frustration. The teams felt they could have been used more effectively. The major reason for this frustration was a professional officer corps unfamiliar with, the capabilities of unconventional warfare and the multiplicity of secret organizations (several of them new) competing for recognition, personnel, funds, and missions.

Following the fall of France, in July 1940, the Chamberlain cabinet, in one of its last acts, created the Special Operations Executive (SOE). Independent of other British intelligence services, its charter was suitably unique: to foster sabotage activity in Axis-occupied countries. Two offices in the War Office and one in the Foreign Office had been studying the subject since 1938, and they combined to form SOE2. Although SOE ran intelligence circuits, it was independent of the Secret (or Special) Intelligence Service (SIS), which today is known as MI 63. In similar fashion, the Special Air Service Regiment remained independent of SOE and SIS. David Stirling, who created the SAS in 1941, summarized his organization's purpose as follows:

.... firstly, raids in depth behind the enemy lines, attacking HQ nerve centres, landing grounds, supply lines and so on; and, secondly, the mounting of sustained strategic offensive activity from secret bases within hostile territory and, if the opportunity existed, recruiting, training, arming and coordinating local guerrilla elements.4

MAP 2. Jedburgh teams deployed to northern France.

The United States approached World War II without a strategic intelligence organization. It first created the Committee of Information, a conspicuous failure that soon became the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Its director, William ("Wild Bill") Donovan, allowed it to duplicate the functions and methods of the British intelligence organizations, to which it was closely tied. But whereas the British effort was marked by independent competing organs, Donovan attempted to unify the many facets of the secret world in his neophyte OSS. Following September 1942, the OSS special operations branch joined the SOE London Group to create a combined office known as SOE/SO on Baker Street in London. [5]

SOE's first director, Dr. Hugh Dalton, explained his organization's purpose as follows:

We have got to organize movements in enemy-occupied territory comparable to the Sinn Fein movement in Ireland, to the Chinese Guerillas now operating against Japan, to the Spanish Irregulars who played a notable part in Wellington's campaign or-one might as well admit it-to the organizations which the nazis themselves have developed so remarkably in almost every country in the world. This "democratic international" must use many different methods, including industrial and military sabotage, labour agitation and strikes, continuous propaganda, terrorist acts against traitors and German leaders, boycotts and riots.[6]

One of the most important personalities in SOE was Sir Colin McV. Gubbins, who eventually became its executive director. Born in Japan in 1896, Gubbins was a slight Scot who had served in the artillery on the Western Front in World War I, in Ireland during "the Troubles," and in northern Russia during the Russian Civil War. In 1939, in the War Office's small unconventional war section, he wrote two short pamphlets: "The Art of Guerilla Warfare" and "Partisan Leaders' Handbook."[6]

He created the "Independent Companies" (later renamed commandos) and successfully led several of them in Norway in 1940. May 1942 found him a brigadier general with the title of military deputy to head of SOE. [7]

In May 1942, SOE entered into talks involving its support of a future Allied invasion of northwestern Europe. The British Chiefs of Staff foresaw SOE activity occurring in two phases. In the first phase (cooperation during the initial invasion), SOE would organize and arm resistance forces and "take action against the enemy's rail and signal communications, air personnel, etc." During the second phase, after the landing, SOE would provide guides for British conventional units, guards for important locations, labor parties, and organized "raiding parties capable of penetrating behind German lines."[9]

Brigadier Gubbins and SOE developed the Jedburgh concept from these discussions with one paper, drafted by Peter Wilkinson, summarizing its activities as follows:

As and when the invasion commences, SOE will drop additional small teams of French speaking personnel carrying arms for some forty men each. The role of these teams will be to make contact with local authorities or existing SOE organizations, to distribute the arms, to start off the action of the patriots, and, most particularly, to arrange by W/T [wireless telegraphy] communication the dropping points and reception committees for further arms and equipment on the normal SOE system. Each Team will consist of one British Officer, one W/T operator with set and possibly one guide.[10]

On 6 July, Gubbins (recently promoted to major general) briefly explained the project to the head of the SOE security section, requesting a code name for teams "to raise and arm the civilian population to carry out guerrilla activities against the enemy's lines of communication."[11] The following day, the security section issued the project the code name "Jedburgh", after a small town on the Scots-English border.[12]

The Jedburgh project evolved along with the changing Allied invasion plans of the Continent. Later in the month, SOE resolved that seventy Jedburgh teams would be required, with the British and Americans each providing thirty-five. In August 1942, the British Chiefs of Staff informed SOE that there was no longer a requirement for Jedburgh teams to provide guides and labor or raiding parties, effectively eliminating phase two of the original proposal. On 24 December 1942, a meeting at General Headquarters, Home Forces, determined that Jedburghs would all be uniformed soldiers and that one of the two officers in each team should be of the nationality of the country to which the team would deploy. This signified that the project would require Belgian, Dutch, and French Soldiers. Furthermore, Jedburgh teams would be dropped to secure areas, where SOE agents would receive them. Each team would be given one or more military tasks to perform in their area. In addition, since it would take at least seventy-two hours to deploy a team and have them operational, Jedburgh teams would not be used to assist the tactical plans of conventional ground forces. Finally, SOE would provide twelve Jedburgh teams to further examine the concept's possibilities and limitations during Exercise Spartan from 3-11 March 1943.[13]

Exercise Spartan simulated an Allied breakout from the initial invasion lodgement area. SOE's Jedburgh teams attempted to assist the British Second Army advance, with the 8^th Battalion of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers in the role of local resistance groups. SOE also used this opportunity to test the insertion of individual agents behind enemy lines and the role of SOE staff officers at army and corps headquarters. Each of these parties communicated via an SOE radio base in Scotland. Following the exercise, SOE concluded that Jedburgh teams should be inserted at least forty miles behind enemy lines to conduct small-scale guerrilla operations against enemy lines of communication. The exercise also demonstrated that each army and army group headquarters- required an SOE liaison and signals detachment. SOE also concluded that it should maintain a small detachment with the Supreme Headquarters.[14]

SOE and OSS, after compiling the Spartan lessons learned, both began the process of moving similar position papers through the British and American hierarchies, seeking approval, support, and personnel. On 19 July 1943, Lieutenant General Frederick R. Morgan, Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, recommended that the SOE proposals be approved. To his understanding, SOE would provide small staffs and signal detachments to each army and army group headquarters (and the Supreme Allied Commander's headquarters) "for controlling resistance groups." [15] Jedburgh teams would constitute a strategic reserve in England until D Day "to provide, if necessary, suitable leadership and equipment for those resistance groups found to be in need of them." [16] Two days later, the British Chiefs of Staff approved the SOE proposal, with the Americans following suit on 24 August 1943. By October, SOE and OSS each agreed to provide sufficient personnel to field 35 Jedburgh teams plus 15 reserve teams-a total of 300 men in 100 teams.[17]

SHAEF created a special forces (SF) detachment for each army and army group headquarters to coordinate these operations with the field army. These detachments linked the field headquarters with SOE/SO. Each detachment fielded about twelve officers and twenty men. The senior OSS officer with the U.S. Third Army described the organization as follows: "The SF Detachment was an orthodox military staff organized to provide the Commanding General of the Army a direct means to exercise control over the organized resistance elements and to use these elements in connection with military operations." [18] The detachments, however, had no means of directly contacting those organized resistance groups and Jedburgh teams other than through SOE/SO. That organization summarized agent and resistance group reports and dispatched those summaries to the SF detachments.[19]

To integrate this effort with the Allied invasion of France, SOE/SO on 1 May 1944 became the Special Forces Headquarters responsible to SHAEF's G3 Branch. Although SOE had several sections running circuits in France, the most important were RF Section (circuits supporting General Charles de Gaulle) and F Section (which operated non-Gaullist circuits). De Gaulle's government in exile still remained at arm's length, but on occasion, its intelligence branch, Bureau Central de Renseignements et l'Action (BCRA), cooperated with SOE/SO. One such occasion was a 25 January 1944 London meeting to discuss the reception of Jedburgh teams in France. SOE, OSS, and the BCRA agreed to finance a mission for BCRA and F Section to establish reception committees and safe houses for Jedburgh teams. Through herculean efforts, de Gaulle's government managed to largely unify the many diverse French resistance groups, in March 1944 announcing the creation of the Forces Francaises de l'Interieur (FFI). The FFI included the Communist Franc Tireurs et Partisans (FTP-French leftist resistance organization), the largest and most active resistance organization. It remained difficult, however, for the many diverse French resistance organizations to cooperate without considering postwar political dilemmas.[20]

In July 1944, SHAEF directed de Gaulle's subordinate and personal friend, Pierre Koenig,[21] commander of the FFI, to gradually assume command over SFHQ operations in France. The transfer did not occur until 21 August. In any case, this was largely a political and cosmetic measure, because Koenig's deputies from SOE and OSS maintained the mechanisms of command, communication, and supply (see figure 1).[22] Most of the eleven Jedburgh teams examined here operated in eastern France, known as Region C to the FFI, commanded by District Military Representative "Planete." Region C consisted of the Ardennes, Marne, Meurthe-et-Moselle, Meuse, Vosges, Bas-Rhin, and Haute-Rhin Departments. This had been a difficult area in which to operate from the beginning, but in August 1944, it became even more difficult, as the Vichy police, the Milice, and its supporters fled east with the remnants of the defeated German Army.[23]

In mid-September 1943, with the Allied invasion of France just around the corner, no Jedburgh force existed. Over the next three months, SOE and OSS each recruited officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) with French language skills-all volunteers. The NCOs would serve as radio operators, the officers as either Jedburghs or staff officers of the SF detachments. Little is known of the SOE selection process, but the OSS qualifications for Jedburgh officers were as follows:

Officers recruited as leaders and seconds in command should be picked for qualities of leadership and daring, ability to speak and understand French, and all-around physical condition. They should be experienced in handling men, preferably in an active theater of operations, and be prepared to be parachuted in uniform behind enemy lines and operate on their own for some time. They must have had at least basic military training and preferably have aptitude for small arms weapons.[24]

Qualifications for the NCO radio operators were less stringent, requiring only a working knowledge of French and the ability to attain a speed of fifteen words per minute before leaving the United States. They, too, had to be in top physical condition. It would appear that the screening procedures were quite rigorous: of the fifty-five officers selected for further Jedburgh training in Great Britain, only thirty-five became Jedburghs. This signified that the OSS was forced to secure additional volunteers from U.S. Army units in Great Britain. Several of those volunteers did not join their colleagues until February, a good month after basic training had already begun.

Although SOE and OSS were theoretically coequals in SOE /SO (and later in SFHQ), SOE remained dominant. SOE provided the training sites and most of the instructors. The American volunteers arrived in Great Britain in late December 1943, with the officers spending two weeks going through psychological tests near Peterfield, south of London. The officers then split into three groups and rotated through the Special Training Schools (STS) No. 6 at Walsingham, No. 45 at Fairford, and No. 40 at Gumley Hall. The sixty-two American NCOs attended, the SOE communications school at Henley-on-Thames. Like the officers, however, they also underwent the ubiquitous psychological tests and practiced marksmanship, self-defense (taught by former members of the Shanghai Police), and physical training. In late January, all the Americans attended the Ringway parachute school, a three-day course, where they trained on parachuting through the small hole (joe hole) of an RAF bomber.[26]

Lieutenant Colonel Frank V. Spooner of the British Army established the Jedburgh training school at Milton Hall, a large estate four miles from Peterborough, England. Operational training for the Jedburghs began there in February 1944, emphasizing guerrilla warfare tactics and skills: demolitions, use of enemy weapons, map reading, night navigation, agent circuit operations, intelligence, sabotage, escape and evasion, counterespionage, ambushes, security, the use of couriers, and hand-to-hand combat. Almost all Jedburghs practiced French, Morse code, and long marches. The Jedburghs also received briefings on the history and organization of the resistance in France and other European countries. The final seventy French volunteers did not arrive at Milton Hall until March 1944, after SOE/SO had conducted a recruitment drive through the Middle East. From 31 May to 8 June, many Jedburgh teams participated in Lash, the last large-scale exercise. In Leicestershire's Charnwood Forest, the teams rehearsed receiving orders, linking up with resistance groups, and later leading attacks against targets designated by radio message. SOE/SO, or, SFHQ as it was now known, expressed pleasure with the exercise, although the simulated guerrillas had been observed moving during daylight in large groups. SFHQ concluded that the guerrillas should have approached their targets in smaller bands. In the, category of "minor criticisms," the guerrilla groups had received vague orders, which led to confusion. In addition, the groups had difficulty with their escape and evasion techniques.[27]

The Jedburghs formed their own teams in March and April, between the large-scale training exercises. In early April, Lieutenant Colonel George Richard Musgrave, British Army, became the new commandant at Milton Hall. By April, training was by and large complete, and on 2 May 1944, fifteen Jedburgh teams sailed for North Africa in preparation for insertion into southern France from Algiers. The teams remaining at Milton Hall continued to train while awaiting their alert or warning order. As a rule, upon receipt of their alert order, the team would be isolated and driven to a London safe house, where SFHQ representatives from SOE's country sections briefed the officers on the particulars of the mission, local conditions, and background information. Although most Jedburghs entered France wearing military uniforms, several teams were informed at the briefing that they would be parachuted into France in civilian clothes. Needless to say, if they were caught wearing civilian clothes, the Germans would treat them as spies. From there, the team was usually driven to Harrington or Tempsford Air Bases to await a flight that same evening. Other air bases were occasionally used, but Harrington fielded the modified blackpainted bombers of the U.S. Eighth Air Force's 801^st (Provisional) Bomb Group (Heavy), while the RAFs 38^th Group flew out of Tempsford. SFHQ maintained its supply and packing area (known as Area H) some thirty-five miles from Harrington near the village of Holme. Many of the Jedburghs heard of the D Day invasion while on Exercise Lash in Leicestershire. There was a general sense of disappointment upon the realization that they would be deployed not before, but after, the invasion. By the end of June, SFHQ had dispatched thirteen Jedburgh teams to France (six from England and seven from North Africa). At the end of July, the number of teams in France increased to twenty-five, although none had been dropped north of the Seine River. [28]

The Jedburgh concept had evolved considerably from Gubbins' original 1942 proposal. The number of teams mushroomed from 70 to 100, of which 93 would deploy to France and another 6 to Holland in support of Operation Market-Garden. From being a British force, the Jedburghs became an international one including Americans, French, Belgians, and Dutch. Basically, they constituted an, unconventional warfare reserve in theater to provide leadership, organization, training, weapons, supplies, and communication links to FFI resistance groups. They would, be inserted at least forty miles behind enemy lines and hence would not usually be in a position to provide tactical assistance to conventional forces. The teams would conduct unconventional warfare against German lines of communication, but not until told to do so by SFHQ. When Lieutenant General Frederick Morgan approved the Jedburgh concept in 1943, it was with the understanding that the special forces detachments at army and army group headquarters would control the organized resistance groups behind German lines. Furthermore, he believed it was the job of his army commander to exercise that control. How suitable, however, were the senior army officers for directing unconventional warfare behind enemy lines?

Modern professional officer corps, as a rule, have very little interest in unconventional warfare. That was certainly the case for the senior commanders and staff officers of World War II, trained in the branch schools and staff colleges of the 1920s and 1930s. Robin Brook, senior SOE adviser to SHAEF, observed that the regular officers he served with had little knowledge of or interest in unconventional warfare.[29] The SF detachments began to see similar patterns upon taking the field in France. As early as 12 July, when the commanders of the 10^th and 11^th SF Detachments met, one observed: "It appears from his experience and ours here that Armies working-under Army Groups are not very strategically minded".[30] The first response of the U.S. Third Army upon breaking-out of the Normandy bridgehead was to disarm the FFL. It took a directive from the 12^th Army Group to establish that the FFI were allies and not enemies.[31] Basically, there was little interest in SF detachments or what was happening 160 kilometers in the enemy's rear. To complicate the situation further, the SF detachments could only contact Jedburgh teams and resistance groups through SFHQ. Another possible cloud on the horizon was the efficiency of communications between resistance groups, SFHQ, and the SF detachments. With more and more Allied special operations teams and resistance groups operating behind German lines, would SFHQ be capable of receiving and analyzing the increasing radio traffic and giving the SF detachments sufficient information to act upon?

Jedburgh teams were but one special operations instrument available to SHAEF in the summer of 1944. Current military doctrine emphasizes a rational construct of Special Operations Forces, an umbrella concept encompassing numerous organizations and functions ranging from psychological warfare and civil affairs all the way to elite special forces teams conducting direct-action missions deep behind enemy lines. In 1944, however, there was no such concept. Theoretically, SHAEF and its SFHQ provided the umbrella to encompass the many special-operations type forces. But as we have seen, the Allied special operations effort was marked by different organizations competing for funds, personnel, and missions. Although pledged to support SHAEF in the invasion of western Europe a number of organizations remained independent, the most conspicuous being British Intelligence and the Special Air Service Regiment. A number of Jedburgh teams in the field, when confronted with a mission beyond their means, specifically requested reinforcement by SAS parties. Unfortunately, SFHQ did not control the operational use of those forces. The modern concept of "deconfliction" (ensuring that simultaneous special or intelligence operations do not conflict or compromise each other) did not exist.

The experience and skills of FFI groups (and SOE agents inserted to work with the resistance) varied considerably. Some groups were rather familiar with the reception procedures (flashlight identification signals and two lines of bonfires) and had even used the procedures once or twice. Other groups would form their first reception committee to meet a Jedburgh team. A coded BBC message (known as a blind transmission broadcast) informed each FFI group of the impending arrival of a Jedburgh team. Some Jedburghs trained to receive a small aircraft in the field to evacuate the severely wounded. Jedburghs, however, were expected to remain in the field until they linked up with advancing Allied ground forces. This event was called being "overrun" and required no special procedures other than a Jedburgh showing his SFHQ dentification paper. The Jedburghs who would parachute into northern France followed the progress of Operation Overlord in the newspapers and BBC newscasts. Until they received their warning order and briefing in London, however, they did not know where they would be inserted. Of the 12^th Army Group and its operations, they knew next to nothing.

The Allied invasion, of Normandy on 6 June 1944 succeeded at all points, and Allied control of the sea and air ensured the rapid buildup of follow-on forces. The German High Command erroneously believed the main invasion would come farther north, in the Calais area. This misconception, along with Allied air interdiction, slowed the arrival of German reinforcements. The feared German counterattack never took place. Instead, a battle of attrition developed a battle the Germans could not afford to fight. The strain on the German Army began to show by 13 June, when the U.S. VII Corps stretched the German line to the breaking point, severing the Cotentin Peninsula on 18 June and advancing north to capture the port of Cherbourg. The Allied armies in Normandy continued, to grow in strength and experience as they wore down the Germans, who still ably defended the difficult Bocage terrain. On 18 July, the U.S. First Army captured St. Lo, while the British Second Army engaged most of the German armored divisions near Caen. What was needed was one powerful thrust to break through the German line. That occurred with Operation Cobra on 25 July 1944, when the U.S. First Army broke through the positions of the German Seventh Army, ably exploiting the breakout and reaching Avranches on 31 July.

On 1 August, the Allied armies reorganized into two army groups. General Bernard Montgomery commanded the 21^st Army Group, consisting of the Canadian First and the British Second Armies, while General Omar Bradley commanded the U.S. 12^th Army Group, with General Courtney Hodges' U.S. First Army and General George S. Patton, Jr.'s, U.S. Third Army. Patton's Third Army swept across Brittany in a vain attempt to secure a usable harbor and then swung east against minimal opposition. SHAEF headquarters had been reading the most secret German signals communications and realized that Hitler, instead of allowing his forces to retreat to a defensible position, was about to counterattack at Mortain. This provided SHAEF the opportunity to surround and trap most of German Army Group B south of the Seine River. On 13 August, however, as the Canadian First and U.S. Third Armies were approaching each other to close the trap, General Bradley halted Patton's forces. Eventually, several days later, the trap closed, but the delay allowed many of the German troops to escape north across the Seine. A second attempt to destroy German Army Group B, by trapping it against the Seine River, also failed. Nevertheless, the Allies had largely destroyed the German Fifth panzer and Seventh Armies. On the morning of 15 August, the second Allied invasion struck, not at Calais, but along the French Riviera.

Although the German forces in the west had been thoroughly defeated, Hitler, from his headquarters hundreds of miles away, issued orders to defend the Seine River and later the Marne River, as if the defeat in Normandy had not taken place. He did, however, allow the German forces in southern France to withdraw north, which made possible their escape. For the German commanders and troops, each day was a struggle to survive. Faced with total Allied air superiority, the remnants of the German Army could move freely only at night or in rain or fog. To their rear, the French Resistance had risen in arms and posed a real threat to any German force smaller than a company. On paper, German commanders still acted as if they were obeying Hitler's orders, but in actuality, they were simply trying to save what was left of their battered formations. They marched east, mostly at night, taking shelter behind the successive river lines in northern France, hoping to get back to Germany.

The Allied commanders, like their German counterparts, fully understood the magnitude of the German defeat in Normandy. The only question remaining was how to exploit the situation. For the U.S. Seventh Army that had invaded southern France, this was rather simple: it would advance north up the Rhone River valley. General Eisenhower reexamined the preinvasion planning and decided to exploit the advance beyond the Seine River. He directed the 21^st Army Group to advance northeast through Belgium and directed Bradley's 12^th Army Group to protect the 21^st Army Group's southern flank. General Patton's Third Army launched a subsidiary offensive due east towards Metz and Nancy. Both the western Allies and the Germans expected the war to end within weeks. The only shadow on the horizon was the possibility that the Allied system of logistical support would halt their triumphant procession to the east.

By 15 August, SFHQ had deployed only two Jedburgh teams in northern France in front of the advancing 12th Army Group. Nine more teams were soon to follow. Recent experience in Brittany demonstrated that U.S. Army field commanders were particularly impressed with the help of FFI guides and scouts. Therefore, most of the Jedburgh teams sent into northern France were instructed to be prepared to send FFI volunteers to meet the advancing field armies. SHAEF possessed abundant supplies to be parachuted to the SOF forces, but with resistance groups springing into action all across France, the limited air assets could not provide immediate delivery. SFHQ briefing officers informed most Jedburgh teams that deployed in northern France that it would take eight days for them to receive supply drops.

