"There just hadn't been enough money for long-range bombers, nuclear bombs, aircraft carriers, and bazookas too. Now, painfully, at the cost of blood, the United States found that while long-range bombers and aircraft carriers are absolutely vital to its security, it had not understood in 1945 the shape of future warfare."

T.R. Fehrenback, This Kind of War (1)

INTRODUCTION

The two largest Airborne forces in the world are in the United States and the [former] Soviet Union. While a modest amount of study has been done on each of these forces separately, there has been no comparative analysis of the two. With the proposed and potential reductions of forward deployed conventional forces, the U.S. has an increasing need for a viable strategic force with sufficient mobility and firepower to accomplish a more demanding global mission. A comparison of the U.S. and Soviet Airborne forces in light of these future needs, will help identify the basic concepts upon which future doctrine, material and force design can be built.

Because the Airborne forces in the U.S. military are such a small part of the overall force structure, they are often overlooked or lumped in with other units (such as the light infantry) when it comes to writing doctrine or redesigning the force. This thesis will attempt to provide some clearly defined and supportable concepts, unique to the Airborne forces, for use in the modernization of these forces.

BACKGROUND

"The United States is a global power with global interests. Threats to these interests arise from a variety of sources, include all levels of conflict and occur in all regions of the world."(2) The Army responds to these threats by having combat-ready forces forward deploy in critical regions and by possessing the capability to respond rapidly to regional contingencies anywhere in the world. (3) As General Carl E. Vuono, the Army's Chief of Staff, says, "The U.S. Army, like the nation's intercontinental nuclear force, is a strategic force. It has been irreplaceable in the past, and will be so in the challenging year ahead. For deterrence, ground forces--forward deployed or rapidly deployable--provide unique capabilities." (4)

U.S. Airborne forces provide the forced-entry component to the Army's strategic force projection capability. The ability to project a Brigade-size conventional force anywhere in the world in a matter of hours can be used as an instrument of national power in the support of U.S. national interests. The 82^nd Airborne Divisions deployment into Honduras in 1988 and into Panama in 1989 are two recent examples of the use of Airborne forces as a instrument of national power. (5)

The Soviet Union has also recognized the importance of Airborne forces. "Soviet planners today have concluded that Airborne force employment has become essential for the conduct of modern offensive operations, with or without the use of nuclear weapons." (6) They have devoted more than 60 years to the development of their Airborne forces with many of their early theories still relevant today. They have built on their pre-World War II theories, early exercises, numerous experiments and over 50 Airborne operations during World War II. (7) In the past 25 years they have conducted extensive scientific analysis and countless experiments which have resulted in significant force structure changes, equipment developments and evolving operational concepts. (8)

As a result of this long-term and continuing Soviet commitment to Airborne forces, the Soviets have markedly improved the firepower, mobility and survivability of these forces. The U.S. has not made the effort the Soviets have in the development and modernization of Airborne forces. U.S. Airborne forces are much the same as they were in World War II. They have failed to develop despite the significant increases in the threat to Airborne forces. This threat includes the worldwide proliferation of: nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; long-range ballistic missiles; precision guided munitions; sophisticated surveillance, reconnaissance and target acquisition systems; armored and mechanized forces; and modernized air defense systems.

With the impending conventional force reductions, mostly from forward deployed forces, the need for a viable strategic force is increasing. The requirement for this force to be rapidly deployable and capable of "forced entry" supports what the Soviets have already determined; that Airborne forces are essential for the conduct of modern offensive and defensive operations. The Secretary of Defense, Richard B. Cheney acknowledged this need when he said,

"The nation needs a highly flexible force that can be more creatively employed to deal with contingencies anywhere in the world. This force . . . must have an optimum mix of strategic deployability, lethality and tactical mobility." (9)

Maybe it's time to look to the Soviets and learn from their extensive developments in Airborne doctrine, equipment and force design.

[AMEN.]

The purpose of this thesis is to identify the concepts for the employment of the future Airborne forces, from which recommended changes

to the current doctrine, materiel and force design of the U.S. Airborne forces can be developed. The recommended changes are necessary for the modernization of these forces.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The objectives of this research are as follows:

1. To review the development of Airborne forces over the past 50 years in both the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

2. To determine how and why the Soviets have modernized their Airborne forces.

3. To compare and contrast the current Airborne doctrine, materiel and force design of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, with an emphasis on mobility, firepower and survivability.

