"Within this evolutionary climate, fiscal realities and the aging of existing systems have resulted in a significant gap in our forced/early entry capabilities. The deactivation of the 3rd Battalion, 73d Armor, coupled with the termination of the Armored Gun System (AGS), has created a critical need for enhanced direct fire assault support and anti-armor capabilities for forced/early entry forces".

Official U.S. Army ACTD web site statement

MIGHTY M551 SHERIDANS AND M113 GAVINS ROLL TO VICTORY IN DESERT STORM!

One of the things that REALLY PISSES us off is this BS that the 82nd Airborne deployed to do Desert SHIELD without ANY tanks. Not true.

A fu*king lie.

3rd Battalion, 73rd Armor deployed with 56 x M551 Sheridan 17-ton light tanks and a number of M113 Gavin 10.5 ton light personnel carrying tanks. These were flown into battle positions by USAF C-130s, which is a little known fact.

Both the Sheridan and Gavin are better combat vehicles (lighter, more mobile, more armor protected, better armed) than overweight 20-ton piece-of-shit lav3stryker armored car rubber-tired deathtraps. Or "armored HMMWVs".

So much for Army "transformation" as it stands today.

The above is a very good picture I stumbled on of a M551 Sheridan with a fireteam of infantry on top passing by a burned out Iraqi T-62? tank during Desert STORM. And a mighty Sheridan getting loaded up during Desert Shield.

AWESOME!

However, now imagine its 1997.

STRIKE #1

Despite (change that TO SPITE) all the success U.S. Army light tanks have recently had with the Airborne, U.S. Army CSA General Dennis Reimer knuckles under to pressure from other General officers, stupidly cancels the M8 AGS out of anti-Airborne petty jealousy (real reason not money). A light tank getting all the action might mean no action for M1 heavy, defensive tankers. A light tank requiring tankers to parachute after it, implies personal risks that the 2D, wants-to-fight-risk-free-war-in-invincible-tanks-or-nothing type narrow-minded Armor branch person cannot accept. These are the folks who only call something a "tank" if its over 40 tons and has a revolving 360 degree turret ansd a big gun in it. These platform-centric types don't accept the REALITY that there are heavy, medium and light tanks that operate on planet earth by human beings, they see the U.S. Army is the center of the universe and defines all reality. This is how they marginalized the M8 Buford by calling it an "Armored Gun System" when it really is a LIGHT TANK. What these heavy tank or nothing types don't want to accept is that light/medium tracked armored fighting vehicles CAN DO WHAT TANKS DO; which is attack the enemy with shock action and overwhelm them. They think that if they acknowledge that lighter tanks can do tank missions they will be out of a job with their American-made M1 Abrams "Tiger tanks". The fact is when the tank was born in WWI, they didn't have turrets. Some even carried infantry. The truth is ANYTHING THAT IS TRACKD AND ARMORED IS A TANK, PERIOD.

The modern battlefield is a battle against the earth itself and man. The earth itself is either open terrain or closed terrain types. To optimized for open terrain you need heavier tanks for 2D maneuver; in closed terrain you need lighter tanks which can swim, go cross-country at-will, and even by flown OVER closed terrain vegetation/buildings for 3D maneuver. What we have just explained goes way over the head of most narcissistic military people who just want the most ego-gratifying platform money can buy.

The M8 AGS has already been Army-type classified for production.

6 x M8 AGS fully-combat-ready prototypes have been made.

Cost is just $3.5 million each.

Read FM 17-18 online at the General Reimer Digital Library--the man who cancelled the light tank when he was Army Chief of Staff

Its Field Manual, FM 17-18 Light Armor Operations is written and distributed.

The 3rd/73rd Armor Battalion at Fort Bragg, NC and 2nd ACR at Fort Polk, LA are ready to receive the M8 AGS light tank.

STRIKE #2

The Army then retires 3rd/73rd's M551s to be war-toys at NTC.

Ok, 2 stupid mistakes.

STRIKE #3

Ralph Zumbro's Armored Expeditionary Forces, U.S. Army ARMOR magazine, Fort Knox, Kentucky, September-October 1995, pages 14-16

Both Vietnam combat veteran and noted author Ralph Zumbro, Mike Robel, Mike Sparks and Stan Crist had written numerous articles starting two years before in the January-February 1995 U.S. Army ARMOR magazine outlining how available M113A3s can be used as contingency airdrop AFVs. Despite numerous articles with do-able, zero-cost options that have never been challenged in print (because they are true), the Army continued with its drive to self-destruction.

WHY DIDN'T HQDA SIMPLY SUPPLY 3/73rd ARMOR BATTALION WITH 56 x M113A3s TO REPLACE THEIR SHERIDANS AND USE THEM AS TROOP TRANSPORT/FIRE SUPPORT PLATFORMS?

This is exactly what Stan Crist proposed...and what Mike Robel had proposed 8 years before!

Too Late the XM8, Alternatives to the Armored Gun System

by Stanley C. Crist, U.S. Army ARMOR magazine, Fort Knox, Kentucky, January-February 1997, COVER article

As a member of the 1st Tactical Studies Group (Airborne) Stan went to the trouble of writing in good faith to the Heavy tanker lunatics at Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) and asked them why not re-equip the 3rd Battalion, 73rd Armor with M113 Gavins and 106mm recoilles rifles since both are available?

Here's how HQDA non-answered him:

PAGE 1

PAGE 2

Notice the bullsh*t response from a HQDA General who conveniently IGNORED THE QUESTION OF WHY NOT EQUIPPING THE 3/73RD ARMOR WITH M113 GAVINS?

The real reason is clear. Because the Army was then run by heavy tanker egomaniacs who DID NOT WANT THE AIRBORNE TO BE ABLE TO PARACHUTE IN WITH ITS OWN LIGHT TANKS. It was NEVER about money and budget, it was ALL ABOUT EGO. Who was going to get the glory and how to keep the Airborne down-trodden lest it get all the action. Yes, the Airborne is populated by some intolerable loud-mouth egomaniacs who call people "legs". Fire those fu*kers. However, America NEEDS AN AIRBORNE, a 3D maneuver force that can be there by fixed-wing planes and parachutes THAT HAS ITS OWN LIGHT TANKS with them so they can locate and encircle the Bin Ladens of this world and counter the Red Chines nation-state bastards that want to gobble up nearby free countries. We had this in Panama and we got Noriega. We don't have this now, so Saddam escaped to start a guerrilla war that bleeds us to this day in Iraq and Bin Laden remains on the loose preparing to nuke an American city. The Army brass always has its own selfish agendas that come first and GETTING THE JOB DONE SUFFERS in this heavy vs. light bullsh*t whipsaw/pendulum effect of which faction is running HQDA at the time.

Strike 3, you are out!

Why?

Because the Army is led by gutless cowards who are afraid to parachute jump to take risks to gain positional advantage if they are "heavies" and if they are light narcisstic egomaniacs their manhood size suffers if they have to admit they need tracked armored vehicles the "mech pussies" use---so kiss DECISIVE MANEUVER by 3D goodbye. And an American city in the near future.

Further research shows that about $100 million of the money that should have bought us TANGIBLE M8 Buford light tanks went to a PAPER STUDY OF ENHANCEMENTS for the M1 heavy tank.

Ok, fine. You are a heavy tanker egomaniac. Then use the !!@@#$% money to IMPROVE THAT TANK. Nadda. No can do. That would mean being more ready for combat when the truth is WE DON'T WANT TO FIGHT. We want to play bullshit garrison games on middle class wages from the U.S. taxpayers.

So when war in Iraq comes again, we have still the 7 gallon-per-mile turbine engines in our M1 heavy tanks that are unguarded in the rear so RPG shots can take them out. A lot of good being a 70-ton heavy tank if you leave your "back door" open in the rear. There are no gunshields on top so commanders and loaders get killed by snipers. After 1, 800 dead and 20, 000 wounded in Iraq NOWWWWW HQDA "sees the light" and upgrades our M1s with rear grill RPG pre-det screens and gunshields. Replace the 1500 hp turbine engine with a 1500 hp Europack diesel that sips fuel at 1 mpg so we can have less of our Soldiers blown up in fuel truck convoys?

Nope. No can do.

We want to be able to "hot rod" in our heavy tanks and we like having a "Jessica Lynch" underclass of "support" Soldier drive us our fuel and water so we can feel sooo superior to them.

The Army has no Cavalry Branch---it created "Armor" branch in 1940 to work-around the Chief of Cavalry who didn't want to give up horses and its been almost downhill ever since (except for General Gavin's Vietnam-era ACRs using M113A3 ACAVs).

Later on, they borrow from discounted civilian sociologists, Alvin and Heidi Toffler's "Third Wave" techno-centric world-view and created a BS bombard & occupy digital firepower "RMA" construct so they don't have to 2D maneuver, either!!!! Instead of building forces to meet real global threats, DoD and the Army pursue technology for technology's sake; anticipating to fight a narcissistic mirrow image of themselves (symmetrical foe not asymmetric enemy) with their favorite war toys and methods. Red China is lying in wait to fight the U.S. just like Germany set up to ambush France/Britain in the 1930s while they tragically went about fighting small wars in the preferred manner and ignored the threat until it was too late. It looks like WWIII will begin just like WWII did with the West's military leaders in self-imposed fantasy land.

Fast forward to 2001...

STRIKE #4

America has been struck by suicidal terrorists on September 11, 2001 because we are physically asleep on duty in a make-believe world of virtual unreality to protect our own borders from hostile saboteurs and protect our airspace. We know the terrorists are based in Afghanistan. The 82nd Airborne as usual, is ready to parachute drop into Afghanistan to cut-off the terrorists escaping our predictable airstrikes. Thanks to a courageous Commanding General in Europe, a M113A3 Gavin Immediate Ready Force-Medium is ready to fly in with the 82nd Airborne to give it light AFV shock action.

The Rangers jump into the Southern Afghanistan airfield, and then leave.

Details:
All the World's Airborne Operations

What happened?

The airfield is not held to be a Forward Operating Base (FOB). The 82nd and M113A3 IRF-M are not sent in. In fact, the Army's own operations staff presented plans to CSA General Shinseki, that included using 4 of the M8 AGs light tanks. Details here:

"How far are you willing to go?"--Sean Connery in The Untouchables

That's a question we should be asking our leaders to get today's terrorists....but our firepower/RMA/Tofflerian leaders DO NOT BELIEVE IN MANEUVER..just mouse-clicking some bombs and "media spin" later...They rejected Airborne operational MANEUVER to stop terrorists from escaping out of Afghanistan out of service politics (can't send M113A3s from Europe would endanger multi-billion-dollar LAV-III armored car purchases)...and jealousy over who gets the "glory" not a concern over human casualties....the 82nd could have dropped right behind the Rangers, held the airfield and THEN....forayed to the border...MSNBC reports:

GROUNDING THE AIRBORNE: Missed opportunity: How bin Laden got away

"In early November, as the first strongholds of the Taliban and its al-Qaida allies began to fall in northern Afghanistan, officers of the U.S. Army's two Paratroop units - the 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions pleaded with the generals running the war to have their men dropped along the Afghan-Pakistan border region to cut off the retreat of al-Qaida and its leader, Osama bin Laden. To the fury of these officers, their pleas went unanswered, turned aside because of the high probability of casualties.

The result: al-Qaida's leadership, along with senior Taliban officials, live on to fight another day. It is just one of the war's missed opportunities now coming to light".

Oh, I forgot after the Al Queda and Taliban escaped, we sent some token marines in to draw attention to themselves and pretend like we sent ground forces into action since we had 10th Mountain Division and SF Soldiers in country for weeks beforehand but in a low-key manner, however they must have not been in much danger since they ran around without helmets and body armor on. The majority of the enemy was long gone, headed into hills/mountains to wait and regroup.

Why?