German Rear-Area Administration and Security

For the most part, the Jedburgh teams would not encounter German main-force combat units, but rather the rear-area security-administration and supply units of the Military Governor of France, the military government directly responsible to the German Army High Command. The German security forces observed a noticeable increase in French Resistance activity early in 1944, particularly in nocturnal English parachute drops of arms. As early as January and February, the Military Governor of France reported that his major effort was devoted to fighting the French Resistance with his security units, East Battalions (composed of Russians), and military police. By May, there was increased resistance activity in Brittany, which had earlier been rather quiet. The Germans believed that the major resistance activity was Communist inspired and centered in southeast France and Dordogne. German security forces knew the basic organization of the resistance, its radio links to London, and its mission to prepare for and assist the coming Allied invasion of France. They also concluded that the majority of the population sympathized with and provided support to the resistance. Furthermore, French police and security forces for the most part were merely going through the motions of tracking down the resistance and in some instances assisted the resistance. The number of French who willingly provided information to the Germans was actually quite small and presumably known to the resistance. German security soon began to form the image of French Communists, professionals, former army officers, and students lined up shoulder to shoulder against the occupation force. The Third Reich considered all resistance activity to be terrorism, which was to be met with counterterrorism: shootings, illegal arrests, and torture. To assist in the more unspeakable aspects of this policy, the SS provided Gestapo and other security offices in the larger cities across France.[32]

Besides the garrison of Paris, the Military Governor of France divided France into four sectors, each with a military commander: northwest, northeast, southwest, and south. Each military commander possessed basically one Feldkommandantur headquarters for each French department, usually commanded by a colonel or brigadier general and from 2,000 to 3,000 personnel. Most of those personnel, however, were administrators and sometimes civilians or women. The sector military commanders also possessed several security regiments and on occasion one or two East Battalions. The Jedburgh teams we shall examine in this study jumped into the sectors of either the Military Governor of Northwest France or Military Governor of Northeast France, the former's headquarters located at Paris and the latter's in Dijon. The experience of the Chaumont garrison indicated the inherent dilemmas of the German situation. Feldkommandantur 769 governed the Haute-Marne Department in northeastern France from the city of Chaumont and maintained a smaller headquarters (Aussenstelle) in Langres. One of its senior civil servants, a Dr. Achten, observed that Chaumont remained quiet and orderly through the German occupation. Since early August, the headquarters was responsible for constructing defenses behind the Marne River, its sector of the Kitzinger Line. Dr. Achten reported that about 60 percent of the French males in the area helped construct the fortifications and assisted the Germans in moving livestock and grain north of the Marne. He noted that the only difficulty was a tendency of the German vehicles to break down. It would appear that as long as the area appeared quiet and orderly, the German occupation forces were satisfied. In reality, the forced laborers along the Marne sabotaged both the German motor vehicles and fortification efforts. Many of those same workers weeks later helped guide U.S. Third Army units through and around the Kitzinger Line. In addition, by August 1944, the German occupation forces really did not want to know what was happening in the countryside. The threat of FFI ambushes led the occupation forces to send only large armed groups outside their garrison. In August 1944, there were vast stretches of France, particularly in the south, virtually unobserved by the Germans.[33]

Team Jacob, 12 August 1944

On the night of 12 August 1944, SFHQ dispatched Team Jacob to the Vosges area north of Epinal as the twenty-sixth Jedburgh team to, the Continent. They landed at about 0100 on 13 August near the village of La Petite-Raon. SFHQ had previously been unable to support the eastern area of France and in mid-August resolved to send a Jedburgh team to the area. The SAS resolved to dispatch the ninety-one-man Team Loyton to the area also. Jedburgh Team Jacob was to assist the local Maquis, cooperate with the SAS, but to remain under the command of SFHQ. They were to avoid open offensive action against Axis forces. Team Jacob consisted of Captain Victor Andrew Gough (British), Captain Maurice Boissarie (French), and Sergeant Ken Seymour (British). Gough was a pleasant young man from Somerset, who before entering the service had been a cartoonist. It was Gough who created the design for the Special Forces wings that the Jedburghs wore on their uniforms.[34]

On 15 August, Team Jacob radioed SFHQ reporting that they had landed safely and were with a Maquis two kilometers south of Vexaincourt. Sergeant Seymour injured his ankle in the jump, but they expected him to be ambulatory in seven days. Meanwhile, the team used the SAS radio operator and hoped to meet "Planete" in a day or two. Of the 800 FFI volunteers in the area, only 50 were armed. Some 600 were forced to remain as sedentaire, inactive in their homes. In two messages on 26 August, the team requested a large supply drop and indicated that their radio set was not functioning. On 5 September, Jacob reported that they had not yet received another radio but that they had contacted SAS Team Loyton. It would appear that several days earlier Jacob and SFHQ had attempted to conduct an arms drop that proved unsuccessful, resulting in numerous F'FI casualties when Axis forces attacked them on the drop zone (DZ). On the following day, Team Jacob canceled that night's arms drop, reporting that Germans were on the DZ.

SFHQ next heard from Team Jacob on 15 September, when it reported that Sergeant Seymour had been captured on 17 August and was rumored to have been shot on the 20th. In a recent battle, Captain Boissarie had been killed along with 100 Maquis. Another 100 Maquis had been captured with the remainder dispersed. On 16 September, Captain Gough (Jacob's sole survivor) radioed SFHQ stating that he had rallied 200 Maquis and with SAS assistance had armed them. He also reported that the transmitter and radio set recently dropped had broken during the drop. Gough said he planned to continue using the SAS set. At 1900, 18 September, Captain Gough sent his last message:

Have contacted 800 Maquis under Marlier. Sent message with SAS yesterday for arms drop. Gave ground. SAS will liaise [liaison] with you. Great difficulty working alone. Can't come up-on regular skeds [schedules]. Will come up on emergency when can. Please have your message ready for me on this channel. Have not had money yet. SAS having personnel drop to team here tomorrow. Please send money addressed to me with one of their officers.[35]

SFHQ continued to send messages to Team Jacob through 28 September. Captain Gough was captured in the days following 18 September and executed on 25 November 1944 at the Schirmek La Braque concentration camp in Alsace. He is buried at the Durnbach Commonwealth Cemetery near Bad Tolz, Bavaria. Captain, Boissarie (alias Baraud) apparently died in a skirmish on 4 September 1944 at Viambois Farm in the Vosges. Sergeant Seymour was captured by the Germans, survived incarceration in a concentration camp, and returned to England.[36]

Team Aubrey, 12 August 1944

SFHQ dispatched Aubrey as the twenty-seventh Jedburgh team to France from the United Kingdom. It was to assist the SPIRITUALIST network (code name for the organizer and circuit) in the Seine-et-Marne region east of Paris, providing an additional communication link to London, particularly for the delivery of arms and ammunition. The team consisted of Captain Godfrey Marchant (British), Captain J. Chaigneau (French), and Sergeant Ivor Hooker (British). They received their briefing in London on 11 August and left for Harrington Air Base at 1700. The team wore civilian clothes for the jump and took off in a modified B-24 from Harrington at 0015 on 12 August, followed by two more B-24s carrying weapons, ammunition, and equipment. At about 0155, the team parachuted without incident into a DZ near La Plessis-Belleville and were greeted by Major Rene Dumont-Guillemet, the leader of the SPIRITUALIST circuit, and a large reception committee from the village of St. Pathus (see map, 3).[37]

On the evening of 12 August, the team cycled to the village of Forfry, where they established themselves in a safe house. The following day, Sergeant Hooker developed a case of the mumps, and since there were no Germans in the village, he set up his radio and operated it from his sick bed throughout most of the remainder of the mission. On the 14th, SFHQ approved Captains Marchant and Chaigneau's request to shift operations to the suburbs of northern Paris, where Major Dumont-Guillemet had identified some 1,500 volunteers. The team believed it much safer to operate in the built-up suburbs than in the gently rolling hills of the Seine-et-Marne.

Captain Marchant secured Spanish identity papers and traveled daily throughout the suburbs, instructing small groups (including Parisian gendarmes) on sabotage techniques. The local resistance group provided Captain Chaigneau with false papers and a motorcycle, and he served as a liaison between resistance groups. On 21 August, Chaigneau and Marchant decided that with the German Army retreating from France, it was time to move to the Meaux area. When Marchant and the SPIRITUALIST radio operator, "Blaise," bicycled back to St. Pathus, however, they found an SS and a German Army field unit camped about the village. The Germans moved north on 24 August, and the following day, Major Dumont-Guillemet, on his own initiative, instructed his forces to rise in revolt. Within hours, however, SFHQ radioed to tell him that the revolt could not start until SFHQ sanctioned the rising. Major Dumont-Guillemet and Captain Marchant then conferred and agreed that to call off the uprising would only create confusion. They decided to go ahead with the insurrection.

Team Aubrey put on their uniforms again on 26 August and awaited the arrival of the FFI volunteers from northern Paris. The latter arrived the following morning in some twenty vehicles, having managed to avoid large German military convoys escaping to the north. This FFI group with Major Dumont-Guillemet and Team Aubrey attempted to set up an ambush position near Rougemont, between Oissery and Forfry. It was not a bad defensive position, resting upon a sunken road [38] with a good field of fire to the south, protected on the west by a heavy wood and on the east by marshy ground impassable to armored vehicles. The problems were twofold: the Maquis, were basically unorganized and untrained, and the men really had no idea what would be coming down the road into their ambush. Only two Bren guns were operational, and only the Jedburghs knew how to operate the four Piats (a hand-held antitank rocket). Even as the FFI column unloaded at the sunken road, a German armored car opened fire on two FF1 vehicles in Oissery. Seconds later, a German light tank opened fire on the vehicles in the sunken road. After about eighty minutes, at about 1230, with the arrival of additional Germans, Major Dumont-Guillemet directed a covering force to hold off the Germans while the remaining men dispersed. Captain Marchant said he would remain with the covering force and ordered Sergeant Hooker to leave the field. Hooker moved east along the streambed, where he met Major Dumont-Guillemet. They spotted Captain Chaigneau about thirty yards ahead of them. Captain Marchant and the covering force held their positions for a short while until another German tank approached and opened fire at close range, whereupon the covering force also fled. Marchant was forced to crawl north to a lake, where he hid for the next eight hours. The German armor continued to fire, killing Captain Chaigneau in the streambed, with a high-explosive shell. The mud in the streambed was rather deep, so Hooker, Dumont-Guillemet, and the others crawled some two kilometers through the mud until they finally reached the shelter of the woods. From there, the group dispersed, with Hooker (who had discarded his codes) and Major Dumont-Guillemet making their way to a safe house in Nongloire-par-Puisieux.[39]

Major Dumont-Guillemet and Sergeant Hooker spent the next day at the safe house. On the morning of 29 August, they awoke to the sound of machine guns and discovered a U.S. VII Corps column advancing down the road to Soissons. They received a ride from the Americans to Meaux, from where they returned to Paris. On the 30th, Sergeant Hooker borrowed a jeep and drove to Forfry, where he found Captain Marchant, and the two returned to Paris. Major Dumont-Guillemet had already returned to London, and the two surviving members of Team Aubrey followed soon after.

The German armored unit that Team Aubrey encountered belonged in all probability to the LVIII panzer Corps, which was responsible to the German First Army on 25-27 August. It consisted of the remnants of several severely battered divisions, including the panzer Lehr and 9^th panzer Divisions. The LVIII panzer Corps concentrated its efforts on blocking the major road nets north of Paris until 27 August, when it was forced to retire to the line Beaumont-Survillers-Dammartinen-Goele-Meaux. In the nineteen days it was in the field, Team Aubrey provided valuable information to London, particularly targeting data on active Luftwaffe airfields north of Paris. In addition, although SFHQ probably knew of the withdrawal of the German's Paris garrison, Team Aubrey's confirmation of its departure on 19 August undoubtedly assisted in clarifying the situation. Captain Marchant estimated that the FFI lost eighty-six men and women killed in the 27 August engagement near Rougemont. Godfrey Marchant, originally from Buenos Aires, died in April 1945 when his B-24, bound for an SOE mission in Burma, crashed on takeoff near Calcutta. Ivor Hooker survived the war, returning to England to live in Suffolk County. He died in June 1988. [40]

Team Augustus, 15 August 1944

SFHQ dispatched Augustus as the thirty-fourth Jedburgh team to the Continent on 15 August 1944 to the Aisne region, where it was to assist the local Maquis and serve as an additional communication link to London (see map 4). Major John H. Bonsall, U.S. Army (USA), the team leader, was born on 11 June 1919 in Morristown, New Jersey. After attending a number of preparatory schools, he entered Princeton University, where he was in the ROTC program. He was commissioned an Army second lieutenant upon graduation in 1941, although he planned to follow his father's example and practice law. He was called to active duty in August 1941, arrived in England in December 1943, and was promoted to major in April 1944. Captain Jean Delwiche (French) and Technical Sergeant Roger E. Cote (USA) were the other members of the team. Delwiche was a professional officer born in Vivaise, a small village ten kilometers north of Laon. He was a profoundly quiet man, undoubtedly the result of the death of his wife and child to illness.

On the night of 15 August, the team flew from England with twenty-four containers weighing three tons and with no other passengers. Landing near the hamlet of Colonfay, about fifteen kilometers south of Guise, they moved to Le Nouvion-en-Thierache, the local resistance headquarters. On the afternoon of 16 August, they reached a farm near the village of Clary, which the resistance suggested would be much safer. The team radioed SFHQ on 17 August that the reception had gone perfectly. Two days later, they reported that they had successfully contacted the local resistance leader. At that meeting, they apparently decided to follow the suggestion of the resistance to conduct operations to the south near Soissons. On 20 August, the team radioed that the resistance movement in the Aisne Department was quite advanced, with 1,100 men armed and trained and 4,900 unarmed men.[41]

On 21 August, the team moved south about 100 kilometers to the village of Rugny. Through 24 August, the team sent London several reports on specific targets for the Allied air forces, mostly large German troop columns headed east for the German border or trains stuck between railroad demolitions. On the 25th, however, Augustus reported that there were so many German troops in the area that it would be unwise to form any Maquis and that hiding places were becoming harder to find. The following day, the team reported that the Germans were constructing field fortifications behind the Aisne River, although without minefields.

On 28 August, they learned that American tanks were in the vicinity and moved north to Soissons. There, they briefed staff officers of the U.S. 3^rd Armored Division on German defenses in the area. The American officers displayed particular interest in the German camp at Margival. [42] SFHQ, on 30 August, sent Augustus the following message:

Have received order from Army commander for FFI to take all possible steps to preserve following Somme bridges from enemy demolition. All bridges Amiens area, also at Moreuil, Boves, Fiquigny, Conde, Longpre. You should attempt to preserve these bridges for about four days after receipt this message. This is important task. Count on you for fullest cooperation. If you need arms can drop from low-flying Typhoons.[43]

Team Augustus presumably received, this message. That same day, the team passed through the American lines north of Laon (south of Froidmont), an area well known to Captain Delwiche. A subsequent OSS investigation revealed that all three members were shot and killed on the night of 30 August at the village of Barenton-sur-Serre. Apparently, German troops stopped a horse-drawn cart and found the three occupants in civilian clothes, carrying false French identity cards, and equipped with weapons, a radio, and other equipment. Since the German troops were the remnants of an armored unit interested mainly in escaping to the German border, they undertook no further searches but merely shot the team and soon departed in the rain. The horse, still towing its cart, returned on its own to its stable in Mr. Magnien's barn, which was occupied by armed FFI volunteers. The return of the horse and empty cart created considerable consternation. Mr. Magnien and his colleagues found the bodies of Jedburgh I team Augustus the following morning, buried the three men at the Bareriton-sur-Serre cemetery, and subsequently erected a memorial in their honor.[44]

Team Andrew, 15 August 1944

Operations in eastern France and Belgium were particularly difficult for SFHQ owing to the great distance from England and the proximity of German training areas and Axis security forces. In mid-April 1944, SFHQ dispatched the first four members of the CITRONELLE* inter-Allied mission to the Ardennes. The mission's leader, French Colonel Paris de Bolladiere and seven more men parachuted into the area on 5 June. Their mission was to contact and assist Maquis on the French Belgian border of the Ardennes. The Germans soon launched a series of attacks in the area, and an American member of CITRONELLE, Captain Victor J. Layton, radioed SFHQ to report that a German attack on 12 June had scattered the resistance group. He reported 5 FFI members killed, 140 captured, and estimated that perhaps 100 remained.[45]

SFHQ on the night of 15 August dispatched Jedburgh Team Andrew to the southern Ardennes in Belgium, where they were to assist the FFI with arms deliveries and provide another communications link to London. The team consisted of Major A. H. S. ("Henry") Coombe-Tennant (British), Lieutenant Edouard Comte d'Oultremont (Belgian), and Sergeant Frank Harrison (British). Henry Coombe-Tennant was born on 9 April 1913 in the Vale of Neath, South Wales, and subsequently became a career officer, serving in the Welsh Guards. As a member of the, British Expeditionary Force in 1940, he was captured near Boulogne.

*Code name for twelve-man inter-Allied mission led by Colonel Paris de Bolladiere inserted into the Ardennes on 12 April and 5 June 1944.

In 1942, he and two colleagues escaped from their German POW camp near Warburg in Westphalia and were fortunate enough to link up with the COMET network in Belgium, which assisted their return to England. Upon his return to England, Coombe-Tennant attended a staff college and in 1943 served on the SOE planning staff on Baker Street. Soon thereafter, he volunteered for the Jedburgh project. One of the members of the COMET network was Count d'Oultremont, born on 27 September 1916 in Paris, a resident of Brussels, who was of medium height, well built, with blonde hair and mustache, and distinguished in appearance. In 1943, d'Oultremont followed the COMET escape route, shortly before the Germans rolled up the network. The two men were rather surprised to meet each other again at Milton Hall and decided to form their own team. With d'Oultremont on the team, they guessed they would be inserted into Belgium. The team received their alert on 8 August and on the 10th traveled to London for their briefing. The briefers informed them that the resistance forces in the Ardennes had recently lost 200 men in an engagement, and only 150 remained. SFHQ instructed Team Andrew to contact the CITRONELLE mission upon their arrival. Two French officers on a similar mission would fly with the team. In addition, a ten-man Belgian SAS force on an independent mission would then parachute with them (see map 5).[46]

On the night of 15 August, the group flew to the Ardennes skirting a storm with high winds. SFHQ dispatched two bombers to the Ardennes that night carrying thirteen parachutists and forty-eight containers weighing approximately six tons total. Upon approaching the DZ, the landing lights were clearly visible, and the SAS team jumped first, about two kilometers east of Revin. The aircraft turned around to make a second pass, but this time the landing lights could not be spotted. Upon being informed that they would either have to jump "blind" or return to England, Major Coombe-Tennant decided to risk the jump. The strong wind scattered the team, but during the remaining hours of darkness, they located each other and buried their chutes. The Belgian SAS team had disappeared to conduct its own mission. At dawn, Team Andrew marched through the forest until they found a woodsman's cottage, where they were offered shelter. On 17 August, a Maquis lieutenant arrived and took them to meet Colonel de Bolladiere's CITRONELLE mission. Along with some other equipment, Team Andrew lost its radio crystals in the drop and was therefore dependent upon CITRONELLE's radio for contacting SFHQ.

On 25 August, the de Bolladiere group received a request for help from a Belgian resistance group about five miles to the east that was in a skirmish with a German convoy. Colonel de Bolladiere took about sixty men with him and found the ambush site. Upon spotting women in the convoy, he ordered that it not be attacked; but it was too late, and a firefight ensued. The following day near noon, a German company from Belgium found and attacked the CITRONELLE group as they were having lunch. The Germans' use of 60-mm, mortars proved particularly effective, and the CITRONELLE mission lost eight men killed and twelve wounded, including Colonel de Bolladiere and Lieutenant d'Oultremont. The Germans, however, had not expected such firepower, and both forces simultaneously retired-the CITRONELLE group to a camp south of Tourbillon. The following day, Coombe-Tennant and Captain Layton returned to the scene of the engagement and observed that the Germans had not removed their dead. The CITRONELLE group subsequently remained deep within the forest about two miles north of the French border. Their main link to the outside world was a Capuchin friar, Anton Hegelmann, who periodically visited their camp. Since they had little ammunition, they remained at their hideout the following week.

Around 1 September, the group learned of the advance of the U.S. Army and decided to move south toward Charleville. Upon reaching Charleville, they discovered that the U.S. Army had already seized the town. The group did, however, set up an ambush and managed to intercept a group of Germans retreating east. U.S. First Army's 10^th SF Detachment picked up the team on 8 September at V Corps headquarters and gave them a ride to Paris. Major Coombe-Tennant and Lieutenant d'Oultremont left for Brussels to rejoin their regiments, leaving Sergeant Harrison to file the final report. Team Augustus was in the field for slightly more than three weeks, working with the CITRONELLE inter-Allied mission. The CITRONELLE group obviously undertook direct military action prematurely and consequently was forced to spend one critical week in hiding. If the CITRONELLE mission materially assisted the advance of Allied ground forces, it was only indirectly: by tying down German forces and constituting yet one more possible threat to German forces retiring east.[48]

Major Coombe-Tennant returned to the Welsh Guards, served in the Middle East, and retired in 1956. In 1961, he joined the Benedictine Order. On 6 November 1989, he died at Downside Abbey. Edouard Comte d'Oultremont survived the war and returned, to Brussels, where he died on 3 February 1988. The Jedburgh community subsequently lost touch with Frank Harrison.[49]

Teams Benjamin and Bernard, 20 August 1944

SFHQ planned to dispatch Teams Benjamin and Bernard on the night of 19 August 1944 to the Meuse-Argonne area of northeastern France to assist the local FFI. Team Benjamin consisted of Major A. J. Forrest (British), Lieutenant Paul Moniez (France), and Second Lieutenant H. Kaminski (France) and was to operate east of the Meuse River. Team Bernard consisted of Captains J. de W. ("Jock") Waller (British), Etienne Nasica (France), and Sergeant Cyril M. Bassett (British). Each team parachuted with the standard Jedburgh radio set, with which they were to contact SFHQ in London to arrange the delivery of additional weapons and supplies. Following a request for such supplies, it would take an estimated eight days for delivery.[50]

Special operations personnel arrive at Tempsford Air Base for a takeoff later in the evening. The man in front is carrying the TR-1 suitcase radio

The two teams received a joint briefing on 17 August that proved suspiciously brief. Information on the state of the resistance in eastern France proved sketchy, and the teams were not provided with detailed maps of the area. The planned jump for 19 August did not transpire, but on the following night, each team took off in a bomber from Fairford Air Base. Both bombers found their way to the DZ, several kilometers south of Clermont-en-Argonne, but could not spot the landing lights until directly above them. As the six Jedburghs parachuted, they suspected that something had gone wrong in the reception committee (see map 6).

The FFI reception committee had no previous experience working with parachuted men or materiel so consequently had not selected or prepared a suitable DZ. They had picked a very small field surrounded by the Argonne Forest. Thus, five of the Jedburghs, along with sixteen packages and about thirty containers, landed in the trees. The reception committee had selected a DZ that was far too small and complicated the problem by placing the landing lights too close to the tree line. Furthermore, they had only fifteen men, so it took two days and three nights to assemble the scattered containers and parachutes.

