As we faced France, Utah Beach-Joe Collins' VII Corps objective -lay to our right, or west. At 0405, in utter darkness, the men of Ray Barton's unblooded 4^th Division began climbing into the landing craft, the gallant Teddy Roosevelt in the lead. Because of our fear of big German coastal artillery, the landing craft were launched eleven and a half miles from the beach! In the vanguard was a wave of eight LCT's transporting thirty-two new "secret weapons" on which we were counting heavily. These were Sherman tanks equipped with flotation gear and a boat screw somewhat akin to our "duck" trucks. They were to be launched at sea and "swim" ashore, to provide our troops instant "artillery" on the beach. Later, additional DD's would be landed directly on the beach by LST's.*

DD Amphibious Sherman Medium Tank

As the landing craft embarked on the long, fearful trip to Utah Beach, air and naval forces commenced a softening up of the beach fortifications. Some 360 American medium bombers attacked Utah Beach, but the heavy overcast thwarted their aim. Official-Army historian Gordon A. Harrison reported accurately that "on the whole the bombing achieved little." The naval warships standing off Utah Beach opened fire at 0536 and for fifty minutes blasted the enemy fortifications with every gun that would reach. Rocket-equipped LCT's delivered 5,000 five-inch rockets onto the beaches just ahead of the leading boat wave. The naval bombardment at Utah was highly effective, naval historian Morison wrote. During the remainder of the day, warships continued to fire at targets of opportunity. The aged [battleship USS] Nevada even destroyed a group of German tanks.

The invasion force at Utah Beach was lucky in one respect. As the landing craft neared the shore, they fell in the lee of Cape Barfleur. Closer to shore, where the DD's were to be launched, the water was less rough. The DD's rolled off the LCT's and plopped into the water without foundering. One LCT struck a mine, blew up and sank with its four DD's, but the other twenty-eight DD's swam ashore without undue difficulty. Swarms of ducks carrying 105mm artillery also had the advantage of relatively calm water. Thus, the assault waves at Utah Beach were backed by both tanks and artillery.

Utah Beach was defended by one regiment of the German 709^th Division, a "static" (non-mobile) outfit composed of reservists and foreign volunteers, many of them anti-Communist Russians from the Republic of Georgia. American Paratroopers inland had cut their communication lines and they were unable to sound an alert. They effectively raked the landing craft that came into their field-of-fire, but quickly surrendered in close combat. By a lucky accident, the Navy put our infantry ashore on the wrong beach, beyond reach of the most telling enemy gun emplacements. Led by Teddy Roosevelt, the initial waves of infantry quickly readjusted to the mistake, overwhelmed the lackluster defenders and struck inland to link up with some Paratroopers who were holding key positions. By the end of the day, 23,000 men had landed at Utah Beach. The 4^th Division

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youtube.com/watch?v=4njAvCleiXM

The naval and air forces commenced softening up the beach at 0550. First came the terrific (and reassuring) salvos from the warships. This bombardment went on for a solid thirty-five minutes. During it, commencing at 0600, some 480 U.S. B-24 heavy bombers dropped 1,285 tons (2.5 million pounds) of bombs. Historian Morison judged that the naval bombardment, though brief, was highly effective, probably reducing enemy resistance by "half to three quarters."

USS Nevada firing off Utah beach

The aerial bombardment, as at Utah Beach, was completely ineffective. Owing in part to poor flying weather, the 2.5 million pounds of bombs fell inland of Omaha Beach, killing some French civilians and many cattle, but few Germans.

Omaha Beach was normally defended by a regiment of the static 716^th German Division, which was no better than the German regiment at Utah Beach. But, as I mentioned, the 716^th had been reinforced by elements of the crack mobile 352^nd Division, one regiment at the beach defenses, two regiments only a few miles away at Bayeux. The regiment of the static 716^th Division at Omaha Beach had actually been incorporated into the command structure of the 352^nd Division. Thus at Omaha Beach, we faced better than two regiments of German troops, many of them first-line.

The beach fortifications and terrain were formidable. There were three well-placed rows of underwater steel or concrete obstacles, most of them mined. At low tide-when we intended to land the assault forces-the beach itself was two hundred yards wide with no cover. Then came a low seawall. Beyond that were sand dunes and bluffs, slashed by five widely spaced draws which we intended to use as exit roads from the beach. All the draws were heavily covered by enemy gun emplacements, and the area between the seawall and cliffs and dunes was sown with thousands of mines. In addition, the Germans had cleverly concealed concrete gun emplacements in the bluffs so as to enfilade almost the entire length of the beach.