Because positive CNN media publicity of M113A3s and god forbid, M8 AGS light tanks kicking-butt in Afghanistan would mean the world would know the multi-billion dollar LAV-III/IAVs General Shinseki says are needed to create a C-130 air-transportable force is not needed and a waste of tax dollars.

THIS IS WHY AL QUEDA TERRORISTS ESCAPE.

Because Army politics come before VICTORY IN COMBAT.

So now in 2002, still in the middle of a "war on terrorism" the Army wants to instead of upgrading its M113A3 Gavins and buying some Army tested and certified M8 Buford AGS light tanks and getting into the fight...they want to waste $$$BILLIONS on inferior LAV-III/IAV armored cars that cannot airland by C-130s let along parachute airdrop and will not be ready for months and months. Syndicated columnist of the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Jack Kelly and Frank Tiboni of Defense News have courageously taken on the Army's lies publicly.

Combat Veteran Jack Kelly exposes the Army's "Heavy Metal" Problem

2006: Light Infantry Narcissists Running U.S. Army to ruin: Non-Linear Battlefields Require FULL armor protection: tracks are 28% more capable of armor protection--and can go cross-country to avoid ambushes in the first place than wheeled trucks...but light egomaniacs can't afford to look like the "mech pussies" in tracks

General James M. Gavin as Army Chief of Research & Development created the Airborne Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle Family (AAM-PVF), the amazing M113 in the 1950s for maximum mobility over nuclear devastated, non-linear battlefields.

The official history of the U.S. Army for that time period says the following:

www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/amh/AMH-26.htm

The seven divisions stationed in the United States constituted the strategic reserve. Four of these-two airborne and two infantry-were designated in 1957 the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) and were maintained in a high state of readiness for quick deployment in event of an emergency. The other three were earmarked as STRAC reinforcements and as a training base for expansion of Army forces should the crisis become prolonged or develop into a full-scale war.

With the emphasis on mobility, even the larger and heavier weapons and equipment were designed to be air-transportable.

A program to produce ground and air vehicles with the necessary battlefield mobility led to the development of armored personnel carriers, such as the M113 with aluminum armor, that could move troops rapidly to the scene of operations while providing greater protection for the individual Soldier. Since

585

highways and bridges might be damaged or destroyed, dual-capability amphibious vehicles that could travel on rough terrain and swim across rivers and swamps freed the fighting units from total dependence upon roads.

What today's planners don't realize is that what was required for a nuclear battlefield is required today with PGMs in a Surveillance Strike System (SSC) that can be as equally devastating but in a more localized way: units ON TRACKS not wheels. We need GREATER PHYSICAL mobility, firepower, protection and livability features not less regardless if tied in to a "Mother May, I?" computer network to alleviate the anxieties of senior officials.

Thus, the M113's purpose was armored, amphibious cross country mobility for LIGHT, AIRBORNE units. In 1960, America's Airborne should have been the first ones to have "air-mech" capabilities organic but the ill-conceived ROAD reorganization plan reverted back to the paratroopers foot slogging and their armored tracks went to heavy units instead. Mass-produced and inexpensive, there was and still is enough M113s to supply BOTH light and heavy units. The old saying if you don't get it right, you spend the rest of your time trying to get it right comes to mind.

BMD-1 after parachute airdrop; note kneeling landing gear

Compare the U.S. Army in 2006 to the Russian Army of today...8 years after we revolutionized ground maneuver tactics with the M113 but sat on its potential, they created their own BMD and fielded one to every paratroop squad. They are already on their 4th Generation BMD and we are still trying to get "GEN I" M113 Gavins IN light units. What a disgrace to the memory of our great Airborne leaders, Gavin, Lee, Ridgway, Yarborough, Hackworth, Moore that we are not having American Light and especially Airborne forces---live up to their full potential.

U.S. Army TALKING about Light Units with M113 Gavin tracked armor (still after 4 decades of using them on & off)

U.S. Airborne/Light units would be lucky just to have M113 Gavins with machine guns, much less autocannon...this wasn't always the case...the 82nd Airborne actually had M551 Sheridans and M113 Gavin light tanks in the 3rd Battalion, 73rd Armor until 1997.

VIDEO: How the U.S. Army Airborne should Power Project by Parachute Airdrop

www.combatreform.com/USARMYAIRBORNEpowerprojection.wmv

LAPES = Low Altitude Parachute Extraction from 5-10 feet

LVAD = Low Velocity Air Drop from 600-1200 feet

Picture above of C-17 interior with a M551 Sheridan light tank and HMMWV truck rigged for low velocity airdrop shows 54 sidewall seats and walkways to the side jump doors are still available; yet Airborne still inefficiently loads C-17s with either all people or all equipment, then offers the lame excuse that "they do not have the airlift" to bring tracked armored vehicles to the fight below. How convenient. Current "can't-do" U.S. Airborne is a disgrace to the CAN-DO spirit of all the Paratroopers who have gone before us and created the American Airborne in the first place.

www.stormingmedia.us/46/4652/A465262.html

Light Infantry, Augmentation, and the M113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier: A Step in the Direction of Versatility

Authors: William K. Sutey; ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

Abstract: This paper examines a proposal to create M113 Armored Personnel Carrier support units (vehicles, drivers, and service support) to provide protected tactical mobility augmentation for light infantry forces. Light infantry divisions are a crucial component of the Army's force structure to meet potential challenges across the spectrum of conflict. They lack, however, the tactical mobility assets to be of any utility beyond the lowest intensity conflicts in the most restrictive terrain. This limitation constrains the Army's versatility as a whole. This monograph first considers tactical mobility as an element of combat power, establishes an analytical framework for the analysis of the infantry mobility systems, and considers the heavily armed and mobile nature of potential world threats. Next, the light infantry concept is explored focusing on the intended purposes for which light infantry divisions were formed and an evaluation of their actual tactical mobility capabilities. Following this examination of today's light infantry, this paper looks at the Pentomic Era in the late 1950's in which M59 armored personnel carrier companies were consolidated at division level and sent vehicles as attachments to augment the tactical mobility of infantry units. Finally, this monograph conceptually outlines a proposal to use M113 APC's to augment deployed light forces and evaluates how this might enhance their utility. Although there are philosophical objections to, and practical problems with, augmenting light infantry with armored personnel carriers, this paper concludes that today's demands for maximizing the versatility of all forces merits reexamination of such a concept.

Russian Airborne FIELDING BMD-4 tracked armor with 100mm guns

BMD-4 uses an improved versionm of the powerful 100mm main gun, 30mm autocannon, 7.62mm medium machine gun turret first fielded with the BMD-3M shown above

The Russian Paratroop crew of the BMD-4 ride INSIDE it during airdrop to save time de-rigging and getting it in action on the ground. Dismount paratroop infantry squad jumps out in FRONT of the IL-76 jet's engines SIMULTANEOUSLY with their mother BMD-4 exiting the rear ramp in order to land closer together. Their D-8 parachutes deploy only a stabilizer chute upon aircraft exit in order to jump in front of jet engine; U.S. old-fashioned static line and deployment bags leave a tangled mess streaming outside the plane as paratroopers exit.

Note the minimalist approach to getting the BMD-4 to slide out the floor of cargo planes; runners under the tracks conserves weight and payload of the plane compared to the U.S. Type V aircrop platforms that each take up about 2, 000 pounds of payload and are a pain to recover on the drop zone for re-use.

The BMD-4 under canopy

The BMD-4 has low ground pressure cross-country mobility like the M113 Gavin first pioneered

The BMD-4 has waterjets to swim in the ocean like the M113 "Amphigavin" with the ARIS GATOR kit

The BMD-4 has stabilized optics and gun mounts to shoot-on-the-move; a capability our M113 Gavins could have if they were OWNED BY LIGHT/AIRBORNE/AIR ASSAULT UNITS and improved on by ownership; ad hoc temporary load of M113s to units will not result in their full potential being achieved...and could result in the enemy killing a lot of Americans in battle because we chose to be inferior.

---

http://en.rian.ru/russia/20060616/49637256.html

New combat vehicles on way to Russian airborne units

19:24 | 16/ 06/ 2006

MOSCOW, June 16 (RIA Novosti) - Russia's Airborne Forces will receive the first batch of a new armored airborne combat vehicle on June 21, an army spokesman said Friday.

The BMD-4 airborne combat vehicle is amphibious, light and well armed. Like its predecessor, BMD-3, it has a hull made of special alloys and a turret, but features many modifications. In addition, it is equipped with a 100-mm gun.

"The start of deliveries of the BMD-4 marks a new era in the development of the Airborne Forces and will significantly raise the combat strength of Russia's most mobile units," Alexander Cherednik said.

The vehicle will be shown off during an exercise on June 26 that senior officers are expected to attend.

Legendary Tanker Ralph Zumbro asks the question:

Could this be the American BMD-4 killer: the "M113A4" Gavin Light tank/AIFV

Nurol of Turkey has a M113-based AIFV with a BMD-3 type turret

"Gents;
That turret sounds like a development of the BMP-3 turret which at lease one ex Russian/Soviet country has adapted to the M-113. Maybe we ought to just BUY them and adapt them to our vehicle????"

Ralph

MEN AND MACHINES? OR MEN WITHOUT MACHINES? OR MACHINES WITHOUT MEN?

The quote by Col. Boyd comes to mind, "Machines don't fight wars, men fight wars, and they think!"

Emery Nelson writes:

I saw first hand in an Armor Battalion what the overemphasis on machines could do. We used to Aggress against them all the time and we would just kick their asses all over the FRG. We would do things like steel their antenna's at night and then attack them. Their excuses were they wouldn't get caught like that in war time,,,, but you know that's BS. All there time spent on gunnery tables would only help them on the range, not on the Battlefield. The Gunnery Tables were a joke, meant to fight one tank at a time on a fixed (and known after your first run)road.

I got this quote from Inside the Third Reich by Albert Speer. Just something I've been thinking about. It has to do with Hitler insisting on heavier armor and a bigger gun for tanks. The Army and the armaments Industry wanted to make a smaller lighter tank with more mobility. The regions of Italy they're talking about is very mountainous just like Kosovo. Speer writes:

"In October I tried once more to win Hitler over to the idea of light tanks: on the southwestern front (Italy) reports on the cross-country mobility of the Sherman have been very favorable. The Sherman climbs mountains which our tank experts consider inaccessible to tanks. One great advantage is that the Sherman has a very powerful motor in proportion to its weight. Its cross-country mobility on level ground (in the Po Valley) is, as the Twenty-sixth Armored Division reports, definitely superior to that of our tanks. Everyone involved in tank warfare is impatiently waiting for lighter and therefore more maneuverable tanks which, simply by having superior guns, will assure the necessary fighting power (page 542)."

All tankers like to talk about the superiority of the Tiger Tank.

This is a quote from the same book on what happened the first time the Tigers made contact with the Russians.

"In the early summer of 1942 he [Hitler] personally ordered the first six of our Tiger Tanks to be thrown into battle. As always, when a new weapon was ready, he expected it to turn the tide of battle. He regaled us with vivid descriptions of how the Soviet 7.7 Centimeter anti-tank guns, which penetrated our Panzer IV front armor even at sizable distances, would fire shot after shot in vain, and how finally the Tiger would roll over the antitank gun nests. His staff demonstrated that the terrain he had chosen made tactical deployment of the tanks impossible because of the marshy subsurface on both sides of the road. Hitler dismissed these objections, not sharply, but with a superior air. And so the first Tiger assault started. Everybody was tensely awaiting the results, and I was rather anxious, wondering whether all would go well technically. There was no opportunity for a dress rehearsal. The Russians calmly let the tanks roll past an antitank gun position, then fire direct hits at the first and last Tiger. The remaining four thereupon could move neither forward nor backward, nor could they take evasive action to the side because of the swamps, and soon they were also finished off (240)."