On 21 August, two local resistance leaders escorted the Jedburghs to their camp on the edge of the Argonne, three miles south-southwest of Clermont, where at 0630, they established radio contact with SFHQ. They used Team Bernard's radio, since the other radio had been destroyed in the drop. They also decided to remain together in one large team until another radio could be supplied. It was not until 23 August that two senior FFI officials, "Colonel Aubusson" and "Angelet" (assistants of "Planete"), arrived to brief them on the local situation. They reported that "Planete" was in Nancy planning for a major operation in the Vosges and that he desired the FFI to harass the Germans in the Argonne region east and west of the Meuse. To accomplish this, there were about 600 men scattered about this rural area and another 300 in St. Mihiel. The Franc Tireurs et Partisans (FTP) had an estimated forty men in Stenay, 200 in Spincourt, and 50 in Souilly. To confuse the situation further, about 3,000 Russian POWs worked as miners in Bassin-de-Briey.

The two team leaders decided, therefore, to split up and return to their original plan. They would call for six priority parachute-supply drops at the beginning of the new moon: three in the Bernard sector west of the Meuse and three in the Benjamin sector east of the Meuse. They planned to arm a nucleus of 200 men in each sector. They consequently began preparations, contacting the local FTP leader to arrange his cooperation and to prepare for Team Benjamin to cross the Meuse. Then disaster struck.

The following morning, 24 August, the Gestapo and Milice, posing as FFI Maquis at the town of Les Islettes, arrested the local FFI leaders (see map 6). The two Jedburgh teams learned of this several hours later and began to carry off as much of their equipment as possible to a new camp. Later in the afternoon, 150 Axis troops led by an SS captain raided the Jedburgh camp evacuated only hours earlier. Through coincidence, an FTP patrol from Souilly, desiring to, coordinate with the Jedburghs and secure more arms, arrived at the camp to find not Maquis but a large enemy force. The FTP fled, losing ten men and, no doubt, some measure of confidence in their FFI colleagues. The Jedburghs abandoned their earlier plans, knowing now that they were being hunted. They consequently moved again that same night through the heavily wooded Argonne to the western side of the Biesme valley into the Foret Domaniale-de-Chatrices.

The move to the western side of the valley took three days, during which scouts attempted to determine the level of damage done by the Les Islettes incident. On 28 August, they learned that one of the FFI leaders had been captured with a map showing the planned supply DZs. The following day, the group met with Major Rooney's SAS group Rupert, both groups having selected the same DZ for that night's supply drop. After coordinating for a joint drop, the SAS canceled the drop later that evening. Probably on this same day, SFHQ informed Team Benjamin of the imminent arrival of American ground forces and requested that Benjamin send guides through the German lines to meet them.[51]

On 30 August, the guides dispatched by the Jedburghs, contacted the advancing American force (the U.S. 3^rd Cavalry Group U.S. XX Corps), providing them with an estimate of the local situation. In the morning, the Jedburghs made three offensive patrols on the Ste. Menehould-Les Iglettes-Clermont road, hoping to cut off retreating German forces. They also desired to prevent the destruction of the railway tunnel and bridges of Ste. Menehould. The road patrol encountered no German forces. A second patrol found the railway tunnel abandoned and not rigged for detonation. The third patrol (consisting of Lieutenant Moniez, Commandant Dulae, and six men) entered Ste. Menehould, killing four Germans, but later withdrew at the approach of German troops. A party of eighty FFI that was supposed to assist at Ste. Menehould proved unable to fight through German forces.[52]

The U.S XX Corps began its advance on Verdun on 30 August, led by its 3^rd Cavalry Group and the 7^th Armored Division. The cavalry seized Ste. Menehould at 0545 on 31 August, and Combat Command A of the 7^th Armored Division moved toward Verdun to capture a bridgehead over the Meuse River. The Germans had destroyed all of the Meuse River bridges in the area except the main bridge at Verdun, which was rigged for demolition and defended by a rear guard with two Mark V Panther tanks. As units of Combat Command A entered the town shortly after noon, a number of FFI volunteers ran under the bridge and managed to cut the wires to the explosive charge before the German sentries opened fire. Minutes later, the tanks of Combat Command A arrived, knocked out the two Panthers, and proceeded east to secure the bridgehead.

On 31 August, before the arrival of American forces, Captain Nasica was wounded in a skirmish with a German patrol at Futeau in the Biesme valley. The Maquis advanced along the Biesme valley, taking Les Islettes on 1 September. On 2 September, the group (about 100 men) entered Clermont and began to intercept German stragglers, killing or capturing about fifty men. The Jedburghs had turned over command of the Maquis to Commandant Dulac and on 31 August moved east across the Meuse toward Verdun. Upon reaching that historic town, they discovered troops of the U.S. XX Corps in force and decided to contact U.S. Third Army headquarters to receive new instructions. On the return drive as they approached Clermont, a German outpost opened fire on their truck, wounding everyone except Captain Waller and Lieutenant Moniez. The Jedburgh team fled, losing its truck, radio, and the last of its personal equipment. During the previous night, a regiment of the 15th panzergrenadier Division had driven the Dulac Maquis out of Clermont and occupied the town. The Jedburgh group infiltrated through the German lines and reached Epernay on 2 September, where Captain Waller met them. On the following day, they reported to Lieutenant Colonel Powell of the 11^th SF Detachment at U.S. Third Army headquarters in Chalons.[53]

The Jedburgh group rested and reequipped, over the week. Captain Nasica and Sergeant Bassett were evacuated from local hospitals to England. On 11 September, Colonel Powell directed the group to assist the PEDLAR* circuit in the Chaumont area

*PEDLAR was an intelligence circuit led by Major Bodington that operated in the Chalons-sur-Marne area, see pp. 43-47.

(see Team Arnold report on PEDLAR). The group subsequently participated in a daylight supply drop at Gargonville on 13 September and, following the capture of Chaumont, assisted Major Bodington in the demobilization of his Maquis. From 18-22 September, Teams Benjamin and Bernard stored excess parachuted arms at Nancy. They returned to England on 2 October, observing that they should have been deployed at least two months prior to 20 August. They also noted that SFHQ had basically ignored the Meuse-Argonne region until August 1944, by which time it was too late to create an efficient organization. Teams Benjamin and Bernard served in France for roughly six weeks, although only nine days before the U.S. Third Army overran the area. Effective Axis security forced the two teams to hide from 24-30 August. Between 30 August and 2 September, four of the six Jedburghs were wounded, with two requiring evacuation.

In many ways, the story of Teams Benjamin and Bernard provides more questions than answers. Their after-action report makes no reference to the FFI of Verdun and the capture of the Verdun bridge, even though Verdun was only some thirty kilometers to the east. In similar fashion, U.S. Army records fail to mention any Jedburgh teams operating in the area. We also know that on 30 August, SFHQ directed Jedburgh teams to seize bridges in front of the U.S. First Army to assist the advance of the ground forces. There is no indication, however, that similar messages were sent to the SOF teams in front of the U.S. Third Army. How it came to pass that an FFI group knew when and how to cut the wires of the demolitions on the Verdun bridge remains open to question.

Team Alfred, 24 Aggust 1944

SFHQ dispatched Team Alfred on 24 August 1944 to the Oise River valley north of Paris to assist in organizing the local FFI, particularly through providing them an additional radio link to London and assisting in the delivery of arms. The team consisted of Lieutenant G. Herenguel (French), Captain L. D. MacDougall (British), and Sergeant Albert W. Key (British). The team left Milton Hall in somewhat of a rush on the morning of 9 August for London, after which they prepared for their jump. It was not, until 23 August that they received a rather hurried second briefing on the FFI and German situation in the Oise sector. They were also informed that it would take about eight days for the delivery of arms drops. The briefing officer told them that if they found themselves within forty miles of the battle zone, they were to recruit fifteen volunteers and move toward the Allied army, gathering tactical information along the way. Upon landing in France, they were to contact the local FFI chief, Dupont-Montura. The team was instructed to avoid open combat (see map 7).

That night at 2300, Team Alfred departed on a two-hour flight through a rather severe storm for the DZ at Le Moulin (in all probability about fifteen kilometers northeast of Compiegne), where the pilot dropped the packages and containers with some difficulty. He then gained altitude for a second pass so the team could safely jump, but amid fierce winds, he could not spot the landing lights and was forced to cancel the jump. The following night, they tried again, and after a fifty-minute search for DZ Moulin, the RAF bomber dropped both the Jedburgh team and their packages and containers. It proved an excellent drop, and it took little time for the reception committee to assemble the team and equipment and take them to the safety of a nearby quarry. As it turned out, the reception committee had secured the containers and packages dropped the previous night but had moved the equipment to a village some twenty kilometers away. Thus, the team would have to do without their personal kits for some time.

On the morning of 26 August, Lieutenant Herenguel traveled to Clermont, where he met Commandant Dupont-Montura, the FFI commander for the Oise area. Following their meeting, Team Alfred sent the following message to SFHQ: "Have contacted Chef FFI departmental. Five to six thousand partisans in area poorly organized but very enthusiastic and demand arms and yet more arms. 400 of total armed in area Compiegne Clermont. Area Beauvais destitute of arms." [56] That night, the team vainly awaited an arms drop at DZ Moulin. The following morning, word arrived that there were parachutists nearby at Francieres, so Captain MacDougall went to investigate. He returned later with five Special Air Service men. Their aircraft could not find the DZ, so the team dropped "blind," although the pilot did not drop the arms containers. The following day, Team Alfred radioed London, reporting the nonarrival of their arms shipment and stating that large bodies of disorganized German troops were moving north through Montdidier toward Lille. A coded BBC broadcast heralded another drop for that evening, so once again, the team assembled at DZ Moulin. This time, they waited until 0230, when a heavy thunderstorm struck. Team Alfred later learned that the arms shipment had been dropped some fifteen kilometers away, where the local Communist-Party-sponsored resistance group had retrieved it. [57]

At this time, German activity forced Team Alfred to seek a safer location each day. On 28 August, they took shelter in a cave located in a small wood. That same day, the team sent, SFHQ at least three messages, reporting that the Germans were destroying their air base at Creil, preparing bridges for demolition, and at several locations erecting antitank obstacles and minefields. The team also reported that it had dispatched five volunteers toward the Allied lines to gain tactical information. That same day, the team received its first message from SFHQ, enigmatically requesting exact map references-information the team was certain that agent "Pasteur" had already sent to London.

On 29 and 30 August, the team informed SFHQ that the Germans were preparing the Oise bridges for demolition and suggested that to prevent their destruction, London should send arms and an SAS group if possible. Team Alfred also reported that the Oise valley remained heavily congested with German troops and gave the location of forty tanks south of Compiegne. The team still hoped to set up several ambushes, even though it would have to use aged rifles and shotguns. Then at 1100 on 30 August, it received the following message from SFHQ: "Would like you to take all possible steps on receipt this message to preserve following Somme bridges from enemy demolition. All bridges Amiens area. Also at Moreuil, Boves, Fiquigny, Conde, Longpre. Try to keep bridges in state of preservation for about 4 days. This target of highest importance. Can drop arms to you from low-flying Typhoons if you need them."[58]

Team Alfred had still, not received any arms drops, so attempting to stop the German Army from blowing up a number of bridges proved a rather difficult task. The team on 31 August radioed London twice requesting arms drops and that evening set off to conduct two ambushes. Lieutenant Herenguel and Sergeant Key remained with the ambush party, while Captain MacDougall took the radio with a horse and cart and attempted to contact the FFI in Amiens. When he arrived in Ferrieeres at the same time as an American armored column, an American staff officer provided him with a vehicle so he could rapidly reach Amiens. But just as he was preparing to leave Ferrieres, word arrived that the British Army had already captured the town. Team Alfred's ambushes went rather well, at Francieres shooting up a German column while receiving few losses. The second ambush killed a small group of Germans while liberating thirty American prisoners of war. The following day, large U.S. Army forces overran the area. Team Alfred subsequently remained in the area working with the FFI attempting to locate German stragglers. After spending three days in Paris, the team returned to the, United Kingdom on 27 September.

The team concluded its after-action report with the following paragraph: "This was the tale of the team Alfred, not a very glorious one but not through any fault of the team. If we had been dispatched when we were first 'alerted' some two weeks previous to our actual departure (team was 'alerted' and 'briefed' on 9 August but did not leave until 24 August) we could have done something useful." Team Alfred spent four weeks in France, but only eight days before U.S. Army conventional forces overran the area. Perhaps their own postmortem was too critical, for the team did provide valuable information on German troop movements and defenses. [59] Lieutenant Herenguel died on 8 September 1945 in Nape, Laos. Albert Key died shortly after the end of the war. The Jedburgh community subsequently lost contact with Captain MacDougall.[60]

Team Arnold, 24 August 1944

The Marne Department of eastern France proved a difficult area for the French Resistance. SOE resolved to open an, intelligence circuit in this area and picked one of its more experienced operatives to lead it, Major Nicholas R. Bodington (almost always misspelled Boddington). A former Reuters Paris correspondent, Bodington had already undertaken several journeys to occupied France. SFHQ sent him to the Marne region in early July 1944 to reopen the PEDLAR circuit. Jedburgh Team Arnold would assist Bodington's circuit in late August (see map 8).[61]

SFHQ dispatched Team Arnold late in the evening of 24 August 1944 to the Marne area near Epernay to assist the local FFI. The team consisted of Captain Michel de Carville (French) of the French Colonial Infantry, Lieutenant J. H. F. Monahan (British), and Sergeant Alan de Ville (British). The team flew from Tarrant Rushton Airdrome at 2230 on 24 August in two Halifax bombers of the RAF's 38^th Group, taking with them thirty containers of supplies.

They dropped at 0030 on 25 August in civilian clothes southwest of Epernay near the village of Igny-Comblize. [62] The DZ was easily recognized, and the team jumped without difficulty. Major Bodington (code-named "Nick") led the reception committee, which fetched the containers and retrieved all the equipment except Team Arnold's leg bags with their personal weapons, maps, uniforms, and crystals for the radio. As a result, the team could not contact SFHQ.[63]

Major Bodington provided a secluded hunting lodge [64] and several guides to the Jedburghs and suggested that they control the zone from Epernay west to Dormans. On 26 August, Team Arnold sent four agents (selected by Bodington) south to contact the advancing forces of the U.S. Third Army. The team also decided to form a Maquis as soon as possible. The local FFI had already armed some 200 men from parachuted arms and hoped to field 200 more. On 27 August, while the team was visiting local FFI leaders, the resistance group in Cerseuil shot and killed a member of the Organization Todt (a labor organization that performed construction for the Wehrmacht). Team Arnold decided to use this incident to raise the Cerseuil FFI to insurrection. On the way to Cerseuil, however, a German patrol spotted, the team and drove it into hiding. The team spent that night in the village of Try. In the morning, they were awakened by the sound of German Army columns crossing the Marne River bridge at Try. Team Arnold sent word for the FFI to assemble at Try. Later in the morning, elements of the U.S. 7^th Armored Division's Combat Command B and the local FFI arrived and attempted to seize the Marne bridge. As the Allied forces approached, however, the German defenders blew up the bridge and successfully warded off a subsequent American attack. The FFI assisted the troops of the 7^th Armored Division by providing a flank screen and taking care of the wounded.[65]

The German organization that prepared the defense of this sector of the Marne was Brigadier General Eckart von Tschammer und Osten's Feldkommandantur 531, which administered the Marne Department, but from some distance away in Chalons-sur-Marne. Its nearest office or outpost was in Epernay. In Chalons the Germans did not view resistance activity as very threatening and continued to work until American armor arrived on 28 August. The Germans concentrated on repairing roads and bridges and preparing demolitions. One major problem was transporting French collaborators and their families east, with some 200 leaving Chalons-sur-Marne only on 27 August. Besides assembling livestock north of the Marne, the Feldkommandantur was also responsible for constructing defensive positions behind the river's north bank. Only 7,690 of the requisitioned 12,000 French workers appeared on the first day. The Germans soon noticed that the French were sabotaging their vehicles. Lieutenant General Franz Beyer's LXXX Corps headquarters assisted in the construction of this sector of the Kitzinger Line. The German forces that crossed the Marne bridge at Dormans were the remnants of Lieutenant General Kurt von der Chevallerie's First Army retiring from the upper Seine. Included in this force was a battle group of the panzer Lehr Division.[66]

From 29 August until 2 September, Team Arnold collected weapons from the FFI. They reported no disturbances. On 2 September, along with Major Bodington and his Maquis, the team moved to Montier-en-Der, where they were to help collect German stragglers. The team discovered few if any Germans at Montier-en-Der, however, and resolved to move on to St. Dizier. They found that town occupied by about three companies of resistance troops and contacted Colonel de Grouchy, the head of the resistance in the Haute-Marne. Their tranquility was disturbed on 8 September, when news came down through FFI channels to prepare rapidly to move south. Team Arnold went to U.S. Third Army headquarters for more precise orders and in the hope of securing more arms. Personnel at Patton's headquarters instructed them to move on Chaumont with all available forces to prevent German forces from escaping to the north.[67]

Major Bodington dispatched one company from St. Dizier toward Chaumont on 10 September. The following day, Team Arnold followed with two half companies. They found FFI troops occupying villages on the road between Juzonnocourt and Boulogne, the latter village being ten kilometers north of Chaumont and the closest point to the German positions. The 2^nd French Armored Division secured Chaumont on 13 September, ending any possible threat to Patton's southern flank.

On 14 September, the FFI forces returned home. Team Arnold reported in at Paris on the 19th and later continued on to London. They observed that they had been inserted far too late to organize and coordinate resistance activities, that it had taken too long for them to receive their requested arms drops, and that since they had been parachuted in civilian clothes, they should have been issued false identity papers. Team Arnold was in France only three days before linking up with the U.S. Third Army. Its remaining twenty-three days were devoted to collecting weapons and finally leading FFI troops to Chaumont.[68]

Team Archibald, 25 August 1944

Jedburgh training, as previously mentioned, proved quite rigorous and, at most times, injured Jeds could be found in the local hospital. In May, while the Jedburghs were forming their own teams at Milton Hall, Major Arthur du P. Denning (British), Lieutenant Francois Coste (French), and Master Sergeant Roger L. Pierre (U.S.), while in the hospital, resolved to form their own team. Denning was a rather imposing figure at six feet three inches in height, with a trim regimental mustache and ever-present pipe. Coste was a career officer in the French Army, a St. Cyr graduate, who was usually found smoking a cigarette. Roger Pierre was a nineteen year old New Yorker. Upon their return to Milton Hall, their "self selection" was approved, and they volunteered to jump into France in civilian clothes. After receiving their briefing in London, however, their mission was canceled. Finally, after waiting fourteen days in London, Denning and Coste received another briefing on 25 August. Team Archibald would jump in their uniforms near Nancy, contact "Planete", and assist the FFI through training, liaison, and delivery of weapons. Their premission briefing, however, was based on information six months old, and hence out of date. They were not informed that other Allied agents were operating in the same area nor that Team Archibald would be delivering a large sum of money to "Planete". The team was instructed to avoid pitched battles with Axis forces.[69]

That same day, the team drove north for Harrington and took off in a bomber at 2045. The pilot had difficulty identifying the DZ but dropped the team and equipment on the second pass at 0110 of 26 August in the Nancy region near the Foret de Charmes (see map 9). Two sixty-man reception committees, each desiring weapons, met the team. Major Denning gave half the weapons to each group and decided to join the Foret de Charmes, Maquis, which already possessed some weapons, was led by a Captain Noel, and was capable of some military action. On retrieval of the parachuted equipment, the team discovered that their radio set was destroyed and numerous weapons seriously damaged in the drop. Another agent from SFHQ, however, (code-named "Careful") was in the area and informed London that Archibald had arrived. Team Archibald received another radio with the first parachuted delivery of supplies.

Captain Noel led the team to his Maquis camp, where Major Denning and a former Yugoslavian captain attemped to repair the damaged firearms. Team Archibald also began to receive parachute drops-some expected, some a surprise. In the latter category was a ten-man Canadian SAS team with three jeeps led by a major code-named "Peter." After much handshaking and backslapping, the SAS team drove off toward St. Die and never returned. Team Archibald later discovered that the entire SAS team was killed in combat.

Archibald's guerrilla band soon rose to a strength of 300 armed and 250 unarmed men. "Planete" finally arrived to receive his 35 million francs, but he could offer little information on the resistance situation in the area. He promised, however, that one of his deputies would subsequently deliver that information. That deputy eventually arrived but only after the end of guerrilla operations with the arrival of U.S. Army field units. Upon learning of the approach of a German division, the group left 150 armed men to await further arms drops in the Foret de Charmes and moved the remainder to Lemenil-Mitry in the Bois de Chivoiteux.

The Germans subsequently swept the Forte de Charmes, burning the village of St. Remy. Maquis Noel lost much of its impetus when "Planete" called its leader away to Nancy. On 2 September, however, Captain Montlac led a resistance group to the German depot at Tantonville, in the afternoon ambushing a German column along the way and subsequently participating in an action at Tantonville. News received during the morning indicated that advancing U.S. Army field forces were only some thirty-five kilometers away, so Major Denning resolved to contact them. He encountered the 42^nd Cavalry Squadron and gave them his interpretation of the situation, but on the return trip, he ran into a skirmish and received a slight wound in the thigh. Upon returning to the Maquis camp, Denning discovered that Captain Coste and several of the group had been wounded. Owing to the severity of their wounds, Denning sent the wounded behind German lines to a Catholic hospital in Luneville. If asked, the driver carrying them was to declare that they were "innocent victims of FFI terrorists." Denning remained with the Maquis, hoping to assist the U.S. Army in securing bridges over the Moselle.[70]

The only bridges between Nancy and Charmes not defended and rigged for demolition were at the towns of Charmes and Langley. Denning's group managed to capture the bridge at Charmes, driving off the small garrison in a coup de main in the evening. The U.S. Third Army, however, ran out of gasoline and was unable to push forward to Charmes. The Germans subsequently retook the town and destroyed the bridge during their defense of the Moselle. With the Americans temporarily out of fuel and German reinforcements now available, the front soon stabilized along the Moselle River. In early September, Patton's forces secured bridgeheads across the Moselle north of Bayon at Lorey, St. Mard, and Velle and asked the FFI for assistance. Major Denning consequently took four companies of Maquis across the river, placing one company in each village and a fourth in Domptail. Captain Noel meanwhile formed an 800-man mobile group that assisted in providing rear-area and flank protection in the no-man's-land between the U.S. Third and Seventh Armies. Following a brief trip to Paris, Major Denning returned to the Nancy area, but by and large, Jedburgh-FFI operations had come to a close. The French government intended to incorporate the Maquis into a field army, and SHAEF saw no further use for Jedburgh teams. Team Archibald made numerous requests for arms drops after 3 September, but SFHQ or the RAF managed, to avert the delivery of arms. Finally, on 31 October, the U.S. Third Army directed Team Archibald to return to the United Kingdom. Team Archibald served in the field for more than two months, although only nine days before the arrival of U.S. Third Army units. The team provided invaluable assistance in organizing a large Maquis that fought as a conventional infantry force with the U.S. Third Army along the Moselle River.[71]

Team Stanley, 31 August 1944

SFHQ dispatched Stanley as the fifty-third Jedburgh team to France on 31 August 1944 to the Haute-Marne region. It consisted of Captain Oswin E. Craster (British), Lieutenant Robert Cantais (French), and Sergeant E. J. ("Jack") Grinham (British). In addition, two French aspirants, Lieutenants Denis and Ely, jumped with Team Stanley and accompanied them throughout the operation, usually commanding platoon-size FFI groups. Oswin Craster had served since 1939 in the 5^th Battalion of the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry. When it became apparent that his unit would not be sent into combat he and several of his comrades volunteered for operations behind German lines. Cantais was a regular in the French Army, who eventually retired as a colonel. Jack Grinham had previously served in the Royal Armoured Corps. Their mission was to assist the FFI near Chaumont on the Plateau de Langres-particularly in setting up air-supply drops. SFHQ also directed them to prevent the destruction of several engineering structures in eastern France. By this late date, SFHQ knew of the imminent arrival of Allied ground forces, so Stanley received instructions to immediately dispatch agents to serve as guides for the advancing ground forces (see map 10).[72]

Team Stanley was in a London hotel as late as 31 August, wondering if they would in fact ever be sent into action, when they received the alert notification. As they drove north for Tempsford airfield, Craster and Cantais received their briefing in the back of a truck. Team Stanley took off at 2045 on 31 August in a Stirling bomber. They parachuted shortly before midnight from too high an altitude, so the five parachutists and numerous cannisters, scattered considerably near Riviere-les-Fosses, about twenty-five kilometers south-southwest of Langres.

