10 Commandments of the German Parachutist

2. Cultivate true comradeship, for by the aid of your comrades you will conquer or die.

3. Beware of talking. Be not curruptible. Men act while women chatter. Chatter may bring you to the grave.

4. Be calm and prudent, strong and resolute. Valor and enthusiasm of an offensive spirit will cause you to prevail in the attack.

5. The most precious thing in the presence of the foe is ammunition. He who shoots uselessly, merely to comfort himself, is a man of straw who merits not the title of Parachutist.

6. Never surrender. To you death or victory must be a point of honor.

7. You can triumph only if your weapons are good. See to it that you submit yourself to this law--first my weapon and then myself.

8. You must grasp the full purpose of every enterprise, so that if your leader be killed you can fulfil it.

9. Against an open foe fight with chivalry, but to a guerrilla extend no quarter.

10. Keep your eyes wide open. Tune yourself to the topmost pitch. Be nimble as a greyhound, as tough as leather, as hard as Krupp steel, and so you shall be the German warrior incarnate.

"Of course, General you know that after Crete we shall never do another Airborne operation. The parachute arm is one that relies entirely on surprise. That surprise factor has now exhausted itself...the day of the Paratroops is over".

Was Hitler right?

In seeking an answer, we must trace the early history of Airborne warfare, up to Hitler's abrupt statement, and ask ourselves whether or not subsequent Airborne operations confirmed or confounded his judgment. Finally, we may consider another question-Does Hitler's statement hold good today? Is the day of the Paratroops really over?

Early History
The history of Airborne warfare starts with a question. Benjamin Franklin, then U.S. ambassador In France, asked,

"Where is the Prince who can afford so to cover his country with troops for its defense, as that 10,000 men, descending from the clouds, might not, in many places, do an in infinite amount of mischief before a force could be brought to repel them?"

Franklin's inquiry, inspired by the sight of pioneer balloonists ascending and floating away downwind, remains relevant today, for its not always the case that land forces will be concentrated to counter perceived threats- along borders or coastlines or wherever- and this preoccupation will leave other areas-- usually the heartland- relatively lightly guarded. Any method of warfare that enables the attacking force to out-flank the main defense and to attack the opponent's vulnerable rear areas has obvious merits. However, It is interesting to note that, In foreseeing the potential of "vertical envelopment", Franklin was equally alive to "the dangers Inherent In such enterprises". His ominous qualifying phrase "before a force could be brought to repel them" recognized problems that all too often were to be overlooked by Airborne enthusiasts a century and a half later.

It was another American, Colonel Billy Mitchell, who first made plans to turn Franklin's idea into reality. In 1918, Mitchell, who was commander of the U.S. Army Air Corps in France, proposed a parachute operation, on to help break the deadlock of trench warfare The idea was to drop a force from the 1st U.S. Division behind the German Lines to attack Metz from the rear General Pershing, his commander-in-chief, vetoed the plan. It was a wild scheme, considering what little knowledge anyone at the time had about parachutes and cold assessment of the problems involved would lead one to conclude that Pershing was right - except for just one thing Billy Mitchell was a commander with vision and energy that sometimes made the wildest dreams come true. The world was to wait another 22 years to discover that, with the right equipment and training the idea was sound.

Between the wars, many nations tinkered with parachute or air- landed troops The earliest recorded "Airborne" missions involving uniformed regular troops took place In Iraq, in 1923 The Royal Air Force had been assigned responsibility for pacification of tribal areas and, in the main, discharged the duty by direct air power against dissidents. Sometimes, it was necessary for troops to intervene on the ground and, using Vickers Vernon bomber/ troop carriers, the massive distances were covered by air. The British Soldiers were landed on any convenient open space close to their objectives, and, when their search-and-destroy tasks were completed, they were flown out again In a sense, these were early airmobile operations They were economical and, In the short term, effective. But, in the longer term, the political consequences of such tactics could prove counterproductive. In 1931, Major General Preston Brown moved a field artillery battery by air transport from the Atlantic to the Paciftc side of the Panama Canal Zone. In the maneuvers at Fort du Pent, Delaware, an Air Corps Captain named George C. Kenney surprised the "enemy," the umpires and observers when he successfully airlanded an infantry detachment on a tactical mission. Meanwhile, at Kelly and Brook Fields, Texas, small-scale experiments In parachuting men and weapons were going on.

The first nation to form a real Paratroop unit was Italy. The initial collective drop was made at Cinisello Balsamo, near Milan, on 6 November 1927 from CA73 troop carriers of the Regia Aeronautica. The Italians used the "Salvator" static-line parachute and used no reserve, a policy decision that must have seemed mistaken to the unit's General Gutdoni as he fell to his death a year later, his Salvator streaming above him in the dreaded "Roman candle " In the late 1930s, the Italians raised complete parachute battalions, and these later expanded into the Folgore and Nembo Divsions, destined to fight with distinction but never to partake in full-scale Airborne operations.

Meanwhile, in the USSR, Marshal Tukhachevski and Commissar of Defense Voroshllov were Iaying the foundations for a massive Airborne force. Jump clubs were set up throughout the country to provide basic training for thousands of young men and women. Military Paratroops appeared first in the 1930 maneuvers when a daring team captured the "enemy" Corps commander. By 1935, practice jumps at regimental strength were possible but effectwe methods of heavy drop were coming into use. All this was demonstrated to foreign mllltary observers during the 1936 exercises.

See the early Russian Airborne in action in web page video clips here! AWESOME!