A noted British historian writes:

"OK - in my view with just one exception (the Gulf) there is no evidence for an Army with a few good tanks winning against an army with lots of mediocre ones. Thus 50,000 Shermans and 70,000 T-34s are bound to win over a handful, just over 1,300 Tiger Is and about 500 Tiger 2s. Look when we concentrated our rubbish in the desert we even beat Rommel in some battles. The same was true of the Cold War; nothing NATO could have done in Germany, never mind how good the tanks, could have prevented the Russians from rolling west, there were simply too many of them and not enough of us, and they don't stop just because they take casualties.

I'm by no means convinced about air power against tanks, at least not in WWII, but if you check the book 'Tiger A British View' there is an account of how the Germans lost all but two Tigers from a battalion through breakdown and stupidity. They lost one other to U.S. Artillery and got one back to Rome in one piece. I suspect that was typical but also see Tom Jentz on the Tiger (his series of books for Schiffer).

From what I am hearing the U.S. Army has sounded the death knell of the 'MBT', and probably rightly so. There is also said to be talk of replacing the gas turbines with diesels which would make sense. The trouble is that both British and American governments got a lot of stick from veterans and the public after the war for sending men out to fight in inferior tanks. This has a kind of knock-on effect and both countries have gone for the biggest gun and best armour, it is a typical reaction. Note though that the Germans, who in a sense lost because their armour was too good but too few, gave priority post-war to high mobility instead of armour in Leopard and have probably got the balance just about right. The Russians, who got the balance right as long ago as 1941 stuck to it in post-war years until they were seduced by technology with T-64, T-72 et al.

Please bear in mind these are merely the ravings of a civilian with a bit of interest in history, no professional qualifications, no service background; lots of important people would disagree with me. Just instinct on my part, like the one that says if you want to see intelligence applied to tank design (and APC design come to that) watch the Israelis."

In fact, years later in the Korean War (KW), the M4 "Easy-Eight" Sherman proved itself more mobile and battle-ready than its newer, heavier M26 Pershing tank! The Superb Korean war weapons/history web site states:

"At the outset of the KW, to its tremendous disadvantage, the U.S. had no tank in the Far East capable of engaging the obsolescent T34/85. The light M24, primarily a reconnaissance vehicle with thin armor plate and a light 75mm cannon, was augmented during August and September, 1950, with various medium tanks such as the M26 Pershing, mounting a 90mm gun. Gradually the old M4A3 "Sherman IV", the WWII workhorse fitted with a new high-velocity 76.2mm gun, became the principle U.S. battle tank. It had a high silhouette, light armor, and an inadequate gun, but it was more maneuverable in Korean terrain than more modern tanks, such as the British Centurian III. Failure to produce a good main battle tank, concentrating instead on anti-tank weapons, was one of the Army's principal weaknesses during the KW."

The web master Bert Kortegaard elaborates;

"RE: Armor in the 2d ID
Posted by Bert
Friday, July 23, 1999 at 23:42:20

Message:
72d Medium Tank Battalion, 2d ID, landed at Pusan on 8/16/50, about at the same time about 5 other Medium Tank Battalions landed. The tank distribution among all battalions was initially about equally between M26 Pershings, and M4A3E8 Shermans.

I don't know the ratio for the 72d -- they did use Pershings at Agok (8/31) -- but they seemed to use only Shermans at Heartbreak Ridge (10/51).

The 73d was originally an M26 battalion, but used Shermans at Baldy and Porkchop. In fact, with its newer high-velocity 76mm gun, the Sherman gradually became the main battle tank used by all our armor forces. High-silhouette, light armor and with the inadequate gun, Easy-8 was nevertheless more maneuverable than our more modern tanks, and better suited to the terrain."

Sounds like "Deja-vu all over again" today with the Army cancelling the M8 Armored Gun System light tank and buying Javelin anti-tank missiles instead when we need BOTH.

A light infantry fire-support tank with a good high velocity gun would have saved many lives in Korea. Even our AT weapons were never really good enough. If we fought in Korea tomorrow morning we would not be able to deploy our heavy defensive M1s at the point of infantry attacks. We would be forced to sit and wait for the NKA with very little room to maneuver making them highly vulnerable. In that situation old fashion AT "guns" (they could fire the 120mm tank round) would be just as valuable (maybe more so because of it's lower silhouette and the ability of the crew to dig it in) and one hell of a lot cheaper. As urbanized as the border is, the need for an assault gun and light tank with great mobility is ten times more important than an heavy armored "mastodon" designed to be invincible to tank gun impacts while duelling other tasnks that could be attacked at our enemy's leisure.

ORPHANS?

Vietnam combat vet and noted author Ralph Zumbro writes:

"The tank's job is to cross trenches, smash bunkers, and kill grunts. PERIOD. Any design that can kill only other tanks is severely limited. The end result is that once all the tank battles are over, the killer tanks cannot break bunkers and machine gun the **** outa the opposing infantry. Not only that, check the endurance of any heavy gun, turbine driven vehicle. They can't stay the course. I rode with 3/69 in November 2000 at the NTC and they had to refuel at LEAST once a day, sometimes twice. I also rode with OPFOR and they went the whole cycle on one, repeat ONE, refuel.

When I pulled up to any infantry platoon in RVN, I was usually asked, "what's yer loiter time." These people were used to jets and choppers that could only stay around for a few minutes. When I told them, "about two WEEKS," they literally shorted out.

I say again, THE TANK'S JOB IS INFANTRY SUPPORT, Not killing other tanks. The only way a war gets won, is to put an 18 year old kid with a bayoneted rifle in the enemy's TOC. Any tank that cannot support the infantry once the opposing tanks are taken care of, does not contribute its fair share to the battle. Just like a fighter plane armed with missiles cannot strafe.....Some of the best air support we got was from Vietnamese pilots driving old Skyraiders....Them little sucker got down between the trees.

I have had infantry riding my fenders and have had my back scratched by cannister rounds from my platoon SGT and have SEEN an NVA cold-cocked by the muzzle of a 90MM cannon. THAT is wot a tank does for a living.

The Sherman got a bad rep for not being able to shoot down a Tiger.....But the sucker WON the WAR, and is still fighting in odd corners of the world... The Tiger and Panther are only museum pieces. Get a hold of an MS called "a bigger hammer" by LTC Alphin, from the Armor School Library, at Ft Knox....Ask for X. The Ms has all the ammo usage and combat vignettes needed to make the point".

Zumbro"

Read Zumbro's excellent common-sense article calling on the Army to heed the call for infantry fire support, Cavalry tanks:

Lighten Up, Guys!

Mine Resistant Tracks

The entire purpose of the light tank or "Assault Gun" is to be agile enough to "be there" to give direct fire support heavier than what the infantry can carry on its backs. If 70-ton "Land Mastadons" [heavy, defensive tanks designed to destroy other tanks in a WWIII doomsday scenario] can't get to the fight, we lose by default. Better is a light or medium tank that can GET THERE with a 90-105mm gun than a 120mm gun Heavy tank akin to the German Tiger tank and only more mobile via excessive force and fuel cost. Their second mission is to kill other enemy tanks when encountered---by main gun/missile attack using terrain agile ambushing. Why the U.S. Army doesn't have light tanks today is because WITHOUT A CAVALRY BRANCH there is a "feast or famine" cleavage in mindset in the existing factions part of Infantry branch wants to only fight "light pure" on foot or go to the other extreme of taking forever to deploy so there is no surprise and the enemy has dug in or moved via "Mech heavy", not accepting the desirability of something in-between. Then there is the Armor Branch community, in love 90% of the time with tank-on-tank duels and only with a passing interest in Blitzkrieg operational maneuvers into the enemy's rear to collapse him totally from within by dislocating his lines of communication. They see themselves as TANK DESTROYERS. Since Armor Branch doesn't want to fight other Armor at any perceived disadvantage, so the light tank---what should be in a Cavalry Branch or Sapper tank corps to support infantry operations---is discarded just like the M551 Sheridan being retired to NTC as a moving armor recognition aid and the M8 Ridgway Armored Gun System is cancelled. Few voices heard in protest. That's because there are no Cavalrymen in the U.S. Army today.

Noted best-selling military techno-thriller author, Tom Clancy writes:

In his book, Airborne, page 213, discussing the M8 Armored Gun System (AGS):

"Unfortunately, the need to support the expensive peacekeeping operations in places like Bosnia, Haiti, and Rwanda caused the top leadership of the Army to cancel the AGS program, and reprogram the funds. Frankly, given the small size of the AGS program, this was a bad decision. Unfortunately, without any replacement for the M551, the same Army leaders moved from bad decision-making to outright stupidity when they decided to stand down the 3rd/73 Armored, thus denying the 82nd even the services of 56 thirty-year-old light tanks."

A commentator in a military news group writes about the Armor versus Armor inferiority complex used as an excuse to dismiss light tanks:

"I'm not sure that light tanks don't make a certain amount of sense in some strategic applications.

For example, let's imagine that we had to fight Desert Storm (DS) over again, with M8 AGS instead of M1A1 Abrams. One of the results of DS was that a vast majority of our tanks were never hit by any AT weapon at all. Detect your enemy first, fire first, kill first from long-range and he can't even engage you before you kill him, much less penetrate your armor. Except in a few tactical situations, you could have had 120mm guns on unarmored trucks (with good thermal sights) and won the battle, albeit with more casualties from the hits that were taken. The AGS is armored enough to keep out any non-anti-tank weapon, so you can't get cheap kills against one, and when armored to full fit-out (Modular armor packages) it can absorb a significant amount of AT hits, too, if far from the sort of survivability the Abrams shows.

We know the 105mm gun can kill T-72s (Israeli experience in Lebanon, some shots in DS). The AGS has less ammo on board, but also is lighter and burns less fuel per mile than an Abrams, so overall logistics would have been easier and resupply of ammo would have been proportionally easier to accomplish. We probably would have lost on the order of 100 tanks instead of 10, but that would not have stopped us from winning the war, nor would the casualties involved in that (assume 1 DOA 1 WND per killed tank on the average, for arguments sake--the AGS has a 3 man crew instead of the 4 on the Abrams) have been completely unreasonable in the overall campaign's casualties.

Now, you can't assume that in every tactical situation, superior sensors, weapons range, and tactics and crew skills will be enough to evade return fire. That was not true in all battles in DS, and most future battles are likely to occur in terrain less condusive to such tactical wizardry. However, at least some of the time, light tanks with good crews and sensors and guns can defeat heavier tanks, and the difference in deployability is immense.

For example, the 82nd ABN Division spent a month on the Saudi border deterring Iraqi armored corps with LAW/AT4 rockets, Dragon and TOW ATGMs (latter on HMMWVs) and 56 x M551 Sheridan older-technology light tanks that cannot shoot on-the-move. In that sort of situation, being able to "airfreight" a couple of hundred AGS a day in would have been a godsend. If there had been an attack, the shoot-on-the move AGS would have been more vulnerable than M1's, but much less vulnerable than foot-mobile Airborne infantry in the desert..."

An Army field-grade officer stated:

"...the U.S. Army has fielded the world's heaviest and most thickly armored tank and infantry fighting vehicle combination: the 70-ton M1 Abrams tank and the 30-ton M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle. These vehicles are designed almost exclusively for dueling with other armored vehicles. The M1 mounts a massive 120mm high-velocity direct-fire cannon and the M2 Bradley carries a high-velocity 25mm autocannon and direct-fire heavy antitank missiles. All to fight the WWIII massed Soviet medium offensive tank armored hordes in Europe.

The M1 tank's weight and limited main gun elevation reduce its effectiveness in the urban, mountainous and wet terrain typically found in potential theaters of operation such as Korea. Heavy armor often requires extensive engineer assistance to cross natural and manmade obstacles. For example, it took three days of intense bridging efforts to get M1 tanks across the Sava River in Bosnia. Finally, the heavy division, with limited infantry and helicopters, is seldom tasked for operations other than war because it has difficulty projecting presence beyond road networks or valleys."