The reception committee assisted in the retrieval of the equipment and provided the team with shelter and transportation. They spent the night in the village and on the evening of 2-two kilometers northeast in the September drove about twenty rain to join an organized Maquis, which they found in the woods west of Bussieres-les-Belmont. On 3 September, the team reported that 300 armed Maquis were in the area along with three companies of the French 1^st Regiment, which had defected to the Allies along with sixty French gendarmes. They estimated that another 2,000 Maquis could be raised if SFHQ dropped sufficient arms. The French 1^st Regiment possessed only light infantry weapons and enough ammunition to last one day. The team also discovered that the Germans had already destroyed the facilities SFHQ had requested saved. An SAS troop in jeeps arrived one morning and asked to use the Jedburgh's radio, since theirs had been smashed on landing. Sergeant Grinham sent their message for them, and the SAS disappeared the following day.[73]

Through 14 September, Team Stanley provided excellent information to SFHQ on German forces in the area, including the heavy road traffic toward Langres (held by 8,000 Germans, with one general identified) and Chaumont (which the Germans were preparing for defense). The team attempted to avoid pitched battles as a result of insufficient arms and ammunition. Beginning on 7 September, however, they began to capture small groups of German troops attempting to escape east from the Bay of Biscay on the road from Champlite to Bonne. On 8 September, the team received its first message from SFHQ, which requested more information on a prospective DZ. The following night, however, the team received its weapons drop. On 11 September, a large body of German troops and their Russian auxiliaries occupied the villages of Grenant, Saulles, and Belmont. A platoon of the French 1^st Regiment on its way to guard the Saulles Chateau ran into these German forces and was repulsed. Team Stanley radioed SFHQ and requested that Allied aircraft attack the Germans dug in around the Belmont cemetery. Three hours later, four U.S. P-47s arrived and inflicted considerable damage on the German force, particularly the motorized transports. Team Stanley reported that they had no idea whether the P-47s' arrival was a result of their message or simply a coincidence, but it certainly improved their relations with the Maquis.

On the following day, Team Stanley radioed London that the German forces around Belmont remained stationary and indicated that they would surrender to the U.S. Army, but not to the FFI. On the same day' the FFI captured five Indians in German uniforms (from the Indian Legion). On 13 September, the Maquis contacted reconnaissance elements of French troops of the U.S. Seventh Army advancing from the south. While the French unit attacked the three villages occupied by the Germans (Grenant, Saulles, and Belmont), Team Stanley and the Maquis helped mop up German stragglers in the woods, guarded POWs, and protected the unit's rear. On 15 September, SFHQ told Team Stanley that their mission was completed and to return to England via Paris.

It remains unclear when Team Stanley dispatched local FFI volunteers to contact advancing Allied ground forces. In all probability, they did so on 1 or 2 September, since the volunteers returned to inform Team Stanley that they had successfully made contact. Since Team Stanley jumped into the no-man's-land between the U.S. Third and Seventh Armies, they sent messengers in both directions.[74]

Team Stanley served in the field for fifteen days. Later, they reported that they had been dispatched to France at least a month too late. They obviously had little time to prepare the Maquis for combat. In addition, Team Stanley had instructions to prevent the destruction of several engineering, structures, but when they landed, the Germans had already destroyed them. The team also observed that while the former Vichy officers were far too passive, the young volunteers performed quite well. The team also felt that SFHQ ignored their messages, particularly their requests for arms drops and an undamaged radio set. The team suggested that in the future, such Jedburgh teams be capable of direct communication with Allied aircraft so that enemy columns could be attacked immediately.

Team Rupert-Philip, 31 August 1944

SFHQ dispatched Rupert on the night of 31 August as the fifty-first Jedburgh team to France. It was to enter the Meurthe-et-Moselle region, assist the local FFI, particularly with communications and resupply, and provide information to advancing Allied ground forces. The team consisted of Captain J. Liberos (France), First Lieutenant Robert A. Lucas (U.S.), and Specialist Third Class Joseph M. Grgat (U.S. Navy). Liberos was a career officer in his early forties, a St. Cyr graduate originally from Rouen. Robert Lucas was a twenty-seven year old infantry officer from Sheldon, Iowa, who had served in the Iowa National Guard and received his commission in 1942. Joseph Grgat was about twenty-one years old and from Union town, Pennsylvania. A young Frenchman in civilian clothes briefed Team Rupert in a safe house in the suburbs of northern London, telling them that their main mission was to prevent German sabotage of French utility structures between Nancy and Verdun. The team departed Harrington Air Base at 2125 of 31 August and flew east without incident. West of Mirecourt, they parachuted at about 0200, landed safely, and were met by a reception committee of about fifty FFI. Ten minutes later, another team of two French officers landed at the DZ from another B-24, so the area proved rather noisy and overcrowded. Team Rupert recovered all its gear except their civilian clothes, two carbines, and two bags including the cipher document. They decided to accompany the Offroicourt Maquis, which had three trucks and drove them most of the way to the camp (see maps 11 and 12).[76]

On Friday l September, SFHQ radioed Team Rupert to tell them the team's name was changed to Philip. The team's radio, however, had been misplaced by the Maquis during the move, so they were out of contact with London. They spent the day with the Offroicourt Maquis, which consisted of about 100 men organized in 3 platoons. They spent the night in Viviers-les-Offroicourt attempting to contact a representative of "Planete". The following day around noon, the team met a light column of the U.S. Third Army at Jevoncourt. Team Philip recovered its radio, but their search of the DZ did not produce the lost cipher document. The team spent the night at Forcelles-St. Gorgon and on the morning of Sunday, 3 September, set off to contact the Lemenil-Mitry Maquis. That Maquis, which worked with Team, Archibald (see pp. 47-51), had withdrawn from the Foret de Charmes and, consisted of about 300 armed and 400 unarmed men. Team Philip, at about 0900, found them at a large abandoned building, where they were under periodic fire from a German heavy-weapons platoon. In fighting west of Bayon and, south of the Bayon-Vezelise road, the Germans inflicted rather heavy casualties on the Maquis, including three officers. At about noon, Team Philip radioed SFHQ, stating that they were with Team Archibald at Lemenil-Mitry and requesting an arms drop for 500 men at a DZ 3 kilometers west-southwest of Bayon (see map 12).[77]

With the death of Captain Maurin and the absence of Major Denning, Captain Liberos of Team Philip attempted to prevent the Germans from destroying the bridges at Bayon and Bainville. Liberos sent two young French women on bicycles to determine if and how the Germans were defending the bridges. He also dispatched three groups of Maquis to the two towns to fire on the Germans if the latter attempted to blow up the bridges. In addition, he sent three volunteers to Bayon to sabotage the electric charges for its three bridges. At 1700, Team Philip radioed SFHQ, reporting that the bridge at Bayon was mined but not heavily guarded and that Majors Denning and Montlac had been slightly wounded. Major Denning returned at 2000 and approved Captain Liberos' actions.[78]

On Monday, 4 September, with the return of Major Denning, Team Philip prepared to travel to Nancy. The team left Lemenil-Mitry at approximately 1900 in a truck. As they were driving out of Houdreville at about 2015, a column of military vehicles approached from the rear and opened fire. The three Jedburghs and their French driver all jumped out of the truck to seek cover. The approaching column proved to be the Reconnaissance Platoon of the U.S. 25^th Cavalry from the U.S. Third Army. Its lieutenant regretted firing on Team Philip, fearing that the gunfire had alerted the German column he was stalking on a parallel road. Captain Liberos, Lieutenant Lucas, and the driver remained uninjured, but they could not locate Specialist Grgat. They consequently spent the night in the Foret Domaniale-de-Serres west of Houdreville (two kilometers north of Vezelise) with an American platoon. The following day, as more U.S. Army field units passed through the area towards the Moselle River, the team searched for Specialist Grgat, but without success. In the evening, they entered their slightly altered truck and drove to Parey-St. Cesaire, where they spent the night. On Wednesday at noon, they radioed SFHQ, reporting that they were in the Foret de Goviller (five kilometers north-northeast of Goviller), that they had still not contacted "Planete", and again requesting resupply of their codes. That evening, as they were starting a trip to Toul, they encountered Colonel Charles H. Reed, commander of the U.S. 2^nd Cavalry Group, and followed his advice that it would be best to spend the night in the forest.[79]

On Thursday, 7 September, the team drove to Toul, where they contacted the local Maquis leader and Lieutenant Ripley of the U.S. Third Army's 11^th Special Forces Detachment. Team Philip radioed SFHQ in the afternoon, informing London that it was impossible to contact "Planete" in Nancy and requesting new orders. They awaited instructions from SFHQ until 9 September, when they drove to the headquarters of the U.S. Third Army. There, the Special Forces detachment commander informed them that Specialist Grgat had escaped and was on his way back to London. Lieutenant Colonel Powell gave Team Philip the following mission:

In liaison with the Chef de Bataillon Joly. Lieutenant Couton, F.F.I. Chief at Verdun, and Chef de Bataillon Duval, F.M.R. for the region Conflans-Briey-Longwy-Longuyon, to arm the Maquis of Verdun (2,000 men) and of Conflans (1,000 men). Once the men are armed and regrouped in the north, to protect the left flank of the 3^rd U.S. Army.[80]

Team Philip operated out of Verdun for the next weeks and met with a local FFI officer in an unsuccessful attempt to obtain arms drops from SFHQ. On Sunday, 17 September, the 11^th Special Forces Detachment at U.S. Third Army headquarters directed the team to report to the 12th Special Forces Detachment at the Hotel Cecil in Paris. Liberos and Lucas remained in Paris for several days and then returned to London.

Team Philip served in the field seventeen days, a period marked by repeated frustrations. Its members concluded that they had been dispatched to France far too late. They also observed that they were never able to contact "Planete" or his deputies and consequently were unable to reach Nancy. They noted that the Maquis from rural areas proved more reliable than their urban counterparts. Team Philip also concluded that the resistance volunteers were very enthusiastic but took too many casualties in combat. Robert Lucas subsequently served with the OSS in northern China. He left the U.S. Army as a captain in January 1946 and settled in the greater Kansas City area. After WorId War II, Joseph Grgat resided in Bowling Green, Ohio, where he died in early May 1988. Captain Liberos survived the war to retire as a colonel in Toulon.[81]

Conclusions

The operations of the eleven Jedburgh teams in northeastern France demonstrate a number of institutional failings. It would be altogether too easy to focus one's attention on radios that did not function, teams inserted too late, or army staffs without the ability to directly contact the special operations forces (SOF) teams on the paths of their advance. One major problem was that SOE and OSS were new organizations attempting to conduct special operations with the new means of radio and aircraft. It should not be surprising that new organizations breakingnew ground would encounter unforeseen difficulties. The second major problem was with the officer corps of the Allied armies, particularly at the senior levels, which remained unaware of the capabilities of SOF teams beyond postlinkup tactical assistance.

Most U.S. Army division, corps, army, and army group headquarters turned in favorable reports on both the French Resistance and the Special Forces detachments for the summer campaign of 1944. U.S. Army field commanders were particularly enthusiastic regarding the help provided by French guides who accompanied American units, briefed them on local conditions, interpreted for them, and led them around German positions. In short, U.S. commanders appreciated the tactical benefits provided by the French Resistance. There is scant reference, however, in the SF detachment summaries to Jedburgh teams or other special operations teams.[82]

The SF detachments themselves frequently remarked that army headquarters remained uncertain where they would be operating in the future, which naturally retarded planning. On 29 July 1944, the First Army's 10^th SF Detachment planned ahead only as far as Chartres and Dreux, and they were still not examining the area north of the Seine on 2 August. One of the problems was that the American staff officers and commanders had been schooled to not extend their boundary lines beyond the front, a practice many still maintained in August 1944. On 24 August, the detachment observed: "The army tactical plan is still confused. Col(onel) Colby at this moment is conferring at 12 Army Group with Col(onel) Jackson and it is expected that he will bring back to this Hq future tactical plans of the American Armies on the continent."[83]

Besides a reluctance to plan ahead and inform subordinate headquarters of those plans, it would seem that the SF detachments did not always receive timely and accurate reports from SFHQ regarding resistance activities, as the following summary reveals:

Resistance Activities at V Corps: On arriving at this Corps on 7 September, we found them in the midst of the French Ardennes. They had just picked up the Citronelle Mission and Jedburgh Andrew. These missions proved very disappointing, as they had been quite inactive. From their reports to London which had been transmitted to us in the field it had never appeared that resistance was very well organized in the Ardennes. This was found to be the opposite of the truth, and it seems that it was the Citronelle Mission that was not well organized. The local FFI had been doing a marvelous job for the V Corps throughout the entire area. The G-3 assigned, through Major Broussard, areas of responsibility to the FFI. It was very interesting to see that on the G-3 operations map the boundaries laid out for the FFI, as well as for the regular regiments and battalions. Major Broussard had one group of almost 500 armed men whom he dispatched here and there to clean up German pockets. Where necessary the FFI groups were augmented by light tanks and on several occasions with Anti-Aircraft units. It is interesting to note that the AA units in this Corps were used mostly to clean up Germans and not in their normal role.[84]

This summary is revealing in several aspects. It tells us that the SF detachment was unaware of the difficulties in operating agents and networks in eastern France and Belgium, of the previous troubles SOE had encountered there, and of the very difficult time the CITRONELLE Mission (and Team Andrew) had in the Ardennes. The above-quoted summary also reveals that in spite of the difficulties, many French and Belgians came out to help the Allied cause once there was a realistic chance to participate without committing suicide. One might disparage such late election, but the volunteers provided valuable assistance that SHAEF's ground commanders appreciated. Furthermore, eastern France and Belgium proved one of the more difficult areas in which to operate, and premature revolts, as has been demonstrated, often led to catastrophe. Finally, the detachment's summary indicates certain preconceived notions about doing business, for example, a tendency to equate success with quantification: the number of armed FFI fielded, the number of POWs taken, or the number of sabotage actions. Those totals were usually associated with tactical missions. Operational significance, possibilities for further exploitation, or lessons learned tended to be deemphasized. It would appear, therefore, that the army headquarters were not the only ones thinking shallow and not deep.

The 11^th SF Detachment of the U.S. Third Army used FFI troops to a far greater extent than the U.S. First Army. The U.S. Third Army used large bodies of resistance troops to assist in the reduction of German garrisons of the Breton seaports and subsequently used some 15,000 FFI troops to guard the Loire River line as the U.S. Third Army swept east toward the German border. Nevertheless, there are relatively few references in the 11^th SF Detachment's summaries to Jedburgh teams, and those merely reported the linkup of ground units with the Jedburgh teams. The detachment observed the 4 September FFI capture of the Moselle bridge at Charmes, but failed to mention the participation of Jedburgh teams.[85]

As demonstrated in the reports of the eleven Jedburgh teams dropped in front of the 12th Army Group, most Jedburghs concluded that they had been inserted far too late. That sentiment was shared by many other Jedburgh teams regarding their own operations. Such spirit and aggressiveness speaks well for those Soldiers but raises a number of awkward questions. We have observed how inherently dangerous such operations were. What would the teams have accomplished had they in fact been inserted a month or two earlier? In all probability, they would have recruited, armed, and trained more FFI volunteers. Had that been done, it would have made it all the more difficult to restrain the FFI from premature revolt and also would have given Axis security forces greater opportunity to infiltrate the resistance. The teams would also have sent additional radio messages to London, which would have given the Germans a greater opportunity to locate the radios with direction-finding sets. There were many areas in occupied France where it was very hazardous for individual agents to operate. To have inserted three-man, uniformed teams into such areas probably would have been risking too much.

One of the major problems with SOF operations in 1944 was clearly communications. Jedburgh team reports indicate that radios packaged in 1944 had a tendency to break during parachute drops. During training exercises early in 1944, a number of problems became evident, but by August, those problems had obviously not been resolved. Jedburgh team reports also demonstrated the feeling that their radio messages were not being listened to or acted upon. It would appear that in August 1944, the SFHQ message centers were receiving so much traffic that it became impossible to analyze, act upon, and disseminate information. The difficulties in the field were best summarized in the report of the SF detachment officer operating with the U.S. 4^th Armored Division in Brittany, who on 12 August observed:

In my estimation and in the Division's the FFI did good work. It was a great sense of security to see armed friendly civilians all around us. They served an excellent purpose in that they helped to guard our supply lines and that they rounded up and cleared the area of German stragglers. However, due to lack of communications between myself and this Headquarters, and myself and field, Resistance could not be controlled to the maximum effectiveness for use to the Division. Due to a lack of concrete orders, both concise and timely, from London, greater action on the part of Resistance in front of the Division was lost. All told, I would estimate that Resistance had been used at 50 percent efficiency in the Brittany campaign.[86]

In the area of communications, there were obvious problems with the radio sets. Furthermore, in August 1944, SFHQ receiving stations received too many messages to effectively evaluate and act upon. And finally, a real problem existed in the inability of the ground force headquarters to effectively communicate tactically with the SOF groups.

One problem not unique to operations in the summer of 1944 was the dilemma of SOF organization. As a number of Jedburgh team reports indicate, when teams requested reinforcement by an SAS party, they usually did not receive it. On the other hand, there were numerous instances of Jedburgh teams encountering unannounced SAS parties. In most instances, when that occurred, the two groups simply went their separate ways. These "private wars" of the SAS often hindered the resistance, drawing Axis retaliation against the resistance and local villagers, usually after the SAS party had already exfiltrated. One thing is certain, however, and that is that the creation of separate and competing organizations, such as the SAS and SFHQ, leads to overlapping functions and creates the opportunity for unnecessary friction.

At army and army group headquarters, staff cells did on occasion incorporate SOF into their future plans. Before the Operation Cobra breakout from Normandy, SHAEF developed a plan using a large portion of the SAS brigade to cooperate with ground units in capturing Quiberon Bay in Brittany. That, like many other plans, was soon outdistanced by events. When the 21^st Army Group undertook the ill-fated Operation Market Garden in September, six Jedburgh teams deployed to support the operation.[87] In the Jedburgh team operations we have looked at, however, there was only one instance of an army or army group request for direct operational support: the 30 August request to seize and hold the Somme River bridges and those near Amiens for four days. Team Angustus was wiped out that evening, and Team Alfred was too far away and in too threatened a position to undertake the mission. The request itself, however, was far too ambitious. It might have been possible for each team to sneak in and blow up one bridge, but it would have been suicide to attempt to hold those bridges for any length of time.

Within the British special operations community, there was a feeling that the higher-level commanders, particularly Montgomery, failed to appreciate the possible uses of SOF. It remains difficult, however, to find a U.S. Army commander who had a firm grasp of those potentialities. One searches in vain through the published Patton Papers for a reference to SOF, finally discovering a transcript of a 7 September 1944 press conference where a correspondent asked how much support he had received from the FFI. Patton responded: "Better than expected and less than advertised." [88] In his diary, however, on 2 September 1944, he observed: "General 'Wild Bill' Donovan was in camp when I got back and was most complimentary. While I think the efforts of his cohorts (office of strategic services) are futile, I personally like and admire him a lot. I will now get set for the next move".[89] This is not meant to single out General Patton as one of the generals who stubbornly opposed the use of SOF. To the contrary, he proved one of the commanders open to new ideas. He in fact used the FFI and SOF teams from SFHQ to a greater extent than his colleagues. Nonetheless, he disapproved of them. If even the bold and imaginative commanders disapproved of operations in the enemy's rear, what chance did such operations have in SHAEF's future? The answer to that question was not long in coming; SHAEF began to disassemble the SF detachments during the first week of September 1944, and by the end of the year, most of the Jedburghs and a large number of other SOF personnel had been transferred to Asia. SHAEF justified its decision by observing that there was no prospect for successful guerrilla warfare in Germany. That was no doubt a correct assessment, but one also senses a certain relief, as if unwanted house guests had finally departed.

One is left finally with the impression that the concept of Jedburgh operations was ahead of its time. The requirements for radios, modified aircraft, and other specialized equipment and weapons pushed the limits of 1943-44 technology and were not entirely reliable. In the realm of organization, this concept was relatively new and of necessity grew out of SOE's experiences in intelligence gathering. Indeed, one of the most instructive examples from these operations was the use of intelligence gathering networks that provided guides and security for the insertion of the Jedburgh teams (what is known in today's Special Forces lexicon as "area assessment" or "pilot" teams). That SFHQ organization proved deficient in a number of areas (i.e., failure to develop networks in eastern France, late deployment of Jedburgh teams, and inability to rapidly resupply teams in the field) should not have come as a surprise since such a major undertaking had not been tried before. Furthermore, the inability of senior ground commanders to appreciate the value of SOF and operations in the enemy's rear must also be placed within the historical context. For the generals of World War II-educated in the military schools of the 1920s and 1930s guerrilla warfare tended to be an alien concept.[90] One of the most important lessons to be learned from these operations is that senior ground force commanders and their staffs must be fully educated in SOF capabilities and limitations.

It remains difficult to assess the effectiveness of the eleven Jedburgh teams dropped in front of the 12^th Army Group in August 1944. Like the other teams dropped to the south, they provided organization, tactical expertise, and training to the FFI volunteers. Upon linkup with advancing Allied ground forces, they also provided well-documented assistance. The teams were designed, however, to work behind enemy lines, and it is on that basis that their performance must be evaluated. Viewed dispassionately, one must conclude that the operations of these eleven teams in northeastern France were only marginally successful. Their major contributions were indirect and defy quantification: their psychological effect upon occupied France and the German occupation force and their role in providing intelligence data, both to SFHQ by radio and by sending guides to meet the advancing Allied ground forces. That the teams could have been much more effective certainly was not the fault of the individual Jedburghs, who proved tough, resourceful, skilled, and highly motivated. It was not the job of these teams to single handedly defeat the German Army in the west, and in any case, three-man teams were absurdly small. In the event of even one casualty, operations became extremely difficult if not impossible. If the Jedburghs may be faulted for anything, it is perhaps that they were too willing to enter into combat.

