Drop Zone Virtual museum WWII Paratrooper oral histories

In 1940, the War Department in Washington believed that all it took to make an Airborne force was to drop infantryman by parachutes. The Paratrooper would operate against key points in small groups but would remain a part of the standard infantry Division. (23) On August 16,

1940, a test platoon was designated and the first jump was made from a Douglas B-18 bomber. The success of the test program -led to the organization of the 1/501^st Parachute Infantry Battalion, commanded by Major William M. Miley. However, by the middle of 1941, the state of training of the 501^st was marginal, at best, mainly due to the lack of practice; there had only been one or two minor training exercises. As America approached World War II, the U.S. Army grew seven fold, to over one and a half million strong, yet there was still only one Airborne battalion. (24) It took Germany's Airborne success in Crete, in May 1941, to get the U.S. Airborne program into high gear.

By the end of 1941, the American Airborne force had expanded from one battalion to four, the 501^st, 502^nd, 503^rd, and 504^th. This expansion continued as each of the four battalions was turned into a regiment and by August 1942, the first two Airborne Divisions were formed, the 82^nd and the 101^st. Thus, in less than 14 months the American Airborne forces grew from one battalion to two Divisions. Each Division was initially organized with one parachute Regiment and two glider Regiments. Later, they would change to two parachute Regiments and one glider Regiment. Additional Airborne Divisions were soon added:

the 17th in late 1942, the 11^th in February 1943 and the 13th in 1944. (25) With the opening of the North African Front by the British and Americans, in November 1942, the 2^nd Battalion of the 503^rd Parachute Infantry Regiment would initiate the American Airborne contribution to the war. The battalion's mission was to seize the Tafaraoui and La Senia airfields in Algeria. However, there were many problems and the operation was considered only marginally successful.

Upon conclusion of the operations in North Africa (May 1943), preparations began for the invasion of Sicily (Operation Husky). Sicily was very important to the development of the American Airborne

employment. Inexperience in planning and mounting such a complex operation, as well as a lack of coordination among the services, contributed to the questionable results. (26)

[Editor's note: Disagree totally. Author is way off base here as far off as the transport pilots were! The Airborne continued because at Sicily it saved the day by stopping a German Panzer Division from reaching the beaches. The woes of the transport pilots and inter-service cooperation are secondary to the usefullness of the Airborne itself, and technical problems that are solvable.]

The complicated flight routes, untrained aircrews and high winds left the first wave of Paratroopers spread over 65 miles and 60 percent of the gliders lost in the sea. (27) The second wave, dropping the next day, fared little better. Friendly fire shot down 27 and damaged another 37 of the 144 transport aircraft (C-47s) carrying the men of the 504^th Regimental Combat Team. Because they had failed to prepare in peacetime, the American Paratroopers were required to develop the doctrine and test the tactics of Airborne operations while under enemy fire.

Despite the problems, the accomplishments of the Airborne forces in Sicily were acclaimed by many. [And not you Maj Kazmierski? Why do you castigate the operation?] German General Student said of the operation,

"It is my opinion that had it not been for the Allied Airborne forces blocking the Hermann Goering Division from reaching the beachhead, that Division would have driven the initial seaborne forces back into the sea." (28)

Sicily was the price the American Paratroopers would have to pay for the obstinacy of the American General Staff. They failed to accept the need for a viable Airborne force until the German successes of 1940 and 1941 provided unquestionable proof of their value. Then, with little preparation, they rushed the newly formed Airborne forces into battle. They were still thinking of the Airborne forces as infantryman in parachutes. As General Ridgway said,

"Deplorable as the loss of life which occurred, I believe that the lessons learned could have been driven home in no other way." (29)

Following the operation, General Eisenhower declared,

"that with proper training and larger troop formations there was no need for failure." (30)

From then on Airborne warfare was to be a highly organized joint affair, with large numbers of aircraft and troops, and with proper air support.

The American Airborne forces would be used again in Italy, this time as firemen. The costly lessons from Sicily were used by the Airborne forces as they reinforced General Mark Clark's invasion force at Salerno Bay, September 1943. The German 16^th Panzer had found a gap in the beachhead and was driving into the flank of the 36^th Infantry Division. The division began to collapse. General Clark was frantic and requested Airborne reinforcement. The shortage of shipping made reinforcement by sea impossible. Within 15 hours 1,300 Paratroopers from the 82^nd Airborne Division were on the ground within the beachhead. Another 600 were dropped over 25 miles behind the German lines to disrupt German communications. The next night the 505^th Regimental Combat Team was dropped into the beachhead and, after some touch and go fighting, the Germans were driven back. The Salerno beachhead was secured and the Paratroopers had won a reputation as an organization that could respond quickly and handle the toughest assignments. (31)

Meanwhile, in the Pacific, there were several Airborne operations of one kind or another. Most of these were battalion-size or smaller. Although a few somewhat larger operations were carried out, they were never on the scale of the huge divisional and corps operations which took place in Europe. In the Pacific, the U.S. could rarely muster either the men or the machines for large-scale Airborne operations and the emphasis was all on seaborne landings. Once the amphibious style of warfare was set, there was no changing it. So the Airborne arm [in the Pacific] remained very much a secondary weapon. (32)

Despite the reduced scale, the war in the Pacific did demonstrate a number of uses for Airborne troops. On 5 September 1943, the 503^rd Parachute Infantry Regiment dropped over 1,700 Parachutists into the Markam River Valley, New Guinea, in conjunction with an amphibious assault on the town of Lae. [MacArthur's "Triphibious warfare" in action"]The operation was very (22) successful. Ten months later, the 503^rd was used to reinforce the congested Kamiri airstrip on the New Guinea island of Noemfoor, recently secured by an amphibious assault. The regiment was then used to help clear the island, which took nearly six weeks of heavy fighting. The newly formed 11^th Airborne Division, after a year of waiting, was finally used in the invasion of the island of Luzon, 3 February 1945.