Military Review, March-April 1997, Air-Mech Strike: Revolution in Maneuver Warfare by Major Charles A. Jarnot, U.S. Army

"Perfect is the enemy of good enough"

The light tank in the U.S. Army is orphaned with its light infantry.

C-130 and CH-47 helicopter-transportable British Scorpion/Scimitar Light Tank: tracked low-ground pressure, go-anywhere vehicle victor in the Falklands war; defeating Argentine Panhard wheeled armored cars...U.S. Airborne/Light Infantry Divisions have NOTHING like this in their force structure! Read how British light tanks were decisive in the Falklands War in 1982!

The 2nd Parachute Battalions War in the Falklands

by Captain Daniel T. Head, U.S. Army ARMOR magazine, January 2000

We need to change this because U.S. Army forces must be able to get to anywhere in the world quickly and in large numbers by AIR--for our world moves by the speed of the AIR and requires quick decisions. Again, a Cavalry mission.

These light forces need an air-droppable light tank to give them the advantage over Third World Country light fighters with AKMs, RPGs and "bargain basement", but lethal Russian BMP and T-62 series AFVs. We cannot afford to fight these folks "even", or we will lose like we almost did in Somalia in 1993. We could have had light AFVs and light tanks from the very beginning of the Airborne in the 1940s but we have only our own stupidity to blame and no excuse. Australian Paratroops are clearing East Timor today with air-delivered M113s with MG turrets they got from US, and our Airborne doesn't even have ANY light AFVs in its force structure. Other countries with a fraction of our resources have better equipped Airbornes! They have a Cavalry, we do not.

Next, the world is URBANIZING, and what the light infantry Soldier carries in his hands is not enough explosive power to reduce cities and "reach" bad guys firing behind cover. People fight wars and people live in cities. We still need BIG GUNs for this, since air power, artillery, naval guns cannot reach into cities, and pummeling thugs with $100 RPGs in buildings by $75,000 missiles will make us go broke.

The signatureless, "smart" top-attack Anti-tank Guided Missile (ATGM) and shells have finally arrived and out-ranges the tank main gun. Having heavy armor to defeat a main gun direct hit will not be as important as getting undetected into ATGM FIRING POSITION FIRST. Thus, ABSOLUTE BEST MOBILITY is essential---which means ability to swim, be silenced and small to be "stealthy", and enough armor to keep going if hit by small arms fire, and have the crew survive if hit by an ATGM, not a fuel-guzzling 70-ton heavy, defensive tank monster. A perfect example of light AFVs saving the day was the Tet offensive in 1968, M113s with gunshield protected machine guns were able to rapidly move into Tan Son Nhut airbase to save it from being over-run by several thousand enemy foot Soldiers by overwhelming protected firepower. These same vehicles flushed out the die-hard Viet Cong from Saigon, saving hundreds of American lives that would have been lost in infantry-pure assaults. We had a Cavalry in Vietnam, today we don't.

All of these factors point to an agile light tank/assault gun---the closest things being the "magnificent 7": the Russian BMD-2, BMP-3, American M551, M113A3 with 106mm RR/120mm mortar turret, M8 AGS (though it cannot swim), British Scorpion family and the German Wiesel All described in detail by clicking their links. The future Main Battle Tank (MBT) should be a medium, (no more than 40 tons) not a heavy tank with some of the features of these agile light tanks.

HOW DID WE WIN WWII, KOREA ANYWAY?

In WWII, the U.S. Army was faced with a very lethal opponent in the German Army. The Germans learned at Stalingrad fighting the Soviets, street by street, that they needed Assault Guns (Sturmgeschutze) mounted on old light tank chasises that could accompany the infantry since their Panzers were incredibly busy combating T-34 Russian tanks. This battlefield wisdom was followed in the U.S. by the creation of the Self-Propelled howitzer when Artillery branch realized it had to offer direct-fire support to be helpful in most cases. A current U.S. Army LTC and weapons expert writes in:

"I still think that the 105mm Howitzer on a light tank chassis has merit, and the M113 with a turreted 120mm breach loading mortar could also carry a reasonable HE warhead. Both could be made with autoloading automatic fire capability, too. But wait, this is an old idea. In WW II, the tank battalion had a HHC howitzer section. First, we used the Howitzer Motor Carriage M8, an M5 Stuart tank with an open-topped turret armed with a 75mm howitzer. Later, we had M4 Shermans with 105mm howitzers. Too late for WWII, in Korea, we had the M45, a 105mm howitzer on an M26 Pershing.

Another approach would be to use large diameter (perhaps 18-24 inch), thin walled barrels to project thin skinned cannisters filled with proportionally tremendous volumes of HE filler. The launcher would look something like an MLRS, but with shorter barrels and perhaps twice as many of them. Oops, that sounds like WW I "Lewis Projectors" used for lobbing gas-filled canisters. Range was about 1 or 2 kms.

Darn, I just can't seem to think of anything that hasn't already been invented, tried, and proven successful."

What we have is in essence an Assault Gun under the control of Field Artillery Branch. However as the bitter lessons of Korea were forgotten in the mad rush to meet the tank maneuver armies of the Red Army at the Fulda Gap in Europe, artillery branch gravitated to indirect fire roles and "heavied up" their SP howitzers to the current M109A6 "Paladin" which is too big to accompany light troops in a city fight. There is no reason why we couldn't put a 120mm DF mortar turret on a M113A3 or create a SP howitzer/assault gun by cutting its chassis to accept a M119 105mm light howitzer. The South Vietnamese Armor Corps used M548 (M113s cut down) cargo carriers to carry and roll-on/roll-off towed old M102 105mm howitzers for a "hip shoot" artillery capability. We have enhanced M548A3 cargo carriers in use today to dispense the VOLCANO mine system. Certainly some M548A3s with clear cargo beds could be joined with M119 towed 105mm howitzers to create a "hip shoot" capability today. Or tow M119 105mm light with tracked BV-206 SUSVs with armor panels added like the Arctic Paratroopers of the 172nd BDE in Alaska do or was done by the U.S. Army and Canadians in Afghanistan to transport mortars.

Until then, the U.S. light infantry is orphaned again, the pre-quel. Light infantry was better force-structured during the Vietnam War with M113 ACAVs than it is today in 2002! Again, we have no Cavalry in the U.S. Army!

LIGHT TANKS IN THE FAR EAST: VICTORY

Wily Japanese General Yamashita with the help of a "studies group" came up with a way to beat the British from Malaya/Singapore though outnumbered 3 to 1. By using highly mobile, infiltrating light infantry on bicycles followed by light tanks, he was able to bypass the road-bound British Army through jungle trails. The Japanese bicycles when they went flat, were ridden on their rims which made sounds the British troops thought were the tracks of light tanks and withdrew from many positions by intimidation. The myth of the invincible "Japanese jungle fighter" was born when only months before a studies group was needed to study jungle warfare because the Japanese Army had no experience in jungle fighting! The mind, like a parachute, works best when its OPEN.

Later in the war, the Japanese light tanks were not much good fighting as part of a confined island defense where their weak machine gun armament and armor were no match for U.S. Army/marine corps (mc) M4 Sherman medium tanks and amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs) like the LVT-4 which had a 75mm gun system. Had they been with a 50mm gun or larger and a little bit thicker in construction, we would have had even higher casualties than we had.

In Vietnam, the NVA used PT-76 light tanks to over-run Lang Vei Special Forces camp in a surprise attack---we had assumed that tanks couldn't operate in jungle terrain, and the mobility of the light tank proved us wrong at a high cost in lives lost.

PT-76 light amphibious tank details

Today's mc is adamant about putting a mere 25mm "pop gun" 2-man turret on the next generation AAV and refuses to mount 105mm turrets on its LAV 8x8 McArmored cars after millions of R & D dollars were spent perfecting them. Though the armored car is the wrong platform, at least the Army's IBCT program has a low-pressure 105mm gun on the LAV-III (IAV-MGS), currently slated for the new units. But using thinly armored, road-bound cars is making the same mistake the Japanese made with their armored vehicles. So McRhetoric about fighting urban war "3-blocks at a time" is obviously yet another McBS PR campaign to draw attention to themselves and try to grab more McBudget share for electronic McGadgets that will not win the city fight when we lack physical, shock-action means. Perhaps they want a McFoot-troop led "McBlood bath" for another McIwo-Jima Mount Suribachi-type McPhoto opportunity?

WHAT IS THE REST OF THE WORLD DOING WITH LIGHT TANKS?

Basically making us look like jack-asses.

The Russian BMP-3 can swim in the OCEANS, be airdropped and carry infantry with 100mm main gun, 30mm autocannon and Medium Machine Gun turret firepower, all in a light package that out performs both Bradley and Warrior in cross-country mobility....

Read it and weep, Russian BMP-3 kicks western IFV's in the ass

Now the Russians have put a 125mm main gun turret on the BMP-3 chassis, making it THE best light tank in the world, capable of SWIMMING in oceans (something even AGS can't do), be airdropped, have infantry ride on top of it etc. Instead of giving the Russian economy free "hand outs" why don't we order 100 of these light tanks with a U.S. 105mm gun turret, and supply them to the U.S. 82nd Airborne and 2nd ACR Strike Force? With the next batch of 100, supply the 25th and 10th Mountain LIDs...if there is a will there is a way..

Russian 2S25 Airborne-amphibious 125mm gun Light tank

Apparently the Russians CAN-DO while we can only make up CAN'T-DO BS excuses.

The Russians have even fitted the 100mm/30mm/7.62mm BMP-3 turret onto the smaller BMD Airborne Combat Vehicle, making it the BMD-3M and now the Gavin....

More Russian CAN-DO: BMP-3 with 100mm/30mm/7.62mm turret on M113 Gavin AIFV

More contrast to our current Army/marines focus on buildings, lawn and ego maintenance instead of warfighting!

Legendary Tank Sergeant Ralph Zumbro writes:

"THAT'S THE VERSION OF THE GAVIN WE'VE BEEN NEEDING!!!

Add a TC cupola, and we can just order the suckers up and go fight. I'm assuming that the 30mm is still there. Where did you find that sucker and who is using it."

Another 1st TSG (A) member writes:

"It's truly an amazing system, the gun can even be stabilized and firing in the water (but I admit I'd have to change my pants when I got off the beach with that going on). It's also quite simple, perfect for the marines (never happen) and Dragoons (could happen).

Did you look at the towed variant of the 120mm Mortar/Gun. Simple and capable of delivering steady fire at 8 to 9 rounds per minute. Combine that with PGMs and an AT missile system like the Russians use in the BMP-3 and you are in heaven.

One of the things the Russians had going for them, is a large population of Veterans from the Great Patriotic War, who went into military industries as designers after the war. Mainly that's due to the nature of the Soviet economy, and those jobs were best to be had. They understood what's possible in war and what's difficult. They didn't want Russian Soldiers to have to deal with overly complex equipment. Simple, Simple, Simple!"

While we are constantly fueling our 70-ton heavy, defensive tanks trying to propel them forward to act as offensive tanks, the bad guys will hit us with swarms of lethal light and medium tanks and we will perish in the POL-fed inferno."

Another 1st TSG (A) member writes:

"Since our last e-mail I got off my ass and did some preliminary research on the ongoing dilemma/subject which will be the subject of a later e-mail. But I would like to go over a few things with you and get some feedback.