It would be altogether too easy to describe the shortcomings of these operations as the result of an institutional failure, but there was no SOF institution per se to blame. SOE and OSS were brand new organizations inventing the scope, direction, organization, and methods of SOF operations. SOE and OSS were so new and insecure that they were both abolished in 1946 and therefore do not actually qualify as institutions. Upon reflection, it appears remarkable that SFHQ achieved as much as it did. One of the more important successes of the Jedburgh operations was the psychological impact, the teams had on the citizens of occupied France. Following years of occupation, the sight of uniformed Allied soldiers behind the lines was a harbinger of liberation and a call to action. As these Jedburgh team operations have demonstrated, that call did not go unanswered. The ultimate triumph of the Jedburgh project, however, was in the successful formation of teams of professional and nonprofessional soldiers from different nations who worked together toward a common goal. To make an accurate and fair evaluation of Jedburgh operations, it remains clear that more study is required, not only of Jedburgh activities in other parts of France but also their subsequent operations in China and Southeast Asia.

Date: 3 July 1944
Unit: 503^rd PRCT, 1^st Bn.
Operation: Table Tennis
Troopers: 739
Country: New Guinea
Dropzone: Noemfoor Island
Aircraft: C-47
Type Air delivery: Day Mass low-level tactical personnel static-line jump

Date: 4 July 1944
Unit: 503^rd PRCT, 3^rd Bn.
Operation: Table Tennis
Troopers: 685
Country: New Guinea
Drop Zone: Noemfoor Island
Aircraft: C-47
Type Air delivery: Day Mass low-level tactical personnel static-line jump

Date: 15 August 1944
Unit: 1^st Abn. Task Force (460^th PFA, 463^rd PFABn.; 509^th PIB; 517^th PCT; 551^st PIB; 596^th PC Eng. Co. Dropping of 300 paratroop dummies, prior to landing)
Operation: Dragoon
Troopers:5,607
Country: France
Drop Zone: Cote d' Azur, Riviera
Aircraft: C-47
Type Air delivery: Day Mass low-level tactical personnel static-line jump, wing shackle bundle drops, Gliders

Allied invasion of Southern France, staged from bases in Italy. Parachute and glider assaults provided the spearhead for an amphibious invasion of the French Riviera between Cannes and Toulon. The DZs and LZs were located inland near Le Muy, where troopers were to perform much the same tasks as in Normandy. Added to the list, however, was the job of preventing fleeing German forces from escaping into the interior. This operation, like Normandy, was successful. Most Troop Carrier crews flew two long missions on D-Day: one paradrop and one glider tow. More than 850 Troop Carrier sorties were flown, of which slightly more than half were on the parachute missions. Approximately 9,100 troopers were delivered, along with over 200 vehicles and 200 artillery pieces, plus approximately 500 tons of others supplies and equipment.

VIDEOS: Operation Dragoon

Holland

1^st British Airborne Division General Urquart played by Sean Connery

Beginning

www.youtube.com/watch?v=6pnv6odQ4oQ

Idiot Browning who miss-planned the operation

www.youtube.com/watch?v=f4BT4S_peV0

Horrock's Briefing

www.youtube.com/watch?v=Om0yG23KUpU

Take-Offs

www.youtube.com/watch?v=dJuJBGIZtcc

Jump Sequence from the Movie

www.youtube.com/v/lfv-19f8ZG8

XXX/30 Corps Starts Attack Under Rolling Barrage--no Cavalry to Clear-out Anti-Tank Guns, ambushed repeatedly up single land road

www.youtube.com/watch?v=7mjISsv5JYA

101^st Loses Bridge that Slows 30 Corps Advance

www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tt4WdpOF4yg

Rebuilding the Son Bridge

www.youtube.com/v/oTrO-B9sx3g

XXX Corps under Joe Vandeleur get stuck in traffic

British Paras under John Frost annihilate German wheeled armored cars on Arnhem Bridge (predictable path can't go cross-country to out-flank the Brits)

Wheeled German Attack incinerated Over Arnhem Bridge

www.youtube.com/watch?v=yiiUJ4sDuX0

General Gavin Acts Major Julian Cook to Assault Nijmegan Bridge

www.youtube.com/watch?v=ACiWrHFMeYY&feature=related

82^nd Airborne Paratroopers take Njimegan Bridge

A Bridge Too Far Nijmegan Bridge Boat Assault

www.youtube.com/v/Lj6sbcyVsqw

Date: 17 September 1944
Unit: 82^nd Airborne Division (with 508^th), 505^th RCT, Includes: 505^th PIR, 456^th PFA, & Co. B, 307^th Engr.; 504^th RCT, Includes: 504^th PIR, 376^th PFA, & Co.A, 307 Engr
Operation: Market Garden
Troopers: 7,250
Country: Holland
Drop Zone: Grave & Nijmegen
Aircraft: C-47, CG-1 gliders
Type Air delivery: Day Mass low-level tactical personnel static-line jump, wing shackle bundle drops, Gliders

VIDEOS: WW2 C-47 Re-Enactments

Paratrooper's Eye View of C-47 static-line parachute jump

www.youtube.com/watch?v=3v7e5mKh708

Paratroopers Mass Tac from C-47s from the epic movie "A Bridge Too Far"

Part 1

www.youtube.com/watch?v=SuCdnZVZyE4

Part 2

www.youtube.com/watch?v=RTq9QYy81b8

Date: 17 September 1944
Unit: 101^st Airborne Division [501, 502, 506]
Operation: Market Garden
Troopers: 6,769
Country: Holland
Drop Zone: Eindhoven
Aircraft: C-47, CG-1 gliders
Type Air delivery: Day Mass low-level tactical personnel static-line jump, wing shackle bundle drops, Gliders

Arnhem: Bridge Too Far or We Didn't Bring Enough?

British Tetrarch light tanks

Were glider-airlanded in WWII during the D-Day invasion, where were they at Arhem?

MYSTERY: the British tank museum's Tetrarch light tank has a 3-pounder gun for fire support as shown above. So don't even try to whine about these light tanks being inadequate to kill heavier German tanks, they were needed primarily to BLAST GERMAN INFANTRY OUT OF BUILDINGS, BUNKERS AND DUG-IN POSITIONS. This was known AT THE TIME as proven by the Tetrarch with the 3-pounder gun. Yet we only know the 6^th Airborne Division having an Armored Reconnaissance unit with light tanks, not the 1^st Brititsh Airborne which landed near Arnhem. The photo above of a Hamilcar at a landing zone west of Arnhem adds to the mystery as SOMETHING has rolled off its front nose ramp. We also know 412 Hamilcar heavy gliders were built so the question arises WHY DIDN'T THE BRITISH GLIDER-LAND A FORCE OF 100-400 LIGHT TANKS AND BREN GUN CARRIERS WEST OR ARNHEM AND PUNCH THEIR WAY THROUGH TO REINFORCE LTC FROST'S MEN?

The puzzling question is where were the light tanks?

www.combatreform.org/airbornetanksnoexcuse.htm

Heavy Lift Gliders + Bren Gun Carriers = Airlanding Troops with Armored Mobility

Heavy Lift Gliders + Bren Gun Carriers + 75mm Pack Howitzers = Airlanding Troops with Armored Mobility + Firepower

Why didn't 57mm and 75mm guns get attached to some Bren gun ultra-light tankettes "mini-STUGs" deployed by gliders to punch through German resistance to reinforce the German paras at Arnhem bridge? Stopping to unlimber a towed 57mm/75mm gun to fire is not the shock action of a STUG.

www2photo.mimerswell.com/tanks/gb/ligh/carr/carr.htm

Here a 25-pounder AT gun on a Bren could clearly have blasted through even German medium and heavy tanks blocking the way to Arnhem bridge...

Smaller 2-pounder AT guns on Brens could have blasted the way through lesser vehicles, dug-in and barricaded Germans to Arnhem...

Why didn't the 1^st British Airborne glider-deliver these "Mini-STUG" Bren tankettes with AT guns so they could have punched through German opposition to consolidate and hold Arnhem bridge?

It wasn't "a bridge too far" it was a case of the Airborne NOT GOING FAR ENOUGH in its force structure and tactics to have their own mini-STUGs.

The British 6^th Airborne Hamilcar glider airlanded Tetrarch light tanks on D-Day....was the 1^st Airborne Division ignorant of this practice? What about Bren gun carrier tankettes? In the documentary below they sing the praises of the 75mm pack howitzer...why didn't anyone mount a 75mm pack howitzer on a Bren gun carrier making it a "Pack Howitzer Carrier"? With such mobile firepower, the British Airborne could have punched through to reinforce LTC Frost at the road bridge and hold it long enough for even the slow mechanized XXX Corps to arrive.

Arnhem According to Gavin

1. According to General Gavin in Airborne Warfare (1947) two measley German wheeled armored cars stopped the 3^rd and 1^st battalions of the 1^st British parachute brigade following a railroad track from getting to the Arnhem bridge held by LTC Frost's 2^nd Battalion. When a 57mm anti-tank gun being towed by an unarmored wheeled Willys jeep tried to get into firing order, it was blasted by the armored cars.

Canadian, Tim Brown's war game professionalism [http://saskminigamer.blogspot.com/2007/06/tiger-route.html] puts 99.9% of the Army and marine corps types on active duty to shame.

The FACTS are that NO TANKS opposed the 3^rd Battalion of the the 1^st British Airborne Division they were simply fucked up lacking the minimum of self-propelled, ready-to-fire weaponry on a tracked armored vehicle to overcome just a little German resistance by men with hand weapons. Tim says:

"This was the path to be taken by L.Col Fitch's 3^rd Parachute Battalion along the Utrecht-Arnhem highway. The battalion was to sweep into Arnhem from the north and link up with Frost's 2^nd Battalion at the bridge. In his way, however was the 16^th SS Grenadier Training and Reinforcement Battalion commanded by Major Sepp Krafft (and later elements of the 9^th SS panzer Division!)."

In airborne operations you must SEIZE THE DAY! the day you arrive is your opportunity to strike the enemy when he's not ready and take things like Arnhem bridges. If you let yourself get stopped by reaction forces THEN you open yourself to his "panzers" opposing you.

2. The failure of the British Airborne to move the 6-8 miles from their drop zones west of Arnhem to reinforce Frost at the Bridge ruined the entire operation which was to be a bridgehead across the Rhine river.

LESSON #1: Quantity (mass)

Its clear the British fucked up Operation Market-Garden by war weariness and a lack of willingness to suffer casualties in the face of a mere pair of armored cars. The truth is that the Airborne forces did their job to include holding Arnhem bridge for several days and XXX Corps in mechanized armored Bren gun carriers, half-tracks led by Sherman medium tanks took too long to link-up stymied up a narrow single-lane highway. Where was Percy Hobart's 79^th Armored Division with the "funnies" tanks to include amphibious LVT-4 Buffalos that could swim across rivers? The relative of an 82^nd Airborne Arnhem veteran writes:

"Uncle XXXX said that when they took the northern end of the Nijmegen Bridge, the Brits said something to the effect of, 'Thanks chaps. We'll be across in the morning.' He said that Gavin had to have his MPs hold Julian Cook's regiment at gunpoint to prevent them from comandeering the British tanks and taking them up the road themselves. They were furious. Had they known the Brits would hold in place until morning, they could have paddled across the river at night and taken far fewer casualties. They took 50% casualties taking the bridge. Uncle XXXX died over 40 years ago from wounds suffered in the Battle of the Bulge - quadrapalegic and had kidney failure - but he was adamant that they could have made it up the road to the Brits. He was a very direct guy and not prone to BS'ing."

While the Allied Airborne in general did not fail the mission, it did fail themselves when it could have held on long enough even for XXX Corps to arrive had the 1^st British Airborne had its act together better. If you are not willing to lose men and lack the mobility to move several miles quickly because you are foot-slogging, you damn well better jump DIRECTLY onto the bridge and have someone willing to fight hard to do it, namely General Gavin's 82^nd Airborne do the job. Gavin would have likely jumped in at NIGHT directly onto the north and south of Arnhem bridge to evade anti-aircraft fires and used aircraft bombing to precede the effort to suppress what couldn't be avoided. Another possibility would have been using gliders at higher altitudes and sneaking in to the bridges Eban Emael and Orne River Bridge-style to get by the AAA guns.

The majority of the 82^nd would have then arrived in concentrated form and held the bridge and a nearby resupply drop zone insuring a successful mission. The 101^st should have then taken Nijmegan bridge and Groesbeek heights with the 1^st British Airborne taking the lower bridges and being relieved first by XXX Corps in motor vehicles. Gavin cites a lack of airlift during Market-Garden to drop all paratroopers and launch all gliders at the same time, therefore having the Arnhem assault echelon jump in at night and a few hours later the other elements during the day would have enabled the planes to return to base and be loaded up for the day time assaults. The 1^st Allied Airborne Army being led by the British General Browning who were the weakest practitioners of airborne warfare and not someone from the British 6^th Airborne Division who aggressively used gliders to deliver light tanks and stand-off glider surprise attacks or having General Ridgway in command was a fatal mistake.

LESSON #2: Quality (aircraft precision firepower)

Where was the excellent IX Air Force P-47 fighter-bomber close air support (CAS) when the British ran into the German armored cars and panzer tracked tanks leading to Arnhem? It seems that they didn't have the CAS ground forward air controllers (GFACs) that the American forces had and thus should not have been given the toughest assignment of taking Arnhem bridge if they were the weakest force.

LESSON #3: Quality (self-propelled anti-tank vehicles)

Moreover, the 1^st British Airborne division had at least 13 x Hamilar gliders capable of delivering 13 light tanks or 26 Bren gun tankettes. We know for a fact that the 2^nd Battalion of the Paras had at least one Bren gun carrier, tracked AFV.

This was the D-Day allocation so more Hamilcars may have been available since 412 total were built during WW2. Proof that the Bitish Airborne had glider-landed 17-pounder, jeep-towed, anti-tank guns and Bren gun carriers:

www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/frames.htm

"The men of the Reconnaissance Squadron, together with one of the 2^nd Battalion's Bren carriers, were to carry out this task, and Frost told Gough that it would be his chance to win his family's fifth Victoria Cross."

Pegasus Archive founder, Mark Hickman states: "I was under the impression that each para battalion had only the one Bren carrier, though I think the single Hamilcar each battalion had would be capable of carrying another."

www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/war_1stBatt.htm

1400 - New positions consolidated in area X rds 726778. By now we were joined by 60 men of the 3 Para Bn under Capt Dorrien Smith, and 1 17 lb gun and 4 6 lb guns of 1 A.L. A/Tk Bty. We also had one carrier. This position was held against increasing opposition from the east and north.

1930 - Withdrawal to area railway bridge 712774. The night was spent in preparing posns with 1^st Bn on the right, 11 Bn on left and 3 Bn in centre. During the night there was some enemy shelling and mortaring. Casualties during the day were about 6 killed and 20 wounded. The carrier and the 17 lb A/T gun were knocked out.

Unlike their brother 6^th Airborne that landed at Normandy with Tetrarch light tanks, the 1^st doesn't seem to have even had a reconnaissance element with light tanks. Jeeps with machine guns don't cut it against armored vehicles. First off, what the hell was the 6^th Recce Squadron of the 6^th Airborne Division doing in September 1944? Did they have something more pressing than say little ole' WW2? Why wasn't the 6^th Recce Squadron which HAD LIGHT TANKS cross-attached to the British 1^st Airborne seeing they would need their mobility and firepower to bust through the 6-8 miles to Arnhem if the Germans reacted with impromptu blocking forces? Why weren't Bren gun carriers modified to have 75mm pack howitzers in a ready-to-fire condition and supplied to Freddy Gough's Recce squadron in the 1^st British Airborne since they only had vulnerable jeeps? Just a few Brens with 75mm guns could have taken out the two German armored cars and enabled the 3^rd and 1^st battalions to link up with Frost at Arnhem bridge on the first day, securing the victory and providing enough combat power to stay certainly until the 23rd when XXX Corps finally arrives at Driel, south of the bridge. According to the details below, the 1^st Recce had 20mm cannon towed by their jeeps, why couldn't they have been employed against the German armored cars? The excerpt below from their Arnhem war diary indicates the Polsten 20mm guns were used in combat. Its clear that the inability of towed guns to fire instantly when threats are encounted DAMNED THE ENTIRE OPERATION.

www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/war_recce.htm

1645 - Polsten sections leave to support A and D Troops who are under strong pressure from the enemy. Section fire on their objective. Lieut Christie killed whilst attempting to save Jeep and Polsten.

Vulnerable, unarmored jeeps are easy to knock out

Polsten expert, Colin Stevens, where we got the great pics writes:

"Book on Recce Sqn - I used to have it but sold it to a friend. If you see a copy for sale I'd be interested.

Yes they had a single Vickers K (Vickers Gas Operated aka properly known as Vickers G.O.) on each of the Recce Sqn jeeps. Several of the jeeps failed to arrive at Arnhem so they were understrength.

'In addition they had 2 x 20mm Polsten cannons carried behind the jeep. The Polsten cannons were an Anti-Aircraft gun but due to its high firing rate was a very effective ground weapon.'

There were two single towed Polsten 20mm Airborne guns for the entire squadron. I have a rare original manual for this gun, and a rare brief booklet about the AB 20mm at Arnhem. I am away from home but as I recall, the barrel of one gun was bent upon landing and was thus out of action. The other gun remained in action. One of the famous Arnhem wrecked jeep photos shows the jeep that towed this gun. It was in action just North of the Hartenstein Hotel (where AB museum is now) in Oosterbeek. I have some of the 20mm shell casings dug up by a Dutchman from that site.

The AB had 6 Pr and 17 Pr anti-tank guns at Arnhem. I saw and photographed three of the shot-up 17 Pounder guns are at the Airborne Museum on display on the grounds when I was there in May 2005.

My own jeep I believe served with 1^st Airborne Division as a replacement vehicle for those lost at Arnhem. I believe they took it to Norway in May 1945 and left it there. The Norwegians used it until 1985! I do not know the British WD number or other British markings unfortunately. The jeep has British modifications including the blackout lights being moved to the fenders (wings) as clearance lights (the Norwegians put them back into the grille) and including the airborne stowage rack mounting holes on the fenders. Presently the jeep is painted for my old regiment (Seaforth Highlanders of Canada) but I plan to put it back to British Airborne markings.

COLIN STEVENS

www.airbornerecce.com/oca/1stars.htm

1^st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron

A BRIEF HISTORY

"Leading the way (into Arnhem) would be a motorised reconnaissance squadron of jeeps and motorcycles. General Urquhart was counting on Major 'Freddie' Gough's highly specialised force of some 275 men in four troops - the only unit of its kind in the British Army - to reach the highway bridge and hold it until the main body of the brigade arrived "

Extract from A Bridge Too Far by Cornelius Ryan

The Squadrons' History

By April 1943 the Sqdn had been made up to strength of about 250 men and was stationed at Bulford near Andover when it left for North Africa via Liverpool on the troopship Staffordshire with the rest of the 1^st Airborne Division. After a few days acclimatisation inland from Oran in Algeria the unit picked up its vehicles, jeeps and motorcycles. After a few more days the Jeeps and their drivers with Motorcycles and other unit gear in the trailers left on a 1000 mile trip to Msaken near Sousse in Tunisia. The rest of the unit went by train.

Training continued but was switched to loading gliders and towing them about the airfields to place them at the rear of the tug planes ready for the invasion of Sicily in July.

After returning to normal training, in September the Sqdn loaded its jeeps and m/cycles onto the famous light Cruiser USS BOISE because there were no gliders left after the Sicily drop. Also on board were 5 under strength Sqdns of the S A S and 25 men of Popski's Private Army. With the British Cruisers Penelope and Abdiel carrying the rest of the Division they entered Taranto Harbour to offload. Unfortunately the Abdiel hit a mined barge and sank in the harbour losing much of the division's artillery and the Sqdn's 6 pounders. The Sqdn left straight away for its task of exploring the route to the Bari on the East Coast via Massafra and Motola to Gioia del Colle, running into some German opposition and suffering some casualties. After a brief stop the Sqdn moved on towards Bari where it was the first British Unit to enter the town and again after a brief stay moved on where it took the Airfield at Foggia. From then the Sqdn was especially active, being always in the front of the advance.

Amongst the losses were some men from B troop which was never reformed.

In November, the Sqdn moved back to North Africa and left Philippeville in Algeria, some on the (sick) Duchess of Bedfordshire (so called as she had no stabilisers and rolled alarmingly) and others on the Monarch of Bermuda getting back to the UK in time for Christmas. (Actually, the Duchess hit the Monarch in the Med - a Zig Zag went wrong - and the Monarch had to dock in Gibraltar for temporary repairs but still got back to the UK for Christmas)

After a very brief stay at Spalding the Sqdn moved to Ruskington just north of Sleaford in Lincolnshire and stayed there for the next 9 months until the battle of Arnhem in September.

In February 1944 Major Gough told the Sqdn that it had been decided that while its vehicles and drivers would go into their next operation in gliders the bulk of the Sqdn would have to jump and they would have to volunteer to be paratroops. (Most had been posted to the Sqdn as it was a glider unit, one had to volunteer to become a paratrooper). He told the parade that any man who did not wish to volunteer should take a step forward - and no one moved. Training took place at Ringway with jumps into Tatton Park and intensive training continued. The unit was retitled 'Airborne' - not 'Airlanding'.

In accordance with Recce policy the firepower of the jeeps was substantially upgraded. Every jeep had a Vickers "K" .303 caliber machine gun mounted with a round magazine holding 96 rounds. In addition they had 2 x 20mm Polsten cannons carried behind the jeep. The Polsten cannons were an Anti-Aircraft gun but due to its high firing rate was a very effective ground weapon. They also carried standard infantry weapons including two 3" mortars and 2" mortars, a Bren Light machine gun, standard rifles but with sniper sights, a PIAT (ant tank) gun and many and various hand grenades. Most men had a Sten submachine gun and the Radio Operators, a revolver.

There were several false alarms but at the end of August a seaborne party of some 40 men with the Sqdn transport vehicles left for France designed to collect and re-equip the Sqdn during its next battle.