Omaha Beach, then, was truly an Atlantic Wall. Historian Morison wrote: "Altogether, the Germans had provided the best imitation of hell for an invading force that American troops had encountered anywhere. Even the Japanese defenses of Iwo Jima, Tarawa and Peleliu are not to be compared to these."

At 0630, the first waves of Gerow's V Corps infantry hit Omaha Beach, most in the wrong places. These were assault elements of the 116^th Regiment of Charles Gerhardt's 29^th Division and the 16^th Regiment of Huebner's Big Red One, plus specially-trained [foot-mobile] engineers to blow the underwater obstacles. All men instantly came under a hurricane of enemy machine-gun, mortar and artillery fire. Dozens died or fell wounded, many drowning in the sea. A majority of the demolition engineers became instant casualties, although a few managed to blow several paths through the underwater obstacles. There was no cover. The men lay in the sand or shallow water, unable to return fire, or crouched behind stranded landing craft. Most of the DD's were knocked out. There was no artillery. For several hours, the beach and the water just beyond was a bloody chaos.

We were fortunate in some respects. The Luftwaffe in Normandy had been utterly crushed or forced to retreat to distant bases. We had complete air supremacy. No German aircraft interfered in any significant way with our operations at Utah and Omaha beaches on . Nor did the German Navy. Some U- and E-boats were ordered to attack us, but these were deflected with ease. Nor were the V-1s or V-2s ready in time. None was fired against us. Rudder's Rangers-in one of the great heroic feats of the war scaled the Pointe du Hoe cliffs and found the six monstrous guns there were dummies-telephone poles! Later, Rudder's men located four of the six guns in a field behind the point and spiked them with grenades. Omaha Beach remained a bloodbath for too long. Six hours after the landings, we held only ten yards of beach. Not until the principal commanders got ashore did the men begin to move toward the cover of the seawall and bluffs. These gallant officers were Brigadier General Norman D. Cota, assistant division commander of the 29^th (a good friend and onetime member of my weapons section at Fort Benning); Colonel Charles D. W. Canham, commanding the 116^th Infantry; and Colonel George A. Taylor, commanding the 16^th Infantry. Cota was a fearless example to every man on the beach as he calmly strode about giving sensible orders. Taylor shouted to his men, "They're killing us here! Let's move inland and get killed!" Cota yelled, "Two kinds of people are staying on this beach, the dead and those who are going to die. Now let's get the hell out of here." Men who were able dashed for the seawall through murderous fire. Hundreds more Soldiers of the 18^th and 115^th Infantry came behind, disgorging from the landing craft. Everywhere courage and valor were commonplace. Slowly, almost imperceptibly, our foothold increased.

USN destroyers saved the day at Omaha Beach

Here I must give unstinting praise to the U.S. Navy. As on Sicily, the Navy saved our hides. Twelve destroyers moved in close to the beach, heedless of shallow water, mines, enemy fire and other obstacles, to give us close support. The main batteries of these gallant ships became our sole artillery. Huebner's chief of staff, Stanhope B. Mason, later wrote, "I am now firmly convinced that our supporting naval fire got us in; that without that gunfire we positively could not have crossed the beaches." When he got ashore that night to establish his V Corps command posts, Gee Gerow's first message to me was emotional: "Thank God for the U.S. Navy!"

The whole of D-Day was for me a time of grave personal anxiety and frustration. I was stuck on the Augusta. Our communications with the forces assaulting Omaha Beach were thin-to-nonexistent. From the few radio messages that we overheard and the firsthand reports of observers in small craft reconnoitering close to shore, I gained the impression that our forces had suffered an irreversible catastrophe, that there was little hope we could force the beach. Privately, I considered evacuating the beach-head and directing the follow-up troops to Utah Beach or the British beaches. Chet Hansen recorded that I later remarked to Monty, "Someday I'll tell General Eisenhower just how close it was those first few hours." I agonized over the withdrawal decision, praying that our men could hang on.

They did-barely. Then at 1:30 P.M. I received a heartening message from Gerow: "Troops formerly pinned down on beaches...advancing up heights behind beaches." I sent my chief of staff, Bill Kean, and Chet Hansen to the beach for a firsthand look. Their report was more optimistic than I dared hope for. The situation everywhere on the beach was still grave, but our troops had forced one or two of the draws and were inching inland. Based on their report, I gave up any thought of abandoning Omaha Beach.

By nightfall, the situation had swung in our favor. Personal heroism and the U.S. Navy had carried the day. We had by then landed close to 35,000 men and held a sliver of corpse-littered beach five miles long and about one and a half miles deep. To wrest that sliver from the enemy had cost us possibly 2,500 casualties. (No exact accounting has ever been arrived at.) There was now no thought of giving it back.