4. To identify the Army's future strategic force requirements, the future threat to Airborne forces and the future missions likely to be assigned to the U.S. Airborne forces.

5. To provide recommendations for the modernization of U.S. Airborne forces.

ASSUMPTIONS

The assessments in this study are made in light of the following assumptions:

1. The U.S. military will continue to maintain Airborne forces in the active duty military and these forces will continue to be the significant component of the Army's strategic forces.

2. Modernization of the U.S. Airborne forces to include doctrine, materiel and force design will begin within the next five years.

3. The additional resources, to include research and development funds, required to modernize the Airborne forces will be made available.

4. The C-17 airlift aircraft will be fielded in sufficient numbers to be a factor in the future airlift and modernization of the Airborne forces.

5. Nuclear and chemical weapons, ballistic missiles and precision guided munitions will continue to be a threat to large concentrations of forces. And, the number of countries that possess these capabilities will continue to increase.

6. The number of U.S. forward deployed conventional forces will be reduced.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

Airborne Forces: U.S. Airborne forces specifically refer to the U.S. Army's conventional Airborne forces. These forces are normally part of the 82^nd Airborne Division but may include elements of the one of the three separate Airborne battalions located in Panama [1/509^th PIR now at Fort Polk, LA], [1/501^st PIR] Alaska and [173^rd Airborne Brigade] Italy. Although there are other types of Airborne units, such as Special Forces and Ranger, these units are not included in the term "Airborne forces" for the purpose of this paper. Likewise, the Soviet "Airborne forces" will only include their conventional Airborne units.

Levels of War: This thesis will use the FM 100-5, Operations, definitions of the three levels of war. Levels of war are the broad divisions of activity used in preparing for and conducting war. They are strategy, operational art and tactics.

(a) The strategic level of war refers to the employment of armed forces of a nation in order to secure the national policy objectives. It is the level of the objective that constitutes a

strategic mission and it is for this reason that a small force such as an Airborne unit can accomplish a strategic mission. The Soviets, according to FM 100-2-1, The Soviet Army, normally conduct strategic actions (operations) only at the national or theater level.

(b) Operational art, or the operational level or war, refers to the conduct of campaigns by large units, normally corps level and higher, to attain strategic objectives. Soviet operational warfare is conducted by fronts and armies. The recent resurrection of two additional levels of war by the Soviets, the operational-strategic and the operational-tactical, may prove confusing when comparing them to the U.S. levels of war. Generally discarded during the nuclear period of the 1960s, these two resurrected levels of war overlap with the higher and lower levels that make up their name. (10)

(C.) The tactical level of war encompasses specific techniques smaller units use to win battles and engagements. For the Soviets, tactics are also conducted by smaller units and are usually considered actions (operations) at Division level or lower.

Combat Power: In accordance with FM 100-5, Operations, combat power is the ability to fight. It measures the effect created by combining maneuver, firepower, protection and leadership in combat actions against an enemy in war. The sub-elements of combat power, to be used for comparison in this thesis, can be further defined as follows:

(a) Maneuver: Maneuver is the movement of forces in relations to the enemy to secure or retain positional advantage. It is the dynamic element of combat which is ultimately the means of achieving surprise, psychological shock, physical momentum and moral dominance necessary for smaller forces to defeat larger ones. A study conducted by the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization in 1984,

indicates that the use of maneuver alone was the most effective way to bring about the defeat of an enemy, five times more effective than firepower alone. (11)

(b) Firepower: Firepower is the destructive force essential to defeating the enemy's ability and will to fight. Additionally, firepower facilitates maneuver by suppressing the enemy's fires and disrupting the movement of his forces.

(c) Protection: Protection is the conservation of the fighting potential of a force. It consists of two components: to counter the enemy's firepower and to take care of the Soldiers' physical needs.

This thesis will only consider the first component of protection which includes all actions that are taken to counter the enemy's firepower and maneuver. The term "Survivability" will be used to represent this first component of protection.

Contingency Operations: Contingency operations, as defined in FM 100-5, are military actions requiring rapid deployment to perform military tasks in support of national policy. For this thesis, contingency operations also imply the use of active component forces, a deployment from a CONUS base, deployment into an area with no sustaining base and a short duration (less than 90 days) operational

Forced Entry: Forced entry is used to describe the ability of a force to project combat power and to physically occupy terrain not under friendly control regardless of the lack of, or availability of ports or airfields. Forced entry at the strategic level can be accomplished by Airborne assault and amphibious assault.