Then on 17th September 1944, 45 men who had previously driven the Sqdns jeeps and motorcycles and heavy weapons and ammunition to Tarrant Rushton in Dorset flew in Gliders to the Dutch Town of Arnhem, where they were joined 30 minutes later by their 160 comrades who had flown from Barkston Heath Airfild, Lincolnshire and landed by parachute. Two of the 22 gliders (out of a total of 358) allocated to the Sqdn did not arrive so they only had 28 instead of 31 jeeps they should have had. Furthermore several of the Gliders on Landing crashed on the soft soil and it proved very difficult to get the vehicles and equipment out which meant that the Sqdn was quite a bit under strength 'HQ, D & C' Troops headed for the Bridge as a coup de main but were held up by "strong" German opposition and suffered several casualties. 'A' Troop had stayed behind as a reserve as planned. Unfortunately radio communications had broken down and when Freddie Gough got a message to say the General wanted to see him he left for Div HQ taking some of H Q Troop and a few from 'D' Troop with him, By the time he found the General the party he had left behind had returned to the D.Z. and when he left Div HQ, after several skirmishes, got to the bridge where the Sqdn was supposed to be and where there were remnants of several units. Our D.R. Chalky White was sent back to Div HQ and was probably the last man to leave the Bridge.

Those at the Bridge held out until Thursday morning 21^st September when they had to surrender because they had no ammunition left. The remainder of the Sqdn under Captain Alsop fought on as part of the force at Oosterbeck from which a few of them (perhaps 2,000 of the original 10,000) escaped including about 30 of the Sqdn on Monday 25th September. That night the survivors met up with the Seaborne party and got new clothing and other gear and the next morning were flown back to the UK arriving back in Ruskington on Friday 29th September at about 9pm.

The full story of the battle of Arnhem is well known and the part the Sqdn played is well documented in the book Remember Arnhem: The Story of the 1^st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron at Arnhem by John Fairley. The seaborne party came back a few days later. The villagers were as devastated as the men by the terrible loses sustained. In fact the loses although high were not as bad as at first suspected and many had been wounded and they and the others who did not return, totalling some 140, were taken prisoners of war.

Shortly after their return of the 30 and the seaborne party, following a period of debriefing and two weeks disembarkation leave, the unit was allocated to barracks at Newark, Nottinghamshire, and reluctantly left Ruskington for ever.

During the winter reinforcements made up the strength to 160 and retraining began. On the 10th May 1945, two days after V E day the Squadron flew with its vehicles to Stavanger, Norway, and quickly moved to Oslo to help organise the withdrawal of German troops. Their mobility was needed to escort German units from some of the more rural areas and they also aided the new Norwegian authorities round up some of the Norwegians who had co operated with the Germans. Whilst they were there they took part in a parade with other Airborne Troops and Russians to welcome Crown Prince Olaf back to Norway after his exile. No medal was issued for this operation as the war in Europe had officially ended but Prince Olaf gave the Squadron a Signed Certificate of Thanks for their part in the difficult task they had successfully completed and members of the squadron who were there were issued with a copy.

In September, the Sqdn returned to the United Kingdom to Broham in Wiltshire from where it was disbanded about 4 years after its formation. The men were dispersed to various other units. The men who were wounded and who had been taken prisoner of war in Italy and at Arnhem returned to this country but not to the Sqdn.

www.airbornerecce.com/oca/6thaars.htm

The 6^th Airborne Armoured Reconnaissance RGT. R.A.C.

A brief history

"The role of the Light Tank Squadron will normally be the capture of an objective, in anticipation of a quick follow up by part of the Airborne Division, followed by patrolling infront of the main position.

It was agreed that the likelihood of heavy opposition would entail the withdrawal of the Squadron"

That was the role laid down in the unit manual but in fact the Unit used its tanks to defend troops against heavy enemy opposition and led the way of all British troops into Germany against the best enemy units.

In 1941 3 Special Service Squadrons of Tanks were formed from various cavalry and tank units but 2 were disbanded in 1942, the third becoming the Airborne Light Tank Sqdn RAC which moved to the 1^st Airborne Division on the Salisbury Plain. When the 1^st Airborne Div. With the 1^st Airborne Recce Sqdn, went to Africa the Airborne Light Tank Sqdn which had used Tetrarch tanks was transferred to the newly formed 6^th Airborne Division. The Hamilcar Glider was designed to carry the Tetrarch Tank. Command of the squadron passed to Major (later Lt.Col.) Godfrey Stewart in April 1943, and he commanded the Squadron, and later the Regiment, for the remainder of the war.

Initialy the unit appears to have 3 Squadrons: A (light tank Sqdn) with 5 troops each with 4 Tetrarch tanks, B (Recce) with 4 troops with scout cars and carriers, a blitz (infantry support) troop on motorcycles and 2 troops of 3" mortars. HQ Squadron had 4 more Tetrarchs, REME, MEDICS, Signals, a resupply unit and 2 troops each with 4 Vickers MMGs. Regimental HQ also had 2 Tetrarchs.

Tetrarch Light Tank being loaded into a Hamilcar Glider

On D Day a small "Harbour Party" of 1 Officer and 15 men flew in with the advance Pathfinder Para Unit to secure the Regimental landing ground. Unfortunately this unit lost its Officer and one stick of men on landing. 20 light tanks and other carriers and vehicles flew in with the second main lift from Tarant Rushton in 30 Hamilcars while others flew in from Brize Norton in Horsas. Some Tanks were lost due to a crash on landing and for a while some tanks were disabled as parachute canopies and rigging getting wrapped round the tracks which had to be burnt off. After 10 days the Unit was withdrawn but the tank units went straight back in their Tetrarchs to support the remaining hard-pressed ground troops. Once again the tank crews were withdrawn but after 10 days retraining went back in with Cromwell tanks and continued supporting the breakout. The Unit was taken out of the line at the end of August and by 6 Sept had regrouped at Larkhil.

There the Unit was enlarged to a Regiment of 4 Sqdns with a compliment of 32 officers and 326 other ranks. The 2 Recce Sqdns each had 4 [M22] Locust tanks when airborne or Cromwells otherwise, and 3 Recce Troops each with 2 carriers and 2 Dingo scout cars. The support Sqdn had 2 MMG troops with 4 Vickers on carriers, a troop with four 4.2" mortars, and a blitz troop on motorcycles.

In December 1944, the Division was sent to France to help with the Battle of the Bulge in the Ardennes and on Monday the 30th December the AARR was involved on the Meuse with the 6^th A/B Div with their Cromwells. By 16th Feb the Rgt left for the UK but left a tail, including the Cromwells in Holland. The tail soon found out they were part of the ground force support of the next operation.

M22 Locust Light Tank

On 24th March, as part of Operation Varsity, 8 x Locust tanks were flown in in Hamilcars along with the troop of 4.2" mortars in Horsas. In fact less flew in "Varsity" than in the D-Day drop. Although the operation was a great success and the battle having been won by nightfall, casualties were very high and of the 8 tanks, only 2 survived fully serviceable. Several tanks and vehicles had been destroyed on landing and casualties were high. The rest of the Regiment had left on 17th March and joined up with the airborne sections on the 26th. The Division continued the advance with the Airborne Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment well to the fore and on several occasions suffered severe casualties, especially at a battle at Minden. On 30th April the Division reached the Elbe and on 3rd May elements of B Squadron met elements of the Russian Stalingrad Armoured Division. 2 days later the war was over and on 16th May the Division was ordered to return home, the Recce Rgt leaving all its Tanks and Carriers in Germany.

Training began for war in South East Asia but as the Japanese surrendered they were reallocated to security duties in Palestine. The Rgt landed in Haifa on 22 Oct 1945 and worked as part of the division facing civil disobedience by both Arabs and Jews and terrorism by Jews.

On 1st Feb the 6^th AARR was disbanded and most of the personnel were transferred to the 3^rd King's Own Hussars which became a Recce Rgt.

Landing Craft + Trailers + Trucks + Bren Gun Carriers = River Crossings

Another weird video fact is you can see Higgins boats---LCVPs on trailers towed by TRUCKS being driven around to cross rivers. Bren gun carriers could be carried and off-loaded by Higgins boats to cross rivers. Why didn't anyone think of this to cross the Rhine and push the Germans off the Arnhem bridge? When XXX Corps finally arrives at Driel, south of the bridge that is now back in German hands, 1^st British Airborne on the far bank of the river has to withdraw because wheeled DUKW amphibious trucks can't get supplies to them. Had XXX Corps had TRACKED LVT Buffalo amtracks, they could have resupplied 1^st Airborne and kept its river crossing point and built a bridge there to get across. Obviously, if the British Airborne had dropped directly onto the north/south of Arnhem bridge or used light tracked armor to punch through enemy impromptu blocking forces, they would have held both sides of the bridge in divisional strength, so when XXX Corps finally arrived amphibious vehicles wouldn't have been needed---they could drive supplies across the bridge to keep 1^st Airborne fighting.

You'll also see LVTs and DUKWs in the video footage...WHERE was Percy Hobart's 79^th Division "funnies" which had LVTs when Arnhem was underway to supply amphibious vehicles?

It could also then deliver a LIGHT TANK if it couldn't swim like the M3 Stuart Light tank attached and below on the www:

TRACKED AMPHIBIOUS SALVAGE OF OPERATION MARKET-GARDEN, 1944

Therefore, had XXX Corps been equipped with enough LVT amphibious tracks organically or by Hobart's 79^th Armored Division being attached, when it finally did arrive at Driel on September 23, 1944 instead of withdrawing the 1^st British Airborne, it could have pushed across and REINFORCED it. Once the toe-hold was strengthened, a Bailey bridge could have been erected for Sherman medium tanks with 17-pounder guns to cross and ward off the German heavy Tiger tanks and the offensive could have swung around the city of Arnhem and encircled the Germans like the paras were a few days before. Good land armies are able to cross rivers and keep maneuvering.

Of course, its better if your light tanks SWAM themselves across lakes/rivers like the LVTs or today's M113 Gavin and PT76s can...the point here is that if your light tanks don't swim like the M8 Buford/Thunderbolt AGS you are not necessarily "sunk" if you are willing to pay for trucks or better yet XM1108 Gavin tracks towing a flat-bottom Higgins boat on a trailer to wherever the river or lake crossing is required so you can have FAR SHORE COMBAT POWER to hold against enemies with much heavier tanks if your light tank has the firepower to kill them. The combat engineer force reinforced by a CAVALRY in light tanks can seize a bridge from both sides 82^nd Airborne @ Nijmegan-style or proceed to build their own bridges for the medium-to-heavy vehicles of a 2D maneuver force to cross.

Operation: Market Garden Overview

VIDEO: BBC BATTLEFIELDS: Arnhem

This is THE BEST documentary on Operation Market-Garden to date. Professor Richard Holmes walks the exact battlefield locations and explains how and why it unfolded showing the STRATEGIC consequences and most importantly does not leave those who failed by incompetence off-the-hook with typical BS hero worship so we might actually LEARN SOMETHING from the tragic events.

Part 1: Holmes: WW2 could have been shortened by at least 6 months had we crossed the Rhine and got to Berlin before the Soviets

www.youtube.com/watch?v=-UIGaM5iXtc

Part 2: XXX Corps lacking a light tracked cavalry doesn't clear out enemy anti-tank guns expecting WW1 style rolling artillery barrage to do its work, Germans let 8 medium tanks go by then destroy 9. Why couldn't low ground pressure Bren gun light tracked APCs and infantry have gone ahead of the high ground pressure Sherman medium tank main body going cross-country adjacent to the single highway?

www.youtube.com/watch?v=O3km0HCZbPw

Part 3: U.S. General Brereton ruled out night drop directly on the bridge resulting in only half 1^st Airborne delivered during the day 6-8 miles away to avoid AAA, then 1/2 of them had to hold the landing zones and couldn't move on to the bridge, unarmored wheeled jeeps can't breakthrough ad hoc infantry blocking force to Arnhem bridge, no radio comms to inform battalions stopped to change direction and take LTC Frost's route that was open, Major Hibbert radioed to HQs to take river route but they replied they were tangled up with the Germans---where was the reserve? XXX Corps stopped for the night after only 7 miles beyond start line? Can't fight forward at night? General Urquart trapped in Arnhem can't command his division

www.youtube.com/watch?v=ABWmB18iIvs

Part 4: Urquart and his men hide in attic for 36 hours!, XXX Corps reaches 82^nd Airborne but Frost's perimeter of buildings is being burned down by tanks firing HE to create a hole in the wall, then WP through that, Horrocks decided with Gavin to cross Waal river in boats in daylight to take Nijmegan bridge, Colonel Tucker asks if British tanks will be ready to charge through to Arnhem, and he says yes. 82^nd Paras paddle across when they should have had their own amphibious light tracked AFVs to swim across with protection

www.youtube.com/watch?v=y2O8j3U_iHQ

Part 5: 82^nd Airborne infantry offer to clear AT guns beyond Nijmegan bridge to get to Arnhem but they wimp out and refuse to move forward at night which would have shielded them, NOTHING STOOD IN THEIR WAY TO ARNHEM!! Frost's 750 men killed/captured even though they held for 3 1/2 days when 3, 000 men were to hold for 2 days....the failure here raises the sociological weakness of those who fight from armored tanks lacking the courage of those without armored cocoons clearly those with the courage to fight without armor like Airborne troops should have their own light tracked amphibious armor to use as needed when ground mobility is required, remaining 3, 500 1^st Airborne Division Paras still holds a Osterbeek pocket north of the Rhine river with a ferry boat where a bridge could have been erected to still get across and make the operation successful,

www.youtube.com/watch?v=LYs0pbtoXJ0

Part 6: Poles in rubber boats can't reinforce the 1^st Paras so they are evacuated, Professor Holmes concludes had we crossed the Rhine millions of people could have been saved by beating the Soviets to Berlin, Amen

www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ApkOygrHII

Late summer 1944, after the invasion of Normandy by the Allied forces the front lines stalled at along the Meuse river and just beyond Antwerp in Holland. In Holland was the 21^st Allied Army Group commanded by Gen. Montgomery. Gen. Bernard Montgomery was a famous general for defeating the German Afrika Korps commanded by Gen. Erwin Rommal in the sands of North Africa. American Gen. George S. Patton commands the armies along the Muese river and demands supplies so he can cross into Germany. In supreme command is General Eisenhower of all allied forces in Europe. Gen. Montgomery called Gen. Eisenhower to his HQ in Belgium to present a plan to out flank the formidable Rhine river and invade the Rhur river valley where all of Germany's industry is to end the war.

The Plan:

The plan calls for the Allied 1^st Airborne Army of the British 1^st and American 101^st and 82^nd Arborne divisions to be dropped into Holland to secure strategic bridges. The British 1^st Airborne Division known as the "Red Devils" are to land at Arnhem and attempted to secure the massive bridge across the lower Rhine. As a backup they are to capture the railway bridge encase the other bridge cannot be taken. While this is happening, the American 101^st Airborne "Screaming Eagles" would drop into the Eindhoven Sector and attempted to capture the bridges for the British XXX Corps that had broke through the front line of defense and was racing towards the bridges that were held by the airborne troops. In the middle, between Arnhem and Eindhoven was the vital bridge at Nijmegen, this was left up to the American 82^nd "All Americans" Airborne Division.

September 17, 1944

British Lt. Gen. Brian Horrocks commander of the British XXX Corps gives the go ahead for the armored divisions to smash ahead through the German front lines. The corps goal is to slash 60 miles along a single highway to the airborne troops all in two days. Allied G2 (intelligence) believed that there was around twenty battalions defending the front line with almost no artillery support. Really there was only ten very weak positions and almost no artillery at the front. Just beyond the front line the Germans had put up several brand new 75mm anti-tank guns along the road waiting to ambush the tanks. Further back they placed machine gun nests and panzerfausts. U.S. 8^th and 9^th Air Force bombers and fighter-bomber hit many targets around the breakthrough point and anti-aircraft positions. All over Britain, over 2,000 C-47 Dakotas begin to take off while bombers tow more than 500 gliders loaded with supplies and paratroops. From the six leading C-47's jump the pathfinders that will mark the land zone for the thousands of troops to come. Unrolling large bright strips of plastic and placing radar beacons the pathfinders marked the entire landing zone. Transports carrying the 101^st Airborne meet lots of flak but manage to maintain formation. In Eindhoven alone more than 7,000 "Screaming Eagles" landed safely and began to move towards there objectives. In the Nijmegen sector 4,500 men of the 82^nd Airborne land around Groesbeek Heights and move towards the bridge. In Arnhem 5,200 men of the 1^st Airborne Division and most of its supplies land safely near the landing zones and Coronal Frost's battalion begins to move towards the huge Arnhem highway bridge. All over Holland German units go on alert and move towards the land areas. These include the 16^th SS panzer Grenadier Training Battalion and 9^th and 10^th SS panzer Divisions along with the garrisons of the towns and at the bridges. The American 82^nd Airborne had secured the Grave bridge one of there objectives as soon as they landed and moved on to the rest of the objectives. British XXX Corps is ambushed as it charges into enemy lines losing nine of the lead tanks and slowing the column down so that it was not on it's time table to reach Arnhem on time. The British tanks had to stop along the highway and let the infantry sweep the woods along the road for German troops. By 1330 hours the lead patrols of units of the 1^st airborne division reached Arnhem bridges and the outer limits of the city. The defense of Arnhem is provided by the 16^th SS panzer Grenadier Training Battalion under the command of SS Maj. Kraft. Overall command of all of the German troops is under Field Marshal Model commander of the German 15^th Army. British 1^st airborne troops push back Krafts forward line of defense with a hail of mortar and machine gun fire towards the bridges. The 82^nd airborne quickly captures its first objective by capturing the main bridge the XXX corps needs to reach the paratroops at Arnhem. Meanwhile, the 101^st "Screaming Eagles" landed near the Veghel and are soon in a fire fight with a company of German troops. After fighting all the way to the bridge at Son the Americans where within grenade throwing range of the bridge when the demolition charges set off by the Germans blew apart the bridge. German troops that overrun an landing zone find a briefcase in a crashed WACO glider that has complete planes for operation Market Garden, including the time table, landing zones and objectives. The German forces then decide to defend the bridges because of this. The main elements of the 1^st Airborne followed main roads and where attacked by the 16^th SS panzer Grenader Training Battalion while Col. Frost's men went down a secondary road and met no resistance. When Col. Frost's men reach the railroad bridge at Oosterbeek that is the secondary objective of the force it is blown sky high by the SS troops defending it. 1^st Airborne radios have all failed and do not work so air strikes cannot be called in on the defending German troops. Nearing darkness the 1^st Airborne troops reach Arnhem bridge and launched an attack to get to the south side. Royal Engineers with flamethrowers crossed the bridge in the dark by crawling all the way across the 2000 foot span. At the south end there was a German pillbox with a machine gun in it, using the flamethrowers the engineers set off the explosives and ammunitions the Germans had stock piled at the end of the bridge. When all of the explosives went off the 1^st airborne came charging across firing. Even though the one pill box was destroyed heavy accurate fire from the south side of the bridge drove the 1^st airborne back across the bridge. At Nijmegen the 82^nd airborne tried to move through the streets to the bridge but pinned down by German machine gun fire. By the end of the day the 101^st and the 82^nd had taken there primary objectives while the 1^st Airborne only held the north end of the Arnhem bridge. The British XXX corps had covered only half the ground that it was supposed to.

September 18, 1944

German troops arrived at Oosterbeek and attack the British landing zones where there is a stalemate with either side moving very far. At Arnhem the British 1^st attempts to rush the other end of the bridge but are driven back. Later the German troops attempted to drive trucks full of troops across the bridge but Bren guns and flamethrowers stop the trucks from reaching the other side of the bridge. German attacks continue throughout the night attempting to push the 2st airborne out of the landing zones. The British defenders hold the landing zones and force the Germans back. At 0930 SS troops attempted to drive the "lightly" armed paratroopers off of the bridge by charging across in halftracks and armored cars. With a working radio the British were able to call air burst shells in from artillery at the drop zones over the bridge destroying the armored cars. What the artillery did not get the automatic weapons and flamethrowers did. As XXX corps attempts to move out towards Eidhoven heavy fog forces them to wait for 2 hours before moving out. Just after starting to move out the lead elements of the Irish Guards runs into four German 8.8 cm Flak guns and several machine guns. The Guards attempt to call in air strikes but the Typhoon fighter-bombers are fogged in at there bases. After four hours of heavy fighting a scout unit finally makes its way behind the German positions and takes out the guns. The corps is 32 miles from Arnhem and the Son bridge is blown in its path to Arnhem. At Nijmegen, the 82^nd Airborne has captured bridges at Grave, Honihghutie and Heuman but is still fighting for the Nijmegen bridge. Out numbered five to one the 82^nd repulses attack after attack on the landing zones. Massive resupply operations begin and the 101^st and 82^nd recover most of there supplies while the British 1^st airborne is pinned down and can only recover some to the supplies.

September 19, 1944

The Polish 1^st brigade is to drop at Driel to help the 1^st Airborne but heavy fog covers all of England and the drop is canceled. The XXX Corps finally gets moving fast crossing the Bailey bridge put up by the Royal Engineers at Son and linking up with the 82^nd Airborne at Grave, but the bridge at Nijmegen is still in German control. In Arnhem, the Germans send a message to Col. Frost asking him to surrender, Col. Frost refuses. The Germans have now overrun the drop zones and most of the supplies are falling into German hands. The 82^nd Airborne with the help of XXX corps tanks maul attacking Germans and force there way forward. To capture the bridge at Nijmegen the 82^nd Airborne is to cross the 400 yard wide Waal canal and attack the bridge from both ends this is to happen early the next day. With stiff British resistance the Germans decide to level every British held building in Arnhem, soon German Tigers and other tanks roam the streets blasting buildings.

September 20, 1944

At Son the 109^th panzer Brigade makes a last attempted to capture the bridge but are beat back by XXX corps tanks and the 82^nd Airborne. At Arnhem Col. Frost's men are down to just 300 defending the bridge while the rest are casualties including Col. Frost when he is hit with shrapnel from a mortar round. The rest of the 1^st Airborne has to pull back to let the 1^st Polish Brigade get across the river to help them. At Son the bulk of the German 15^th Army has arrived and a major assault on the bridge is attempted, but they are beat back by British troops from XXX corps. At Nigmegen, the 82^nd attempt to cross the Waal river, after a devastating rocket attack by Typhoons and with artillery support they start across. German machine gun fire sinks many of the boats. But many troops make it across and capture the bridge from both ends. As XXX Corps rolls over the bridge, they are only 11 miles from Arnhem. To get to Arnhem, the troops must travel the elevated highway along what is called the Island an are to soggy off of the road for heavy armored vehicles. Without supplies and almost out of ammunition, Col. Frost's men surrender the bridge while other attempted to sneak through the German lines.

September 21, 1944

XXX Corps is only 5 miles from Arnhem when they are stopped by German anti-tank guns and are forced to wait for the road to be cleared. The 1^st Airborne is surrounded and under attack from all sides, but with fire support from XXX corps artillery they are able to hold off the Germans for a while. It is found that the only way back across the river is by the ferry , but the ferry had been set adrift by a shell. At Driel, the 1^st Polish airborne finally lands amidst machine gun fire.