The United Kingdom's attaché' was Major General (later Field Marshal) Wavell. He was impressed by the demonstration and by the quality of the Paratroopers but expressed reservations as to the real tactical value of the drop. As a professional Soldier concerned with the realities of full-scale conflict between modern armies, Wavell's doubts were valid. How were these lightly armed, sparsely supplied Paratroops to hold out against a force brought to repel them, especially if that force contained tanks? Wavell had no way of foreseeing that a combination of political and military pressures could create conditions where such troops might, in many places, do an "infinite amount of mischief", conditions in which a force might never arrive to repel them The man with this foresight recently had achieved absolute power in National Socialist Germany and was busy creating armed forces capable of turning his expansionist dreams Into reality. This man was Hitler.

Fallschirmjager
In 1935, Hitler had abrogated the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty which had limited the size of Germany's Armed Forces and forbidden the manufacture of military aircraft, The Junkers 52 civil airliner had been in mass production for some years, tailored for easy conversion to military use. Thus, when In early 1936, the German General Staff ordered Major Immanns to set up a parachute school at Stendal, the essential troop-carrier aircraft were at hand. The Luftwaffe's possession of large numbers of these robust, tri-motor transports made possible the German achievements. In the realm of Airborne warfare, achievements that to this day remain, in many important respects, unique.

Hitler was a leader who rose to postwar through the organized terror of his SA "Stormtroopers", To be sure, he had a lot going for him besides terrorism, but these more positive factors did nothing to leasen the importance of brutality as the mainspring of Nazi power. The National Socialist party had more in common with the Mafia or Al Capone's gangsters than with normal political parties in civilized society. Hitler's special qualities as a politician an rested upon his understanding of the use or threat of violence, the double cross, lie, propaganda and polemics. When he turned his talents to high military command, he used the same tools. For 18 months, he was supremely successful, then, it all began to go bad.

Time had run out for the methods of the politico-military terrorist, and Hitler had none of the answers in a war of attrition against Russia, America and England. Long before 1939, Hitler wrote, "I shall never start a war without the certainty that a demoralizad enemy will succumb to the first stroke." For so long as he stuck to this formula, he was brilliant. The early growth of German Airborne forces was a haphazard affair. Initially, there was an Army regiment, a Luftwaffe contingent, an SS platoon and no policy. Later, the SA formed an Airborne battalion. Still, there was no clear POLICY, and service staffs were squabbling over control. It was not until June 1938 when Luftwaffe General Kurt Student was placed in overall command that the young German Airborne arm began to make military sense. Student insisted that all his Paratroops, the Fallschirmjager, be in the Luftwaffe although the Army continued to supply troops to be used in the air-landing role. He threw sabotage tasks overboard and concentrated on organizing and training his men along conventional lines-conventional. that is, insofar as the troops were formed into a division with light supporting arms and trained to fight as a team. The tactical employment Student had in mind was anything but conventional-it was to make landings in the enemy's rear, so concentrated in space and in time that objectives could be realized by the exploitation of the surprise factor and then held in sufficient strength to ward off counter-attacks, Like Wavell, Student had been an observer at the 1936 Soviet maneuvers. Unlike Wavell, he believed that Airborne troops with the right weapons could resist the force brought to repel them. [So do we, even more so Airborne troops can go on the OFFENSIVE, not sit/hold] According to one of his own subordinates, General Meindl, Student had "big ideas but not the faintest conception as to how they were to be carried out". The orthodox always view original and daring thinkers with suspicion, and often their reserve is justified, but Airborne operations are high- risk ventures, As such, they prosper best if daring and imagination combine so to stun the opposition that risks are minimized, The motto of Britain's Special Air Service Regiment "Who dares, wins'" More than a romantic slogan; for those who live dangerously, it is hard, practical advice.

Hitler was delighted by the Airborne arm and strengthened the means by which his, enemies could be made to succumb at the first stroke. It Improved his chances of forcing his enemies to capitulate under the threat of force, in the manner of a protection racketeer. Consider the implications of his words, hurled in mad fury at the Austrian chancellor on 12 February 1936:

"You don't seriously believe that you can stop me, or even delay me for half an hour, do you? After the Army, my SA and the Austrian Legion would move in, and nobody can stop their just revenge- not even I"

In his best guttersnipe manner, Hitler was telling the defenseless Austrian leader, either surrender quietly or face not just military defeat, but licensed butchery of the defeated.

Austria fell without fighting, so did Czechoslovakia. Had the Czechs fought, they would have experienced the first large-scale Airborne attack. [They did see a live-fire Airborne seizure] Student's embryo Airborne Division stood by to land near Freudenthal, Moravia, in the 1938 seizure of the Sudetenland and again to land around Prague when the remainder of that country was occupied. The second plan is interesting, partly because it involved a direct attack upon the seat of government and partly because 29 years later a similar operation actually took place. Poland would not yield to Germany's demands, and, on 1 September 1939, the series of bloodless victories gave way to the first of the violent conquests

Airborne troops were briefed for a number of operations in the Polish campaign, but the rapid advance of the armored divisions made them unnecessary. It was April 1940 when the Fallschirmjager made their debut-in the invasions of Denmark and Norway, This small campaign was of secondary importance to German strategy- all the more reason for rapid and economical victory. This was achieved by excellent Army, Navy and Air Force cooperation and by superb risk assessment on the part of the planning staff. The aim in both countries was to overwhelm resistance by bold initial strokes. By making defense appear hopeless, Danes and Norwegians were to be encouraged to accept the Invader.By quickly occupying the ports and airfields, British assistance was to be excluded. [Strategic isolation: a tactic that could be used in Korea] Just one parachute battalion was made available. It had orders to drop one company less a platoon to seize the Vordtngborg bridge linking Copenhagen with its ferry terminal, the remaining platoon at Alborg to capture two airflelds, a company at Sola Airfield, Stavanger: and the remainder of the unit on Fornebu Field, Oslo. At all the captured landing grounds, infantry subsequently were to be alrlanded, and, at the same time, the navy would bring more troops ashore through ports. In Denmark, there was virtually no resistance, and the attacks succeeded, in Norway, things went less smoothly Sola was stubbornly defended, but the Fallschirmjager were well-trained and ready for the problems encountered.