I had often agonized over assigning green troops to spearhead the Omaha Beach assault: Gerow and his V Corps headquarters, Gerhardt and his 29^th Division. That was why I had made the decision to add elements of Huebner's battle-hardened Big Red One. As in the Sicily assault, the Big Red One once more bore the brunt of the enemy's fury. But I thanked God the division was there.

In the British sector, owing to reefs and foul ground, Monty's Second Army under Miles Dempsey had to land on a flood tide an hour to an hour and a half after we landed. This gift of time enabled the warships of the Royal Navy to deliver Monty's beaches a two-hour daylight bombardment, nearly four times as long as the naval bombardment at Omaha. To this was added a massive attack by British heavy bombers. The combined sea and air attacks in the British sector were far more effective than those in the American sector.

Dempsey had three divisions to our two, and thus three landing beaches. These were, from west to east: Gold, Juno and Sword. Each of these three British landings was far less arduous and bloody than Omaha. The British sector was defended by men of the 716^th Division, composed of many Poles and Ukrainians. The British 50^th Division, landing its DD's on Gold Beach, quickly overran the lackluster defenses, pushed four miles inland, but failed to reach its objective, Bayeux. In the center, the Canadian 3^rd Division, at Juno Beach, lost eight DD's in rough seas, but the assault forces overran the defenses and also penetrated about four miles inland. Some Canadian armored patrols reached the vital Bayeux- /Caen road. At Sword, the British 3^rd Division lost twenty-eight of its forty DD's in pitching seas, but the remaining twelve knocked out German gun positions on the beach, enabling the division to overrun the enemy. The division also pushed four miles inland, linking up with the British 6^th Parachute Division along the Orne River, but it failed to take its objective, Caen. In sum, Dempsey landed 75,000 British and Canadian troops and 8,000 Paratroopers on. He suffered about 3,000 casualties, one-third of these Canadians.

Fortunately, German reaction to our invasion was confused, indecisive and obstructed by bureaucratic red tape. None of the top German commanders expected an invasion in such poor weather. In fact, Rommel had gone to his home in Germany to visit his wife on her birthday. Most of the German Seventh Army division commanders were at Rennes for war games. Of the senior German commanders, only von Rundstedt was at his command post.

When word of the widespread airborne assault reached von Rundstedt in the early hours, he realized at once that something out of the ordinary was afoot. Whether or not it was the real invasion or a Dieppe-like hit-and-run operation was immaterial to him. He perceived that so large-scale an airborne operation would require a substantial amphibious assault for link-up. He at once placed all German troops in Normandy on "highest alert." He correctly guessed that Caen was the logical target for the amphibious assault. He ordered Rommel's 21^st Panzer Division, near Caen, to move up and repulse any attackers.

At the same time, still in the early hours, he ordered two divisions of the 1^st SS Panzer Corps near Chartres to prepare to move toward Caen. These were the 12^th SS (sixty-five miles from Caen) and the Lehr Panzer Division (eighty-five miles from Caen). These two panzer divisions would give von Rundstedt a total of three to repel the invaders on the beaches. But bureaucratic indifference and stupidity thwarted him. Berlin Army headquarters refused von Rundstedt permission to commit these divisions without Hitler's direct approval. Hitler, away at his Bavarian mountain retreat, Berchtesgaden, had stayed up late the night before. No one dared wake him up. Von Rundstedt had full authority to call Hitler direct, but he declined to do so. Twelve crucial hours ticked by. Not until four o'clock on afternoon did von Rundstedt receive permission to bring up the other two panzer divisions. By that time the skies had cleared and Allied air was overhead in force, compelling the Germans to postpone movement of the divisions until nightfall, when Allied air was blind.

That left only the 21^st Panzer Division to deal with the British and Canadian forces advancing on Caen. In Rommel's absence, his chief of staff, Hans Speidel, directed its operations on . He assigned half its infantry to fight the British airborne troops on the east side of the Orne River, the other half to support the 116^th Division in beach defense. At noon, he ordered the division to regroup and cross the Orne to the west and position itself due north of Caen to attack the oncoming British and Canadians. Owing to the congestion in Caen and the lack of bridges, the division did not reach attack position until four o'clock in the afternoon. The attack-the only large-scale German counterattack on -was met by the British 3^rd Division and it failed. But the panzers dug in and denied the British Caen.

A bolder, faster thrust by the British 3^rd and the Canadian 3^rd Division would certainly have gained Caen and, with the help of the 6^th Parachute Division, might have led to encirclement and annihilation of the 21^st Panzer Division. Historian Liddell Hart blamed the missed opportunity on "the excessive caution of the commanders on the spot-at a time when there was hardly anything to stop them." [5]