AirLand Battle -AirLand Battle future (ALS-F): The ALB-F concept is an evolution of our current AirLand Battle doctrine to meet our global requirements in the year 2004 and beyond. It will guide development of

our doctrine, equipment, organization, training and leader development. The focus is on how we will fight in 15 years. (13)

LIMITATIONS

No classified materials or OPLANS will be cited. The scope of the study will be further limited by time and financial constraints. Finally, the majority of information was obtained from primary and secondary sources available in the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College library, the Soviet Army Studies Office, the Combined Arms Combat Development Activity and the 82^nd Airborne Division.

For the purposes of this research, deployability will be studied in terms of airframe requirements using U.S. Air Force aircraft, primarily the C-141, C-5 and the C-17. No commercial aircraft will be considered in the movement of U.S. Airborne assets. The Soviets' Aeroflot aircraft will not be excluded from the deployability consideration of the Soviet forces. However, the Aeroflot pilots, who are all Military Transport Aviation reservists, will only be considered current in the necessary pilot skills required for assault landing operations.

DELIMITATIONS

1. The recommendations provided will not include computer assisted operational research and system analysis.

[Editor: Scratch that! When you read this here on the internet you get the full force of www research tools at your fingertips]

2. This research study will not include a detailed comparison of the Airborne forces of nations other than the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

[Editor: Too bad; The Germans with their Wiesel AFVs, now being used by the U.S. Army 75^th Ranger Regiment and the Israeli's use of our own M113 Gavins would add weight to Kazmierski's arguments--but noone is stopping, you--the reader to go to German-IDF links we provide here.]

3. This research study will not include a detailed study of the use of Airborne forces during World War II.

4. The cost of modernizing the Airborne forces will not be computed. However, some cost comparisons will be conducted.

[Editor: It would be ZERO if we re-assigned M113A3 Gavins!]

5. Leadership and the second component of protection (to take care of the Soldiers' physical needs), will not be considered when combat power is analyzed and compared. The complexity of quantifying and comparing these qualities exceeds the limits of this study.

SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY

The future of the Army's Airborne forces must be given some serious study. Unless the U.S. modernizes the Airborne forces, the future of the Army as a strategic force is in question and the ability of the National Command Authority to project power during a national crisis is in jeopardy. Because changes in equipment and force design take many years to complete, the urgency of this effort must not be underestimated. This study will provide recommendations for our future Airborne concepts, doctrine, equipment and force design. These recommendations will be based on a comparative analysis of the U.S. and Soviet Airborne forces and will consider the likely threat to future Airborne forces. The rationale for the Soviets's massive modernization of their Airborne forces will be the focus of much of the comparison. There is little doubt that the Airborne forces of the U.S. are currently a viable contingency force. However, unless something is done now to plan for their future, this unique strategic force may become obsolete.

METHODOLOGY

This research was conducted in an effort to provide worthwhile recommendations to both the Combined Arms Center and the Airborne Community for consideration in planning the future doctrine, material and force design of the U.S. Airborne forces. The investigation methodology will follow these procedures:

1. A brief look at the history and evolution of the U.S. and Soviet Airborne forces.

2. A review of the current missions, capabilities and limitations of the U.S. and Soviet Airborne forces.

3. A detailed look at the reason for the Soviet's extensive modernization of their Airborne forces over the past 20 years. A look at the rationale for the U.S.'s failure to direct similar attention to the U.S. Airborne forces.

4. A comparative analysis of the combat power (maneuver, firepower and survivability) of current U.S. and Soviet Airborne forces.

5. Identification of the future of U.S. Airborne force missions and future Third World threats. An analysis of how these future threats impact on the U.S. Airborne forces and other U.S. strategically deployable forces.

6. Recommendations for the modernization of the U.S. Airborne forces.

CONCLUSION

There is an increasing need for a deployable, versatile and lethal Airborne force in the future. However, unless a concerted effort is made now, to determine what that force must be capable of doing in the future, the modernization of the Airborne forces is likely to meander along as it has in the past. This thesis is an attempt to initiate that effort which will prevent the day when the U.S. Airborne forces cease to be a viable force.