Fighter bombers provided close support while the Paratroops threw grenades through pillbox embrasures. The field was ready to receive Junkers within 20 minutes of the parachute assault. At Fornebu, thick cloud had forced the aircraft to turn back, and the Junkers loaded with infantry began landing in the face of direct fire. They suffered casualties. [WHY YOU AIRDROP!!! AIRDROP!!!!] Escorting fighter-bombers, running short of fuel landed and trained their guns on the defenders, chaos was somehow turned to victory. The operation continued, and the defenders gave up. Within hours, a German military band was leading troops into Oslo, all part of the disarming psychological tactics, all southern Norway was taken over quickly and at relatwely small cost, justifying the risks taken.

Farther north, the British landed troops and aircraft, and a protracted but isolated little campaign continued until the Unned Kingdom forces finally were ejected

The German decision to use the Fallschirmjager in Norway, nevertheless, may have been mistaken. Surprise can take many forms, and one of these is the employment of a new idea or method. The price that was paid for Airborne assistance in the Norwegian campaign was the exposure to the allies, and to nations still neutral, of the tactics of seizing airfields by small parachute assaults and then using these fields to accept large numbers of air-landed reinforcements. {WE ARE STILL DOING THIS STUPID TACTIC TODAY] As we shall soon see, this price was to be high.

Belgium and the Netherlands

The apogee of Hitler's military career was the campaign that began on 10 May 1940 and ended with the defeat of France and the ejection of British forces from the European mainland. Two neutral nations, Belgium and the Netherlands, also were conquered in the course of this "blitzkrieg" attack and it was in these countries that General Student's Airborne troops were committed. The thrust into Belgium was a vital part of the overall attack plan, while the main point of effort was developed farther south, through the Ardennes, a powerful subsidiary stroke was to be made across the Belgian border due west toward the Channel coast. The French and British, so the Germans hoped, would see this as the main threat and hasten to the Belglans' aid. [Once the allies took the "bait" of Begium, the Germans panzers ran wild in their rear areas and drove just short of the coast, nearly cutting off the entire AEF and annihilating them had it not been for the desperate sea evacuation at Dunkirk.]

But, to make this threat convincing, the Belgian frontier defenses had to be overcome swiftly, and this posed serious problems. The Albert Canal ran just west of the border, and the three bridges in the German attack sector were well-defended The whole area was dominated by artillery sited in the modern fortress of Eben Emael, built into the hlllside, constructed of concrete and steel and manned by 1,200 Soldiers The task of forcing the passage of the Albert Canal was entrusted to a 400-man strong glider force commanded by a young Captain. In utmost secrecy, the attack was planned and practiced. Then before dawn on 10 May, the 41 gliders cast off from their Junkers tug aircraft while still over Germany. Silently, the gliders continued on their course, over the narrow strip of Dutch territory and into Belgian air space. Dawn was just breaking as they touched down on or near their objectives. The Airborne troops had been allowed 5 minutes "surprise time." stretched by their captain to 10 minutes, ahead of the main invasion of the Netherlands' and Belgium's neutral borders. As usual Hitler had kept his intended victims negotiating till the last moment and then had fallen upon them without so much as a declaration of war. One of the three bridges was demolished by its defenders, but the other two were captured intact.

Meanwhile, nine gliders landed on the very top of Fort Eben Emael, the only area within miles that could not be raked with fire from the fort's guns. The landing zone was too small for a parachute assault, and gliders never before had been used to deliver troops. The Belgian defenders were taken completely by surprise. Further unpleasant surprises awaited them. The Germans' were armed with another novel weapon- "hollow-charge" explosives that could penetrate the roofs of gun emplacements hitherto believed impregnable. They blasted them all the way through, disabled the guns and neutralized the garrison. The small Airborne assault force unlocked the Belgian defenses on the Albert Canal and provided a free run for the panzers. The threat to the Channel ports could not be ignored, and French and British forces were moved north to meet, just as overall German strategy demanded. Political deception, surprise- both tactical and technical- and well-calculated risk-taking by bold and skillful troops combined to achieve a legendary victory.

While the 400 glider troops were fighting on the Albert Canal. General Student's main forces were flying toward the Netherlands. The overland invasion of this nation was entrusted to relatively light German forces under General von Kuechler, numerically weaker than the defenders, and this fact made the Airborne contribution vitally important and extremely hazardous. The Dutch defenses rested on three successive lines, a lightly fortified delaying position at or near the frontier, the main "Grebbe- Peel line" which made use of natural defensive barriers, and, finally, "Fortress Holland'"- Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Utrecht and The Hague-- protected by estuartes, rivers and areas of extensive flooding.

The Airborne plan for the Dutch operation remains, for this writer, the most interesting in the history of Airborne warfare. There were two divisions available, Student's own 7^th Airborne, and, subordinate to him, Graf von Sponeck's 22^nd Airlanding. Considering the weakness of the main German ground attack and the fact that no large-scale Airborne operation had been launched ever before, any commander of orthodox upbringing would have sought to minimize the risks by employing the Airborne in direct support of the ground attack where early linkup was likely [Like us gutless Americans do all the time even though we have the world's largest airlift fleet and could airdrop ANYTHING we needed] . This is precisely what General von Kuechler proposed. He planned to use his Airborne force to break the Grebbe-Peel line in the area of Soesterberg. But Student's unorthodox mind saw an altogether different way of minimizing the risks...

Use the Airborne to crack open "Fortress Holland", he argued, and aim part of the force directly at the nerve centers of government, and the entire Dutch defense system will crumble. What is more, the national WILL to continue the fight will be shaken so by such an attack that the ground force advance across the frontier and through the Grebbe-Peel line will be made easy.