First off, there seems to be an international trend towards lighter AFV's in the form of light and medium tanks. There is more R&D going on with major manufacturers and more interest from military organizations in same. Recently, Alvis has acquired Hagglund and are currently supplying Sweden and Norway with new light tanks and AFV's. Alvis AFV's are undergoing a upgrade retrofit for continued modern service and enjoys a rather large market of satisfied users. FMC was courting Turkey who was interested in M8's and they have since adopted and manufacture their own, Thailand has shown interest in M8's, but I am unaware if they have adopted it. Argentina fields a German/Argentina medium tank design. Spain (with Austria) manufactures and both field a light AFV family including a light tank. Singapore is the largest user of French AMX-13 light tanks and offers a modernization retrofit tank for sale or service to do same. Israel also offers modernized AMX-13's with retrofit service, I have also heard of a MARS-15 light tank they offer but cannot find any information. Cadillac-Gage is forthcoming with an advanced version of their light tank called the Stingray II. I heard that a good percentage of the M551's were given to ROK, where they were retrofitted and given 90mm main guns. [Editor: AMEN. They are not too pig-headed to use them] Could this be one of the reasons the Pentagon didn't adopt the M8? Because this class of AFV seems to be evolving at a rapid pace?"

[Editor: don't count on it. HQDA never met a light tank it didn't like, anything that helps Airborne/Light Divisions, HQDA is dead set against. Remember there is no Cavalry Branch in the U.S. Army to insure we have light tanks for a general-purpose mobile combat force.]

"A light tank should be very feasible in a high-intensity conflict, especially with the introduction of the new 120mm CTG from the Swiss. More emphasis is placed on speed and maneuverability (in keeping with General Hobart and Guderian style tactics) and with the advent of a new generation of ATGM's even the best MBT's would be threatened. The current key to survival seems to be active/passive armor systems. A light tank with sufficient armor to survive against infantry weapons in close combat with the best active/passive armor system should be adequate for a modern battlefield. A hit from any MBT main gun would disable just about any MBT short of the newest generation and even the newest MBT's are adopting active/passive armor systems to survive against the newest ATGM's. In other words, if you get hit by a main gun round from a late model MBT or ATGM, even if you are an MBT of the latest generation, odds are you're dead. Armor sufficient to protect against less is adequate as long as you have increased speed and cross-country maneuverability through concealing vegetation to compensate.

When I conversed awhile back with some buddies in the 73rd with the 82nd and some other armor units plus what I have read. Tankers prefer to operate standing in the hatches, they always stressed visibility. Israeli tankers practice this constantly. Yes, it does lead to casualties, but they still insist on doing this. So it stands to reason they need some form of cupola.

There is some problem with raised silhouette, so I was thinking of a folding gunshield mount, the Israeli's use a folding mount for their deck MG's on their Merkava's, I propose a more complicated variant. With the MG laying in the folded position, the front and side plates lay flat. When you pull on the grips to position the MG, it rises up, bringing the gunshield plates up in position and locking in place.

Another item that should be looked into. ABN units would be stuck by circumstances with a light tank. The small size of the AFV would limit main gun ammo storage. Because a light tank would carry less main gun ammo, a 30mm or greater chain gun (Boeing now makes some pretty lightweight ASP-30 models) should be used to augment or replace the 7.62mm coaxial. This would permit the AFV to engage APC/IFV's or other intermediate targets without expending the limited main gun ammo, reserving it for harder targets like MBT's. This would be especially crucial considering ABN forces operate with such tenuous supply lines and expand the capability of the light tanks. Because of the conditions under which ABN would be deployed, you can't count on much else coming.

With weight a limiting factor in light tanks, would Chobham armor increase armor protection at equal or slight increase in weight? If so, why hasn't this route been tried? [Editor: it has, the Brits put chobham on the sides of their Warrior MICVs in the Gulf War. One was hit by a 120mm Challenger main gun round and suffered just a dent!] The Blackhorse vets I spoke to told me that NVA 12.7mm fire used to tear their Sheridans up. A tank so lightly armored that .50 cal fire can disable them is ridiculous. The Level III protection against 30mm APFSDS should be bare minimum. The light tank should also be fitted with more extensive sensors, spotting OPFOR beforehand in terrain would increase battlefield survivability.

One of the items of conversation I had with tankers was regarding autoloaders like the Soviets tanks use. They all were very skeptical of the concept. They didn't trust a mechanical device in a role so crucial and they preferred a 4-man crew to facilitate field maintenance/repair like fixing a thrown track and the extra pair of eyes for observing the terrain/security. Perhaps a compromise is in order. A stowable autoloader in 3 configurations:

1) Fully folded and disengaged to permit manual loader operation.
2) Semi-deployed to assist manual loader operation.
3) Fully deployed in auto function in the absence of a loader (such as an undercrewed vehicle).

Also, it seems that acquiring proper refitted BMD or BMP's would not be a problem. South Korea, Norway and Israel are the few I found that have adopted at least BMP-3's. Germany should have a few that they inherited with the re-absorption of East Germany. Israel is very good at refitting Soviet vehicles to western standards.

How do we get M8's in our inventory? Sell off some of our surplus M60's and 1st generation M1's to the Israeli's or Japan for example, and use the proceeds to buy M8's, or trade the same with Turkey for M8's since they have adopted and manufacture it. I think the AUSA could do it unilaterally without involving DOD or State Dept by claiming, 'in the interests of national security'...".

Our reply: The problem is HQDA DOESN'T WANT THE AIRBORNE TO HAVE LIGHT TANKS. IT THINKS WE ARE GOING TO TURN THE BATTLEFIELD INTO A GIANT VIDEO GAME WITH GADGETS SO WE CAN DESTROY TARGETS FROM A DISTANCE WITHOUT ANY MANEUVER. THERE IS NO CAVALRY BRANCH TO FIGHT FOR LIGHT TANKS!

That's the problem. Its not money.

The Army is run by a "heavy" tank destroyer mafia and they know they are dying. The U.S. Army as not had a Cavalry Branch since the end of WWII, go figure it out. There is no constituency within the Army for light tanks and APCs. The Army would rather spend a billions on road-bound LAV-III armored car death traps with a computer or a 20-ton "Future Combat System" armored car with robotic sensory gadgets to be anti-Cavalry than FIELD one tactically sound light tank for the Light/Airborne Divisions so they can force-an-entry and later on fire & maneuver. They NEVER want a light tank to be in a light division, ever again. Otherwise they will be able to win small wars single-handedly without heavy forces like we did in Panama.

The current 20-ton "FUTURE" Combat System is purely stalling tactics and maneuvering to REPLACE THEIR HEAVY M1 tanks in the future, NEVER to empower the Airborne, Light Infantry or form an effective Cavalry. They will conveniently make sure the 20-ton FCSs are unable to be airdropped ("embedded electronics are too sensitive") with the 82nd Airborne. If it EVER gets built in the first place, which I doubt. The LAV-III armored car will become the defacto "FCS" by applying the robotic gadgets to it, because after all, the Army says the platform is not important, its the capabilities of the new technologies (gadgets). If that is true, why are we buying new rubber-tired armored car PLATFORMS, then? Apply the gadgets to a physically-sound, robust M113 tracked AFV, which we have over 17,500 of and LET'S SEE if these wunder-toys are the future of warfare or not?

Do some checking around. We can applique' armor to the M113A3 and make it .50 cal HMG, 30mm autocannon and RPG resistant, why won't HQDA do this? They haven't even bought the applique' armor panels!

I'm being as blunt as possible, its egotistical assholism (Heavy or RMA force ego that comes before National Defense/freedom/efficiency) that is the problem by those that want to fight comfortable leisure-war-with-all-their-heavy-and-stand-off-war-toys.

HQDA has ALWAYS HAD THE MONEY TO BUY LIGHT TANKS, BUT IS TOO SELFISH AND CORRUPT TO BUY THEM. The costs to close the contract out on the M8 alone would have bought a DOZEN M8s and the Army already had bought 6 x pre-production models. Its HQDA Anti-Airborne prejudice that keeps the U.S. Army Airborne from having either a light tank or light M113A3 Gavin AFVs assigned to them.

A reader writes:

"Excellent work on the light tanks section. The large amount of responses are good, intelligent and to the point. From what I can gather, there is absolutely no interest from the higher-ups on a light tank. What I have found is that EVERYBODY else is adopting and/or developing light tanks. With the big surge in R&D, apparently high demand and heavy competition, I expect to see some very interesting vehicles becoming available.

Update on the XM8; Turkey has adopted and is now manufacturing their own. FMC is now courting both China's. Steyr-Daimler-Puch in also in the running offering their ASCOD Ulan light tank. The PRC will most likely go with the Russian 2S25. The XM8 looks the most likely with ROCA, the winner will be produced indigenous with planned 600 units.

General Dynamics is apparently working on a light tank project with a prototype they call a 'expeditionary tank'. Rumor has it GD is working with Hagglunds and Steyr-Daimler-Puch on this project.

The 2S25 is very impressive. Your site is the first notification I have had with it. Upon studying the side view, I opine that it is a BMD/BMP variant, though the stretched chassis is obvious with seven road wheels. The hull configuration shows it's heritage but with noticeable differences indicating the internal layout and armor is different. The engine is obviously in the rear by the forward location of the turret on the hull. Unfortunately, I can find no specifications on the vehicle. I can surmise that by being amphibious, by having such a 'high power-to-weight ratio' and high speed/maneuverability even in uneven terrain that the armor protection is on the low side. One source seems to confirm this by stating that the armor protection is proof against 30mm APDS frontally at 300m+ with sides at 7.62mm AP at all ranges. The vehicle's stated amphibious, airdrop, firepower and maneuverability are noteworthy. Why does it seem that everybody, including our foes, builds and/or adopts what WE need and we're not just last on the boat, we're not even getting on it.

Not only do we not have a light tank, the chances are increasing that our guys will be facing a light tank we should have.

I am sorry but not surprised at your mention of an 'Armor mafia'. When I was a leg, we used to grouse about the 'Airborne mafia'. But even then there was a great deal of awe and respect for Paratroopers. Apparently the decaying effects of our society has permeated our own ranks. The worst insult we offered between ourselves applies here, the Armor clique are behaving like risk-averse CIVILIANS.

Troopers never give up, it's time to get politicians involved. The most likely will be 'hawkish' representatives and the representatives from the states where a light tank and it's components would be built."

WILL OUR FAMILIES BE WIDOWED?

We need to get "busy" here in the U.S. and deploy a M8/M113A3 force NOW as an interim future combat system medium MBT to replace the 70-ton M1 Abrams series is developed. Infantry cannot follow behind the turbine engine wake of the Abrams to use it as a moving shield in urban combat, they can behind a diesel-engined M8 Buford light tank or M113A3 Gavin AFV. Some of those M113A3s could mount 106mm RRs and 120mm turreted mortars to act as light tanks/assault guns. Field Artillery Branch could put a gunshield on its towed howitzers and place designated M119 105mm howitzers so equipped on M548A3 tracked carriers to give light forces a "hip shoot" artillery capability. We have to DO SOMETHING, and QUICK before the next war erupts---or our "orphans" will become dead heroes. Living heroes are better.

---

SOME LIGHT TANKS AVAILABLE NOW OFF-THE-SHELF HQDA WILL FIND "UNACCEPTABLE" REGARDLESS FOR MYRIAD EXCUSES

M8 Buford Armored Gun System (AGS)

Overview:

An excellent article by Captain Francis J.H. Park in the July-August 2000 U.S. Army ARMOR magazine, except for it didn't mention how band-tracks would give M8 AGS high road speeds and low vibration levels, thus LAV-III-type armored cars offer no benefits to the Army, only drawbacks, and excessive costs financial and human.

The 17-ton M8 Buford AGS was designed to be C-130 transportable and parachute air-droppable. It was designed for use by Airborne and Light Infantry/Cavalry forces. It fires the entire suite of 105mm munitions, from anti-personnel (beehive), white phosphorous (good mark for airstrikes), high-explosive plastic to the M900 Armor Piercing Fin Stabilized Discarding Sabot Tracer Depleted Uranium (APFSDS-T-DU), which provides lethality equal to the M829 120mm round used in the 70-ton M1 Abrams heavy tank. Its main gun defeats bunkers, buildings, point targets and all variants of the BMP, BTR, BRDM, SPH, T72, and T80.