September 22, 1944

At Nijmegen, XXX Corps infantry begins to move down the line towards Arnhem but are slowed by heavy German attacks and it takes them the rest of the day to battle to Oosterhout. At Veghal, the Germans make a heavy counter-attack but are forced to retreat by the 101^st Airborne.

September 23, 1944

British Troops attempt to ferry supplies across the river to the 1^st airborne by amphibious DUKW vehicles but soon all of the wheeled vehicles are bogged down and stuck in the mud on the other side. The 1^st Airborne is now surrounded and under major attack from all sides. At Ooserbeek, the German heavy Tiger heavy tanks plow down the streets trying to drive out the paratroopers with little luck. Even though the tanks have little luck the 1^st Airborne's perimeter is slowly contracting and ammunition is running low. XXX Corps moves down the corridor along the elevated highway and finally reaches Driel.

September 24, 1944

German forces receive a shipment of 60 x Tiger tanks from the Eastern front this much needed help is to force XXX corps back and stop them. A truce is held and the British wounded are evacuated by German medical units. The British 1^st Airborne was under heavy attack and any major attack would cause the entire perimeter to collapse.

September 25, 1944

It is decided to evacuate the entire 1^st Airborne across the river to the Polish lines where a few troops have managed to sneak across the river to the paratroops. Maj. Gen. Urquhart commander of the 1^st Airborne plans to sneak what is left of the division across the river at night. Some troops will stay with what is left of the machine guns and ammunition to give the appearance that the troops were not moving. These troops would then move out later that night to cross the river.

September 26, 1944

Operation Market Garden is over and of the original 10,000 man force of the 1^st Airborne there are only 2,163 men that made it back across the river to Polish lines. Overall the Allies suffer 17,000 casualties and the Germans take between 13,000 to 15,000. Overall the entire campaign was a draw; the Allies suffered a defeat but the Germans lost many units that would have been used elsewhere to lengthen the war.

General James M. Gavin

PART 1

www.youtube.com/watch?v=xtN8dl1IIHU

PART 2

www.youtube.com/watch?v=kUGEVsxDIyA

PART 3

www.youtube.com/watch?v=E1rUOsb8ShI

German Radhfahrtruppes (Bicycle-Infantry) converge on Arnhem

PART 4

www.youtube.com/watch?v=KnKZlRKxZs4

PART 5

www.youtube.com/watch?v=hHKnF-IIZe0

PART 6

www.youtube.com/watch?v=yymULFohTX0

PART 7

www.youtube.com/watch?v=ERmiGTmlXak

PART 8

www.youtube.com/watch?v=ufobpLGuldY

PART 9: Gavin's Paratroopers Take Nijmegan Bridge

www.youtube.com/watch?v=3zzZhd3waCY

PART 10: 82^nd Airborne enables British tanks to cross Nijimegan Bridge but XXX Corps Conks out and refuse to fight the last few miles to link-up with the British Paratroopers even though American paratroopers were willing to hitch a ride on back of their tanks

www.youtube.com/watch?v=LpPD1AweL3c

PART 11: British 1^st Airborne crosses Rhine back to XXX Corps Lines

www.youtube.com/watch?v=RpB4G5L11WY

Date: 22-29 December 1944
Unit: TBP
Operation: REPULSE: re-supply of Bastogne
Troopers: N/A
Country: Belgium
Drop Zone: Bastogne
Aircraft: C-47, C-46, B-24, Waco CG-1 gliders
Type Air delivery: Day/Night door and wing shackle bundle cargo drops and glider landings

Operation Repulse, which took place in Bastogne on December 27, 1944, as part of the Battle of the Bulge, glider pilots, although flying directly through enemy fire, were able to land delivering the badly needed ammunition, gasoline, and medical supplies that enabled defenders against the German offensive to persevere and secure the ultimate victory.

USAAF Troop Carrier combat emergency resupply missions to Bastogne and the Bulge, plus airlanding of 17^th Airborne troopers and their equipment near Reims as that unit was deployed into the Allied effort to reduce the German Ardennes salient. Though Troop Carrier resupply, troop unit movements, and evacuation operations had begun before and lasted longer than this period of time, it was this span of days that was designated by IX TCC as "Operation REPULSE." During these eight days IX TCC units flew 2,137 aircraft sorties and carried approximately 5,541,000 lbs of supplies. Of this, more than 2,090,000 lbs was designated for the resupply of Bastogne, while 3,200,000+ lbs accompanied the more than 11,000 troopers of the 17^th Airborne as they were brought from England to the Continent. Of the 2,137 aircraft sorties, 927 were dispatched to Bastogne between the days of 23-27 December, along with 61 gliders loaded with everything from heavy ammunition to volunteer medical teams. It was during the resupply of Bastogne that the communications and inter-unit coordination problems that had dogged Airborne-Troop Carrier operations throughout the war reached their most destructive point in the ETO. It was immediately after these operations that these problems were, for the most part, corrected.

Date: 29 November 1944 - 5 December 1944
Unit: Co.C, 127^th Abn.Eng, Bn. Co.C., 1^st Pl.., 187^th P/GIR 221^st AB. Med. Co.; 457^th PFA 11^th Abn. Div. Hdqt's Group 511^th Pcht. Signal Co. 11^th Abn. Div. RECON Pl. Jumped one man at a time onto a table top plateau, using Cub L-4's & L-5's, one C-47 made 14 passes.
Operation: Tabletop
Troopers: 241
Country: Leyte
Drop Zone: Manarawat
Aircraft: C-47, L-4, L-5
Type Air delivery: Day Mass low-level tactical personnel static-line jump, wing shackle bundle drops

Date: 3 February 1945
Unit: 511^th PIR, 457^th FABn.
Operation: Shoestring, Dropped 240 paratroop dummies (Oscar) at Mt. Malepunyo prior to main jump
Troopers: 1,830
Country: Philippines
Drop Zone: Tagaytay Ridge
Aircraft: C-47

Beautiful painting of Operation Topside by Jim Dietz

Date: 16 February 1945
Unit: 503^rd PRCT, 462^nd PFABn; 161^st Airborne Engr. Btn.
A very unique air/sea attack.
Operation: Topside
Troopers: 2,050
Country: Philippines
Dropzone: Corregidor
Aircraft: C-47

www.youtube.com/watch?v=_BI7m2hrkCw

www.youtube.com/watch?v=AuOQyrgM0CU

On February 16, 1945, Paratroopers of the 503^rd Parachute Combat Team, commanded by Colonel George M. Jones, parachuted onto the tiny island of Corregidor at the mouth of Manila Bay in the Philippines and which had been held by an entrenched Japanese force since mid-1942. It had taken the Japanese five months to subdue the American "Battling Bastards of Bataan" who defended the island fortress back in 1942. U.S. Sixth Army estimated approximately 600 Japanese defenders on the island, but in fact the number was closer to 5,000-all serving under the edict that they would defend the island to the death. As Allied forces converged from the south and north on Manila, AAF units and navy guns made it clear to the Japanese on Corregidor that they would soon be the target of an invasion. Now the Japanese diehards who held the island were to be overwhelmed by a combined parachute-amphibious assault by the Americans to retake the island. The defenders, led by Capt. Ijn Itagaki, prepared for an Allied amphibious assault on the island's low east end. He established his forces in the steep crags and crevices leading up to the island's 500 ft. heights on the west end, known as "Topside," which is where he set up his CP. The Japanese command did not prepare for an airborne assault as the small, rocky island did not appear to have any feasible DZs. The 503^rd Parachute Regimental Combat Team developed a plan, however, that proved otherwise. It was a risky plan, but the defenders of the island were at such an advantage over amphibious assault forces that U.S. Sixth Army CG Walter Krueger agreed to the airborne assault. In command was Col. George M. Jones, 503^rd CO, who for this mission would also have the use of the 3^rd Battalion of the 34^th Infantry Division, Sixth Army. Jones picked out two small locations: the Topside parade ground, 1,500' by 450', and the golf course, 1,500' by 200'. The area was so small that only a handful of troopers could jump at a time and Troop Carrier crews would have to make three or four passes each to jump a full stick. The Troop Carrier outfit that would fly the mission was Col. John H. Lackey's 317^th Group, which had at its disposal a total of 51 x C-47s, and could deliver only one battalion at a time, in two parallel columns (one to each DZ) with a five-hour turnaround between drops. Jones scheduled his 3^rd Bn drop at 0830 on 16 February to allow for a heavy round of aerial attacks on the island's high-ground defenses. The jump would be followed two hours later by an amphibious assault by 3^rd Bn of the 34^th Division; three hours later, the 2^nd Bn of the 503^rd would come in by air, thus placing 3,000 men on the island on D-Day. The 503^rd's 1^st Bn would follow on D-plus-1. In the days prior to the 16th, the island took a tremendous aerial pounding, and Japanese communications link-ups were destroyed. On D-Day, Jones rode with Col. Lackey, and prepared to make adjustments to the delicate timing required to make this mission work. The first jumpers were hit by unexpected winds and missed the DZs. Jones, in the course of two more passes, adjusted the jump altitude and delayed the jump by 14 seconds until troopers were landing exactly on target. Adjustments were conveyed through Troop Carrier crews to individual jumpmasters. Col. Jones jumped on Lackey's final pass. After a heavy naval and aerial bombardment, the initial serial of C-47s from the 317^th Troop Carrier Group, commanded by Colonel Jack Lackey, began dropping Paratroopers at 0830 in the morning on the parade ground and golf course on the highest point of the island designated as "Topside" drop zone. Due to the small size of the drop zone, the Paratroopers jumped in six-man sticks at an altitude of 500 feet above the drop zone. The Paratroopers made bone-crushing landings amid the rocks and broken trees of the rugged island. Many were blown off the edge of the drop zone to become hung on the cliffs below. As it turned out, the first troopers who missed the golf course landed near Capt. Itagaki's CP, and Itagaki was killed by a hand grenade. Within minutes of the initial drop, the Japanese commander on Corregidor, Captain Itagaki, and his entire staff were killed in their headquarters. The Japanese defenders, victims of a well-coordinated surprise attack, had lost their commander, the high ground, and all communications. Though fighting was intense because of the fervor of the defenders, the outcome was never in doubt. Supported by the Paratroopers on top of the island, the first four waves of amphibious infantry from the 34^th Infantry Regiment of the 24^th Infantry Division landed on Black Beach below unopposed. The Japanese were taken completely by surprise. At 12:40 the same day, a second serial of Paratroopers began jumping. By the end of the day, Colonel Jones was in control of the top of the island and cancelled the last parachute jump scheduled for the following morning. His last battalion came ashore by landing craft instead on February 17th. In spite of the success in getting onto the island fortress, the Japanese fought back fiercely from caves and in banzai charges. On February 27th, the last tip of the island was cleared and all organized resistance ceased on Corregidor. After 10 days of mopping up, the Japanese dead numbered 4,506, with 51 prisoners. Hundreds more had been blown up or burned up, or were sealed in the island's many tunnels and caves. The 503d RCT suffered 197 killed and 1,022 wounded.

Los Banos: More Proof that Airborne + Armor (amphibious) Fight Well Together

Date: 23 February 1945
Unit: 511^th Parachute Infantry Regiment: 1^st Btn., Co.B; Hdqt's Co., 1^st Btn.; Hdqt's Co., 1^st Btn., Light Machine Gun Platoon Operation: Rescue (2,147 internees)
Troopers: 130
Country: Philippines
Dropzone: Los Banos Prison Camp
Aircraft: C-47

--U.S. Army General Colin Powell

As American troops retook the Philippine Islands, retreating Japanese forces carried out several massacres of civilians and Allied prisoners. Gen. Douglas MacArthur became increasingly concerned that the Japanese would slaughter the more than 2,000 prisoners held at the Los Banos internment camp, 20 miles south of Manila. So, in February 1945 he told Gen. Joe Swing, commander of the 11^th Airborne Division, to rescue the civilian prisoners as soon as possible.

Swing assigned the mission to Col. Robert Soule and his 188^th Glider Infantry Regiment. Soule picked Maj. Henry Burgess and the 1^st Battalion of the 511^th Parachute Infantry Regiment to conduct the actual prisoner-liberation raid. As late as Feb. 18, Burgess and his 412 men were still involved in heavy fighting and did not even know Los Banos existed. Within five days they would be in and out of the objective after executing one of the most successful raids of the Pacific war, perhaps THE most successful raid in American military history..

Burgess' summary of the available intelligence on Los Banos was simply that "there wasn't much" to go on. Lt. George Skau and the division reconnaissance platoon had been operating behind the Japanese lines for four days and had gathered some information but simply not enough. On Feb. 19, however, the raid's planners received an unexpected windfall when Pete Miles, a civilian engineer who had previously worked for the Army, reported to division headquarters after having escaped from Los Banos the day before.

Miles had a wealth of information about the camp's routine, including the revelation that only those Japanese actually on guard duty were armed.

With this key bit of information, the rescue plan was finalized by Feb. 21. To catch the off-duty guards in the middle of their exercise period, the mission would begin at 0700 on Feb. 23 with Skau's platoon and a group of Filipino guerillas killing the guards on duty. At the same time, Lt. John Ringler's Co. "B" and Lt. Bill Hettinger's machine-gun platoon would land on a small drop zone next to the compound. Once on the ground, the paratroopers would race across the camp to the weapons rack hoping to arrive before the off-duty guards could react.

Earlier, at 0400, the rest of the battalion would board 54 x LVT-4 amphibious tractors or "amtracks," slip into Laguna de Bay and head for Maycndon Point, two miles north of the prison camp. The force would reach the landing point at 0700, secure a beachhead, and continue to the prison in the amtracks.

On top of all this, Soule would lead a diversionary attack consisting of the 118^th GIR's HHC and 1^st Bn., Co. "B" of the 637^th Tank Destroyer Bn. and elements of the 472^nd and 675^th Field Artillery Bns. This force would move from Manila toward Mamatid to hold the Japanese 8^th Div. in its positions.

On the morning of Feb. 23, the raid got off to a good start. Skau's platoon had marked the DZ with colored smoke, and the jump was nearly perfect.

As the Paratroopers descended, Skau's men neutralized the perimeter guards. Caught completely by surprise, the off-duty guards milled around in confusion. By the time they realized what was happening, it was too late. Ringler's men had already beaten them to the weapons rack.

Burgess' amtrac force was also having success. On reaching the compound, the lead vehicle smashed through the gate and the others followed. Lt. Tom Mesereau positioned his Co. C to block any Japanese reinforcements. All was going according to plan.

The only snag in the operation was convincing the internees that the rescue was real. Ringler reported to Burgess, "My men can't get the people to head for the loading area. Most of them are cowering in their shacks and barracks. ... It's chaos!"

Burgess had the answer. The fire that had been started in the initial firefight was spreading toward the amtracks parked near the guards' barracks and camp headquarters; internees were rushing to the amtracks ahead of the flames. Burgess told Ringler to go to the south side of the camp, upwind, and torch the other barracks with the hopes of having a similar effect.

Burgess later said the results were "spectacular. Internees poured ... into the loading area. Troops started clearing the barracks in advance of the fire and carried out ... over 130 people who were too weak or too sick to walk." By 1130 the camp was in flames, but the evacuation was complete.

However, time was still critical. Mesereau and his company had made contact with an enemy company, and there were indications that a much larger Japanese force was close behind. The first shuttle of about 1,500 internees and accompanying guards had left the beach at about 1000.

Burgess had the rest of his battalion and the reconnaissance platoon in a defensive perimeter on the beachhead and about 700 internees still waiting for evacuation. After completing their first round trip, the amtracs returned to the beachhead, and by about 1500 all personnel were on board and underway. By this time, the Japanese had closed in and were beginning to find their range, but the amtracs had the head start they needed and escaped in the nick of time.

The raid had been a tremendous success. To reach their objective the 11^th Abn. Div. had moved some 25 miles behind enemy lines by air, sea and land. In the process they had rescued 2,122 prisoners (16 marines who surrender early in the war), destroyed a Japanese camp, and killed at least 70 enemy troops. Only three 11^th Abn. Div. Soldiers and two guerrillas were killed. The only casualty among the inmates was one woman, who was grazed by a bullet.

www.thedropzone.org/pacific/Ringler.html

THE LOS BANOS RAID

by John M. Ringler

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Mission

The Company "B" mission was only one part of the over-all operation. I was in command of Company "B" since mid-January, 1945, which gave minimum time to become acquainted with all the personnel in a new unit in combat. We were pulled off the front line on 21 February, 1945 for the Los Banos mission on the 23rd of February.

Prior to this operation, it was the battalion commander who assigned the day's operation or mission to his company commanders. For this operation, Lt. Col. Edward H. Lahti, the Regimental Commander, arrived at my company CP, as we were fighting for Fort McKinley. He stated, "You will report to the Division Commanding General and I will take you there." A thousand things can race through your mind as to what I or the company did since our 3 Feb. 511^th RCT jump on Tagaytay Ridge that the Div. CG is directing my presence. At this time, I had not heard anything about Los Banos. The Regt. CO stated that he didn't know why the CG wanted me.

Upon arrival at the Div CP, the G-2 and G-3 met Lt. Col. Lahti and myself. They directed us to Major General Swing's office, where I reported as directed. It was at this time that the CG informed me that "B" Company would jump on Los Banos to rescue the internees from the Japanese prison camp. He commented that we could take heavy losses of troops and internees if we were not successful. After discussing the major points of the operation, the CG asked if there were any questions. I had none at the time and was unaware that other units would have a major role in the operation.

The Briefing

The CG then directed the G-2 and G-3 to provide a complete briefing on the information they had available to them. It was at this time that I was informed of the other elements that would make up the task force to accomplish the mission. As the airborne commander, I was permitted to select my own drop zone from the photos that the G-2 and G-3 provided. They also provided a very detailed and complete intelligence summary on the enemy gun positions, diagrams of the camp facilities and a daily routine of activities of the Japanese guards. This information, which was very vital, was provided by Peter Miles, an American internee who escaped from the prison camp a few days earlier. After many hours of briefing and planning, I returned to my unit, which had already been relieved from the front line action. After discussions with the Ist Bn. CO Major Henry Burgess, he attached the Hq. Co. Light Machine Gun platoon, under the command of Lt. Walter Hettlinger, to "B" Company to provide extra manpower and firepower. The company only had a strength of 80 plus personnel prior to the reinforcement.

I was briefed that the 1^st Bn., (minus "B" Company), with attached units, would travel by Amtrack across the lake (Laguna de Bay). The 88^th Glider Infantry Regiment (minus its 2^nd Bn) would establish the diversionary force to hold the enemy in their positions. The Filipino guerrilla force would outpost the outer edge of the prison camp to prevent any possible escape of the Japanese force. "B" Company, plus the LMG platoon, would revert to control of the 1^st Bn. CO, upon their arrival at the camp. The Division Reconnaissance Platoon would complete all prior reconnaissance of the camp area and be in position to attack the enemy positions upon the opening of the first parachute at 0700. Lack of sufficient winds on the Laguna de Bay caused considerable problems for the Recon platoon in their water crossing, which delayed, but did not prevent, their movement to their objective areas.

My plan was to drop at a low altitude, and as close as possible outside the camp to surprise the Japanese garrison, and to avoid a concentration of enemy ground fire. The three rifle platoons would assemble on their own leaders and move directly to their objective areas to engage the enemy. The platoon leaders were briefed on their area of responsibility, and they in turn briefed their men. On the afternoon of 21 Feb., I assigned Lt. Roger Miller, with two enlisted men, to make a reconnaissance of the drop zone with the Recon Platoon and then return to the unit for debriefing and to jump with the company.

The Jump

We spent the night of 22 Feb. at Nichols Field. There was no moon. The sky was clear in the predawn, as we put on full combat equipment, then our parachutes, and loaded with our crew-served weapon bundles into nine C-47s, under the command of Major Don Anderson, 75^th Troop Carrier Squadron. The short flight in tight formation was unopposed by Japanese fighter planes or antiaircraft fire. As we approached the drop zone, smoke was visible. I was jumpmaster of the lead aircraft. At dawn, 0700 hours, we jumped and all landed on the DZ without casualties.

Due to weather conditions, Lt. Miller and the men were not able to return for the jump. They rejoined the company at the drop zone. It was our own "B" Company men who released the smoke grenades as the planes approached the DZ. The Recon Platoon, although encountering difficulty, was able to arrive at their assigned target areas to engage the enemy gun positions. The enemy was initiany concentrating on the action from the Recon. Platoon, which permitted "B" Company to assemble and rapidly move into the prison camp.

After a rapid assembly, there was only minor enemy resistance, which was eliminated. Upon our arrival inside the camp, the internees were very jubilant and excited as to the events taking place. After a rapid survey of the situation, our company started to assemble the internees for a rapid movement out of the camp. With over two thousand individuals, this became a turbulent mass of human beings. Trying to control them and keeping them in one place was almost impossible. It was at this time that some yelled, "Enemy tanks." We had to react to the alert to defend against possible attack. The noise that the individual heard was the Amtracs headed to our positions. Another problem occurred. Many of the internees did not want to leave their huts, or were returning to retrieve items left behind. To overcome this problem, I had Lt. Hettlinger take a detail and torch all of the huts. The arrival of the Amtracs again caused mass confusion in trying to control the internees.

The Liberation

After the first Amtracks were loaded with the disabled, along with women and children, we were able to assemble all the remaining internees into a walking column, and head for the Mayondon beach area. As our unit guarded the moving internee column, we heard distant firing, indicating the enemy was probably sending elements to engage our troops. The battalion commander was successful in his decisive action to evacuate all of the internees and troops via the lake; thereby, saving the possibility of receiving heavy casualties, if we had attempted to fight our way through the enemy lines. All troops and the 2,147 men, women, children internee prisoners, including a few U.S. Navy nurses POW, arrived safely near Mamatid village, the original embarkation point for the Amtracs on the shore of Laguna de Bay.

For this mission, I made a decision to jump at a much lower altitude than the normal 1,000 feet. This low altitude gave us less exposure to enemy fire and permitted a rapid assembly. Prior to this mission, each of the platoons had a Filipino lad with them for carrying ammunition, and they wanted to make the jump. After approving this request of the NCOs, they gave the three lads a quick course in proper parachute landing positions. I was not worried about them getting out of the C-47 aircraft, for I knew the NCOs would take care of it. If I had to make that decision other than during combat condition, I would not have given approval.

This operation was successful due to the efforts of all units that participated. Failure on any one unit's part could have meant serious loss of lives for the internees, the guerrilla force and our own troops. This entire operation was completed on verbal orders. The written orders came after completion of the mission.

One point of the operation that I have never understood is how could you have over two thousand persons in the target area and live fire coming in from four sides and yet not have a casualty within the camp. It is actions like this that makes us think of who controls our destiny.