This revolutionary idea attracted opposition from the High Command, but Luftwaffe Chief of Staff Jeschonnek, nevertheless, put the proposal to Hitler at the next war-planning conference.

The Fuhrer was delighted. Here was a military plan that reflected exactly his politico-military theories, it was the tactics of the terrorist raid played out on a vast scale. He gave the go-ahead.

The operation fell into two parts, in the north, Von Sponeck's division was to seize the airfields at Valkenburg, Ockenburg and Ypenburg by parachute assault, then airland two Infantry regiments which were to enter the Dutch capital, seize the royal family, government and High Command in the hope of ending organized resistance or, at any rate disrupting defense plans South of Rotterdam, Student's division was to land by parachute at battalion or company strength to seize crossings over the major water obstacles that protected Fortress Holland's southern flank Simultaneously, an infantry regiment would airland at Waalhaven near Rotterdam to provide a reserve. Theirs were the tasks of holding open a secure route into Rotterdam for Von Kuechler's panzers, blocking any French relief force coming up from the south and preventing movement of Dutch reserves.

Although the Dutch clung desperately to neutrality, they also were determined to defend themselves in the event that neutrality was overturned. Thus, wherever the Fallschirmjager landed, they met stiff resistance. In the south, Student's 7th Airborne Division captured all but one of its bridge objectives by surprise and shock action. The landings at Waalhaven were costly but ultimately successful, and the airlanded troops moved off to capture the bridge still in Dutch hands and to help defend the narrow corridor against counterattacks. In Rotterdam, Paratroops landed in a football stadium, the nearest open space to the New Meuse bridge, then hijacked a tram which moved them to their objective. [!!!!!! Why didn't Brits use the ferry 4 years later to cross the Rhine???] Other troops were landed on the New Meuse in seaplanes and clambered up the bridge superstructure and cut the wires to the demolition charges. The fight was hard and costly, and, on several occasions, the outcome hung in the balance, But, when on the morning of D plus 2 the leading panzer division reached the Moerdlk bridges, the Airborne corridor lay intact before them. "Fortress Holland" had been cracked.

North of Rotterdam, Von Sponeck's 22^nd Division was having a tough time, He had just sufficient Paratroops to seize the three airfields, provided resistance was weak and the operations went like clockwork, only 15 minutes would elapse between the parachute drops and the first touchdowns by Junkers bringing in his predominantly Infantry force. Things started going wrong at the outset, The flat, patchwork landscape confused the German pilots who dropped many Paratroops wide of their objectives. [GPS solves this today] The Dutch indeed had learned something from the lessons of Norway, resistance was dogged, and mobile reserves including armored cars [Airborne can airdrop its own Armored Vehicles to counter this] moved down from the north to counter the landings. The result was that troop carriers containing men of the 47th Infantry Regiment landed at Valkenburg in the face of intense fire. Junker-52s sank to their axles in the soft mud and stuck; further waves could find no space to land and turned back. [WHY YOU AIRDROP!!!!!] At Ypenburg, 11 of 13 Junkers carrying the first assault company of the 65th Regiment were shot down In flames by anti-aircraft artillery, General von Sponeck was due to land here. Seeing the chaos below, he flew on to Ockenburg. But there the same grim picture unfolded- an airfield strewn with the wrecks of aircraft. [That's why you AIRDROP AWAY from the airfields and take them FIRST] Pilots put down wherever they could, on sand dunes, highways and small fields. The shock effect on the Dutch nervous system was considerable, and rumors spread like wildfire, the attackers had done damage, but not an infinite amount. The planned action inside The Hague never materialized, and the Division was forced onto the defensive, The price of unveiling the technique of airlanding directly onto airfields one month earlier in Norway had been paid.

Editor: Why are the Germans needing to AIRLAND? Because the Germans couldn't jump with full combat equipment! Refer to Fallschirmjager in picture at the top of this page. The worst parachutes used by a major power were those of the Germans which were based on the Italian "Salvatore" design. The German RZ (RUCKENPACKUNG ZWANGAUSLOSUNG or, rucksack packed to open) series of chutes (primarily the RZ-16 and the RZ-20) had a single strap between the back of the body harness and the chute. This resulted in a face down position which required knee and elbow pads and a forward roll upon landing. (Employment of this type of parachute is curious since German air crew used a chute that had lift webs attached to the shoulders like the British and American models.) This landing position led to many landing injuries. To allow for proper deployment, the Paratrooper had to leap forward in a straight body dive when Jumping. Control during the descent was almost impossible except for a superbly trained and agile trooper and even then little control was possible. The forward roll landing also kept the parachutist from carrying much equipment on his body. Except for pistols, grenades and the occasional submachine-gun, German Paratroopers had to rely on containers for their main combat equipment. The chute was attached to the harness with four clips which, like the American chute, were difficult to undo when under fire or when the trooper was being wind dragged. The Germans issued each Fallschirmjager with a gravity knife to cut the rigging in an emergency. The opening shock of this canopy first parachute was also very harsh but the chute would fully deploy in under 40 meters which meant a lower drop altitude and less time dangling helpless in the air. By the Crete invasion, the Germans deployed various colored parachute canopies for camouflage and to aid in the identification of commanders and/or containers. The main German Airborne aircraft, the venerable Tri-Motor Junkers JU-52 was one of the true greats. Designed in the late 1920's, a few were still in service in the 1980's. Known as "Auntie JU" the JU 52 was strongly built. It could carry 10,000 pounds of cargo, 13 Paratroopers or 18 regular troops. Its wide use belied the fact that it was outdated and too slow, top speed was only 180 miles per hour.