Status and Availability as of April 2002

Four AGS vehicles were reconditioned and fully prepared for deployment to Ft. Lewis in Summer 2000. Two of these four fully operational vehicles are located on the east coast in York, Pennsylvania and two are located on the west coast in San Jose, California. Two additional vehicles and a spares package including four complete sets of on vehicle equipment, Basic Issues Items (BII) and level II armor (and 3 sets of level III armor) are with the vehicles. This package is sufficient for immediate deployment and can be quickly supplemented for prolonged operation. Technical Manuals were developed and validated under the original AGS contract and are immediately available. A complete training package including training aids exists. Gunnery and maneuver training devices are still in the Army system for AGS.

These first four vehicles could be delivered within days of contract start date.

In short, the people, equipment, support package, and the ammunition are in place to expeditiously train, deploy and support immediate deployment of the existing M8 AGS assets. New M8 AGS production vehicles could be available within 9 months of contract award, assuming M35 cannon availability.

Armored Gun System: The Rapidly-Deployable Silent Killer

For many out there, who lay awake nights and dream of Super Lightweight Silent Killer Platforms, it is time to build a Full Platform Demonstrator. The M8 AGS can be immediately converted to Hybrid Electric Drive (HED), Band-Track for this purpose. The M8 AGS was paid for and the Army owns 6 of them. This approach would allow for the use an existing platform, which results in tremendous time and cost savings. The AGS has a Digital Data Bus, which can support the insertion of additional electrical components and embedded training programs. As such, PMCS processes can come over the VIS Communication system, so that tomorrow's Soldiers won't need to dig out the -10 manuals in the rain and mud.

Hybrid Electric Drive M113A3s, and Bradley's have been built and tested. Further, a TTD (Transformation Technology Demonstrator) based on a stretched M113A3 chassis (the Mobile Tactical Vehicle Light), Hybrid Electric Drive, and Band-Track was presented over a year ago at the AUSA Symposium in Fort Lauderdale. Many senior Army officers including the Chief of Staff have had a test ride in this vehicle and experienced its rapid acceleration, smooth ride, and stealth mode operations. Recently the Future Scout Cavalry System integrated demonstrated was also completed, further demonstrating that a hybrid electric tank is right at our fingertips.

The M8 AGS has a ramp door in the rear that lowers for the Engine/Transmission to be rolled out for easy maintenance. This area would allow easy conversion to Hybrid Electric Drive. With such a propulsion and power management system, Soldiers will have a Long Range, Extremely Fast, and Silent Killer.

 Long Range: a small, fuel efficient engine runs the Hybrid Electric Drive until Fuel Cells become available. The 150 gallon fuel capacity would take you a long way, especially considering the AGS's C-130 airdrop capability.

 Extremely Fast: no hesitation acceleration of Hybrid Electric Drive would make the small silhouette of the AGS very hard to acquire and hit.

 Silent Killer: a single AGS HED shooting M-900DU could engage multiple tanks in a matter of seconds as a Silent Killer, running on battery power in stealth mode.

The advanced armor package developed for the AGS is modular and would provide a functional full up system to test EM Armor, Active Protection and other future concepts. The Hybrid Electric Drive produces ample power for the integration of these and other sensor, communications, or weapon systems. The M8 AGS also has an advanced autoloader that fires a sustained 12 rounds a minute of 105mm Ammo out of a M35 Cannon, far superior to the WWII designed M68 Cannon. The Hybrid Electric Drive Tank has power to spare and digital management so that GEN II FLIR could be operated in silent watch. The tank version of the "Energizer Bunny" is here.

The M8 AGS HED could be delivered in short order. We should put this Silent Killer in the hands of American Soldiers to refine employment concepts as part of an all arms battle force.

A pool of both Active and retired Senior NCO's are qualified to train the M8 AGS.

---

THAT'S RIGHT! The damn thing the Army wanted to buy in the first place is now available off-the-shelf thanks to the more courageous Free Chinese and Turkish Armies!;...and 6 light tanks are already owned by the U.S. Army! GOD BLESS THEM!

NOW what is HQDA's excuse?

Specifications here

Its the airdrop, stupid

Much has been made of the bloated LAV-III/IAV at 19-24 tons being to heavy to AIRLAND by C-130s.

Airland is NOT airdrop.

There are two weight and range ratings for the C-130 (E and H Models) aircraft, a peacetime and a wartime rating. These aircraft are rated as being capable of transporting 50 000 lbs of cargo (extreme weight) on a 350 nautical mile (NM) flight in wartime. In peacetime, the extreme weight limit is 46,000 lbs. With no cargo the E model can fly a no-wind distance of 2,000 NM while the empty H model can fly a no-wind distance of 2, 400 NM.

There are, however, other restrictions. The load on the aircraft's ramp hinge is limited to 42,000 lbs which becomes the maximum weight for most combat vehicles. The C-130 can transport this weight of cargo for 1200 NM if it is taking off and landing from prepared airstrips having refueling capability (as in Panama) .

This was therefore established as the RO/RO combat weight of the AGS with level 2 armor, full crew, full ammo, 85% fuel, full BII, and shoring. The C-130 cannot land with this much weight at unprepared airfields nor can it fly this far if refueling is not available at destination. This is one of several reasons that the AGS was designed to be capable of Low-Velocity AirDrop (LVAD).

The type of airfield at destination is irrelevant if the C-130 is going to drop its load by parachute and return to a prepared air strip. The airdrop weight of the AGS is 36,600 lbs with level 1 armor, no crew, limited ammo, and fuel for 50 miles operation. The parachutes, type V air drop platform, rigging, crushable material, and other airdrop items brought the weight of the item being extracted from the aircraft to just under the 42,000 lbs limit. The C-130 airdropping an AGS therefore has a peacetime range of 600 NM radius.

It turns out that the weight of these airdrop items is less than the weight of fuel that a C-130 would need to land, taxi, off load, taxi, take off, and climb to cruising altitude. The crew, level 2 armor, extra ammunition, and extra fuel would be on another aircraft with other cargo. This could also be airdropped, or it could be airlanded at a forward air strip if it is light enough.

The maximum loads that the C-130 can transport in peacetime goes all the way down to 4.8 short tons for 100 NM radius for a Type I forward airstrip. The classification of forward airstrips is described in TM 5-330/ AFM86-3 Vol II. The maximum peacetime ranges for these airstrips is in AFR 76-2.

CV90

---

21.5'L x 10.2'W x 8.6'H, 42mph. (all figures approximate)
20-25 tons approximate.
Welded steel hull/turret. Supposedly Level III protection upgradeable with bolt-ons to higher.
Outperformed Warrior and Bradley in Norway Army field tests, notably in terrain manueverability and hill climbing. In use with Swedish and Norwegian Armies in a variety of different configurations.

Light tank version (CV90-105) with 105mm main gun.
Currently undergoing experimental fitting with the Swiss 120mm CTG (CV90-120), although reported chassis is damaged by recoil. (See Army Technology website for details).

IKV91

---

21.2'L x 9.9'W x 7.7'H, 40mph. (all figures approximate)
18 tons approximate.
Classified armor.
Currently in use with Swedish Army. Appears to be first generation CV90. Fully amphibious, noted for low-ground pressure. In present configuration mounted with 90mm low recoil main gun. Obviously lightly armored for such low weight. Production, 1975-1978. Export model offered with improved armor and 105mm main gun.

ASCOD (LT105)

---

20.5'L x 10.5'W x 9.2'H, 42mph. (all figures approximate)
30+ tons approximate.
Welded steel armor, with add-on, protection Level III.
Joint Spain/Austria venture. Currently in use with Spanish & Austrian Armies. Present configuration with 105mm main gun. Can be refitted with 120mm CTG.
(see Army Technology website for details).

TAM

---

22.3'L x 10.8'W x 7.9'H, 46mph. (all figures approximate)
Classified armor.
Joint Germany/Argentina venture. Currently in use with Argentine Army. Present configuration with 105mm main gun. Can be refitted with 120mm CTG. Good specifications/capability for early production light tank.

STINGRAY II

---

No information available yet.

Note: All appear to offer decreased IR & sound signatures and all are NBC rated. All are diesel.

Note trend towards steel armor for maximum protection. Even the bolt-on applique armor for M113A3 is steel, which is what the Israeli's also use for their M113's. When the W Germans fielded the first IFV, the Marder. They sacrificed amphibious capability by constructing it out of steel instead of the then current trend of aluminum (M59/M113). When asked about this the Germans replied that based on their experiences on the Russian Front in WWII, they felt that armor protection heavier than international norm for infantry was crucial and preferred the qualities of steel over aluminum. The low silhouette & heavy armament of the Marder forced the Russians to introduce a competitive IFV, the BMP.

In the Falklands, the British Scimitar/Scorpion light tanks went against Argentine Panhard-90' wheeled armored cars. In the difficult terrain of that island, the Panhards easily bogged down, while the tracked Scorpions scooted around with no problem. It is said that the Scorpion ground pressure is so light, it can run over a ballpoint pen on concrete without breaking it. This is another factor to consider.

BMP-3 100mm/30mm/MG light tank/IFV

Beats BFV and Warrior in the desert for mobility, can SWIM in the surf zone like a AAV. Airdroppable AND carries a squad of infantry.

---

2S25 125mm light tank

Same as above, except engine in rear and 125mm gun turret fitted.

---

Very capable vehicles are available, it's now just a matter of obtaining them.

A reader from overseas writes:

"Its funny that while the Russian Army moves away from its wheeled vehicles (the BTR series), learning lessons from the brutal combat in Chechnya, the U.S. Army is moving towards them.

Below is a picture of the MT-LB6MB, a dedicated APC variant of the MT-LB, acknowledged as the Soviet/Russian equivalent of the M113 APC, which your site gives well deserved praise to.

The MT-LB is usually referred to as a tracked multipurpose armored vehicle and has probably been used for more roles than any other vehicle in the Russian army inventory, including artillery prime mover, command vehicle, armored ambulance, transporter-erector-launcher for ATGMs and SAMs, armored recovery vehicle, combat engineer vehicle, repair vehicle, chemical/ radiological reconnaissance vehicle and battlefield surveillance radar platform. It has also been used as a self-propelled mortar (mountng the 82mm Vasilyek automatic mortar) and as a purely ad hoc air defense and fire support vehicle with the ZU-23 AA gun. Last, but not least, it has been used as an APC, and can carry 11 men. In Chechnya Russian BTR-80 equipped Motorized Rifle units have often exchanged their BTRs for MT-LBs and the recently the Russian Army has been so impressed with the performance of the MT-LB that the construction of a dedicated APC variant with improved armament and armor has gone ahead. Its impressive performance obviously comes (like the M113) from its excellent cross-country performance (due to its very low ground pressure, lower than the ground pressure of the M113 even) robustness, ease of maintenance etc.

Like the M113, the MT-LB is an 'old' vehicle, being introduced in the late 1960's I believe. In 1995 however the vehicle was modernized with a new engine and improved steering by Muromsk Diesel Locomotive Works. The vehicles (approximately 5000 in the CIS total) were stripped down then overhauled and at the same time the steering system was replaced by a new hydrodynamic steering mechanism, which improved the ride of the vehicle and also made it easier to handle.

I could not find a larger picture of the MT-LB6MB, I apologize, but this vehicle has had the single PKT 7.62x54R machine gun removed and replaced with a drop-in turret called the Modular Weapon Station, which is mounted on the roof near the rear of the vehicle. This turret was first seen on the new BTR-80A and is equipped with the 2A42 30mm autocannon first seen on the BMP-2, a PKTM coaxial machine gun, and six 81mm smoke grenade launchers. The turret also has a much improved day sight.

The MT-LB6MB has a 290hp engine (more powerful than the engine on the M113A3 even). Like the M113, in its original form the MT-LB weighs a little over 11 mt. The addition of the MWS and the strengthening of the armor probably has increases the weight of the MT-LB6MB by an extra mt or so (the BTR-80A weighs 14.6 tons compared to the 13.6 tons of the original BTR-80).