Courtesy of "WINDS ALOFT" Quarterly publication of the 511^th Parachute Infantry Association

NEW! HISTORY CHANNEL TV DOCUMENTARY

Rescue at Dawn: The Los Banos Raid

Brandishing the stealth and cunning of a modern-day Special Forces operation, the Los Banos raid is regarded as the most successful Airborne raid of all time. On February 23, 1945, a combined force of U.S. Paratroopers, Filipino guerrillas, and amphibious tanks liberated over 2,000 POWs who faced a potential massacre by their Japanese captors. In this 2-hour special, we return to the Los Banos Prison Camp with four Soldiers who took part in the rescue and one of the liberated prisoners.

Date: 24 March 1945
Unit: 17^th Airborne Division (507^th PIR, 513^th PIR, 464^th PFA, 466^th PFA, 139^th AEB, 224^th AMC, 155^th AAB, 411^th AQM, 517^th ASC, 680^th GFA, 681^th GFA, 717^th AOC & 194^th GIR). Also small units: MP's, Division Artillery, Reconnaissance Platoon, & Parachute Maintenance Co.
Operation: Varsity
Troopers: 4,964
Country: Germany
Dropzone: Wesel
Aircraft: C-47, C-46 Commando
, CG-1 Gliders Type Air delivery: Day Mass low-level tactical personnel static-line jump, wing shackle bundle drops, Gliders

www.standto.com/airborne/rhine.html

The Rhine Crossing

After the Allies stooped the Ardennes Offensive in January 1945, they began to push forward again towards the fronteir of Germany itself. By March, the 21^st Army Group under Field Marshall Montgomory's command was facing the last obstacle into Germany, the Rhine River. The operation planned for the crossing of the Rhine was called "Operation Plunderer" and the Airborne element of it was called "Operation Varsity". The 1^st Canadian Parachute Battalion, was part of the 3^rd Parachute Brigade of the British 6^th Airborne Division in the XVIII Airborne Corps.

The Plan

This operation was different from most of the Allied Airborne Operations that preceded it. The lessons learned at Arnhem months earlier were taken into account during the planning of Operation Varsity. This would be a daylight drop to increase the chances of the pilots finding the proper Drop Zones. The area would be subjected to an intense bombing and artillery campaign prior to the drop. Link-up with ground forces was scheduled for the end of the first day. The Airborne Force would be within reach of the ground force's artillery and could call on it for support. Unlike previous operations, the Paratroops would be used as a tactical rather than a strategic force. The amphibious crossing would take place before the drop. The role of the Airborne Forces would be to seize and hold vital high ground overlooking the river and prevent enemy reinforcements from reaching the bridgehead.

1 CAN PARA

As part of the 3^rd Para Bde, the Canadians would drop on the west side of a high wooded feature known as the Diersfordter Wald. The entire 2200 men of the Brigade were to be put down on a 800x1000 yard Drop Zone within 6 minutes. The first task would be to secure the DZ and then to gain a hold in the woods. the British 8^th Bn was assigned the north end, the British 9^th Bn would take the south end and the 1^st Canadian Parachute Battalion would capture the center including the woodline, a road and some houses towards the south of their objective. The Commanding Officer, LCol J. A. Nicklin, assigned "C" Coy to clear the northern part of the objective near the road junction. Afterwards, "A" Coy would pass through and clear the houses while "B" Coy cleared the western part of the woods and provided flank protection.

The Drop

The 1^st Canadian Parachute Battalion arose at 0200 hrs and began their preparations. They emplaned at Chipping Ongar Airfield in England at 0730 hrs on March 24th, 1945. The weather was clear and the flight took just over two hours. The Air Force provided cover for the transport planes by supressing the flak batteries and keeping enemy fighter aircraft out of the area. On the ground, the German 7^th Parachute Division were expecting an Airborne Assault as part of the Rhine crossing but they did not expect it would come after the Amphibious Assault. Most of the jumpers landed on the Drop Zone which was right next to the objective. Many of them had holes shot through their canopys during their descent. Some landed in the trees on top of the German positions. The LCol Nicklin landed in the trees directly above an enemy machine gun nest and was killed in action. Major G. Fraser Eadie assumed command and led the battalion during the operation and for the rest of the war.

With the enemy so close, the companies found themselves in action as they landed. Clearing the Drop Zone was a task for the 8^th Bn but it was not complete when the Canadians landed so they had to fight their way off the DZ. There are many stories of close calls and acts of bravery from the men who were trying to assemble into their companies. Although the fighting was intense in many areas the companies managed to take their objectives by about noon and began consolidating their positions. The plan had work well. Now the Paratroopers had to hold-on until the ground forces linked-up later that night. There were counter attacks by the enemy but none were successful. Fighting continued through the day but the intensity diminished. A re-supply air drop came in at 1500 hrs with more ammunition. By late afternoon reconnaisance elements of the 15^th Scottish Division had made contact and at 0800 hrs the next morning 2^nd Army infantry units moved into the position.

Cpl Fred Topham, V.C.

On 24th March 1945, Corporal Topham, a medical orderly, parachuted with 1^st Canadian Parachute Battalion onto a strongly defended area east of the Rhine. At about 1100 hours, whilst treating casualties sustained in the drop, a cry for help came from a wounded man in the open. Two medical orderlies from a field ambulance went out to this man in succession, but both were killed as they knelt beside the casualty. Without hesitation and on his own initiative, Corporal Topham went forward through intense fire to replace the orderlies who had been killed before his eyes. As he worked on the wounded man he was himself shot through the nose. In spite of severe bleeding and intense pain, he never faltered in his task. Having completed immediate first aid, he carried the wounded man steadily and slowly back through continuous fire to the shelter of a wood.

During the next two hours Corporal Topham refused all offers of medical help for his own wound. He worked most devotedly throughout this period to bring in the wounded, showing complete disregard for the heavy and accurate enemy fire. It was only when all casualties had been cleared that he consented to his own wound being treated.

His immediate evacuation was ordered, but he interceded so earnestly on his own behalf that he was eventually allowed to return to duty.

On his way back to his company he came across a Bren gun carrier, which had received a direct hit. Enemy mortar bombs were still dropping around, the carrier itself was burning fiercely and its own mortar ammunition was exploding. An experienced officer on the spot had warned all not to approach the carrier. Corporal Topham, however, immediately went out alone in spite of the blasting ammunition and enemy fire, and rescued the three occupants of the carrier. He brought these men back across the open, and although one died almost immediately afterwards, he arranged for the evacuation of the other two, who undoubtedly owe their lives to him.

This N.C.O. showed sustained gallantry of the highest order. For six hours, most of the time in great pain, he performed a series of acts of outstanding bravery, and his magnificent and selfless courage inspired all those who witnessed it.

Lessons Learned

This operation went very well. Many of the men who were there talk about it as an example of what Airborne troops can do when proper planning is done. The lessons learned from previous operations were addressed here and it paid off in the overall success of the mission. The American 17^th Airborne Division, who were operating to the south of the British, learned a hard lesson about their new C-46 Commando aircraft. It had been designed as a jump plane with two rear doors to speed up the exits and keep the troops closer together on the ground. Unfortunately, the wing fuel tanks were not self sealing and that made them vulnerable to ground fire. Of the 72 x C-46s used in the drop, 22 were shot down and another 38 were damaged. Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway, the Commander of XVIII Airborne Corps, refused to allow the C-46 to be used for Airborne Operations after this disaster.

Date: 23 June 1945
Unit: 511^th PIR
Operation: Gypsy
Troopers: 1,030
Country: Philippines
Dropzone: Aparri
Aircraft: C-47

Late Summer 1944 through Mid-Spring 1945: Air Supply, Evacuation, Transport, and Repatriation.

www.youtube.com/watch?v=1f5qK-HwbTc

On most days and many nights when IX TCC outfits were not involved in airborne assault missions and training, units were fully occupied by tasks that included hauling gasoline, ammunition, and other supplies and equipment to the armored columns that led the Allied ground advance. On return trips these units often carried medical evacuees from the Front, and later in the war, returning POWs. In between these flights came the routine transport duties, as well as unit movement by air of various military outfits. Competition for Troop Carrier services was fierce as some ground commanders, unable to obtain necessary resupply by ground, tried to gain access to these highly mobile resources, even at the sacrifice of airborne operations. Though IX TCC records are admittedly incomplete with regard to the proportions of these "other" missions, the statistics that we have gathered provide insight into the proportions of this "double-duty." In 1944, IX TCC estimated that its units hauled 242,024,000 lbs of total freight (including gasoline, ammunition, and vehicles), carried 200,676 airborne and glider-borne passengers on missions and training flights combined, evacuated 125,009 patients, transported 132,366 passengers, and moved 41,965 troops in units. Note that the C-47 had a maximum allowed payload of 5,850 lbs, though they often carried more. Between 1 January and 10 May 1945, IX TCC estimated that units hauled 173,622,400 lbs of freight, including 12,929,212 gallons of gasoline. During April's critical push into Germany by armored columns, monthly totals added up to a staggering 118,793,000 lbs of freight and 10,255,509 gallons of gasoline delivered on 20,979 TC sorties. During these critical last months of the war, IX TCC crews flew 128,449 medical evacuees from the Front to rear areas, and in the last month-and-a-half of the war, evacuated over 165,000 POWs.

Date: 2 May 1945
Unit: M Section, British Naval Intelligence, Selected British Royal Marine Commandos, German Freedom Fighters
Operation: JAMES BOND
Troopers: 150
Country: Berlin, Nazi Germany
Drop Zone: DZ Lake Muggelsee
Aircraft: RAF C-47 Dakotas, Wellington bombers
Equipment/supplies air-delivered: Folding kayaks, radios, demolitions, Lee-Enfield .303 rifles, Thompson .45 Sub-Machine Guns (SMGs), .38 and .45 ACP pistols, Sykes-Fairbairn knives
Type Air delivery: Night, Mass low-level tactical personnel static-line water jump

This daring RAPWI operation lead by Commander Ian Fleming and his 2IC Lieutenant Commander Christopher Creighton resulted in the capture of defacto Nazi Germany ruler, Martin Bormann in exchange for at least $1 Billion in stolen loot and the deception of his death by sacrifice of a doppelganger is detailed in the book OPJB: The Last Great Secret of the Second World War and verified in Mike Sparks' new book, James Bond is Real: The Untold Story of the Civil-Military Secrets Ian Fleming Warned Us About.

youtube.com/watch?v=hh5gZmdjixw

A documentary is being produced of this event.

youtube.com/watch?v=CpIt1chVfZQ

Korean War: Army Paratroops & Korean Spies

OVER ENEMY TERRITORY IN KOREA -- One of the nine missions assigned to the 315^th Air Division (Combat Cargo) is the dropping of Paratroopers in airborne assaults. Far East Air Forces Combat Cargo has participated in two such combat assaults: at Sukchon-Sunchon, Korea, in October 1950 and at Munsan-ni in March 1951. Chutes billow out as troopers of the U.S. Army 187^th Regimental Combat Team jump from a formation of U.S. Air Force C-46 "Commandos." While airborne assaults took place, other Combat Cargo planes continued the other missions assigned to the 315^th Air Division. Besides airborne operations, FEAF Combat Cargo planes have airlifted more than 1,100,000 passengers and 400,000 tons of cargo on the Korean airlift. (circa March 1952)

Paratroopers of the 187^th Regimental Combat Team put on parachutes and "Mae West" life preservers before boarding a 483^rd Troop Carrier Wing U.S. Air Force C-119 "Flying Boxcar," en route to Korea from southern Japan. (Circa July 2, 1953)

Battle-equipped Paratroopers of the 187^th Regimental Combat Team wait to board C-46s of the 315^th Combat Cargo Group prior to take-off on an airborne assault mission somewhere in Korea. (circa June 20, 1953)

Date: 20 October 1950
Unit: 187^th ARCT, 2^nd Battalion
Operation: DZ Easy
Troopers: 1,203
Country: Korea
Dropzone: Sukchon
Aircraft: C-119 Flying Boxcar Equipment/supplies air-delivered: Gun jeeps, 105mm artillery pieces
Type Air delivery: Day Mass low-level tactical personnel static-line jump, platform Heavy drop

Animated jumper exiting C-119

Date: 21 October 1950
Unit: 187^th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (ARCT) of the 11^th Airborne Division.
Operation: DZ William
Troopers: 671
Country: Korea
Dropzone: Sukchon
Aircraft: 113 x C-46s and C-119 Flying Boxcars
Equipment/supplies air-delivered: Gun jeeps, 90mm, 105mm artillery pieces
Type Air delivery: Day Mass low-level tactical personnel static-line jump, platform Heavy drop

The C-119's first combat mission included a cooperative airdrop with C-46s on 20 October 1950, when 2,860 Army paratroops and 300 tons of supplies were dropped at Sukchon during the drive to Pyongyang in North Korea. General MacArthur planned to employ the airborne troops of the 187^th Airborne Regiment in a drop north of P'yongyang in an attempt to cut off North Korean officials and enemy troops, and to rescue American prisoners of war who it was assumed would be evacuated northward when the fall of the North Korean capital seemed imminent. MacArthur set the airdrop for the morning of 20 October 1950. The regiment loaded into 113 planes, C-119's and C-46's of the 314^th and 21^st Troop Carrier Squadrons based in Japan. This flight carried about 2,800 men. The planes were crowded-a typical C-119 carried 46 men in 2 sticks of 23 men each, 15 monorail bundles, and 4 door bundles. Each man had a main parachute, a .45 caliber pistol, and a carbine or M1 Garands 7.62mm x 82mm rifle. After the troop drop came that of the heavy equipment-equipment organic to an airborne infantry regiment, including jeeps, 90mm towed antitank guns, 105mm howitzers, and a mobile radio transmission set equivalent in weight to a 2 1/2-ton truck. Seven 105mm howitzers of the 674^th Field Artillery Battalion and 1,125 rounds of ammunition were in the drop. Six of the howitzers were recovered in usable condition. This was the first time heavy equipment had been dropped in combat, and it was the first time C-119'S had been used in a combat parachute operation.

Date: December 1950
Unit: USAF MATS 314^th Troop Carrier Squadron
Operation: Save the Asses of the Ungrateful, incompetent marine egomaniacs
Troopers: N/A
Country: Korea
Dropzone: Koto-Ri
Aircraft: C-119 Flying Boxcar
Type Air delivery: Platform Heavy drop Equipment/supplies air-delivered: Bailey Bridge sections to construct complete bridge across mountain gorge to rescue trapped marines

The C-119's greatest feat during the Korean War, however, was a mission to aid the retreat of U.S. marine corps from Chosin in December 1950. During this unprecedented mission, the 314^th successfully dropped eight 2,500-pound bridge sections, each measuring 16 x 5 feet. The assembled bridge allowed the troops to span a deep gorge that was blocking their only escape route. In December 1950 two Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) divisions, numbering over 300,000 men, entered Korea practically undetected and began closing the jaws of a giant trap. Air Force C-119 "Flying Boxcars" dropped supplies to the marines, but on 7 and 8 December the Chinese closed the sack by blowing the bridge across an otherwise impassible 1,500-foot-wide gorge south of Koto-ri. Without help, the marines would be forced to leave behind their heavy equipment and make it out on foot, a trek many of the wounded and frostbitten would not survive. [What? real marines don't need vehicles, these are pussies thus saith usmc narcissism] Air Force C-119s again answered the call and dropped eight two-ton spans of a treadway bridge for marine engineers, who kept the column moving by bridging the gap.

www.qmfound.com/riggers.htm

Chosion Reservoir Bridge Drop

Perhaps the most famous drop was the first ever airdrop of an M-2 treadway bridge, at Koto-Ri on 7 December 1950. Communist forces had surrounded parts of the 7^th Infantry Division and the 1^st marine division near the Chosion Reservoir. The Chinese had demolished part of a mountain road over an impassable ravine to their rear, blocking withdrawal by vehicle. The 8081^st dropped 1,571 tons of supplies to sustain these 20,000 men from 29 November to 9 December 1950. In an effort to provide an escape route the 8081^st constructed platforms for and rigged eight sections of an M-2 bridge that was at Yon-Po airstrip. The next day eight C-119s lifted off, each carrying a 4,500 lbs section of the bridge. In the air the Quartermaster Dropmasters extended the bridge sections 8 feet out of the rear of the aircraft to cut down the ejection time and increase drop accuracy. Dropping into an area only a few hundred feet long, the bridge sections arrived intact, testimony to the skill of the riggers of the 8081^st. The marines assembled the bridge which undoubtedly saved lives. This drop showed the high degree of improvisation, speed and ingenuity of the company. One Soldier interpreted the marines' opinion after the drop: "When it comes to handing out plaudits to the Army the marines generally change the conversation to the Halls of Montezuma or talk about the weather. But if the talk gets around to the day the Army's Paratrooper Quartermasters airmailed them a bridge, the song is a lot sweeter."

"The airdrops were a godsend."

- Marine Sgt. Lee Bergee, a survivor of the Chosin Retreat

Notice the marine asshole didn't thank the USAF for dropping the bridge or the us Army for rigging the sections so they could be parachute dropped, without just one of these elements and the marine egomaniac would be TALKING TO God instead of abusing his name to avoid having to give credit to the Air Force/Army who saved his ass.

Date: 23 March 1951
Unit: 187^th ARCT 2^nd of the 11^th Airborne Division & 4^th, Airborne Ranger Co's.
Operation: Courageous & Tomahawk
Troopers: 3,486
Country: Korea
Dropzone: Munsan-Ni
Aircraft: C-119 Flying Boxcar
Equipment/supplies air-delivered: Gun jeeps, 105mm howitzers
Type Air delivery: Day Mass low-level tactical personnel static-line jump, platform Heavy drop

Synopsis:

Following the recapture of Seoul, Communist forces retreated northward. Operation COURAGEOUS was designed to trap large Chinese and North Korean forces in the area between the Han and Imjin Rivers north of Seoul, opposite I Corps. The operation featured a parachute drop by the 187^th Airborne RCT onto the south bank of the Imjin River near Munsan-ni, twenty miles north of the current front line, and a rapid advance by an armored task force. Both the airborne drop, which used over a hundred C-119 Flying Boxcar transport aircraft, and the armored movement were successfully executed. The drop took place on 22 March 1951, and Task Force Growdon (made up of armored elements from the U.S. 24^th Infantry Division's 6^th Medium Tank Battalion, borrowed from IX Corps, and infantry elements from the U.S. 3^rd Infantry Division) linked up with the Paratroopers on the twenty-third. The 187^th faced only weak resistance, and the armored task force faced primarily minefields rather than active defenses. However, once again Communist forces withdrew more rapidly than the UN forces could advance to trap them.

Korean War Air-Mech-Strike: Combat Jump at Munsan-Ni

3D Maneuver by Paratroopers at Munsan-Ni Followed by 2D Maneuver by Tanks: the U.S. Army Can-Do This

LTG Matthew Ridgway, U.S. Army

www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,814500,00.html?promoid=googlep

Again at the Parallel

Monday, Apr. 02, 1951

The Eighth Army pushed slowly and methodically along the roads and over the ridge tops on the way back to the 38^th parallel. Lieut. General Matthew Ridgway's men prudently refrained from pursuing the enemy pell-mell, painstakingly mopped up his rearguard elements.

The fight for "Tombstone Hill," rising 1,200 feet from a valley on the central front, was typical. A North Korean rearguard clung to its one-man pillboxes studding Tombstone's flank. The fortifications were foxholes, each roofed over by a three-foot layer of logs, stones and earth. Each man inside had plenty of ammo and a two days' bag of rice. U.S. marine Corsairs blasted Tombstone with rockets, seared it with napalm. Shell bursts enveloped it. G.I.s crawled up, peppering the enemy's pillboxes with small-arms fire. Those who survived held off the U.N. attack for two days, then slipped away under cover of night.

A fleet of Flying Boxcars and C-46s dropped some 3,300 Paratroopers of the 187^th Regimental Combat Team (11^th Airborne Division), plus attached Rangers, on the flatlands around Munsan, 22 miles northwest of Seoul and twelve miles below the 38^th parallel.

Under Brigadier General Frank S. Bowen Jr., it was the second and biggest paradrop of the Korean war; the first took place last October north of Pyongyang (TIME, Oct. 30).

The 187^th quickly seized its objective: a clump of hills dominating what was thought to be the escape route for the retreating Reds.

"The purpose of this operation is to kill the enemy," reiterated General Ridgway, who followed the Paratroopers in a light plane. But Bowen's men found their quarry had slipped out of the trap. Instead of 60,000 Communists, they found less than 20,000.

Paratroopers capture Well-Camouflaged, North Korean Rear Guards

A few hours after the drop, U.N. tank-led task columns from Uijongbu linked up with the chutists.

www.combatreform.org/FM_17_10_Armored_Force_Field_Manual_Tactics_and_Tech1942.pdf

FM 17-18 ARMORED FORCE FIELD MANUAL

17. AVIATION.-a. The role of aviation attached to or operating in support of armored force units, its characteristics, and tactical and technical employment are given in FM 1-5, 1-20, and 100-5.

b. Corps headquarters contain an aviation section that acts in an advisory and technical capacity for the corps commander and coordinates operations of attached or supporting observation and combat aviation.

c. (1) An observation squadron is attached to the armored division. It is equipped both with airplanes of high speed and sufficient range to reconnoiter the area essential to armored operations and with airplanes capable of operation from advanced landing fields.

(2) Observation aviation performs distant and battle reconnaissance (including artillery adjustment), liaison, command, and photographic missions.

Page 11

d. Combat aviation is made available by GHQ. It is employed against targets which cannot be engaged effectively by available ground weapons within the time required and supplements or extends the range of available artillery. Its chief missions in support of large armored force units are:

(1) Neutralization of hostile aviation.

(2) Neutralization of enemy artillery.

(3) Neutralization of hostile defensive installations, including antitank.

(4) Direct support of the attack.

(5) Neutralization of counterattacks, especially of armored units.

(6) Destruction, harassing, or delaying of hostile concentrations, reinforcing, pursuing, or retreating forces, and rear installations and centers of communication.

e. Transport aviation will be furnished by GHQ for the supply of elements of armored units when operating beyond the sources of normal supply or when no land communications are available.

1. Either parachute troops or air-borne troops may be employed in conjunction with the operations of armored units to secure terrain objectives on the routes of march or to seize vital points in rear of the hostile front. They may establish support groups and supply bases for a break-through.

The enemy was still withdrawing; north of the 38^th parallel he was either digging in for a stand or marshaling fresh forces for another attack.

Enlisted Soldier's account of Munsan-Ni Combat Jump

New LIFE magazine pictures by John Dominis from GOOGLE image search of found many pics of the Korean war combat jump revealing important details like that the paras used M6 Cole carts to move their heavy 4.2" (107mm) mortars:

http://images.google.com/hosted/life/l?q=parachute+source:life&imgurl=500d2b797f804837

  THE PALLADIUM TIMES

Oswego, New York, Friday, March 23, 1951

PARATROOPERS BATTLE REDS

3,300 Chutists Outnumbered by 20,000 of Enemy

Jumpers Bolstered By Tough Rangers Land Behind Communist Lines North Of Seoul; Chinese And North Koreans Try To Wipe Out Allies, Aided By Armored Column And Infantrymen