The fuselage and the side doors were too narrow to allow carriage and air dropping of heavy loads. Still, it was a good airplane and always popular with its crews. Because of the rather athletic forward landing roll necessitated by their parachute harness, the German Paratrooper could carry little more than a pistol and some grenades on his person. Therefore, many weapons containers, called Waffenhalter, had to be carried and dropped. A single 40 man plus platoon of Fallschirmjaeger needed no less than fourteen containers just for weapons and a basic ammunition supply. The containers were carried either under the Wings or in a bomb-bay. Each container could hold over 200 pounds of equipment and the maximum loaded weight was 260 pounds. It was five long and about 16 inches square. The container had a crash pad at one end and the parachute was connected at the other end. Some containers were equipped with a pair of small wheels and a tow bar that could be clipped onto the container after the drop. This allowed the container to be towed from the drop zone.

The number one priority of the troops upon landing was to find their containers. Colored bands or other markings were used to aid retrieval by the correct units and to indicate which items the container carried. These technoglitches are what destroyed the German Airborne in WWII; creating a dependancy on AIRFIELD SEIZURE to airland fully equipped infantry units (5 more men per JU-52). Make Paratroopers fully equipped by airdrop, make their parachutes streamlined on their backs so you can AIRDROP the same number as you can airland and then you can bypass airfields entirely as a bottleneck to project combat power. Its one thing to WANT airfields for follow-on forces, its another thing to NEED airfields because you can't get your force to the battlefield otherwise. There is a big differance here.]

The Grave of the Fallschirmjager, for WWII

The Fallschirmjäger marching song

"Rot scheint die Sonne" (Friedrich Schäfer)
Red shines the sun, get ready, who knows
whether it will smile for us tommorow?
The engines start, full throttle,
takeoff, on our way, today we meet the enemy.
Into the aircraft, into the aircraft !
Comrade, there is no going back.
In the distant west there are dark clouds,
come along, and don't lose heart, come along !
Thundering engines, alone with one's thoughts,
each one gives a quick thought to his loved ones at home,
then comrades, comes the signal to jump,
and we drift towards the enemy, light the beacon fire there.
Quickly we land, quickly we land.
Comrade, there is no going back.
In the distant west there are dark clouds,
come along men, don't lose heart, come along !

Our numbers are small, our blood is wild,
we fear neither the enemy nor death,
we know just one thing: with Germany in distress,
to fight, to win, to die the death.
To your rifles, to your rifles !
Comrade, there is no going back.
In the distant west there are dark clouds,
come along men, don't lose heart, come along !

The result was near disaster for the 7th Airborne Division. By the end of the first day, none of the four regiments had achieved Its objectives, and each was hanging on by its fingernails. Since no airfield had been captured, the follow-up infantry could not be flown in to tilt the balance [WHY YOU JUMP!!!!!!] The British, Australian and New Zealand defenders had foreseen the importance of these fields [Ultra secret] and defended them accordingly. At two out of the three airstrips, quick counter-attacks deprived the Germans of all hope of capturing them; at the third, in the west, the defenders dithered and did nothing, the Fallschirmjager were able to turn initial failure into ultimate victory because the "gods of war" provided two lucky breaks and because their leader, Student, recovering hts old brilliance, recognized these gifts and acted accordingly.

Although Student had planned to commit virtually all his Paratroops during the first day, the second wave that went in during the afternoon had got into such a muddle that two companies were left behind in Greece. These, together with trainees and any spare men that could be found at the mounting airfields, were mustered to provide Student with lucky break number one- a reserve force of Parachutists. [WHY EVERYONE MUST BE ABLE TO JUMP] At the westernmost lodgment, the assault brigade, although severely mauled in savage flghtlng, sensed the opportunity provided by the defenders. If the New Zealanders would not grasp the initlative, then perhaps the Germans could. This shrewd assessment tied in nicely with lucky break number two, for not only had the New Zealanders failed to counterattack, but, on one vital position overlooking the arrfleld, a battallon had been withdrawn--this tactical error- and it was indeed an error and not any lack of stamina on the troops' part- ensured the success of Student's bold decision to press his attack through the west.

Once the airfleld was captured and the Infantry division was able to land, the outcome of the battle was no longer In doubt.

With continued air supremacy, and now with military superiority, the Germans were not to be stopped by the dispersed defenders. Using primarily rifles and bayonets, Freyberg's men killed one out of every four Paratroopers who landed on the first day. Many more were wounded. General Student lamented that "Crete was the Grave of the German Paratroopers."

What went wrong?
Before the attack on Russia, Germany's victories had been accomplished at remarkably small cost; the losses in Crete came as a severe shock to Hitler, However, it is fair to assume that the German leader's conclusion that "the day of the Paratroops was over" rested on a stronger premise than shock. Hitler, better than any of his generals, had understood the opportunities for combining political intimtdation with bold military action to achieve rapid, cheap victories. He saw the Airborne arm as a valuable ingredient in this formula. But, now that the weak had been defeated, Germany faced a war of attrition in which terrorist tactics could no longer play a significant part. Although hoping for a rapid conquest of Russia, Hitler appreciated that this campaign would be a war of the big battalions In which the relatively vulnerable Airborne arm, lacking the advantage of total surprise, could accomplish ltttle except its own extinction. In this setting, his assessment probably was correct.

So far as the Fallschirmjager were concerned, Hitler's prophesy was self-fulfilling. A well-planned and carefully rehearsed scheme to capture Malta in 1942 by a combined German-Italian Airborne assault was rejected by the Fuhrer with the words "the affair will go wrong and will cost too many losses." The Mediterranean in 1942 was one of the last places where the Luftwaffe was to enjoy the degree of superiority that made a huge Airborne operation feasible. Thereafter, the Fallschirmjager were grounded effectively by allied air power as well as by Hitler's orders. They fought brilliantly as infantry, but that is another story.