Unfortunately, the over-cautious use of the Airborne by the Eighth U.S. Army resulted in the Parachutists being met on the drop zone by the advanced guard of the ground troops conducting the link-up. (33) Later in February, a very successful company-size Airborne raid was conducted by elements of the 11^th Airborne Division. The surprise drop at the Los Banos internment camp resulted in the release of over 2,000 American prisoners. [Irony is that this includes 16 U.S. marines who surrendered to the Japanese; you NEVER HEAR AN ACKOWLEDGMENT or "THANK-YOU" from gyrenes on this, do you? Or when the 101^st Airborne saved the marines at Khe Sanh in Vietnam] from Two days later the 11^th Airborne Division conducted its final Airborne operation as part of the mop-up operations on the island of Luzon. An Airborne task force was dropped forward of the advancing Sixth Army to intercept the Japanese withdrawal. The operation was a success and the battle for Luzon was won.

While the 11^th Airborne Division was on Luzon, the 503^rd Parachute Regiment would conduct the most significant and successful Airborne operation of the war in the Pacific, the assault on Corregidor. A 6,000 man Japanese garrison had turned the island, with its 400 foot high cliffs, into a fortress. Yet, on 16 February 1945, in 15 to 20 knot winds, a single battalion of the 503^rd Parachute Infantry Regiment dropped on two very small (150 by 250 yard) drop zones completely surprising the Japanese. While the Japanese were well prepared to defend against an amphibious assault, they were not expecting an Airborne assault. By nightfall the 503^rd had control of the top of the island and cleared the way for the successful seaborne assault. Without the parachute assault, the amphibious landing would (23) have been enormously costly if not impossible. The astonishing results inevitably cause one to wonder why the same technique was not used to save thousands of American lives in the expensive amphibious island-hopping campaign against Japan from 1942 to 1945? (34) Corregidor, like the German Airborne assault of Fort Eban-Emael, proves that an expected attack in an unexpected manner can achieve remarkable results out of all proportion to the size of the attacking force. (35)

THE AMERICAN WORLD WAR II EXPERIENCE IN NORTHWEST EUROPE

After the surrender of Italy on 3 September 1943, the Airborne Divisions were pulled back to England for retraining and reinforcement in preparation for the invasion of Northwest Europe. The lessons of Sicily had been assessed and many of the problems worked out; the future of the Airborne was assured. However, unlike the German strategic use of Airborne forces to capture Crete, the American Airborne was orienting toward a tactical role. As stated in the 9 October 1943 War Training Circular Number 113, "Airborne troops should not be employed unless they can be supported by other ground or naval forces within approximately three days, or unless they can be withdrawn after the mission is accomplished." (36) Despite the doctrine, General Henry H. Arnold, Air Force Chief and General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, recommended to General Eisenhower that the Airborne be used in a much bolder, operational manner in support of the invasion of France. It is not surprising that General Eisenhower chose the more conservative use of Airborne forces. (37) In a personal letter from Eisenhower to Marshall dated 20 September 1943, he said, "...I do not believe in the Airborne Division."(38) Although, further in the letter, Eisenhower did indicate his support for the use of Airborne forces in smaller than Division-size operations.

[Editor: That places Ike in the same military incompetence camp as Hitler and Stalin]

For the invasion of France, Operation Overlord, there was only enough shipping to support a five Division amphibious assault. The three Airborne Divisions, the U.S. 82^nd Airborne Division, the U.S. 101^st Airborne Division and the British 6^th Airborne Division, were used to increase the initial assault strength to eight divisions. The Airborne plan was simple, to isolate the amphibious beaches by blocking German reinforcements of those beaches and by engaging enemy forces retreating from the beaches. At 0130 hours 6 June 1944, 822 x C-47s carrying 13,000 men began dropping the leading units of the two U.S. Airborne divisions into the Cotentin Peninsula near the towns of Carentan and Ste Mere-Eglise. Enemy anti-aircraft fire, fog and poor navigation broke up the tight formations and the units were spread all over the peninsula, a few even landing at Cherbourg 29 miles away. (An excellent account of the American airdrop in Normandy is available in S.L.A. Marshall's book, Night Drop.)

Yet, despite the scattered delivery, the actions by the 82^nd and the 101^st Airborne Divisions succeeded in all essential purposes. About 1,500 men were casualties of one type or another from the assault but many small groups of American parachutists (LGOPs ) began fighting isolated battles all over the area. The fact that the drop was so scattered confused the German defense and stopped all coherent German movement. At the same time as the American drop, on the east flank of the invasion, two Brigades of the British 6^th Airborne Division were dropped. Like the Americans, they were quite scattered but succeeded in securing the area inland from the beaches and sealing off the left flank of the invasion zone from the expected German counterattacks. The amphibious landings in the areas where the Airborne forces had been deployed took place without much opposition and the few German efforts to.counterattack the beach landings were disrupted by the Airborne forces. The amphibious forces quickly linked up with the

The plan for Operation Market Garden was first, to lay down an Airborne carpet of three Airborne divisions ahead of General Montgomery's Second Army (Operation Market). A single British Corps, spearheaded by an armored division, would then advance along a sixty-four mile corridor to Arnhem, over the seven major bridges secured by Paratroopers (Operation Garden). The Second Army was to follow, cutting off all the German forces in Western Holland and sweeping down into the heart of Germany, thus bringing the war to a close in 1944. (Cornelius Ryan provides an in-depth look at the operation in his book; A Bridge too Far.) The Airborne techniques used in the operation were good. Units and formations were dropped or landed with remarkable precision as

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