Russian infantry preferred to ride in a tracked MT-LB with a 7.62mm machine gun rather than a wheeled, supposedly better protected BTR-80 APC with a 14.5mm heavy machine gun. While the BTR-80 choked on the debris strewn streets of Grozny and rocky roads up in the mountains the tracked MT-LB didn't break a sweat. Now that the same superb tracked APC has been equipped with the firepower of an infantry fighting vehicle and has had its armor improved, its ridiculous that the U.S. Army is ignoring their own excellent M113A3 and instead going for the wheeled LAV-III deathtrap option.

While I was writing this email I thought I'd tell you about the latest Russian BMD development. The BMD-3M has been identified. The main difference between the BMD-3 and BMD-3M is that it is fitted with a new turret based on the BMP-3 design. The Russian airborne now has not only the 30mm autocannon at their disposal but the 100mm main gun of the BMP-3 for direct fire, shock action. I have also attached a picture.

Regards,

Dorian

P.S. There is also an MT-LB6MA version with the same features of the 6MB except instead of the MWS there is a BTR-80 style turret with the 14.5mm heavy machine gun, coaxial PKT machine gun, etc."

[Editor: Can you spell H-Q-D-A C-O-R-R-U-P-T-I-O-N?]

---

MORE FEEDBACK!!!

A noted Armor combat leader writes:

"Having been retired for 22 years, I'm somewhat out of touch with the details of current programs, though I'm aware of GEN Ski's desire to be able to insert a force of infantry and wheeled LAVs by air to be followed by heavier forces by sea. Actually, we did the former in Viet Nam in 1966 to put down the Buddhist Mutiny in the crack ARVN 1st Div. I was Sr Advisor to the ARVN Chief of Armor when Prime Minister Ky asked us to airlift a troop of M41 (76mm gun) light tanks to DaNang. We did this using three sorties by three C133s ("stretch C130s) each carrying two tanks fully combat loaded with crews mounted. They went into action immediately upon arrival and put an end to the foolishness.

I can't agree fully that we're reluctant to maneuver because of heavy casualties in 'Nam. We did a pretty good job in Panama, Haiti, and especially Desert Storm where we pretty much destroyed the Iraqi Army. I believe it was a tragic error to fail to Seize Bagdhad and depose Sadam, but that's water over the dam.

As to the M113 ACAV's ability to withstand multiple RPG hits, I would take that to be well established. We sustained multiple penetrations without catastrophic results unless the round hit the fuel tank or ignited on-board explosives. ARVN countered this by 'refusing' the fuel tank mounted on the left rear by presenting the right front to the enemy. We suffered an average of 0.8 personnel casualties per penetration on ACAVs often carrying a dozen or more people. Later, quite by accident, we discovered that a three- or four-inch layer of styrofoam on the wooden trim vane used for swimming completely stopped penetrations by igniting the RPG too far from the actual armor.

Based on all this, I would argue that a force of ACAVs backed by M41's would still suffice for anything short of World War III against China. I'm not sure whom we should contact to promote this concept since my impression is that the overwhelming majority of current flag officers got there by kissing ass rather than standing on any principle."

A veteran writes:

"Regarding light tanks - air-droppable. There was,in addition to the Ontos, another unarmored tank that mounted a 90mm gun, called the Scorpion used by the Army. Pooh, you say, I saw it at Ft. Sill in 60'.

Maybe its time to look at it again. There was no crew protection, they just sat exposed around the gun. It could be up gunned. I saw the Ontos also and would not liked to been on the receiving end of that six barreled critter. With regard to the ATV, I saw in Red Bluff, CA., a version of the one discussed, that had a tread set-up on the rear wheels that enabled it to go anywhere, especially snow. The treads mouned over the wheels and was easily installed. I drove it and once we used it on SAR mission in the winter of 89/90."

OUR REPLY (He is right)

Dear Sir,

You are correct! I have some better pics of the M56 Scorpion I am scanning now, one from the War museum in Seoul, Korea and at Fort Benning's Infantry and Fort Bragg's Airborne museums.

See the M56 here:

http://www.geocities.com/equipmentshop/airbornetanksnoexcuse.htm

If we had the will, we could easily cut down a M113A3 or a German Wiesel to create an assault gun like the M56. Or buy the M8 AGS like we said we would. The problem is hubris---Airborne with its light-itis hubris and HQDA with its jealousy of the Airborne becoming too capable and leaving nothing for the "legs" to do.

RETURN OF THE MIGHTY M551 SHERIDAN?

Another reader writes in:

"It has been with some great interest that I have researched the present lack of Armor issue, at your 'Web' site. The cancellation of the M8 system is inexplicable - other than it may have competed directly with some other Army project, the usual excuse. However I am unable to find out, what this other program might be. The M551 was an exceptionally good concept, in theory. And a reproduced version is a clear answer to your problem. Putting this vehicle back into production, with the known defects corrected, and with a microwave( and IR ) missile guidance system added to solve the 1000 to 1250 meter guidance problem. It is commonly stated that the missile, " drops below the line of sight", as old first generation 'Saggers' - However I do not think that this is the issue. The missile's own exhaust must be the issue- Rather, the exhaust interferes with the IR beacon. Also, the IR only system cannot be fired over a body of water. A 'millimeter wave'( x-band) command guidance beam system added to the Shillelagh will allow either type to be selected. The IR is preferable in the desert at long range as it is undetectable by the enemy and un-jamable.

The M551 re-production should include a spade which drops down below the hull, at the rear like a self-propelled gun, for firing the 152mm conventional round- for stationary rapid firing accuracy. A reduced charge 125mm subcaliber HEAT and HESH round should also be available- (w/sabbot)- for rapid firing on the move- In order to limit recoil forces on the vehicle. And of course, a power stabilized turret. The bottom armor must be greatly thickened, so amphibious mobility will require a 'screen', as the 'swimming Sherman' used at Normandy on 'D-Day'. That the M551 had many, reliability issues is not a question. It is precisely so, that re-producing this fine, and potentially excellent, platform -Makes economic sense, that we now know exactly what will require re-engineering, of this ALREADY designed system.

In this matter, one must consider the various approaches to 'light' tanks taken in the past. A 'light' tank design is particularly subject to changes in the balances between protection, mobility, Firepower.

The M551 design is an almost perfectly sized vehicle, with a SUPERIOR weapon to that of most tanks one would encounter. .

As the above picture from 'Desert Storm' illustrates, the modern tank, even as heavily constructed as the M1, is vulnerable to the standard tank gun.

Chobahm armor and severely sloped armor is designed to defeat HEAT ammunition- particularly, a severely sloped armor will, reportedly, completely defeat a missile round.

Since it is clear that the standard tank gun is effective at 2000 meter ranges, the initial concept of the Shillelagh is still valid- As the Soviets illustrate by their efforts at guided 125 mm tank rounds. Thus the 152 mm Shillelagh can be considered to possess several very strongly favorable characteristics:

1: The large missile round, as a HESH weapon, can destroy any well sloped target as HESH ammunition is not affected by the slope of the armor of the target.
2. A microwave (X-band) guidance can function to give precise guidance that will allow for a real 'top attack' weapon against targets 'en-defile'.

A 'micro-wave' command guidance option could also reflect off the very small target area of a tank turret 'en-defile' and precisely command the opening of control surfaces, 'pop-out' wings, which would direct the missile into a downward arc, thus striking the target from the top with over 8 pounds of high explosive. Such a HESH round would completely destroy any opposing enemy vehicle. The reflection of the "x-band", command guidence beam, from the target, system would act as a proximity sensor which deploys the "Pop-out" control surfaces at the correct distance from the target.

3. The 'gun-launched' Shillelagh has a much higher flight speed than a wire-guided missile. Thus the firing vehicle is not greatly exposed, as any missile armed 'tank-hunter' APC modification will be. The high flight speed also greatly increases the chance of a 'hit' on a target moving at speed, laterally, across the field of fire. Wire-guided missiles are very difficult to track such a target if the ground allows for 'cover', for the target tank to move into.

4. A 'subcaliber' 125mm, 'sabboted' HE infantry support round, for the M81 gun would similarly be superior to to the high velocity 120 mm rounds, as low velocity rounds have a much greater explosive content.

5. The 152mm full caliber round posses a destructive power similar to the 162mm 'demolition' gun on the now retired M60-based M728 Combat Engineering Vehicle.

6. There has been a great deal of discussion about compressed propellant, injected directly into the weapon's firing chamber. Although I don't have any precise knowledge of this process, if it works - The 125mm(subcaliber)/152mm rounds could be manufactured and stored with only partial propellant charge.

Thus, reducing the round's weight, and making adjustable charge firing possible- I.e. the compressed propellant can be selectively metered into the firing chamber. A mixture of solid and compressed propellant should solve the 'caseless ammunition' problem, as mixtures of solid-and-gas-propellants are the most efficient in terms of burn, and complete combustion.

7. A compressed propellant container could be installed below the turret 'bustle' in the back deck, in an armored container, thus reducing risk of ignition by bottom/mine attack.

A remanufacturing of the M551 should consider that the size of the hull is ideal. A re-manufactured vehicle should not have increased size. The M551 is ideally suited to air transport. It's small size gives this vehicle high mobility. The KEY point of air-assault is: One can take the high ground from the start. The M551's superior mobility, if delivered to positions above the enemy, would be extremely dangerous to the opposing force.

The M551 weighs in at 17 tons. A re-manufactured version could be designed at up to 24 tons, maximum. Improved bottom armor could consist of Chobham armor, over a steel bottom frame-replacing the original aluminum construction.. Chobham armor should give a very superior performance against mine attack.

The frontal armor could be increased, and the mantle of steel. Thin Chobham armor is not likely to improve resistance significantly. It's performance against ballistic attack is dependent upon various layers, which may not be possible in thin plate.

However, the frontal armor of a 20-to 24 ton re-manufactured M551 might be for 30 to 50 mm of steel armor, perhaps significantly more. The frontal armor should be modular, i.e. additional plates added or removed according to requirements of mobility at the drop zone. If the vehicles are used to support urban combat, much increased armor could be attached, as mobility in this context id less relevant, and the full 152mm ammo essential.Heavier frontal armor will support a 'reactive' armor system as protection against RPG, and possibly heavier ATGM systems.

The First, Second, and Fifth roadwheel stations should be changed from Torsion Bar suspension to hydro-pneumatic, both for greatly improved cross-county performance, and adjustability due to varied frontal armor components.

A 'reverse' driving system should be studied, similar to the Swedish 's-tank', for the same reasons. Possibly, the view from turret commander's copola optics -could be electronically presented on a 'head-up display' on the driver's windshield, and the commander give verbal aids/queues when the Sheridan needs to 'bug-out'. Reverse driving is a requirement in rugged terrain, as turning around is often not possible. The transmsission also needs to be suited to full power reverse maneuvering.

I suggest the engine must be uprated to at least 400 hp, for a 20 to 24 ton re-manufactured M551. A two unit, two stroke diesel might be a very acceptable solution. Two banks, separate engines, of 4 cylinders each, of which either one or both could be engaged. When idling, a 4 cylinder engine will put out less noise and IR signature, and maintenance on this very small and difficult to service vehicle, could be improved if either of the two engines could be simply hoisted out for service or replacement.

I am not suggesting that, as some Russian wheeled vehicles, that the engines be engaged separately to either track. Rather, they are both clutched to the standard drive train.

---

A further possibility is illustrated below: ( "Hawk" )?