Allied Airborne Operations
Although in his dismissal of Airborne warfare after Crete, Hitler was obviously referring to German operations, there is little doubt that he also disregarded Allied Airborne potential, There is ample evidence that subsequent events caused him to reverse his valuation of parachute troops, but, by that time, he was seeing them, as it were, from the receiving end. The Russians committed their 4th Airborne Corps between January and April 1942 in a desperate attempt to sever German lines of communication east of Smolensk and ease the pressure on Moscow units were dropped piecemeal, by night, to ambush convoys, attack base and supply trains and to join with or form partisan groups which would operate behind enemy lines indefinitely. They were to do "as much mischief as possible" until the "forces sent to repel them" eventually hunted them down. No plans existed for their relief or withdrawal; they were to fight until killed or, for the lucky few, until the tide of war eventually turned and the Soviet Army drove the Germans from the motherland. The sacrifice of the Soviet Airborne Corps tells us something of Russian philosophy for the employment of Airborne forces is that Soldiers who volunteer for a corps need not expect "a fair chance of survival". The Soviet Paratrooper expects only the toughest and most desperate assignments. He IS expendable.

Anglo-American Airborne Soldiers operated on a small scale in North Africa. In the Sicily invasion in 1943, they were employed in four separate Brigade-strength landlngs, all distinguished by numerous acts of gallantry amid general chaos. These adventures were not without tactical worth, but their real value lay in the lessons learned for the future.

The invasion of the European mainland in 1944 posed severe problems for the Allies. The first involved getting large numbers of troops ashore, the second was to overcome the German defenses along the beaches and immediately inland, and the third was to resist the inevitable counter-attacks by armored Division. The most critical periods would be the actual assault Iandings and the subsequent 48 hours during which the Germans might be able to obliterate the alllied lodgment. The way the allies used their Airborne troops to support the D-day landings was cautious and unoriginal. Planning staffs in Washington had advocated daring drops near Paris to divert German armor from the beachhead, fortunately, those closer to the scene had grasped the fact that, against an experienced, determined enemy, especially in terrain where he could use his tanks, the bold Airborne stroke could succeed only tn very special circumstances, and they had decided that France in June 1944 was certainly not one of these occasions. Instead, the one British and two U.S. Airborne divisons were used to diminish the risks attending the main landings. There were sufficient landing craft to put ashore the assault echelons of only five infantry Divisions. In the first wave delivering another three Divisions by AIR represented a 60- percent Increase in the strength of this force. By landing the Airborne at the two flanks of the invasion beaches immediately prior to the amphibious assaults, the defenders were confused and in some areas weakened. During the battle to hold and enlarge the beachhead, the Germans were denied opportunny to aim their counter-attacks at the allied flanks. The drops, carried out by night, were scattered Nevertheless, the Paratroops and gilder troops fought with great distinction to accomplish their tasks. Although the dispersal of men over a wide area caused problems for the Airborne units, it also served to confuse and, In many instances, paralyze the defenders. The Airborne contribution to Operation Overlord fully justified the allied decision to raise Airborne divisions and proved Hitler's prophesy false so far as his enemies were concerned. Critics may argue that the outcome of the next great allied Airborne endeavor contradicted the evidence of Normandy and indicated that Hitler had been right after all.[How? Its was XXX Armored corps that failed to reach the Airborne that held the bridges for 9 days!]

This was Operation Market-Garden, In which three Airborne divisions attempted to capture and hold open a 70 mile-long corridor across the Dutch water obstacles so that British armor might break through the German positions, outflank the Siegfried line and pose a threat to the heart of Germany.

Launched in mid- September 1944, the operation gained all but the last tactical objective- the Rhine bridge at Arnhem. But this, was supposed to be a breakout, and, just as the would be jaw breaker would regard failure on the last obstacle as fatal to his whole enterprise, so the defeat of the 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem was fatal (they had to withdraw when XXX Corps couldn't break through to them) to the strategic object of Operation Market-Garden.

www.youtube.com/watch?v=VSm5nBZ4X0A

Failure had many causes. The project lacked top-level support, and delay In obtaining such support wasted the precious and fleeting moment when the Germans, shattered by their defeat in France, had virtually no means of resisting. Fortune favored the Germans with part of an armored Corps camping just outside Arnhem at the time of the landings and the weather turning sour to hamper air operations after the first day. The British made mistakes which greatly magnified the advantages that the Germans gained from their good luck. The 1st Airborne Division landed 7 miles from its bridge objective and thereby surrendered the element of surprise. Arrangements for close air support were weak and failed utterly in the event. The employment of reserves was decided in advance, and the opportunity to recast the plan of battle In the light of the first day's fighting was thrown away. If gallantry alone could guarantee victory, we would have won the battle of Arnhem, but, unfortunately, many, harsher factors also are taken into account.

One result of the setback at Arnhem was a reluctance of allied commanders to risk another daring Airborne plan. In the last operation In the European war- the Rhine crossing-two Airborne divisions were put down only 2 or 3 miles behind German lines. This was a successful operation in the sense that all objectives were taken although, in terms of cost-effectiveness, it must be viewed with reserve. The condition that favored the Paratroops at the outbreak of war-a weak and unprepared adversary- recurred inside Germany as defeat on all fronts undermined the nation's will and ability to fight. Had it been our policy to extend the Anglo-Amerlcan sphere of influence in Europe farther east, the Airborne arm could have been invaluable.

The war against Japan demonstrated a number of uses for Airborne troops, notably General Orde Wingate's glider landings behind enemy lines in Burma, General Kenney's operations in the Markham Valley of Papua and the 503d U.S. Parachute Regiment's spirited assault onto Corregidor's island fortress. Perhaps the allies should have concentrated more Airborne effort in the Pacific. In Europe, Paratroops confronting a modern Army are inevitably vulnerable to "the forces sent to repel them" which usually means tanks and artillery. {Why we need to AIRDROP Airborne tanks/arty with us] In Jungle terrain, the opposition is likely to be limited to the same light equipment that Paratroops carry, thus brightening the Airborne's chances of victory. If the Objective is an island, then the defenders' means of retaliation are restricted to what can be spared from the garrison The flexible response of distant mobile reserves IS denied.

Postwar Opinion and Experience
In the aftermath of war, the victors glorify their deeds and tend not to ask themselves how, In Its early stages, the war was nearly lost. Thus, the Allied Airborne actions were lauded and magnified, often with insufficient critical analysis, while the German operations were neglected. The Airborne arm tended to be seen solely as a battlefield weapon. Almost no attention focused on its use as an instrument of coercion in conditions short of full-scale war. [Operation Golden Pheasant in 1988, and Haiti in 1994 are good examples of this] Gliders were abandoned by all the great powers during the 1950s. The French and the British used their Paratroops in various campaigns that punctuated their withdrawal from imperial commitments. In Korea, the U.S. Army undertook two brigade-sized operations, as helicopters became available, these were used increasingly for tactical missions. By the time of massive American involvement in Vietnam, it was clear that, for operations over relatively short distances, the helicopter provided a means of delivery superior to the parachute.

[Editor: DISAGREE VIOLENTLY. AirLanding aircraft results in a bottleneck and slow build up of combat power. Combat has proven that aircraft make excellent targets in open AZs/LZs! Read your own words about the German transports airlanding and getting creamed, above! Airlanding helicopters got barbecued by enemy RPGs, automatic weapons fire in the Landing Zone when the enemy chose to fight us. Or the VC/NVA would simply "melt" into the jungle as we slowly offloaded helicopters to secure the LZ, at the first sign of engine noise. Parachute mass tactical entry can put thousands of men on the ground in minutes one pass over the Drop Zone, catch the enemy by surprise and kill him BEFORE he can run away. U.S. failure in Vietnam was not using Parachute assaults like the French did, but to enable Airborne forces to have light Armored Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) delivered by parachute airdrop to dominate the fight, give shielded mobility and self-sufficiency once on the ground and then use helicopters to gunship CAS, MEDEVAC and extract the force after the battle was joined. But Americans today are lazy and want to "wing it" with light troops that end up getting shot to pieces at a foot slog rather than do precise staff and parachute rigging work to deliver a dominating, battle winning AFV-equipped maneuver force. We'd rather bomb the enemy from 15,000 feet and trash-talk from ships than field and deliver ground forces from the AIR that can decisively defeat the enemy. This isn't "Airborne warfare" its air STRIKE warfare, and it doesn't work. The Rhodesian Fire Forces were not, and got better results by COMBINING parachuting and helicoptering. The U.S. Airborne did this in Panama in 1989, but this was PRE-draw down.]

The Paratroops remained in business for Airborne action over long ranges since there is no way that helicopters can compete with fixed-wing troop carriers for range and payload. However, among NATO powers concerned only with defense, the utility of Paratroops now is questioned. In limited war, as the Turks demonstrated recently in Cyprus, Parachute troops still are useful, but what relevance have they in Western Europe? To find an answer, we must examine likely Soviet Airborne tactics.

The Warsaw Pact Threat
When in the summer of 1968 Soviet leaders decided they must return a liberalized Czechoslovakia to Communist orthodoxy, they employed the same mix of political intimidation, double cross, lies, propaganda and swift military action that once served Hitler so well. After negotiating a political settlement to lull their intended victims, the Russians secretly completed their invasion plans. During the evening of 20 August, the KGB (Committee of State Security) mounted a terrorist-style attack on the airport control tower at Ruzyne Airport, Prague Control of air space was assumed from a specially equipped Aeroflot airliner landed an hour earlier. Within minutes, the first of hundreds of Antonov troop carriers had landed Soviet Paratroops of the 2d Airborne Division secured the airport and surrounding areas. Light armored vehicles followed, and these motored into Prague to neutralize the Czech Government and ensure that the Warsaw Pact invasion over land frontiers would go unopposed. The close cooperation between KGB and Airborne troops is characteristic.

Soviet Paratroops are selected from politically reliable volunteers. Ideological indoctrination is more thorough than usual. The five Airborne divisions and the special service units-known as diversionary brigades-are under central and independent command and are destined for special and independent missions. In the planning of these ventures, the KGB will be a guiding hand.

Like the Americans, the Russians have concluded that, for battlefield air mobile actions, the helicopter is the best vehicle.

[Have they? Look at the BMD/fixed wing aviation force structure compared to helicopters. Where are the thousands of helicopters needed for an Air Assault capability? Russian helicopters are in disrepair. Author is incorrect here.]

Unlike the Americans, the Soviets reject the Air Cavalry or Air Assault Division concept and insist that all motor rifle battalions eventually should be capable of undertaking helicopter-borne tasks ahead of the mechanized advance. As an interim measure, one Battalion per Division is trained especially for the role This policy has freed the Airborne divisions from short and medium-range tactical commitments in support of Soviet aggression against NATO and provided the Russian leaders with a powerful force for strategic use.

The strategic uses to which the Russian Airborne might be committed are not disclosed to the writer for obvious reasons The four scenarios which follow are based upon a study of history, Russian political ambitions and up-to-date Soviet military sources The Prague operation typifies one use the swift subjugation of liberal, national or independent tendencies within the Russian Empire in a manner that avoids the display of brute force that harmed Soviet reputation in Hungary In 1956. As Russia consolidates its hold over client states in the Near East and Africa, and if the West remains evidently unwilling or unable to intervene whatever the provocation, such operations may be mounted further afield rather than allow client states to opt out of Soviet control.