The design was originally based on a GM prototype for a stabilized unmanned turret,

Stabilization:Yes

Armament: 1 x 120mm gun, MAG MG, M2HB, Mk-19 OR GAU-19/A (C)
Ammo: 34 x 120mm, 1,000 x 7.62mm NATO, 500 x .50 cal HMG, 200 x 40mm,
Fuel Type: D, G, AvG, A
Load: 700 kg
Veh Wt: 21,051 kg
Crew: 3
Night Vision: Passive IR, Rangefinder, Thermal Imaging

After many hours of research, I have just this day 'un-earthed' this illustration. The lack of a full turret allows the positioning of the gun fully toward the rear of the chassis, and subsequently, a well sloped mantle. It you have any further information, please reply on this matter."

Airborne!

A Cavalry Vet writes:

"I have been reading the 1st Tactical Studies Group (Airborne) for a year. What you say about the appreciation the Russians have for airborne warfare is true if a tad understated.

I will say this for the record, I like wheeled armored vehicles and as for your comment 'The U.S. Army doesn't need any more armored cars that limp home at 5 mph'. I would rather limp home at 5 mph than be stuck in a 'kill zone' with a broken track. On the other hand the Initial Brigade Combat Teams are the second biggest joke passed on by Slick Willie Clinton and his goons.

The reality of the 'Bold Brigades' is in a document that I down found in the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment's web site discussing the proposed LAV organization of the Regiment. It was from something called the Advanced Warfighting Working Group (AWWG) 'Proposed LAV Organization 2nd ACR Medium' This was a study for equipping the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment with the Light Armored Vehicle. There was one phrase in there that worried me then and worries me now since I feel that it is critical to the whole philosophy of Initial Brigade Combat Teams.

I remember, one of the great lines that I have seen in the various articles about the Initial Brigade Combat Teams is a 'Robust Reconnaissance Surveillance and Target Acquisition Squadron to Enhance Situational Understanding' I have spent a good deal of my military career in Reconnaissance units. Oh, what the hell I am a Cavalryman and I love it. I know what cavalry units are supposed to do and I know when I smell a rat.

In a section called 'Traditional Employment: (Theater Reconnaissance)' was this section 'The proposed ACR is not designed to "fight" like a traditional ACR due to its enhanced 'situational awareness' and lack of armored protection, but will direct other "killing" systems and employ standoff precision fires.' and then there was the section 'The employment of this type of organization also enable the commander to simultaneously attack targets throughout the depth of enemy territory thereby giving him a mounted "Deep Strike" capability.'

What the hell is this?

From my reading, the concept is the make the a regimental sized scout platoon out of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment. I served in my share of scout platoons and we were always prepared to fight-for-information. There is one constant in warfare that must be accept before everything else; before you win the battle on the battlefield you must win the reconnaissance battle. This is true today as it was at Gettysburgh or Waterloo. I don't think that either the Proposed LAV Organization for the 2nd ACR Medium or the Initial Brigade Combat Teams are being prepared for a serious fight. I think that is a mistake and someone will have to pay the butcher's bill for it.

If there is one thing that I have noticed in reading the 1st Tactical Studies Group (Airborne) you have some very good ideas but you are too conservative by far, in the 1970s I remember discussions about airborne armored brigades and even an airborne armored division and it was built around M113 variants and the M551 Sheriden Armored Reconnaissance/Airborne Assault Vehicle, with the infamous 152mm gun launcher.

The concept of airborne armored cavalry squadrons, airborne armored cavalry regiment airborne armored brigades and even an airborne armored division has a lot of potential to this day. In fact the potential is greater than in the 1970s because the M8 Armored Gun System is a much better antitank weapon than the M551 Sheriden Armored Reconnaissance/Airborne Assault Vehicle, with the infamous 152mm gun launcher system. It can even fight from a hull-down position which the M551 Sheriden could not because the ground wuld interfere with the control signals for the Shillelagh missile.

You have been going on about the Air-Mech Strike warfare concept constantly. Now I will really rain on everybody's parade, while you have been talking about Air-Mech Strike warfare, the Russian's have been building it. While the Clinton administration and their court jester General Shinseki gutted the M8 AGS light tank and gave us the 'Bold Brigades' the Russian have been developing a nasty little surprise for everybody, it is my opinion that they looked at the Air-Mech Strike warfare concept and said 'Hey this is just what we need!'

Before anyone discounts this idea, I served with 1st Air Cavalry in Viet Nam in 1965 and 1966. In 1982, I met a Soviet Tank Colonel in Philadelphia and we started talking about war and when I mentioned that I had served with the 'Cav' he just happened to spend an hour talking to me and he was intensely interested in my view of Air Cavalry's potential against a greater force equipped with Soviet-type weapons. I will never forget what he said 'What would an Air Cavalry type division equipped with Soviet equipment be able to do against a much larger force also equipped with Soviet-type equipment and fighting on a broad front?' My comment was 'Where in Siberia?' He just smiled at me and said 'Well this is just a hypothetical exercise after all.'

While 'Dorian' picture of the BMD-3M with the 100mm Gun was very interesting, there is a much nastier surprise on page 879 of the Jane's Armour And Artillery 1999-2000 edition it seems that the Volgograd Tractor Plant Joint Stock Company is developing something referred by Christopher F. Foss the editor of Jane's Armour And Artillery as the 2S25 Self-propelled Antitank Gun. Frankly, I think that the Russians are developing an Amphibious Airborne Main Battle Tank for their Air Assault Divisions.

The 2S25 Self-propelled Antitank Gun is armed with the 125 mm 2A75 smoothbore gun like the T-72, T-80 and T-90 Main Battle Tanks.

My theory is this, the Russian have a threat and they have looked at the 'Air-Mech-Strike' concept and they are going to take it and run away with it because they have even more enemies than we do, just look at a map.

It is my prediction that the Russian Air Assault Divisions are going to become more like the current heavy motor rifle division but with Airborne capable weapons systems. I really don't think that Tom Clancy was far off in 'The Dragon and The Bear'. The Russian Air Assault Divisions are going to adopt the 'Air-Mech-Strike' concept and be the strategic reserve and power-projection force particularly in the East.

The U.S. had better get with the concept and build on what we have all ready and expand it. We have a tradition of cavalry operations that puts the rest of the world to shame. Build on it! A combined force of Air and Armored cavalry is a force multiplier

Finally there is one last dirty little secret about the proposed Airborne Armored force which will shock everyone. It is more tactically flexible that the current M1A1 and M1A2 Abrams Main Battle Tank force. The Airborne Armored force can fight very effectively in the third world without the massive engineering support M1A1 and M1A2 Abrams Main Battle Tank force.

XXX

A former Cavalryman

Dear Cav Combat Vet,

I love what you say, and agree except for your beginning. I will lose my LAV-III air-filled rubber tires LONG before I lose my M113A3 or M8 AGS tracks. You will not be "limping home" after your tires are shredded. In an 8x8 rubber tired armored car you have 8 weak points of failure versus 2 STRONG points in tracks. Quality beats quantity. Today, if you don't like steel tracks with rubber pads, there are kevlar-reinforced rubber "band tracks". Do you want to be in an armored car with 40 PSI that can't leave the road or a light tracked AFV with a PSI of 8 that can go cross-country at will?

The key points that you make are the sad truth: our senior Army leaders have bought off into the Alvin/Heidi Toffler's "Third Wave" world view of a digital battlefield, where PHYSICAL mechanical advantage via tracks is passe' as "2d wave", "industrial age". They are full of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) hubris, they think that with sensors they will never have to maneuver or verify ground truth with men on the ground, just BOMBARD & OCCUPY. An Army green version of the AF's bombard & occupy mentality with computers in armored cars.

In the book, "Air-Mech-Strike: 3-Dimensional Phalanx, full-spectrum maneuver warfare to dominate the 21st Century" the authors acknowledge that the Russians were the FIRST to have Air-Mech and they have a LOT of it now. You are right.

Airborne!

The Staff

PUT LIGHT TANKS UNDER THE CONTROL OF INFANTRY BRANCH

An Army Armor officer who fought using M551 Sheridan light tanks writes:

"I for one, am for turing over the M8 Armored Gun System platforms to the Infantry branch so they can better support their own brother grunts. If it works that USMC uses their own to fly CAS for their brother grunts on the ground, then the same reasoning for using Infantry to support Infantry (because they should know best how to support their brother "crunchies")?

Armor Officers and Soldiers in infantry orgs tend to be treated like red-headed-stepchildren.

I learned this first-hand in the 82nd ABD. They (the INF) in lighter orgs, with the exception of a few, has no clue how to support tanks. The 2/505 PIR responded to my request for fuel with 10 x 5 gal jerry cans of diesel! When I told the S4 my requirement, he laughed and told me that amount was more than his entire Bn used in a year. I guess I should have been more clear in my request and the S4 should have known the fuel requirements of the various vehicles in his TF.

Give the M8 AGS light tank to the Infantry I say.

Make their MOS as an ASI like the Bradley crews were '11Ms'.....perhaps they would be '11G' as in Gun System."

Hmmmmmmmmmm

His idea has merit because it puts the platform where its battlefield FUNCTION is best fulfilled.

By embedding M113A3s AND M8 AGS light tanks into the INFANTRY you:

1. insure they are brought to the battle (No more TF Rangers)
2. Force lightfighter logistics to sustain these vehicles (its not that bad)
3. Force the vehicles to be made self-reliant--band tracks, fuel drums etc.
4. Force light infantry to use light armor without losing their lightfighter skills
5. Doesn't threaten the heavy tank destroyer M1 crowd

M8 Buford AGS and Stingray Light Tank models!!!

An amazingly skilled model builder from Singapore just sent in these pictures of a 1/35 scale M8 Buford and Stingray light tanks he BUILT FROM SCRATCH. Wow. Too bad we didn't have in the U.S. Army just a fraction of his willpower and enthusiasm for light tanks, we wouldn't have over 500 dead and over 2,000 wounded some maimed for life in Iraq.

M8 Buford AGS Light Tank

---

Stingray Light Tank

AIR ASSAULT USING M113 GAVINS & M8 BUFORD ARMORED GUN SYSTEMS?

EXCLUSIVE TO THE 1ST TSG (A)! MEET THE CH-53E SkyCrane!

We spliced a very-hard-to-find 1/72 scale model kit MH-53E Sea Stallion's 3 engines, main and tail rotors to a 1/72 scale CH-54/S-64 SkyCrane to illustrate what we could do today to effect SeaBasing and Air-Mech-Strike. No model kit exists for a 17-ton M8 Buford AGS so we did the best we could and hooked up a 8-ton Scimitar light tank with a sizable turret to illustrate somewhat that the CH-53E SkyCrane could be the AMS delivery means for a M113 MTVL Gavin/M8 Buford/Tracer 3D maneuver force. Maybe the Singapore scale model maker could make us a 1/72 scale M8 Buford for us? Note that the CH-53E SkyCrane has Infared CounterMeasures (IRCM) and an in-flight refueling probe to extend its range indefinitely if tankers are available.

PHASE I: CH-53E engines/rotors + S-64/CH-54 SkyCrane body = 20-ton AMS V/TOL aircraft in a matter of months at very low costs...

Maximum power, minimum weight: CH-53E SkyCrane sheds 6 tons of CH-53E fuselage to become a 20-ton cargo lifter!

Note the powerful 3-engined CH-53E powertrain & 7-bladed rotor system

PHASE II: CH-53E SPEEDCRANE: Strategic Reach through Piasecki VTDP technology

These are pics of the CH-53E SkyCrane modified into a fast compound helicopter with wings and Piasecki Vectored Thrust Ducted Propeller (VTDP) units for forward thrust and counter-torque directional control. This "SpeedCrane" could do 200+ mph and have a 2,000+ mile range.

Using a rolling take-off we get a 25% increase in payload via transitional lift thanks to the wings and forward thrust units.

Meet the CH-53E SpeedCrane!

VTDP Compound Helicopter Details

Carrying a Light tank by Streamlined External Loading (SEL)

FOR MORE CH-53E SKYCRANE & SPEEDCRANE DETAILS: The Next Chinook?

Want Pvt Murphy in your pocket?

Return to U.S. Army Airborne Equipment Shop