A second use might be on the NATO flanks. Suppose a renewed conflict arose over Cyprus and that either Greece or Turkey felt itself at the same time, vulnerable to attack and betrayed by its allies. A minor sense of grievance could be worked up quickly by the KGB into an anti-NATO frenzy. In such circumstances, an offer of technical assistance by the Soviet Union might be accepted easily once the huge transports begin to land, who will complain about a few security guards? One Antonov An-22 can carry a battalion. 20 could land a complete Russian division inside one hour. At this stage, who will dare complain?

My third and fourth scenarios bring us nearer home. Consider a period of acute political tension in Europe involving Warsaw Pact mobilization and NATO reactions to achieve military preparedness. KGB agents strive to undermine morale, turn populations against governments that are "leading them towards war"! divide ally from ally and suborn all from "NATO allegiance" Soviet propaganda, stresses the inevitability that any conflict will involve massive nuclear attack on civilian populations. Fear undermines resolution, and, eventually one NATO member's nerve breaks and its government seeks an accommodation with MOSCOW. Such a settlement involves sacrifice. The Russians insist on guaranteeing the state's neutrality by a token security guard by the time anyone counts these guards, there are two Soviet Airborne Divisions in what was recently a NATO country. All at once, the political tension is relaxed, the Warsaw Pact armored divisions return to barracks and, a fort night later, a Communist government takes over in a West European state.

Would NATO ever recover?

Another question might not the population of that frightened nation actually have welcomed the first Soviet Paratroopers in their sky-blue berets as "liberators" from the horrors of nuclear war? Think about it before dismissing the idea as unrealistic.

Finally, consider war in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. By the fourth day, the Western, allies have lost sufficient territory, men and materiel that their leaders are contemplating resorting to nuclear weapons. The Soviets are confident they can overrun Europe and achieve their war aims using only conventional ordnance, vital for them that the war does not turn nuclear and devastate their homeland. What they need is a means of disrupting the NATO decision-making machinery and of convincing Western European public opinion that continued resistance is futile. This is how that need might be fulfilled. Four days of conventional alr attack have reduced NATO's air defenses sufficiently to permit massive Airborne operations to be launched against, shall we say, Brussels and Bonn. One Division is dropped on or near each city in the first wave, and more troops land on captured airfields. These events are supported by cleverly contrived propaganda in the form of disinformation exercises. Disinformation differs from normal propaganda in that the public is deceived by connived or counterfeit information so that they are, as it were, convinced by the evidence of their own eyes, little suspecting that this evidence has been planted. The KGB are the authors of such plots and do not lack the means of staging them. In one capital, left-wing extremists seize the radio and television stations and set out to convince the general public that the government has been overthrown by a popular "Peace Committee". In the other besieged city, newsmen are presented with what seems to be incontrovertible evidence that government leaders, accompanied by their families and wealth, are on the point of deserting their posts and flying to South America. So, the general public gets to hear of this apparent betrayal from the same reporters and newscasters they have grown to trust over the years. Police and military fight bravely to repel the Airborne invaders amid civilian reactions ranging from panic to apathy, loyalty to treachery. The Russians suffer severe casualties in the air and on the ground, in some sectors, whole invading units are wiped out, and the military situation is restored. In others, desperate battles, continue, and infiltrating Paratroopers link up with Soviet agents emerging after years underground. The terrible truth that dawns slowly on the NATO Soldiers is this, Even if they succeed in killing every single Russian Paratrooper, the battle still may have been lost, for them like the 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam, is NOT a struggle for real estate or for any visible military gain, it is a battle for a nation's guts. The mischief done is infinite. The close ties between the Soviet Airborne command and the KGB equip these Paratroopers to follow the early example of the Fallschirmjager. The Russian leaders, like Hitler, draw no hard lines between diplomacy and war. The rule that "politics is the art of the possible" applies worldwide. Through the threat or use of violence, an un-scrupulous nation expands the bounds of possibility. We should recognize the roles that Soviet Airborne forces can play in crisis situations and plan to counter them.

[BRAVO. AWESOME. 4th generation war described in the late 1970s. Our hat's off to you, sir. WOW. The Tet offensive is a perfect analogy. In modern war its the WILL OF THE POEOPLE THEMSELVES THAT IS THE TARGET.]

This leads us back to NATO'S attitude toward its own Airborne troops, at present dominated by largely irrelevant arguments concerning their value and survival chances in various tactical settings. In a European conflict, forget these, use helicopters.

{Editor: ok if you use AIRMECHSTRIKE.]

We need a multi-national NATO Airborne force, with troop-carriers, to react, in peacetime, to perceived threats if NATO is to survive, it must summon up the courage to challenge the USSR's imperialist actions outside Europe as well as along the frontiers of the alliance. The only reaction rapid enough is an Airborne reaction. [AMEN! Not a braggadocio-marine-corps-by-ships months-too-late, but an AIRBORNE force. Too bad we didn't have this force for Kosovo, huh?] The force must be expert in the technique of counter-landing which snuffs out a host, ie; airhead within hours of its inception. In the event of full-scale hostilities, such a force could provide NATO leaders with an option less final than the resort to nuclear war, either for restoring a situation similar to that imagined earlier or for unsettling the dubious loyalty of the Warsaw Pact. These would be missions from which few would return. Let us not deceive ourselves. Surviving World War Ill is going to be a rare experience among Soldiers in Europe. The only levels at which survival need influence planners are the hopes of national survival and world survival. The NATO Airborne force could contribute to these aspirations.

The "day of the Paratroops" is longer than we may have thought.

[DAMN RIGHT IT IS! AIRBORNE, SIR!]

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